Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/30225

TítuloThe effect of competition on managers’ compensation : evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
Autor(es)Ferreira, Priscila
Fernandes, Ana
Winters, L. Alan
Palavras-chaveEntry deregulation
Executive compensation
Performance-related pay
Product market competition
DataJul-2014
EditoraCentre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Resumo(s)This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplified firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the reform, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs, with no significant effects found for other managers or workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives.
TipoworkingPaper
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/30225
ISSN0265-8003
Versão da editorawww.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP10054.php
Arbitragem científicayes
AcessoopenAccess
Aparece nas coleções:NIMA - Documentos de Trabalho/Working Papers

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