Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65672
Registo completo
Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Sá, Luís | por |
dc.contributor.author | Siciliani, Luigi | por |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | por |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-18T13:49:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-07-01T06:00:36Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019-07-01 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-12 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Sá, L., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2019). Dynamic hospital competition under rationing by waiting times. Journal of health economics, 66, 260-282 | por |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6296 | por |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65672 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii) hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower waiting times, policies that promote patient choice will instead lead to higher waiting times. These results are robust to different game-theoretic solution concepts, designs of the hospital penalty structure, and patient utility specifications. Furthermore, waiting time penalties are likely to be more effective in reducing waiting times if they are designed with a linear penalty structure, but the counterproductive effect of patient choice policies is smaller when penalties are convex. These conclusions are partly derived by calibration of our model based on waiting times and elasticities observed in the English NHS for a common treatment (cataract surgery). (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | por |
dc.description.sponsorship | - We thank two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions. SS and Straume acknowledge funding from COMPETE (ref. no. POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006683), with the FCT/MEC's (Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia, I.P.) financial support through national funding and by the ERDF through the Operational Programme on Competitiveness and Internationalization - COMPETE 2020 under the PT2020 Partnership Agreement. SS thanks FCT/MEC for the PhD Studentship SERH/BD/129073/2017, financed through national funding and by the ESF. | por |
dc.language.iso | eng | por |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | por |
dc.rights | openAccess | por |
dc.subject | Hospital competition | por |
dc.subject | Waiting times | por |
dc.subject | Patient choice | por |
dc.subject | Differential games | por |
dc.title | Dynamic hospital competition under rationing by waiting times | por |
dc.type | article | - |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629618311421 | por |
oaire.citationStartPage | 260 | por |
oaire.citationEndPage | 282 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 66 | por |
dc.date.updated | 2020-06-18T12:58:35Z | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1879-1646 | por |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.06.005 | por |
dc.identifier.pmid | 31306867 | - |
dc.subject.fos | Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão | por |
dc.subject.wos | Social Sciences | - |
dc.subject.wos | Science & Technology | - |
sdum.export.identifier | 5589 | - |
sdum.journal | Journal of Health Economics | por |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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Dynamic Hospital Competition Under Rationing by Waiting Times (Revised Manuscript).pdf | 386,53 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |