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TitleCompetition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment affect the propensity to issue sickness certicates?
Author(s)Brekke, Kurt R.
Holmas, Tor Helge
Monstad, Karin
Straume, Odd Rune
Sickness certication
Issue dateFeb-2017
PublisherUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
Abstract(s)Competition among physicians is widespread, but compelling empirical evidence on the impact on service provision is limited, mainly due to lack of exogenous variation in the degree of competition. In this paper we exploit that many GPs, in addition to own practice, work in local emergency centres, where the matching of patients to GPs is random. This allows us to observe the same GP in two di⁄erent competitive environments; with competition (own practice) and without competition (emergency centre). Using rich administrative patientlevel data from Norway for 2006-14, which allow us to estimate high-dimensional xed-e⁄ect models to control for time-invariant patient and GP heterogeneity, we nd that GPs with a fee-for-service (xed salary) contract are 11 (8) percentage points more likely to certify sick leave at own practice than at the emergency centre. Thus, competition has a positive impact on GPssick listing that is reinforced by nancial incentives.
TypeWorking paper
DescriptionJEL Classication: I11; I18; L13
Publisher version
AccessOpen access
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Documentos de Trabalho

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