Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687
Título: | Political budget forecast cycles |
Autor(es): | Bohn, Frank Veiga, Francisco José |
Palavras-chave: | Opportunistic political cycles Political budget cycles Revenue forecasts Deficit Transfers Asymmetric information Political economy |
Data: | 2019 |
Editora: | Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
Resumo(s): | By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up. |
Tipo: | Documento de trabalho |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687 |
Versão da editora: | https://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspx |
Acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIPE - Documentos de Trabalho |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
NIPE_WP_12_2019.pdf | Political Budget Forecast Cycles | 1,21 MB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |