Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849

TítuloMerger, partial collusion and relocation
Autor(es)Posada, Pedro
Straume, Odd Rune
Palavras-chaveSpatial competition
Merger
Relocation
Partial collusion
DataDez-2004
EditoraSpringer
Revista Journal of Economics
Citação"Journal of Economics". ISSN 0931-8658. 83:3 (Dec. 2004) 243-265.
Resumo(s)We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.
TipoArtigo
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849
ISSN0931-8658
1617-7134
Versão da editorahttp://www.springerlink.com/content/108909/
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoAcesso aberto
Aparece nas coleções:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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