Factors associated with the publication of a CEO letter

Abstract

Purpose — In most European code-law oriented Latin countries, the publication a CEO’s letter to shareholders in a company’s annual report is a fairly recent phenomenon. We seek to determine the characteristics which explain why companies in one such country, Portugal, published a CEO’s letter. Design/Methodology/approach — Our holistic theoretical framework draws on elements of agency theory, institutional theory and signalling theory. To understand the characteristics of Portuguese holding companies which published CEO letters, we used a logistic regression model to explore 266 observations over the years 2006-2011. Findings — Publication of a CEO letter increases with the fact of being audited by a Big 4 accounting firm; a higher level of profitability; and a high number of foreign subsidiaries. Other findings are that finance companies are slightly more likely to publish a CEO letter than non-finance companies. The number of CEO letters increased to a peak in 2008, and then declined. Practical implications — The increasing number of companies now publishing a CEO letter raises the concern for regulatory authorities of whether the CEO letter content should be audited, since any numbers presented in the management report have to be audited in Portugal. Originality/value — To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical exploration of the characteristics which explain why companies publish a CEO’s letter. Mimetic and normative isomorphism is revealed to be a potentially important influence, since there is a tendency of companies audited by Big 4 accounting companies, and with foreign subsidiaries, to publish a CEO letter.