Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/46821

TítuloJustice et paternalisme dans les essais précoces en cancérologie
Outro(s) título(s)Justice and paternalism in early oncology trials
Autor(es)Merrill, Nathaniel Roberto Buil
Palavras-chaveÉthique de la recherche clinique
Essais précoces en cancérologie
Justice Paternalisme
Clinical research ethics
Early cancer trials
Justice
Paternalism
DataSet-2015
EditoraElsevier Masson
RevistaEthique et Sante
CitaçãoMerrill, R. (2015). Justice et paternalisme dans les essais précoces en cancérologie. Éthique & Santé, 12(3), 177-181
Resumo(s)Some recent discussions on clinical research ethics such as early cancer trials drew attention to the paternalistic nature of the ethical framework necessary to protect the interests of people. More specifically, it has been suggested by some authors that a clinical trial which requires a high level of risk research should be considered ethically unacceptable. In this article, I begin by outlining an argument in favor of a paternalistic restriction of the freedom of individuals to participate in early trials. I continue by making two objections to this paternalistic argument. Then I explain how this paternalistic argument can be defended when it is based on considerations of distributive justice. I conclude by noting that although the paternalistic argument for distributive justice must be dismissed, the fact is that anyway paternalism is inevitable in public health policy.
Some recent discussions on clinical research ethics such as early cancer trials drew attention to the paternalistic nature of the ethical framework necessary to protect the interests of people. More specifically, it has been suggested by some authors that a clinical trial which requires a high level of risk research should be considered ethically unacceptable. In this article, I begin by outlining an argument in favor of a paternalistic restriction of the freedom of individuals to participate in early trials. I continue by making two objections to this paternalistic argument. Then I explain how this paternalistic argument can be defended when it is based on considerations of distributive justice. I conclude by noting that although the paternalistic argument for distributive justice must be dismissed, the fact is that anyway paternalism is inevitable in public health policy
Tipoarticle
DescriçãoPostprint
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/46821
DOI10.1016/j.etiqe.2015.07.003
ISSN1765-4629
Versão da editorahttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1765462915000793
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoclosedAccess
Aparece nas coleções:CEPS - Publicações dos investigadores do CEPS

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