Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/29674

TítuloThe effect of competition on manager's compensation : evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
Autor(es)Fernandes, Ana P.
Ferreira, Priscila
Winters, L. Alan
Palavras-chaveEntry deregulation
Product market competition
Executive compensation
Performance-related pay
DataJul-2014
EditoraUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA)
Resumo(s)This paper studies the effect of competition on executive compensation. We estimate the effect of increased product market competition on the performance-pay sensitivity of CEOs, and contrast it with the effect for department managers and other workers in the corporation. We use a recent reform that simplied firm entry regulation in Portugal as a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical strategy exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across municipalities. Using linked employer-employee data for the universe of workers and firms, we show that increased product market competition, following the deregulation, decreased the sensitivity of pay to performance of CEOs and other managers, with no significant effects found for other workers. These findings are consistent with existing theoretical results in a principal-agent framework that a fall in entry costs leads to weaker managerial incentives.
TipoworkingPaper
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/29674
Arbitragem científicano
AcessoopenAccess
Aparece nas coleções:NIMA - Documentos de Trabalho/Working Papers

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