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Abstract
This study focuses on the period of the Portuguese Overseas War (1961–1974), with the aim of analysing the role of military accounting in Portugal, particularly regarding whether state budgetary procedures were adapted to meet the needs of the state and the military. The analysis was developed by considering the budget constraints faced at the time, which were profoundly influenced by the laws of public sector accounting that had two main goals concerning the control and the balance of the budget. This work contributes to a better understanding of the role of accounting during the 13 years of war in three different war scenarios and in a small country with limited resources. In the context of permanent scrutiny by the Ministry of Finance regarding the distribution and management of public spending, it is believed that accounting and military administration played an important role but fell short in preventing budget overruns during the period of analysis.

Keywords
accounting, military, Overseas War, costs, budget

Introduction
Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal was involved in a military conflict in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (known as Guinea-Bissau after its independence in 1973).
Commonly known as the Guerra do Ultramar (hereafter Overseas War), this was a remarkable period in Portuguese society at the time (Simões, 2000). This military conflict remains poorly investigated from a Portuguese accounting perspective. In fact, as argued by Funnell and Chwastiak (2015), research on major military conflicts in the 20th century has not yet received proper recognition.

However, accounting and war as well as accounting and the military have been objects of growing interest in accounting history research (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018; Funnell and Chwastiak, 2010). Accounting has been studied from different perspectives, and one of the focuses has been the adaptive and reactive role of accounting during wartime periods (Antonelli et al., 2014; Cobbin and Burrows, 2018; Miley and Read, 2014). Although war, terrorism, and other conflict situations are more likely to have a negative impact on humankind, the reality is that they are part of human history, and, as Funnell and Chwastiak (2010: 147) put it in their editorials in Accounting History, there are ‘rich opportunities for research into matters that are of critical importance to individuals and to nations’.

Focusing on the period of the Portuguese Overseas War, which lasted from 1961 to 1974, the central objective of this study is to analyse the role of military accounting in Portugal, particularly whether the state budgetary procedures were adapted to meet the needs of the state and the military during this difficult period. It is also intended to analyse the budgetary overruns observed during this period and to identify the budgetary constraints faced by military entities during the period of war.

The Overseas War developed during a period in which Portugal was ruled by a dictatorship, a corporatist authoritarian regime (1926–1974), which followed the unstable Portuguese First Republic (1910–1926) (Serrão, 1995, 2001). During most of this regime, the leading figure was António de Oliveira Salazar, whose main objectives were to stabilise the economy after the financial chaos of the First Republic and to impose a budgetary equilibrium. These goals established subsequent guidelines for the development of the economy, society, and the state (Rosas, 1993a).

Regarding the spatial definition of the nation, it remained unchanged during the entire period of the dictatorial regime (known as Estado Novo – New State) (Cairo, 2006). According to Cairo (2006: 372), ‘Article 1 of the Constitution of 1933 described Portugal’s territory as a possession of the nation, not of the state’. The Portuguese territory was described in the Portuguese constitution as follows: in Europe, continental Portugal and the archipelagos of Madeira and of the Azores; in Western Africa, the archipelago of Cape Verde, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and its dependencies, St John the Baptist of Ajuda, Cabinda and Angola; in eastern Africa, Mozambique; in Asia, the states of India and Macau and their dependencies; and in Oceania, Timor and its dependencies (Decree no. 22241, 22 February 1933; Cairo, 2006).²

However, in the international context of the 1950s and 1960s, the decolonisation movements throughout the world and within the context of decaying Portuguese sovereignty over its former territories, the Portuguese government modified its concept of colony, metropolis and empire (D’Souza, 1994; Moço, 2012; Telo, 2012). In 1951, the colonies were renamed ‘overseas
provinces’ (Law no. 2048, 11 July 1951) to reinforce the sentiment that Portugal was a pluricontinental and multiracial nation, not a coloniser (Telo, 2012: 63). After 1961, the inhabitants’ special regime of ‘assimilado’ (Opello, 2019: 80) was abrogated, and ‘every inhabitant of the Empire became formally a Portuguese citizen’ (Cairo, 2006: 372). The rhetoric reflected one reality, but the reality in the colonies was different, with local indigenous people lacking citizenship (Allen, 2018; Moço, 2012). As stated by Opello (2019: 80), ‘the standards for being officially recognised as an assimilado (one assimilated into Portuguese culture) were so high that only an extremely small percentage of Africans ever achieved this status’.

These changing conceptions of the empire were themselves catalysts for the Overseas War. Towards the end of the Salazar regime, between 1961 and 1974, Portugal was involved in a military conflict in the colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, during which it debated the right to its presence in Africa. This war was considered difficult because of the extreme climatic conditions associated with disparate geographical locations in Africa, which included three different theatres of operation disconnected from Portugal by thousands of kilometres, as well as because the Portuguese were outnumbered (Tavares, 2005).

The Overseas War, depleting Portugal’s population of young men, material goods and financial resources, undoubtedly marked the third quarter of the 20th century. From the Portuguese perspective, the history of this thirteen-year period has been written only recently, as those who lived during this period have now given their testimony (Mesquita, 2011). The war effort involved a huge cost to the country. According to Simões (2000), expenditure on items for national defence increased significantly, particularly from 1967/1968 onward, and the situation was clearly visible in state budgets from 1961 to 1974.

In war scenarios, through its economically rational discourse, accounting always plays an important role that can legitimate decisions, mediate the relationship between the military and politicians and control military finances and forces (Funnell, 2006). This role can be at the level of quantifying costs, managing public funds, or processing information. In the specific case of the Overseas War, the financial management of the armed forces in the colonies assumed a leading role. According to Mesquita (2011), this was due to the deficit during the war and the difficulty in properly managing public funds, which led the then Minister of Finance to withdraw financial management authority from the Ministry of the Army. The Armed Forces saw their interests undermined by the financial policy of the government, and their management capacity was questioned (Mesquita, 2011: 407). This illustrates the political nature of accounting (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015). It was used to mediate the relationship between the military and politicians.

At the international level, several studies have been conducted on accounting in military organisations during conflict scenarios. Such studies highlight the contribution of military accounting to the development of accounting in general (Funnell, 2006, 2008; King and Case, 2007; Miley, 2006; Sarikas, 2009; Smith, 2001). However, Portugal’s overseas war remains under-investigated from an economic viewpoint, and principally from an accounting perspective. In particular, Rocha’s (1977) work highlighted the economics of the war and the affected colonies. The author addresses trade relations between Portugal and the colonies during the war by focusing not only on the importance of the war industry but also on commercial ties between Portugal and the colonies. In turn, by highlighting the importance of the national military industry and the role played by military industrial establishments across all branches of the military, Tavares (2005) provides a valuable contribution to the study of the Portuguese military industry during the Overseas War and its contribution to the war effort.

This research, which aims to study military accounting during this period of war in Portugal, takes a qualitative research perspective based on primary archival sources as well as secondary sources. The primary sources include documents and records, legislation, various letters and
models of accounting classification, for which the military budgets during the study period will be analysed in detail. This documentation includes those produced in continental Portugal and colonies from 1961 to 1974.

Data collection was conducted in Portugal’s national archives for the purpose of searching for accounts from the Portuguese armed forces. The research took place primarily in the Arquivo Histórico Militar (AHM) (Military Historical Archive) in Lisbon and the Arquivo da Defesa Nacional (ADN) (National Defence Archive) in Paço de Arcos, near Lisbon. The study also used secondary sources, including reports and accounts, news published in various media and information published by the Portuguese Army. Oral history was also used to a minor degree.

This study contributes to international accounting history research, as it addresses recent calls for research from the non-English research community (Baskerville et al., 2017; Gomes et al., 2015). It contributes to the literature on military accounting and on accounting and war by addressing the specific case of the Portuguese Overseas War of the 1960s and the 1970s, which has been widely neglected in accounting history research published in international journals (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018). Additionally, this study helps make information that has been confidential for a long time publicly available. Therefore, it unveils a piece of Portugal’s recent history that has never been investigated before. As argued by Funnell and Chwastiak (2010: 147), ‘the vast stores of readily accessible official and private sources in many countries should provide additional impetus to the accounting historian’s quest to understand the importance of accounting in ensuring that armed forces are the servants and not the master of those who fund them and provide the legal legitimacy for their existence’.

This study is structured into five sections. The second section provides a literature review on the role of accounting in the context of war. This is followed by the presentation of the Portuguese social, economic, and political context during the 20th century, including the period of the Overseas War. The third section provides a description of the administration and accounting systems in place during the period of analysis, with a focus on the costs of war and budget control. Next, an analysis of the role of accounting during the war is presented, with a focus on the accounting system adopted and the flow of accounting information from the colonies to Lisbon. The study ends with a discussion and conclusions.

