Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487
Registo completo
Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Ghandour, Ziad | por |
dc.contributor.author | Siciliani, Luigi | por |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | por |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-11T13:38:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-01-14T07:00:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-01-14 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Ghandour, Z., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2022, March). Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets. Journal of Health Economics. Elsevier BV. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102588 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6296 | por |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487 | - |
dc.description | "Online ahead of print" | por |
dc.description.abstract | We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers’ lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies). | por |
dc.description.sponsorship | FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia(UID/ECO/03182/2019) | por |
dc.language.iso | eng | por |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | por |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UID%2FECO%2F03182%2F2019/PT | por |
dc.rights | openAccess | por |
dc.subject | Hospital payment | por |
dc.subject | Investment | por |
dc.subject | Quality competition | por |
dc.title | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets | por |
dc.type | article | - |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016762962200008X?via%3Dihub | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 82 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 82 | por |
dc.date.updated | 2022-03-11T11:38:08Z | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102588 | por |
dc.identifier.pmid | 35065851 | por |
dc.subject.wos | Social Sciences | por |
dc.subject.wos | Science & Technology | por |
sdum.export.identifier | 11083 | - |
sdum.journal | Journal of Health Economics | por |
Aparece nas coleções: | EEG - Artigos em revistas de circulação internacional com arbitragem científica |
Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro | Descrição | Tamanho | Formato | |
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RepUM_JHE2022.pdf | 465,15 kB | Adobe PDF | Ver/Abrir |