Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/65647

TitleThe effects of electoral incentives on fiscal policy: evidence from a legislative change at the local government level
Author(s)Veiga, Linda Gonçalves
Veiga, Francisco José
KeywordsElectoral incentives
Term limits
Local governments
Legislative change
D72
H3
H7
K16
Issue date1-Jul-2019
PublisherOxford Univ Press Inc
JournalJournal of Law Economics & Organization
CitationVeiga, L. G., & Veiga, F. J. (2019). The effects of electoral incentives on fiscal policy: evidence from a legislative change at the local government level. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 35(2), 394-421
Abstract(s)This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited (TL) mayor, it experiences a fall in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck mayors, relative to reelection-eligible ones, to implement new investments and to obtain conditional grants from the central government, especially in election years. Although lame ducks are less opportunistic in general, the results suggest that opportunism may not decrease in municipalities whose TL mayors resign before the end of their terms and are replaced by their (eligible) vice-mayors.
TypeArticle
DescriptionAuthor's Accepted Manuscript
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/65647
DOI10.1093/jleo/ewy027
ISSN8756-6222
e-ISSN1465-7341
Publisher versionhttps://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/35/2/394/5296292
Peer-Reviewedyes
AccessEmbargoed access (2 Years)
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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