**Accounting in the war context**

Despite the pervasiveness of war and militaries throughout human history, the interest among accounting historians in the relationship between accounting and war (and the military) is slight and limited primarily to Britain and the United States (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018; Miley and Read, 2012). Extant research that includes other countries is related to Australia (e.g. Barton, 2004; Cobbin, 2009; Miley and Read, 2012, 2014), France (e.g. Lemarchand, 2002), Germany (e.g. Lippman and Wilson, 2007), Ireland (e.g. Quinn and Jackson, 2014), Italy (e.g. Antonelli et al., 2014; Cinquini et al., 2016; Vollmers et al., 2016; Zambon and Zan, 2007), the Soviet Union (e.g. Djatej and Saritas, 2009), and Spain (e.g. Balsells and Chamorro, 2016; Fernandez-Revuelta et al., 2002; Sánchez-Matamoros, 2014).

Recently, Cobbin and Burrows (2018) reviewed and classified 55 articles on related research published between 2000 and 2017. The literature was classified based on the relationship between accounting knowledge and the military and war. Four categories arise: (a) accounting aiding the military in peacetime (18%), (b) accounting as a timely contributor to war (40%), (c) accounting evolves to meet the needs of the military in peacetime (7%), and (d) accounting evolves as a contributor to war (35%). Following a primarily descriptive-narrative and case-study approach, these studies focus on temporal ranges from the late 16th century to the present day. The
papers reviewed cover 11 different wars as well as the peace time that precedes or follows the conflicts (i.e. the American War of Independence, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, the Boer War, World War I, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and Gulf Wars I and II). Within this literature, Cobbin and Burrows (2018) identify accounting-specific themes, including accounting procedures, budgeting, costs, and disclosure, as well as accounting-related themes, such as financing, efficiency, gender, and culpability.

Accounting has been closely intertwined with the management of the preparation and prosecution of war. Despite accounting’s most obvious contribution (as an information system for decision making, planning, and resource control that should enhance the effectiveness of the military or impose financial discipline in regard to military spending), research highlights that war and military accounting serve broader political purposes, particularly the interests of the dominant political elites (Antonelli et al., 2014; Funnell, 1990, 2005).

As evidenced by Funnell (1990, 2005), until the beginning of the 20th century, military accounting was not used by the British government to promote military effectiveness or efficient administration, nor to improve operations in the field. A study on the evolution of the British army’s financial control from the late 17th century (following the constitutional battles between the British Parliament and the Crown) until the Crimean War (1854–1856) shows that accounting was used to control the military, as the military were considered a political threat to the constitutional authority of Parliament (Funnell, 1990). ‘Ensuring that the military was financially ignorant but also financially accountable made them dependent upon the decisions of others who may be far from the front line of battle and whose first priority was to ensure a detailed accounting for spending according to approvals and mandatory procedures’ (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015: 183). In the analysis of the South African War (1899–1902), Funnell (2005) also exposed the ineffectual and deceptive accounting systems of the civilian administration of the British army and its responsibility for soldier deaths in the battle of the Crimean War up to the war in South Africa.

The soldiers’ perspective of how effective the accounting systems were in supplying the British front line during World War I and II was investigated by Miley and Read (2012, 2014). The cartoons drawn by a frontline officer in the British army during World War I (Miley and Read, 2014) and the oral histories of veterans who served in the Australian Army during World War II (Miley and Read, 2012) were used by the authors to demonstrate how the army supply accounting system, driven by matters of stewardship and accountability for fiduciary purposes, did not support (and, in fact, even obstructed) the effective provision of supplies to frontline soldiers. From a different perspective, according to Sarikas (2009), World War II increased the need for rapid changes in the accounting practices of the Soviet government in order to save military and economic resources.

Through an analysis of the federal expenditure control system of the United States of America (US) Navy, during the Civil War (1861–1865), Mayer-Sommer (2010) showed that appropriation accounting, rather than promoting planning, control, and the stewardship of public funds of the Navy, resulted in far less control than expected. It also allowed abuse by key officials. However, as attested by Mayer-Sommer (2010: 194), the expenditure control system played an important role in legitimising wartime spending for the Congress and the public.

Similarly, an analysis of the state budgeting practices of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Munitions for World War I in Italy, provided by Antonelli et al. (2014), revealed that budgeting and accountability mechanisms were conditioned by networks of power relations. These networks facilitated the political processes of procurement. Budget accountability controls that existed prior to the war were discontinued during the conflict to conceal the collusive practices of an elite group of industrialists, bankers, politicians, and the Army military supply. Following Richardson (1987), the authors assert that budgeting procedures played the role of a legitimising institution in decision and policymaking around war resources (Antonelli et al., 2014: 141).
Chwastiak’s studies (1999, 2001) on the emergence of US military management control systems, such as the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) system, during the first phase of the Cold War and during the Vietnam War, also highlighted the political dimension of accounting, providing an economically rational discourse to politicians. Chwastiak (1999, 2001) found that, instead of promoting greater efficiency in weapon system choices and preventing the abuse of public funds, accounting became a symbolic mechanism for rationalising and legitimising high military spending. Thus, accounting produced social inefficiencies and waste. Managerial control systems, such as the PPB system, changed visibilities in the US Department of Defense in such a way that the arms race and preparation for the nuclear war became normalised as a rational and productive process (Chwastiak, 2001).

In an interesting study on how accounting was used for objectivity and efficiency, Cobbin and Burrows (2010) researched the British Navy’s budgetary reforms in the late 1880s. The authors highlight the fundamental intervention and support of two pivotal individuals, Arthur Forwood (Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Navy) and Lord George Hamilton (First Lord of the Admiralty), in the introduction of a new system of appropriation accounting. As stated by Funnell and Chwastiak (2010: 148), ‘the emphasis on the purpose of the army’s accounting changed with a growing appreciation of the need for accounting to provide the means by which expenditure on the military could be better managed’.

Funnell (2006) noted the ‘ideological or political instrumentality of accounting’ (p. 720) in the attempts made by the British government’s early 20th-century attempts to modernise military accounting. This reform, which led to the creation of an Army Class at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1906, advocated that the army administration should adopt business methods and a business mentality. This shift was of fundamental importance in preserving the British Empire and promoting an efficient army. Military reform was a crucial part of the movement of national efficiency led by Lord Rosebery.

This movement was intended ‘to elevate the efficiency of all aspects of British life’ (Funnell, 2006: 746) to overcome the pessimism that followed failures of the army in the South African War (1899–1902) and the decline of Britain’s industries and political competitiveness. Funnell (2006: 721) stated the following:

Administrative failures during the South African War were shown by the Commission to have been associated with ineffective and deceptive accounting systems administered from the War Office. Thus, the modern army could no longer afford to deny its administrative officers an education in the ways and principles of business: accounting would serve the interests of British imperialism through its contributions to military efficiency.

The War Office, with the largest global spending, would have to be efficient and perform well in the battlefield as well as in the financial books. Nevertheless, despite the economic advantages that could arise from the adoption of business accounting practices, Funnell (2006) concluded that military accounting was primary in providing constitutional protection.

The dependence between liberalism and the introduction of accounting innovations is also evidenced by Funnell (2011), who analysed the British liberal social reform programme (1906–1912) and the consequent reform of the army’s financial administration led by the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane. Social reforms and the launching of a welfare state had to be funded by savings in other government spending, particularly in regard to the army. According to Funnell (2006, 2011), Haldane was responsible for major changes in the organisation and financial administration of the British Army. This reform led to the incorporation of a business mentality of rational calculation and set the basis of a more business-like system of military accounting able to promote a
‘dominant role for the military in financial decisions’ (p. 69) and to provide ‘the means for the military to take financial responsibility for its actions and for responsible individuals to be held to account for the cost of their decisions’ (p. 88).

Social, economic, and political context

By the late 15th century, Portugal was a leading colonial power and a major trading nation (Boxer, 1969; Godinho, 1962, 1981; Gomes et al., 2008; Livermore, 1976; Peres, 1959; Serrão, 1980). The Portuguese overseas empire included territories in Asia, Africa, and South America. However, by the end of the 17th century, the importance of the Portuguese Empire had decreased considerably (Boxer, 1969; Gomes et al., 2008). The Portuguese Empire was considerably reduced with the independence of Brazil on 7 September 1822. Dom Pedro, the Prince Regent, declared independence from Portugal in an event known as the ‘Cry of Ipiranga’, where he cried out ‘Independence or death!’ (Júnior, 1972). This action was the result of measures taken by the Portuguese crown to remove Dom Pedro’s powers and forcibly return him to Portugal. Under pressure from England, the Portuguese crown officially recognised independence with a treaty signed by the new Empire of Brazil and the Kingdom of Portugal on 25 November 1825 (Ramos, 2009).

