Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/32885
Título: | Promoting cooperation in resource dilemas : theoretical predictions and experimental evidence |
Autor(es): | Botelho, Anabela Dinar, Ariel Pinto, Lígia Rapoport, Amnon |
Palavras-chave: | Experimental economics Common pool resources Appropriation Public good provision Environmental uncertainty C9; D7; H4 |
Data: | 2015 |
Editora: | Elsevier 1 |
Revista: | Journal of behavioral and experimental economics |
Resumo(s): | Whereas experimental studies of common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas are frequently terminated with collapse of the resource, there is considerable evidence in real-world settings that challenges this finding. To reconcile this difference, we propose a two-stage model that links appropriation of the CPR and provision of public goods in an attempt to explain the emergence of cooperation in the management of CPRs under environmental uncertainty. Benchmark predictions are derived from the model, and subsequently tested experimentally under different marginal cost–benefit structures concerning the voluntary contribution to the provision of the good. Our results suggest that the severity of the appropriation problem may significantly be mitigated by the presence of an option for voluntarily contributing a fraction of the income surplus from the appropriation phase to the provision of the public good. |
Tipo: | Artigo |
Descrição: | This study was conducted while Botelho and Pinto were on sabbatical leave at the Water Science and Policy Center, University of California, Riverside, and the School of Business Administration, University of Arizona. |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/32885 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.socec.2014.11.007 |
ISSN: | 2214-8043 |
Arbitragem científica: | yes |
Acesso: | Acesso restrito UMinho |
Aparece nas coleções: | NIMA - Artigos/Papers |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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JBEE.pdf Acesso restrito! | JBEE_LPinto | 703,09 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |