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TitleNational versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly
Author(s)Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Straume, Odd Rune
Sørgard, Lars
Issue date2006
PublisherRAND Corporation
JournalThe RAND Journal of Economics
Citation"The RAND Journal of Economics". ISSN 0741-6261. 37:1 (2006) 212-233.
Abstract(s)We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A “national champion”policy of promoting domestic mergers rather than international ones is nevertheless never optimal.
Publisher version
AccessOpen access
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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