With Brazil’s independence, Portugal saw in Africa a certain form of national regeneration as well as opportunities for commercial development (Lains, 1998). Colonial policy became an instrument available to Portugal to stimulate its own development. Accordingly, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Portuguese Empire was considerably reduced, but Portugal continued to have colonies in different parts of the world (see Figure 1).

The first quarter of the 20th century was a difficult period for Portugal, with political turmoil, financial difficulties, migration, and epidemics (Rosas, 1993b; Serrão, 2001). Portugal plunged into a period of military dictatorship. A military coup in May 1926 by a group of army officers resulted in the suppression of Parliament as well as all freedoms (Saraiva, 2011: 497). According to Saraiva (2011), the financing needs of the new dictatorial government accelerated several reforms, including accounting.

The need to control, reformulate, and modernise public accounts resulted in the presidential invitation to make António de Oliveira Salazar (known as Salazar) the Minister of Finance. He had professional standing among distinguished economists, public recognition and was the church’s spokesman for social and political issues (Sardica, 2011). According to Cardoso (2012), the financial recovery triggered by Salazar implied a set of measures in budgetary consolidation and tax and customs reforms aimed at normalising public debt. Salazar’s control as Minister of Finance ensured that he verified all government actions, primarily in setting the maximum allocation of expenses for the services of each ministry. He also held the right of the previous examination of all government initiatives, with direct repercussions on revenues or expenses (Cardoso, 2012; Sardica, 2011).

This situation changed after 1932. Salazar became the Prime Minister of Portugal’s military dictatorship in 1932. As a Prime Minister, he founded the authoritarian Estado Novo (New State) in 1933 and presided as Portugal’s strongman until 1974 (Ramos, 2009; Rosas, 1993a). The New State was ‘nationalist’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘corporatist’ (Ramos, 2009: 627). The objective of the regime was to “build the “national family”, a monocultural, Catholic nation based on corporatist principles. Deus, Pátria e família (God, Fatherland, and Family) became the trinity that encapsulated the fundamental values of Salazarism’ (Corkill and Almeida, 2009: 395).

The colonies played a significant role in the Estado Novo’s policy. Portugal’s position was not just ideological but also economic and strategic. The government wanted to direct Portuguese emigration from Central Europe to the colonies and to have access to raw material to facilitate the
growth of the Portuguese industry and guarantee a market for Portuguese exports (Amaral, 2011; Lains, 1998; Lains and Silva, 2005; Mosca, 2007). The colonies were fundamental to the financial stability of the country (Mosca, 2007). The policy of sovereignty and self-sufficiency was reflected in the small scale of the Portuguese economy and limited access to foreign capital (Mosca, 2007).

By the end of the 1950s, economic policy was subject to several reforms, which implied a reduction in nationalism. The main aspects were an opening to the entry of foreign capital and greater active diplomacy. The result was integration with international organisations: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, the United Nations (UN) in 1955, the European Free Trade Association in 1959, the International Monetary Fund in 1960, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1961 (Mosca, 2007). At the international level, the challenge to the Portuguese presence in Africa began shortly after the end of World War II (Telo, 2012). A growing number of countries in the UN raised their voices against the fact that Portugal continued its colonial policy in both Asian and African colonies. Portugal was under a dictatorial regime at that time. Between 1932 and 1968, Salazar worked hard to maintain the support of some allies (Freixo, 2007), taking advantage of the Cold War period. Nonetheless, Portugal adopted a defensive strategy against the decolonisation movements, arguing that it did not have colonies but, rather, ‘overseas provinces’, which were part of a ‘pluricontinental and multiracial nation’ (Telo, 2012: 63). With this argument, Portugal tried to convince others that it was unique. It tactically defended this position at the UN (Telo, 2012). As stated by Opello (2019: 80),

Figure 1. The Portuguese Empire in 1933.
Although Portugal was a small country in Europe, its colonies made it a world-class nation, the centre of an extensive and racially diverse pan-Lusitanian community scattered across the globe and held together by the mutual bonds of Portuguese language and culture. The Portuguese, like the French with respect to Algeria, propounded the notion that Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea were simply extensions of Portugal overseas, indissolubly linked to the metropole. The Portuguese claimed to be carrying out in Africa a nonracial, Christian, civilizing mission as they had successfully done in Brazil. Theoretically, an African inhabitant of the colonies could become the legal equal of any metropolitan citizen, if willing to abandon traditional African ways of living and adopt Portuguese language and culture.

After 1956, Portuguese isolation related to colonialism became deeper as more colonies became independent. In 1956, Portugal had one of the largest empires in Africa and was engaged in a process of reorganisation of its armed forces with financial and technical support from the United States. This situation became particularly complicated. What was on the horizon was the beginning of an armed conflict in Africa, with no support from the international community, nor from traditional allies, such as Great Britain, which had already granted independence to many of its colonies (Telo, 2012). Additionally, the United States changed its policy regarding African countries by supporting decolonisation. The result was that Portugal was the only nation in 1961 that refused self-determination (Telo, 2012). The position assumed by Portugal resulted in an outbreak of the Overseas War (Pereira, 2008).

The beginning of the armed conflict occurred in Angola on 4 February 1961 with six groups of Angolans, armed with a small number of firearms but primarily with machetes and improvised weapons, attacking a number of important buildings. In Guinea, the fighting started in 1963, while in Mozambique, it started in 1964. It is important to emphasise that Portugal had other colonies that became independent both before and after the Overseas War. Some of the territories in contemporary India were annexed without armed conflict, which makes the Overseas War a particularly dark period in Portugal’s history (see Figure 2).

According to Ribeiro (2004), Portugal had an uninformed public that was tightly controlled and quite distant from Africa’s problems. They were educated in a sort of imperial mystique with the support of the church. This situation allowed Salazar to declare, ‘To Angola rapidly and in force’ (Ribeiro, 2004: 24), as if Portugal herself was under attack. The tenacity with which the Portuguese defended their presence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea is associated not only with the authoritarian way in which Salazar directed colonial policy but also with the fact that Portugal was too weak and poor to allow decolonisation (Pereira, 2008). Telo (2012) points out that the 13 years of war eroded public opinion and cohesion at all levels. By 1961, Portugal had

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Nature of independence mechanism</th>
<th>Method by which independence was achieved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Independence declared:</td>
<td>Largely peaceful</td>
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<tr>
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<td>independence recognised</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>Goa, Daman, Diu</td>
<td>Annexed (seized) by India</td>
<td>Largely Peaceful</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>St John Baptiste of Ajudá</td>
<td>Annexed (seized) by Dahomey</td>
<td>Taken by force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Annexed (seized) by Indonesia</td>
<td>Taken by force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Independence achieved</td>
<td>Armed conflict – the ‘Overseas War’</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Independence granted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Independence granted</td>
<td>Peaceful</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>Ceded to the PR China</td>
<td>Peaceful</td>
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Figure 2. The fate of the Portuguese Empire in 1999.
Note: We would like to acknowledge and thank the enormous help given by one of the referees in preparing this figure.
become fragmented and reached full disunion in 1974, leading to the 25 April Carnation Revolution, which removed the fascist dictatorship and restored democratic principles. According to Telo (2012), Portugal paid the price for 13 years of a controversial war. The problem was not the war itself but the policy used to justify the war.

The administration, the accounting system and the costs of the Overseas War

The military administration

The Overseas War demanded a new organisation to administer the resources and personnel mobilised to the colonies. On 7 October 1959, DL no. 42564 was promulgated, where a new organisation of the Minister of the Army was established. With DL 42564, the Minister of the Army was responsible for mainland and overseas territories, which were divided into military regions/units. The military administration assumed significant relevance, and its organisation provided a comprehensive understanding of the concerns and needs for organisation and control during wartime, with the accounting information system integral to that effort.

In 1961, the army administration was the responsibility of the Minister of the Army, which was responsible for the normal functioning of army agencies. The Minister of the Army could exercise authority directly or by delegation, in which case a direct delegate was the Deputy State Secretary of the Army, who dispatched all matters that the Minister had placed under its oversight or accountability (CECA³, 1988; DL 42564).

The Minister of the Army and the Deputy State Secretary of the Army are, in the army administration, followed in the hierarchy by the Army Chief of Staff, who could only dispatch matters that were committed by ministerial order (DL 42564, Article 24). In addition, the Army Chief of Staff was responsible for presenting superiorly and in a timely manner for the administration of ground forces, particularly in regard to the production and acquisition of material.

