Can data openness unlock competition when the incumbent has exclusive data access for personalized pricing?

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of an incumbent.s data investment decisions in shaping the competitive interaction of .rms and market structure. We provide antitrust agencies with some insights that may help them to determine whether and when personalized pricing (PP) by a dominant .rm, which is enabled by the use of exclusive data, dampens competition and harms consumers. In markets with intermediate entry costs, where entry is blocked without any intervention, a data openness remedy, by means of a mandatory information sharing, is an e¤ective tool to restore competition and boost consumer welfare. Even in markets where entry is inevitable, due to low entry costs, a mandatory information sharing to promote competitive PP further boosts consumer surplus in comparison to the case where only the incumbent employs PP. In contrast, public agencies should consider a ban on PP in markets with su¢ ciently high entry costs. In these markets, a mandatory information sharing remedy would simply not produce the desired competitive outcome.