Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/11617

TitleTesting static game theory with dynamic experiments : a case study of public goods
Author(s)Botelho, Anabela
Harrison, Glenn W.
Pinto, Lígia
Rutström, Elisabet E.
KeywordsGame theory
Experiments
Public goods
Issue date2009
PublisherElsevier
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Citation"Games and Economic Behavior". ISSN 0899-8256. 67 (2009) 253–265.e3
Abstract(s)Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.
TypeArticle
URIhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/11617
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.013
ISSN0899-8256
Publisher versionwww.elsevier.com/locate/geb
Peer-Reviewedyes
AccessRestricted access (UMinho)
Appears in Collections:NIMA - Artigos/Papers

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