Immediately after the Army Chief of Staff, appointed by the Minister of Army as proposed by the Army Chief of Staff, were the Quarter Master General (QMG), the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the Assistant General. These individuals had to be generals with the ranking of directors-general (DL 42564, Article 25).

In 1961, the full and real administrative power within the army resided with the QMG. The QMG was responsible for administering two services: the Fourth Section of the Army Staff, responsible for all logistical aspects of material and transport, and the Administrative Council of the Army Staff, responsible for managing and controlling revenue, expense, monetary funds and budgets. Responsibility for nine separate directorates meant administrative control over commands in overseas provinces and independent territories (CECA, 1988). Of particular relevance to this study are the Directorates of Budget and Administrative Services, the Directorate of Account Verification and Administrative Inspection, and the Military Agency. Figure 3 illustrates the hierarchy of military organisations at the beginning of the war, focusing on QMG administrative competences.

The area on which some directorates focus is observable in Figure 3. For example, the Directorate of Budgets and Administration Services had the following functions: preparing budget proposals for the Ministry of the Army’s spending (ordinary and extraordinary)⁴, preparing budget proposals for expenses for the ground forces of the overseas provinces, and verifying the private budgets of military units and establishments, among other functions (DL 42564, Article 137).

The Directorate of Account Verification and Administrative Inspection had the following functions: studying issues relating to the auditing of the accounts of the military units and
establishments, both in peacetime and in wartime, and their administrative inspection and publishing guidelines and instructions for account verification aimed at simplification and efficiency, among other functions (DL 42564, Article 140).

**Figure 3.** Organigram of the military hierarchy at the beginning of the Overseas War. Source: Built based on the description provided by the Decree-Law no. 42564, 7 October 1959, concerning the general organization of the Army Ministry.
The Military Agency, which had existed since 1959 (CECA, 1988), maintained the service of current accounts with military units, establishments and agencies, both from continental Portugal and overseas (DL 42564, Article 160). The Military Agency was also responsible for the custody of funds as well as pension payments for both retired and reserved officials. After 1961, the Military Agency was the only agency authorised by the Army Minister to perform operations involving the transfer of funds for military service between Lisbon and the overseas colonies. In this way, it operated as a bank for the army (Decree no. 43914, 15 September 1961 Article 1).

Public accounting during the Overseas War

At the beginning of the war, the public accounting system was still based on the 1928 budget reform, as established by Decree no. 15465 on 14 May 1928. According to the preamble of this decree, the reform replaced the lack of order, consistency and clarity in public accounts that had been prejudicial to public credit and national production. The reform aimed to enhance the ‘understanding of the national situation, to balance revenues and expenses, and to protect the treasury and the taxpayer’ (Decree 15465, Preamble). The situation was reinforced by the statement that ‘it is necessary to concentrate and not to disperse the financial power of the state and the contributory capacity of the nation, for this supreme and urgent objective: to balance public accounts, as the basis and necessary condition for the development of national production itself’ (Decree 15465, Preamble).

The main purpose of the accounting system was to provide the government with budgetary control and law enforcement. It was characterised by a cash accounting system involving single entry bookkeeping (Caiado et al., 2007). The budgetary accounting system should provide information about the revenue and expenses of the state and municipalities, both in continental Portugal and in the islands of the Azores and Madeira (autonomous regions) and the colonies (Decree 15465). Figure 4 shows the documents prepared according to the 1928 accounting reform.

The different documents were an integral part of the General Budget of the State (Decree 15465, Article 2) and provided detailed information concerning several dimensions of the Portuguese budget, allowing control of accounting information from continental Portugal, the islands, and the colonies.

- Document 1 concerned the general budget of the public administration, describing the revenue by chapter and total expenses for each of the following divisions: superior state bodies, foreign affairs and national defence, interior business, colonies, and finance.
- Document 2 consisted of the general statement of state companies, comprising the operating account (expenses, income, surplus, and deficit) and the establishment account (expenses, income from operating accounts, and subsidy from the treasury).
- Document 3 presented the General Account of the State’s Effective Debt as of 31 December of the previous year as well as the annual interest and amortisation charge.
- Document 4 consisted of securities held by the treasury and indicated totals, the sums of debt capital, and the annual interest and amortisation charge aggregated by different divisions (i.e. debt values presumed in the present). Whether interest was included in the revenues as well as general expenses of the state budget were given on this map.
- Document 5 presented the General Account in terms of percentages of taxes levied by the state and belonging to the local authorities of the mainland and islands.
- Document 6 presented a summary of the global budget of the local authorities of the mainland and islands in terms of total income and expenses.
Document 7 indicated the global debt in each of the three classes of municipalities (parishes, municipalities, and districts) as well as the corresponding annual interest and amortisation charges.

Document 8 briefly presented the last approved budget of each colony, comprising the global income and expenses.

Document 9 presented the global debt of each of the colonies, itemising the debt in currency, gold, and respective charges.

The accounting system, which was established in 1928, prevailed for most of the dictatorial regime, and only in 1945 (Decree no. 35413, 29 December 1945) was a new law issued comprising standards for the functioning of accounting and models of books, main and auxiliary, for bookkeeping to be undertaken by the administrative councils of the military units and establishments. To complement the 1928 law, there was a need to be more detailed about the organisation, operation, accounting and bookkeeping of the administrative councils. Only in 1971 did DL 305/71 introduce changes to the law established in 1928. The accounting system remained the same and focused on budgetary control, but the classification of revenues and expenses changed, with the aim of allowing international comparison of key economic indicators and improving the elaboration of national accounting.
Despite the public accounting system being based on the budget and concerned with the balance of public finances, several control and management mechanisms had been implemented by military institutions, mainly through the creation of internal documents for the control and verification of revenues and expenses. These will be analysed later.

**The costs of the Overseas War**

The concern of Salazar’s government with the balance of public accounts was appreciable (Madeira, 2012); the war placed a huge burden on public finances (Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011). Although the costs were considerable, according to Mesquita (2011), there is evidence that the real financial costs were higher than those included in the budget. Madeira (2012) argues that political and ideological motivations were the basis for the manipulation of accounting documents that concealed the real costs of war from the public.

When the war began military spending on the colonies, particularly Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, increased considerably (Mesquita, 2011). Before 1960, expenses were calculated for a context of peace, and the armed forces in the colonies, ‘more specifically, the private forces of each province were supported by the budgets of the respective provinces. Extraordinary or reinforcement forces were supported by the general budgets of the metropolis, the General State Budget, as it was then called’ (Mesquita, 2011: 408). From 1960 to 1961, the extraordinary expenditures (EE) of the armed forces grew from 1043 to 2977 thousand **contos** (an increase of 185%), while ordinary expenses (OE) remained stable (see Table 1). After 1960, the financial management of the armed forces of the different colonies became the responsibility of Lisbon through its Department of National Defence (Mesquita, 2011).

**Table 1.** Expenditure on the armed forces compared to total government expenditure (actual). (Thousands **Contos**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>OE</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>Total expenditure AF</th>
<th>Total expenditures of State</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>2876</td>
<td>13,515</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>2977</td>
<td>4805</td>
<td>16,460</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3795</td>
<td>5175</td>
<td>17,944</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3846</td>
<td>5853</td>
<td>19,556</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2185</td>
<td>4368</td>
<td>6563</td>
<td>21,031</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2192</td>
<td>5077</td>
<td>7270</td>
<td>23,216</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2472</td>
<td>5531</td>
<td>8003</td>
<td>25,678</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2624</td>
<td>7174</td>
<td>9798</td>
<td>29,664</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2792</td>
<td>7961</td>
<td>10,753</td>
<td>33,133</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2937</td>
<td>8398</td>
<td>11,334</td>
<td>36,663</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>9461</td>
<td>12,967</td>
<td>42,651</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3731</td>
<td>10,126</td>
<td>13,856</td>
<td>47,553</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4266</td>
<td>10,110</td>
<td>14,376</td>
<td>58,251</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4706</td>
<td>11,884</td>
<td>16,590</td>
<td>68,360</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6402</td>
<td>14,885</td>
<td>21,287</td>
<td>93,775</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9245</td>
<td>8277</td>
<td>17,522</td>
<td>128,128</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


AF: armed forces; OE: ordinary expenses; EE: extraordinary expenses.

