opinion, but I will fight for your right to express it." Rather than think that our camp, or even our group, is the only one to be in possession of truth, we should allow other persons to express their opinions and we should do nothing that might contribute to the creation of a climate of fear.

In the final chapter of the book, Blackford mentions an anonymous reviewer for the publisher Bloomsbury who wrote in his blind peer-review "[…] that the manuscript of *The Tyranny of Opinion* merely repackages an existing social consensus" (213). I would rather say that the book illustrates with contemporary examples ideas that can already be found in Tocqueville. I cannot really find anything new or original in the book, and I wonder how Peter Boghossian could call it 'a masterpiece' to be read by 'every university professor' (cover page).

This does not mean that it is a bad book. Nor does it mean that Blackford should not have written it or that Bloomsbury should not have published it. Someone who is familiar with the problems discussed in the book will not see his or her thought-horizon extended. But he or she will nevertheless be glad to see that there are still some persons who are not afraid to openly oppose those in their own camp and to fight intolerance wherever it may come from. Moreover, he or she will be glad to see that there are still some people who adopt a nuanced way of thinking and admit that, "[…] complexity seldom pleases others, yet it's indispensable for serious understanding" (11).

In this context, one would have wished that Blackford had been more careful himself and had thought twice before writing that abortion or physician-assisted suicide are today not opposed by 'liberals of any kind' (197). Taking account of the complexities of these questions in an equally complex society, one can be a liberal and find plausible reasons to reduce abortion and physician-assisted suicide to a minimum. In refusing to admit that one can be a liberal and nevertheless oppose physician-assisted suicide or abortion – though not with the penalization of the woman who has recourse to it, nor of the doctor who practices it – Blackford practices a politics of exclusion or stigmatization, which he criticizes all through the book.

To conclude: the book may be useful for students who want to have a brief and clear exposition of Mill's main ideas about freedom of speech and for those who want to find examples for the intolerance of the Left.

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Brad Inwood. *Stoicism: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 136 pp.

Oxford University Press's *A Very Short Introduction* series entrusts to outstanding scholars the often-difficult task of presenting a selected topic or figure in a synthesis that is brief and accessible on the one hand, while being up to date and well-sourced on the other. A new volume on Stoicism appeared in print in 2018. Given increasing specialization in academia, this burdens the author with a great deal of trouble, but the work

provides a wonderful resource to both the interested layperson, as well as the professional philosopher looking to step into Hellenistic philosophy.

This volume is authored by Brad Inwood, who is highly regarded for his contributions on Pre-Socratic philosophy as well as on the Stoics – notably his delightful book on Seneca and his editorial work in organizing *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). He has also made available translations of various extant writings of the earlier Hellenistic Stoics into modern language for the first time. The author is therefore rightly counted as a leading authority on the topic (perhaps along with scholars such as A.A. Long and M. Schofield).

The author has been able to produce here an interesting introduction to Stoicism, overcoming the "[…] striking gap between the current understanding of Stoicism […] and contemporary academic writing about the ancient school" (10). As Inwood points out, the ancient Hellenistic school of philosophy and the 'therapeutic' presentation of Stoic ethics by, among others, the French philosopher Pierre Hadot (*The Inner Citadel: Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), are two very different things. The current "[…] view of Stoicism as a practical psychological aid is probably the commonest current approach to the school in our own society. But there is another conception of Stoicism that we should also consider, one that puts more emphasis on its historical origins and on the underlying theoretical work that led to the development of Stoic philosophy in the ancient world and provided reasons for adopting their views rather than those of other therapeutic philosophies" (9-10). The gap between popular opinion and scholarship is probably unavoidable in all instances, but as the author notes, it is a more serious problem in the case of Stoicism given the fragmentary state of the ancient texts for over three centuries.

