Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/17591

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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt R.-
dc.contributor.authorCellini, Roberto-
dc.contributor.authorSiciliani, Luigi-
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-05T12:03:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-05T12:03:18Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407por
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/17591-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish beliefs about quality. We take a differential-game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers choose the optimal quality investment plan based on demand at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers observe demand in each period and choose quality in response to current demand). If variable costs are strictly convex, and the degree of cost complementarity between quality and output is not too strong, the steady-state quality is higher under the open-loop solution than under the feedback solution. In both solutions, quality and demand move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the steady-state. While lower transportation costs or less sluggish beliefs lead to higher quality in both solutions, the quality response is weaker when players use feedback strategies.por
dc.description.sponsorshipFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)por
dc.description.sponsorshipCOMPETEpor
dc.description.sponsorshipQRENpor
dc.description.sponsorshipFEDERpor
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.publisherWileypor
dc.rightsrestrictedAccesspor
dc.titleCompetition in regulated markets with sluggish beliefs about qualitypor
dc.typearticlepor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00319.x/abstractpor
sdum.publicationstatuspublishedpor
oaire.citationStartPage131por
oaire.citationEndPage178por
oaire.citationIssue1por
oaire.citationTitleJournal of Economics & Management Strategypor
oaire.citationVolume21por
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00319.xpor
dc.subject.wosSocial Sciencespor
sdum.journalJournal of Economics & Management Strategypor
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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