*Conto was the multiple of the escudo: 1 conto meant 1000$00 (one thousand escudos). Available at: https://www.infopedia.pt/dicionarios/lingua-portuguesa/conto, accessed 16 July 2019. To have a more accurate idea of the values now, considering the total expenditure of the State for the year 1960: 13,515,000 escudos would be equivalent to 6,008,279.53€. Available at: https://www.pordata.pt/en/Portugal, accessed 15 February 2021.
The costs of the war meant that during the entire period from 1960 to 1974, with the exception of 1970, Portugal had a deficit of accounts. According to Rodrigues (2007), this situation resulted primarily from the huge costs of the war that triggered public spending. The massive use of human and technical capacity in a distant theatre of operations, with extremely adverse environments, could only be maintained with considerable financial support (Mesquita, 2011). This assertion is illustrated in Table 1, which shows armed forces expenditure compared to total government expenditure (OE plus EE).

From 1960 to 1974, EE increased considerably, substantially exceeding OE. This situation was reversed by the end of the war in 1975. According to Simões (2000), the weight of the war in Africa represented an enormous burden for the Portuguese economy, but it also represented an enormous political weight. To mitigate these effects, the government attempted to hide the real costs of the war by sub-budgeting defence expenditures (Simões, 2000), as will be seen later.

As already mentioned, there were essentially two types of expenses incurred by the armed forces: ordinary and extraordinary. It is important to note that the administration of these expenses was the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. Regarding EE, the budget included proposals for the three branches of the armed forces (army, navy, and air force) that were integrated into the General Secretariat of National Defence in a single proposal. This proposal was approved by the Minister of Finance (CECA, 1988). OE appeared in the budget separated by the three branches of the armed forces (see Table 2). EE would be included in the budget of the armed forces, detailing the value of the ‘Overseas Extraordinary Military Forces’ specific to the three theatres of operations (CECA, 1988: 517). The remaining values were related to EE associated with the Department of National Defence and the three branches of the armed forces (see Table 3).

Due to the scarcity of resources and close scrutiny by the Ministry of Finance, these funds were invariably scaled back by the Ministry of Finance, particularly after 1968 (CECA, 1988; Mesquita, 2011). In the tables (see Tables 2 and 3), it is possible to observe the costs incurred during the war with OE and EE in all branches of the armed forces.

Table 2. Tri-service breakdown of total ordinary expenditure from 1960 to 1975 (actual).
(Thousands Contos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air force</th>
<th>Department of National Defence and other services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>833.80</td>
<td>603.30</td>
<td>375.70</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>1833.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>846.00</td>
<td>590.00</td>
<td>364.50</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>1827.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>898.60</td>
<td>616.00</td>
<td>377.30</td>
<td>27.70</td>
<td>1919.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>939.00</td>
<td>662.70</td>
<td>377.20</td>
<td>28.40</td>
<td>2007.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1043.50</td>
<td>404.70</td>
<td>408.50</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>2185.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>985.00</td>
<td>747.60</td>
<td>431.00</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>2192.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1148.70</td>
<td>851.70</td>
<td>442.50</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>2471.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1195.90</td>
<td>953.10</td>
<td>444.80</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>2623.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1261.30</td>
<td>1014.20</td>
<td>456.10</td>
<td>61.00</td>
<td>2792.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1332.10</td>
<td>1072.10</td>
<td>483.40</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>2936.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1576.80</td>
<td>1285.00</td>
<td>588.50</td>
<td>55.80</td>
<td>3506.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1587.70</td>
<td>1447.90</td>
<td>628.20</td>
<td>66.80</td>
<td>3730.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1807.70</td>
<td>1695.30</td>
<td>691.80</td>
<td>71.40</td>
<td>4266.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2000.20</td>
<td>1916.60</td>
<td>715.30</td>
<td>74.60</td>
<td>4706.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2861.40</td>
<td>2498.30</td>
<td>948.30</td>
<td>93.70</td>
<td>6401.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4632.00</td>
<td>2953.80</td>
<td>1438.40</td>
<td>220.90</td>
<td>9245.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from CECA (1988: 512).
EE measured the true scale of the cost of war. The budget constraint of that period had serious repercussions on the relations between the Ministries of National Defence and the Ministry of Finance, sometimes translating into an exchange of correspondence. For example, in a letter from January 1970 (ADN, SGDN6, 716.2), the Minister of National Defence expressed concern about the lack of funds for the settlement of financial charges to be borne by the overseas extraordinary military forces in 1970. The Minister of Defence’s concern and the existing tension are evident in the excerpt of the letter, dated 12 July 1970 which is reproduced in Figure 5 and transcribed and translated below:

… Your Excellency further stated that this reinforcement would not include “arrears from the Army Ministry” which still adds up to a few hundred thousand contos.

I asked Your Excellency to cover extraordinary expenses in 1970 for an amount of 6,745,000 contos, … in 1970, the Ministry of the Army had a charge of 375 thousand contos for deferred payments, in addition to the arrears already indicated, and increases in salaries, so Your Excellency will understand my concern regarding the coverage of extraordinary charges for 1970.

Should not the 375,000 contos deferred be included in the reinforcements provided by you? Will they be considered in the same way as the “arrears”? Further, will 130,000 contos for helicopters that fit in 1970 will also be excluded from those reinforcements?

I am very grateful to Your Excellency if you can elucidate me, at least with regard to the general idea, for the proper administration of expenditure in the part that falls to this department. (ADN, SGDN, 716.2; emphasis in the original).
The government created additional revenue sources to deal with the financial difficulties. This was the case with Angola, where a new tax was levied in 1963 in a new way. The Defence Extraordinary Tax was implemented, but large utility companies were exempted. According to Mesquita (2011), this led to situations of injustice and immorality. Another measure was to resort to loans from the government of the colonies, as was the case in Angola and Mozambique (Mesquita, 2011).
The situation demanded tight control of expenses. By the end of 1965, the Ministry of Army conducted studies to determine the minimum values required for the forces on the battlefield (CECA, 1988). These studies determined that the average amount necessary per day per person (officers, sergeants and soldiers) was 115 escudos (115$00). This value encompassed the salary and campaign subsidy (35$00), food (23$00), uniforms (5$00), sea transport (10$00) and other costs (42$00) (CECA, 1988: 527). The item ‘other costs’ included the purchase of arms, equipment, quartering material, accommodation, religion, health and social assistance, fuels and lubricants, water, electricity, mail and telephones and ammunition (CECA, 1988). The value of 115$00 (presently equivalent to approximately 43.53€) ranged from one province to another; in Angola it was 115$00, in Guinea it was 105$00 and in Mozambique it was 125$00 (CECA, 1988). The differences may be explained by the different modes of transportation required to get from Lisbon to each of the colonies. Based on these calculations, a formula was developed to calculate the annual costs for the armed forces in the different theatres of operations: average amount = 42n (where n is the number of men). The 42n was the formula for Angola, while for Guinea it was 38n and for Mozambique it was 46n (CECA, 1988).

The situation became so complicated that, in 1968, the Minister of Finance did not want to continue to have contact with the Ministry of the Army, believing that the army did not properly manage the funds it was allocated (Mesquita, 2011). By 1974, the Portuguese economy had entered a deficit regime (Varela, 2011). The war effort over nearly 14 years drove military spending to almost 40% of the total public expenditure of the state (Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011). During the war, the economy entered a deficit regime with a negative balance in the general state budget (Mesquita, 2011; Simões, 2000; Varela, 2011).

**Budget overrun**

During the dictatorial regime, one of the main financial concerns was the balance of public accounts. As mentioned before, the war put significant pressure on the control of expenses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget allocation</th>
<th>Expenditure (actual)</th>
<th>Budget variance + /−</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>797.00</td>
<td>1042.90</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1656.90</td>
<td>2976.70</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2189.90</td>
<td>3795.40</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2587.90</td>
<td>3845.60</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2600.30</td>
<td>4367.50</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3547.00</td>
<td>5077.40</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4037.00</td>
<td>5531.00</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5373.00</td>
<td>7174.30</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5607.00</td>
<td>7960.50</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6332.40</td>
<td>8397.70</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6342.40</td>
<td>9460.90</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7023.10</td>
<td>10,125.80</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7575.90</td>
<td>10,110.10</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>7708.30</td>
<td>11,884.00</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8224.60</td>
<td>14,885.30</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8830.00</td>
<td>8276.50</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from CECA (1988: 519).
Table 4 provides a comparison between the initial budget allocation for the National Defence for the period between 1960 and 1975 and the actual expense during that period. The table shows that the degree of budgetary variance is (on average) approximately 46% over the entire period. However, 1961 and 1962 had budget overruns of 80% and 73%, respectively. This can be explained by the beginning of the armed conflict and the mobilisation of human and material resources to war scenarios. A high value was again registered in 1975 when the war ended.