Despite this obstacle, and in accordance with the aim of the series, the author tries to make Stoicism accessible to the non-professional audience by introducing examples of the current popular use of Stoic ideas. He illustrates the low spirits of Marcus Aurelius by using "Marvin, the paranoid android in *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*" (1); reminds us that the Stoic ethical programme is embodied in the academic honour society Phi Beta Kappa (2); and points to entries from a blog that include texts with titles such as "How Does the Stoic Tweet?" (3), as well as Elen Buzare's spiritual exercises (4). Yet in this attempt to show the current relevance of Stoicism, it seems that the author may have been excessively concerned with making the book accessible to his audience. For these references are probably unnecessary to appeal to the modern reader, who is already capable of grasping the ideal of a serene or 'stoic' attitude, given the present thirst for a moral compass.

The book is organized into two introductory chapters, in which the author presents the doctrines and personalities of the best-known of the ancient Stoics, a chapter focusing on the historical genesis of Stoicism, three systematic chapters on Stoic physics, ethics, and logic, and a concluding chapter that attempts to bring the work full-circle by integrating the historical and systematic elements with contemporary ones. In more detail, the introductory chapters include brief excerpts from Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, Epictetus' *Handbook*, and later in the book 'even Seneca' (in whose case we receive just one quotation and are directed generically towards translations provided by the University of Chicago

Press). These excerpts are accompanied by short biographies of the personalities in question. Also of note is that this section includes a graphic timeline (11) and briefer references to less well-known figures whose writings have barely survived. The historical chapter places the birth of Stoicism amid the Academic and Peripatetic traditions. Lastly, the three core, systematic chapters attempt a 'reconstruction' (10) of Stoic doctrine.

Given the fragmentary character of the writings from these figures – especially the early Greek Stoics between 310 and 300 BCE and its Roman revival in the first century CE – the author recognizes that Modern scholars are involved in a task of reconstruction from the notoriously unreliable Diogenes Laertius' *Lives,* the imaginative Cicero's dialogues*,* and Stoic critics such as Sextus Empiricus, Origen, and Plutarch. This entails a measure of uncertainty about what the Stoic doctrines actually were.

This uncertainty is somewhat forgotten in the core, systematic chapters, in which the author presents these Stoic physical or epistemological doctrines. While Inwood acknowledges the possible exception of Marcus Aurelius about the nature of the spirit (as distinct from the materialist Stoic physics) and points to some authors whose only concern is the ethical programme, he is far more interested in presenting Stoicism as providing a comprehensively integrated doctrine ranging from the said ethical programme all the way up to a matching cosmology.

In the concluding chapter, he goes so far as to suggest that the recovery of the ancient ethical programme should invite a rapprochement with our best and presumably not 'obsolete' modern cosmology. As he says, "[…] even if Stoicism for the modern world were significantly transformed by swapping out an obsolete understanding of the natural world for one based on our current best science, it would, I contend, still be worth doing" (109). The author's reason for this attempt at reconciliation is that the Stoic ethical programme integrally includes navigating the restraints and opportunities provided by the very nature of the world around us (108). (However, we find it difficult to understand how our modern science of the natural world, which is supposed to be value-neutral, can provide a cosmology rich enough to bear relevance to this sort of ethical program).

Throughout the short book, the author 'takes the side' of Large Stoicism, making a compelling case for the consistency of the comprehensive worldview involved in the Stoic ethical attitude. Overall, it is remarkable. But the third chapter of the book seems less successful, despite the author's efforts to clarify the roots of early Stoicism and engage the Greek Stoics in dialogue with "Plato and his followers" (27), who shared the same veneration for Socrates.

In chapter 3, Inwood suggests that the fictional cosmology that we find in Plato's *Timaeus* (see Catherine Zuckert's major book on Plato's philosophers) and Xenophon's writings appealed to Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. What separated Plato and Xenophon from Zeno was "in a word, metaphysics" (28). That is, the author suggests, why the "[…] early Stoics didn't just join the school Plato founded" (28) – where probably Zeno studied under Polemo –owing to differences in 'metaphysics'.

