Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/45546

TítuloThe effect of competition on executive compensation and incentives: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
Autor(es)Fernandes, Ana P.
Ferreira, Priscila
Winters, L. Alan
Palavras-chaveEntry Deregulation
Product Market Competition
Executive Compensation
Managerial Incentives
Performance-related Pay
EditoraUniversity of Wisconsin Press
RevistaJournal of Human Resources
Resumo(s)This paper studies the effect of increased product market competition on executive compensation and incentives. We use a reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment, and exploit its staggered implementation across municipalities for identification. Using employer-employee data, we find that increased competition following the reform raised total pay but reduced the sensitivity of pay to firm performance. This is consistent with theoretical results showing that a fall in entry costs weakens managerial incentive provision. Entry deregulation also increased performance-induced CEO turnover and firms’ probability of exit, suggesting that competition provides direct incentives for managerial effort.
Arbitragem científicayes
Aparece nas coleções:NIMA - Artigos/Papers

Ficheiros deste registo:
Ficheiro Descrição TamanhoFormato 
Fernandes_JHR_manuscript_5811.pdf303,6 kBAdobe PDFVer/Abrir  Solicitar cópia ao autor!

Partilhe no FacebookPartilhe no TwitterPartilhe no DeliciousPartilhe no LinkedInPartilhe no DiggAdicionar ao Google BookmarksPartilhe no MySpacePartilhe no Orkut
Exporte no formato BibTex mendeley Exporte no formato Endnote Adicione ao seu Currículo DeGóis