As presented in Table 5, an analysis of the expenses of the overseas extraordinary military forces shows that the degree of overrun at the amount allocated is higher when compared to the budget of the global national defence. As these EE were related to the national defence in conflict situations, specific to the three theatres of operations, they provide an approximation of the actual costs of the war. The numbers presented in Tables 1 to 5 demonstrate how expensive the war was for Portugal. There was an immediate need to control these expenditures, but doing so was difficult (Mesquita, 2011). The flow of numbers/budgets among the different government ministries demonstrates the relevance of the implemented accounting system as well as the documents that were basis for the General Budget of the State (Decree 15465). This accounting information allowed control over the information, preparing budgets, calculating budget variances and reporting, with an additional focus on the costs of the Overseas War.

### Accounting in the Overseas War

#### Accounting system

As mentioned before, the Minister of the Army was responsible for the mainland and overseas territories (DL 42564). The accounting system developed for the colonies was organised following a division of the territory in military regions and independent territorial commands (DL no. 43351, 24 November 1960). DL 43351 established five military regions (with a specific region for Angola, Sao Tome and Principe divided into six areas/commands and another specific region for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget Allocation</th>
<th>Expenditure (Actual)</th>
<th>Budget variance +/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>280.00</td>
<td>526.00</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>950.00</td>
<td>2427.70</td>
<td>156%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1500.00</td>
<td>3264.50</td>
<td>118%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1750.00</td>
<td>3354.90</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1750.00</td>
<td>3592.30</td>
<td>105%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2000.00</td>
<td>4155.70</td>
<td>108%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2500.00</td>
<td>4466.80</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3500.00</td>
<td>5753.30</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4000.00</td>
<td>6197.40</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4000.00</td>
<td>6084.90</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4000.00</td>
<td>6899.10</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4000.00</td>
<td>7129.90</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4500.00</td>
<td>7649.20</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5000.00</td>
<td>7527.50</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5000.00</td>
<td>11,848.20</td>
<td>137%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7100.00</td>
<td>6823.10</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from CECA (1988: 519).

Table 5. Extraordinary expenses of the overseas extraordinary military forces, budget overruns from 1960 to 1975. (Thousands contos).
Mozambique, with three areas/commands and seven independent territorial commands (Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde, Guinea, State of India, Macao and Timor). The military regions and independent territorial commands were divided into ‘military circumscriptions, in accordance with the respective administrative division and the location of the military elements installed in them’ (DL 43351). These military units and establishments, which could be battalions, groups or regiments, were each equipped with a body known as the administrative council. An example of such a military unit was the Batalhão de Cavalaria (Cavalry Battalion) no. 571 of Mozambique (AHM, Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149) (see Figure 6). Other examples include the Companhia de Caçadores (Hunters’ Company) no. 614 of Mozambique (AHM, Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1274, Pasta no. 136) and the Regimento de Infantaria (Infantry Regiment) no. 21 of Angola (AHM, Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1513, Pasta no. 50).

In 1961, the accounting system that was specifically in place for many military units and establishments resulted from Decree no. 35413, dated 29 December 1945. It was entitled ‘Regulation for the Organisation, Operation, Accounting and Bookkeeping of the Administrative Councils’. This law essentially contained standards for the functioning of accounting and models of books, main and auxiliary, for bookkeeping to be undertaken by the administrative councils of the military units and establishments (Biblioteca Pública de Braga (Public Library of Braga), cota S.C., p. 223, 7 ‘V’). Decree no. 34365 of 3 January 1945 created these administrative councils for military units and establishments. In 1945, the Portuguese government felt the need to prepare for war. It stated, ‘[e]xperience has shown the need to bring the activity of the respective commanders or chiefs to the training and preparation for war of the respective commanders or chiefs, freeing them from bureaucratic concerns, which manifest or hinder their command action’. Thus, the organisation of the administrative councils of the military units and establishments is provided in Figure 7, as described in the DL issued at the end of 1945.

Administrative councils had four main responsibilities. First, they superintended all of the acts of administration of the military unit under the guidance of the respective commander or chief. Second, they managed revenues, regardless of their sources, as well as their legal application. Third, funds were entrusted to their custody. Finally, they ensured compliance and legal enforcement of the regulatory provisions as well as special instructions regarding administration (Decree no. 35413, 29 December 1945, Article 5). Each member of the administrative council had, among others, the functions described in Table 6.

At that time, it was not possible to speak about a specific official accounting plan for the bookkeeping related to military expenses. Nonetheless, the description, organisation, and composition of the different expense items are listed in Table 7.

As presented in Figure 8, the accounting records in the administrative councils followed bookkeeping standards and models based on main records/books and auxiliary records/books. The administrative council’s bookkeeping had to be done in harmony with the models defined in Decree no. 35413, mentioned earlier. The records/books had an opening and closing term. They were signed by the president, and the pages were numbered and initialled by him. Although the decree called them ‘registos’ [records], they were, in fact, what are commonly referred to as books.

Each of the main books had a specific function:

- **Resumo Geral de Fundos** (General Summary of Funds): brought together the different movements of the Synthetic Journal in a single monthly movement.
- **Diário Sintético** (Synthetic Journal): briefly reproduced all the movements made in the Analytical Journal; the sums from this journal were transferred monthly to the General Summary of Funds.
Diário Analítico (Analytical Journal): recorded all receipts and payments made by the Treasurer and included them in the respective cash sheets as well as the transfers required by accounting. The sums of this journal were transferred to the Synthetic Journal.

**Figure 6.** Revenues and expenses account of the treasury funds – Cavalry Battalion no. 571 – Mozambique, 1964.

*Source: Arquivo Histórico Militar (Military Historical Archive), Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades (Commission of Accounts and Determination of Responsibilities), Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149.*

- **Diário Analítico (Analytical Journal):** recorded all receipts and payments made by the Treasurer and included them in the respective cash sheets as well as the transfers required by accounting. The sums of this journal were transferred to the Synthetic Journal.
Actas (Minutes): intended to record the minutes of the administrative council, describing the proposals presented, the deliberations taken, the transactions conducted, and the existing balance in the safe.

Material (Material): recorded the movement of materials distributed to administrative sub-units and various services.

Fardamentos (Uniforms): recorded the movement of uniforms, shoes, and raw materials for repair.

Pão (Bread): recorded all of the movement related to bread.

Forragens (Forages): recorded all of the movement related to forages.

Only the main books, in which receipts and payments were recorded, were connected. The amounts were transferred from one to another, with a general summary of funds as the final record. The other main books were used to record different goods/materials; they were independent as they were reliant on a cash-based accounting system. As presented in Figure 8 and described below, the main books were complemented with several auxiliary books:

- *Registo de Armazém* (Warehouse Record): intended to record the entry and exit of foodstuffs and items purchased by the board for consumption of food and general services.
- *Registo de Contas Correntes com Fornecedores* (Record of Current Accounts with Suppliers): intended to open current accounts for suppliers and creditors.
- *Registo de Fardamento* (Record of Uniforms): an auxiliary book to the main book with the same name that had the function of recording the duration of each type of article used in columns.
- *Registo dos Débitos* (Record of Debts): intended to record the debts to be satisfied by the officers.
### Table 6. Functions of the members of the administrative councils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>President</strong></td>
<td>Call meetings; Submit the matters to be discussed to the council for deliberation; Dispatch requests submitted by the head of accounting; Authorize the payment of expenses; Take note of all correspondence; Promote the exact fulfilment of the board’s decisions and supervise, personally or through other members, the management acts resulting from them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head of accounting and reporting member of the board</strong></td>
<td>Receive and follow up on correspondence addressed to the administrative council; Present and report to the administrative council all matters that have to be submitted to its appreciation and resolution; Supervise the execution of the decisions taken; Exercise, by delegation of the president, the necessary oversight and inspection in all acts of battalion administration and in the respective bookkeeping; Present the correspondence received and to be sent to the president; Bookkeeping or ordering, under his responsibility, the books and records of the administrative council; Guide and supervise the bookkeeping of the records under the responsibility of the treasurer and the person in charge of the quartering material; Inform the president, regarding all expenditure documents that have to be dispatched by him, about the legality and appropriateness of the budget; Prepare the accounts and organize the documents that have to be submitted to the inspection process or that must be filed for inspection purposes; Have the bookkeeping of his responsibility properly arranged, closing the transaction for the previous month by the 15th of each month; Organize, by the 15th of each month, the balance sheet of the general summary of funds, in order to accurately inform the administrative council of the balances and availabilities of each one; Ensure that the sums of any proceeds delivered to the treasurer are entered in the safe immediately after receipt; and, Subscribe the books of accounts and documents that, by their nature, require his signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treasurer</strong></td>
<td>Receive, count and collect, through the respective documents, duly checked by the head of accountancy and endorsed by the president, the sums that are delivered to him to enter the safe; Make the payments of the documents delivered to him, duly endorsed by the head of accounting and authorized by the president; Make all receipts, payments and deposits where and when determined by the administrative council; Deliver to the head of accounting, after payments or receipts are closed and after checking the safe, the cash sheet, accompanied by proper documentation; Receive and distribute all uniforms and quartering material for the unit or establishment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on the description provided by the DL no. 35413, of 29 December 1945.
Registo de Depósitos (Record of Deposits): consisted of loose sheets, one for each deposit. Each month, a monthly summary of balances was made, the sum of which should correspond to the total balance in the main book, the ‘General Summary of Funds’.

