Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo:
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/66492
Registo completo
Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Almeida, José Bacelar | por |
dc.contributor.author | Barbosa, Manuel | por |
dc.contributor.author | Barthe, Gilles | por |
dc.contributor.author | Pacheco, Hugo | por |
dc.contributor.author | Pereira, Vitor | por |
dc.contributor.author | Portela, Bernardo | por |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-19T20:41:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-19T20:41:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781538666807 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1940-1434 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/66492 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We give a language-based security treatment of domain-specific languages and compilers for secure multi-party computation, a cryptographic paradigm that. enables collaborative computation over encrypted data. Computations are specified in a core imperative language, as if they were intended to be executed by a trusted-third party, and formally verified against. an information-flow policy modelling (an upper bound to) their leakage. This allows non-experts to assess the impact of performance driven authorized disclosure of intermediate values.Specifications are then compiled to multi-party protocols. We formalize protocol security using (distributed) probabilistic information-flow and prove security-preserving compilation: protocols only leak what. is allowed by the source policy. The proof exploits a natural but previously missing correspondence between simulation-based cryptographic proofs and (composable) probabilistic non-interference.Finally, we extend our framework to justify leakage cancelling, a domain-specific optimization that allows to first write an efficient specification that fails to meet the allowed leakage upper-bound, and then apply a probabilistic preprocessing that brings leakage to the acceptable range. | por |
dc.description.sponsorship | The fourth author is financed by the COMPETE 2020 Programme within project POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006961, by the FCT within project UID/EEA/50014/2013 and grant SFRH/BPD/121389/2016. The second author is financed by Project NanoSTIMA/NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-000016 through the NORTE 2020 Programme. | por |
dc.language.iso | eng | por |
dc.publisher | IEEE | por |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/5876/147326/PT | por |
dc.relation | SFRH/BPD/121389/2016 | por |
dc.rights | openAccess | por |
dc.subject | Domain-specific-languages | por |
dc.subject | Multi-party-computation | por |
dc.subject | Privacy | por |
dc.subject | Secure-compilation | por |
dc.subject | Security | por |
dc.subject | Semantics | por |
dc.subject | Type-systems | por |
dc.subject | Verification | por |
dc.title | hnforcing ideal-world leakage bounds in real-world secret sharing MPC frameworks | por |
dc.type | conferencePaper | por |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | por |
oaire.citationStartPage | 132 | por |
oaire.citationEndPage | 146 | por |
oaire.citationVolume | 2018-July | por |
dc.date.updated | 2020-08-17T15:58:46Z | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/CSF.2018.00017 | por |
dc.subject.wos | Science & Technology | - |
sdum.export.identifier | 5950 | - |
sdum.journal | Proceedings IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium | por |
sdum.conferencePublication | IEEE 31ST COMPUTER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS SYMPOSIUM (CSF 2018) | por |
sdum.bookTitle | IEEE 31ST COMPUTER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS SYMPOSIUM (CSF 2018) | por |
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