Registo das Oficinas (Record of Workshops): was used to record the work in all workshops.

Registo das Requisições (Record of Requisitions): served to control the progress of requests made to the administrative council until they were completely satisfied.

Registo de Vencimento de Oficiais (Record of Officers’ Salaries): was used to record all allowances and discounts given to officers each month and to extract the list of salaries processed.

Exploração Agropecuária (Agricultural Exploration): a double-entry bookkeeping system was stipulated for the control of agricultural exploration. For this purpose, the following books were used: (a) income and expenses or cash, (b) inventory of materials and animals, (c) memorial, (d) journal, (e) balance sheets, and (f) ledger.

Registo de Títulos (Record of Securities): intended to mention all funds organised, sent for processing, and received by the administrative council. These records included the date of the movement in which they were recorded in the main book, the ‘General Summary of Funds’.

According to the description of the auxiliary books, they were used to control information of a diversified nature, and some were used to control and provide detailed information contained in one of the main books. This was the case for the Record of Deposits and the Record of Securities with the General Summary of Funds and Uniforms, both main and auxiliary books/records.

Table 7. Structure of the composition of expenses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I – Expenses related to personnel</td>
<td>Regular remunerations – Salaries of staff, contractors and employees; Accidental remunerations – Bonuses, campaign subsidies, insulation bonuses, salary supplement; Other staff costs – Daily subsistence allowances, food, guard uniforms and shoes, subsidies for house rental.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II – Expenses related to materials</td>
<td>Construction and new works; acquisitions of permanent use, real estate, livestock, motor vehicles; Furniture, material of defence and public security, current consumables, raw materials, munitions, printed, everyday items and miscellaneous unspecified, packaging items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III – Payment of services and other charges</td>
<td>Hygiene expenses, health and comfort – Clinical services and hospitalization, light, heating, water, washing and cleaning; Communications expenses – Post and telegraphs, telephones, transport; Facilities charges – Rents of urban and rural buildings; Administrative charges – Subsidies for funeral, family allowances, family subsidies, service payments and charges not specified; Other charges – Driving force, private and reserved expenditures, religious services, awards and medals, unforeseen expenses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the data available at Arquivo Histórico Militar [Military Historical Archive], Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades [Commission of Accounts and Determination of Responsibilities], Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149.
The flow of accounting information from the colonies to Lisbon

Supported by the main and auxiliary books used by each administrative council, at the end of each month, a document called the Conta da Receita e Despesa dos Fundos do Tesouro (Revenues and Expenses Account of the Treasury Funds) was prepared, which corresponded to the general summary of funds (AHM, Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149) (see Figure 6). This document provided the monthly values of revenues (‘Receita’, see Figure 6, left side) and expenditures (‘Despesa’, see Figure 6, right side). On the left side of the page are the values of the revenues based on payment slips; on the right side of the page are the expenditures. The monetary amount of revenues is 750,644$80, which corresponds to the payment in cash (Ordem de pagamento no. 566 – Payment order no. 566) of the expenditures submitted, verified and approved in the previous month.

In Figure 6, expenditures followed the structure described in Table 7, and for each of the items, there is information inserted by the unit (‘Unidade’) – the first column – and by Verification Services (‘Serviços de Verificação’) – the second column. The expenditures included: expenses...
related to personnel (‘Salários com o pessoal’), amounting to 676,667$80, expenses related to materials (‘Despesas com material’), amounting to 1616$80, and payment of services and other charges (‘Pagamento de serviços e diversos encargos’), amounting to 29,462$20. The expenditures indicate the monthly totals of each item submitted for verification and approval by the unit and totalled 730,078$10 (Figure 6, first column with total ‘submetidas a verificação’), while the value confirmed by the verification service was 707,746$80, corresponding to the parcels mentioned above (‘Liquidadas’, Figure 6, last column on the right side). This was the beginning of the flow of information from the colonies to Lisbon (see Figure 9).

In addition, a budget allocation chart [Mapa da Situação das Dotações] (see Figure 10) was prepared to provide information on the execution of budget allocations (‘Rubricas Orçamentais’, see Figure 10, first table in the figure). In this chart, detailed information concerning two of the three classes of expenses is described: expenses related to materials and payment of services and other charges. First, information is given on the budgetary values of the previous periods. These include ‘Saldo anterior’ – previous balance; ‘ Dotação inicial e reforços’ – initial allocations and reinforcements; and ‘Somas’ – balance. This is followed by information on the ‘Despesas submetidas a verificação e liquidadas neste mês’ – expenses submitted to verification and approved this

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**Figure 9. Flow of accounting information from the colonies to Lisbon**.
*The contributions of General Victor Manuel Mota de Mesquita and Sergeant Major Rui Jaime Domingues da Fonseca were fundamental in the elaboration of this figure.*
month and, finally, ‘Saldos disponíveis’ – available budget balances. For each of these items, there is information inserted by the unit (‘Unidade’) – the first line preceded by (a) – and information inserted by Verification Services (‘Serviços de Verificação’) – the second line preceded by (b).

The item Expenses submitted to verification and approved this month corresponds to the monetary totals of each item of expenses related to materials and of payment of services and other charges, as presented in Figure 6. For example, $310 corresponds to ‘Rep. Viaturas’ (vehicle repair) in Figure 10 and is the same value inserted in Figure 6 under the classification of ‘Veículos com motor – Reparações e sobressalentes’ (Engine vehicles – Repair and spare parts). Interestingly, we can verify that not all monetary totals submitted for approval were accepted without changes. For example, the unit registered $3,573 concerning clinical services and hospitalisation (‘Serviços clínicos e de hospitalização’) (see Figures 6 and 10), and Verification Services validated this amount, inserted in the second column of Figure 6. However, Verification Services registered an amount of $3,498 in the expenses submitted for verification and approved for this month, as seen in the second line (Figure 10, first table in the figure – ‘Despesas submetidas a verificação e liquidades neste mês’). The monetary totals concerning personnel (salaries and family allowance – ‘Abono de família’) included in Figure 6 are not included in Figure 10, as they were registered in other documents.

This document was signed by all members of the administrative council (‘Conselho Administrativo’), the president, the head of accounting and the treasurer (see Figure 10) (AHM,
Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149). Afterward, the documents were directed to the Directorate of Account Verification and Administrative Inspection, which was dependent on the QMG, to obtain the Termo de Verificação (verification term) (see Figure 10). This verification term allowed the certification of the final balances of revenue and expenses (‘Verificação de Saldos’ – balance verification, see Figure 10, bottom left). The monetary amounts of the previous balance (‘Saldo anterior’), revenues verified (‘Receitas verificadas’) corresponding to the amount of revenues at 750,644$80 as in Figure 6, the amount of verified expenditures of the month at 707,746$80 (‘Despesas verificadas’), and finally the balance for the next month (‘Saldo que passa’) were provided via the balance verification. The confirmation of the monthly amount of expenditures that was verified and approved is presented in numbers (707,746$80) and described in words (‘Termo de Verificação’, see Figure 10, bottom right). The monthly accounts sent by several units to the Directorate of Accounts Verification and Administrative Inspection for verification and liquidation were accompanied by a statement from the administrative council. In this sworn statement, which was signed by the president of the administrative council, the head of accounting, and the treasurer, it was declared that all legal formalities regarding the expenses submitted for verification and liquidation had been observed (AHM, Comissão de Contas e Apuramento de Responsabilidades, Maço no. 1418, Pasta 149).

In Angola, the Directorate of Accounts Verification and Administrative Inspection was described as follows by Sergeant Major Rui Fonseca11:

The service (section) of Accounts Verification was large. It was located in a privately rented building in Luanda, outside the headquarters. This section is and will always be remembered by all companies and battalion sergeants, captains, and commanders; when they left the premises with the signing of quittance, they took a deep breath because they had made the delivery of all materials and funds needed to return to the mainland. The signing of this section was the last because before they had to make the delivery of war material, the quartering materials, sanitary material, transmissions, and other material that had been requested at the beginning of the commission… (written interview, 14 November 2013).

From the Directorate of Accounts Verification and Administrative Inspection, the accounting documentation was sent to the fourth section of the army staff (see Figure 9). After receiving the documentation, the fourth section prepared an aggregated document, titled the Conta de Gerência Anual (Annual Management Account), which was later sent to the Repartição de Gabinete do Chefe do Estado-Maior do Exército (Office Division of the Army Chief of Staff) (see Figure 9). At this office division, all documents from all the overseas dominions were gathered, and a single document, a global management account, was prepared and submitted to the Minister of the Army, who, in turn, would send it to the General Secretariat of National Defence and then the Ministry of Finance (see Figure 9). Finally, this global management account was sent to the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors) (see Figure 9), a body constituted by judges and endowed with functions of independent control over the fundamental aspects of financial activity. By law, the court had the authority to audit public accounts, including the accounts of overseas units.12

Discussion and conclusion

Portugal, a small country in Europe, historically maintained a large empire, with Lisbon as the centre of an extensive and racially diverse community dispersed around the globe. Angola, Mozambique and Guinea were considered overseas extensions of Portugal, indissolubly linked
to Lisbon (Cairo, 2006; Mesquita, 2011; Opello, 2019). Portugal argued that a non-racial, Christian, and civilising mission was carried out. Nonetheless, despite socioeconomic and racial disparities, Portugal was the only nation that refused self-determination as of 1961 (Opello, 2019; Pereira, 2008; Telo, 2012). Therefore, this study provides insights into a major military conflict of the 20th century, explores the role of military accounting in Portugal and answers the call made by Cobbin and Burrows (2018).

This study reinforces the relevance of studying the adaptive and reactive role of accounting in wartime (Antonelli et al., 2014; Cobbin and Burrows, 2018; Miley and Read, 2014). In Portugal, the adaptive role of accounting is paramount. From 1928 to 1971, the same cash accounting system was in place with the same goal of supporting the government with budgetary control and law enforcement. A war puts pressure on state finances. In 1945, the government felt pressure to issue a law with specific standards for the functioning of the accounting of military units and establishments. The need was to control the organisation, operation, accounting and bookkeeping of the administrative units in the different colonies. They wanted to be better prepared in the case of war (Decree no. 35413, 29 December 1945). This provides an example of the role played by accounting in mediating the relationship between the military and politicians (Funnell, 2006), who serve a broad political base (Antonelli et al., 2014; Funnell, 1990; 2005) and the dominant political elites.

Accordingly, this study demonstrates that the flow of accounting information from the colonies to Lisbon followed a strict circuit, resulting in a global annual management account sent to the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Finance, and the Court of Auditors. The Court of Auditors audited public accounts, including those of overseas units. As argued by Antonelli et al. (2014: 141), the accounting and budgeting procedures in the Overseas War played the role of a legitimising institution in decision-and policy-making regarding war resources. Thus, the accounting system and the circuit of the financial and accounting information had as their main objective the provision of a faster and more efficient account of the situation to make accountable the numerous participants in the process and exercise strong control over the balance of the budget. In line with Mayer-Sommer (2010), the control of expenditure played an important role as it legitimised wartime spending during a period when Portuguese public finances were facing considerable difficulties.

This study also demonstrated the failure to meet budgets that were approved over the course of the entire war period. The costs associated with the war and their unpredictability resulted in a public deficit during that period. The deficit led to situations in which budgeting and accountability mechanisms were subordinated to power relations (Antonelli et al., 2014). The most visible situation was the case of a rupture in the relations among ministries when the Minister of Finance accused the Minister of the Army of not knowing how to properly manage the money already entrusted to him. This situation led to the Ministry of Finance withdrawing the management of public funds from the Ministry of the Army, an example of the political nature of accounting (Chwastiak, 1999, 2001; Funnell, 1990, 2005; Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015).

This study also highlights that budgetary constraints forced the government to develop costing procedures and calculations to reduce battlefield costs, including an analysis of the cost per person per day. Thus, records from the Overseas War reinforce the argument that there was a need for accounting to provide the means by which military expenditure could be better controlled (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2010).

Aligned with accounting history research focused on accounting in military organisations (Funnell, 2006, 2008; King and Case, 2007; Miley, 2006; Sarikas, 2009; Smith, 2001; Vollmers et al., 2016), this study contributes to the literature by providing insight from a non-English setting (Baskerville et al., 2017; Gomes et al., 2015). It also contributes to a better understanding
of the role of accounting in major military conflicts of the 20th century using the specific case of the Portuguese Overseas War of the 1960s and 1970s. This study provides a detailed description of the structure of accounting systems as well as the flow of accounting information between continental Portugal and the colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (1961–1974). The study contributes to a better comprehension of the role that accounting played in this wartime conflict, when there were budget constraints and tight accounting rules supported by law; the focus was on controlling and balancing the budget. Such constraints determined the strategies adopted based on financial and economic criteria.

Finally, this study enriches both Portuguese and international literature by making information that has been confidential for a long period of time public and, therefore, unveils a piece of Portugal’s recent history that has previously been obscured. As argued by Funnell and Chwastiak (2010), this study is expected to stimulate accounting historians in different countries, especially in Portugal, to further research the importance of accounting in ensuring that armed forces are in service of the public good and not used at the behest of powerful dictators.

Other interesting possibilities for future research include investigating the role of accounting in providing and managing the infrastructure and non-military industries needed to support the prosecution of war (see Cinquini et al., 2016; Quinn and Jackson, 2014; Vollmers et al., 2016). In addition, future research could explore the use of non-conventional weapons in different conflict scenarios and unravel the human and social consequences of the conflicts (e.g. Chwastiak, 2001; Lippman and Wilson, 2007). In the specific case of Portugal, diplomacy was used to avoid international agreements that prevented the use of these weapons. In addition to operational advantages, economic advantages also dictated their use. Critical perspectives could be adopted in regard to this research topic, including an ethical perspective, to explore the value (or non-value) of life and how, in situations of conflict, the end justifies the means.

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Notes
1. It is important to acknowledge that while, from the perspective of Portugal, this was just one war, from postcolonial perspectives, there were multiple wars.
2. ‘Dependencies’ were made of small settlements that were dependent on or subordinate to the archipelago or province (Fernandes, 2012).
3. Comissão de Estudo para as Campanhas de África (CECA) [Study Commission for the Africa Campaigns], established by Ordinance 43/80 on 16 February 1980. Among other functions, this committee had to locate, record, and promote the identification of all documents and objects of interest to the study of military intervention in the African campaigns.
4. In budgetary terms, expenditures of the armed forces were classified as ordinary and extraordinary. The first concerned normal and permanent expenditures; the second were those referring to the defence of public order in exceptional circumstances and related charges. Both were incurred in mainland Portugal and overseas. During the Overseas War, the most important extraordinary expenses registered in the state budget were included under the heading ‘Overseas Extraordinary Military Forces’ and related to the expenses incurred overseas by reinforcement forces. By registering the extraordinary expenses related to the military forces overseas separately, it was possible to have a budgetary measure of the cost of the war. Available at http://www.guerracolonial.org, accessed on 30 May 2017.

5. Together with Continental Portugal, the Azores and Madeira archipelagos form the whole of the Portuguese Republic. The Portuguese constitution recognises politico-administrative autonomy to the autonomous regions, with their own respective political and administrative statute and government.


7. It will be used, as in the original documents, escudos and contos, throughout the paper. Escudos was the Portuguese currency at that time, represented by the symbols or $ (which will be used in this work because the other is not available). Conto was the multiple of the escudo: 1 conto meant 1,000$00 (one thousand escudos). The symbol $ is used and positioned, as was the practice in Portugal, after the unitary monetary value and before the cents.


9. In 1965, the daily salary varied by sector of activity. In industry, it was 49$00, in commerce it was 84$00, and in the banking and insurance sector, which had the highest daily salary, it was 125$00 (Carvalho, 1967).

10. The elaboration of the circuit of documents from the colonies to Lisbon was only possible with the help of General Victor Manuel Mota de Mesquita and of the Sargento-mor Rui Fonseca. The authors are grateful for their personal attention and time.

11. Sergeant Major Rui Jaime Domingues da Fonseca fulfilled military service in Angola during the Overseas War. This information was given in a written interview via email.

12. The Court of Auditors was created in 1930 and re-organised in 1933 (Decree no. 22257, 25 February 1933).

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Legislation

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Decree no. 22241, 22 February 1933 – Portuguese Constitution

Decree no. 22257, 25 February 1933 – Reorganisation of the Court of Auditors

Decree-Law no. 22465, 11 April 1933 – Colonial Act
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Decree no. 35413, 29 December 1945 – Regulation for the Organisation, Operation, Accounting, and Bookkeeping of the Administrative Councils
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