Moreover, Inwood takes at face value the traditional interpretation of the theory of forms, despite acknowledging that "[…] there is still a wide-ranging debated about what separation meant to Plato" (29). So, the Stoics had to come up with a new theory.

The author seems to rely especially on the work of a (nonetheless) brilliant French philosopher, the late Jacques Brunschwig (especially his seminal paper collected in *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Inwood agrees that the materialistic giants in Plato's *Sophist* provided Zeno "[…] with the way of handling the disagreement about incorporeal Forms, from where he developed an entire philosophical system." (31).

The author clearly suggests to the reader that – notwithstanding the fragmentary and second-hand nature of our knowledge of this early period – the emergence of the Stoic school was grounded in fundamental differences in cosmology and not in a new ethical ideal, barring exceptions made to Aristo of Chios, Minimal Stoicism, and most extant writings of the (late) Roman period.

While the author's narrative of the interaction between Stoicism and the Academic-Peripatetic traditions is an interesting hypothesis, suggesting that they are sheer physicalists may easily mislead the contemporary reader who is used to the modern view, from Descartes onwards, of man, the world, and god – a view that bifurcates in a radical way the concepts of spirit and matter, a view that was alien to the Stoics.

Most Stoics whose physical writings are extant do in fact assert that only bodies exist, such that they can be called physicalists. Even so, this can only rightly be said in a looser sense than we are more familiar with, since their cosmology acknowledges non-physical things as subsistent (*huphestos*) but non-existent, e.g. times, places, and sayables (*lektas*), in a finely-grained way very different from the strictures of modern thinking. Had Inwood chosen to use an example from contemporary, popular culture, the far more popular Star Wars' cosmology of the Force would probably illustrate this looser sense of Stoic physicalism better than the analogy using *Hitchhiker´s Guide to the Galaxy*.

Moreover, although the author's presentation of Stoic physics does raise interesting questions about human freedom and causality, Inwood frames the question in terms of Analytic Philosophy as though an ancient form of compatibilism (53-54). Such an approach in modern terms may be misleading because it does not emphasize what is distinctive in Stoic physicalist cosmology. It is unclear to the reader throughout the book to what extent Stoic cosmology implies an anthropology that is entirely different from that of the 'ghost in the machine', to use the pithy and revealing expression of Gilbert Ryle. As far as the Stoics are concerned, we have in mind here a comparatively idiosyncratic biological anthropology (cf. the references in Dirk Baltzly. "Stoicism." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*) rather than something akin to the mechanistic view of, for example, J. J. C. Smart. Additionally, even if it is obvious that we should not consider grasping Stoic physics in a radically dualistic way, the presentation does not convey with enough strength the historical contrast between the Atomists and Epicureans on the one hand, and the distinctive use of 'spirit' (*pneuma*) and 'reason' (*logos*) that makes for the characteristically Stoic view on the other.

Moreover, nothing is said about the role of the Stoics concerning the natural law (although probably the most consistent presentation is also indirect, through Cicero's characters in his *Republic* and *Laws*), nor does the book explore the magnificent work of M. Schofield about the Stoic view of the city. This could have been at least pedagogically

useful in demonstrating how there cannot be a modern Stoicism without a complementary cosmology – however that might be achieved in a contemporary way.

Despite these reservations, the book is truly remarkable and manages to maintain a difficult balance of appealing to both professionals and to wider readership. Those concerned with living ethically will find a readable introduction to this fascinating school of thought, and philosophers, especially in in the field of Hellenistic philosophy, will find it informative because it does not refrain from presenting an interesting, if sometimes controversial, reconstruction of the early Stoic worldview. This work seems to us a welcome contribution, both for its own merits, and because Hellenistic philosophy as a whole has regretfully received, so far anyway, much less attention than that of the classical Greek period.

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Robert M. McManus, Stanley J. Ward, and Alexandra K. Perry, *Ethical Leadership: A Primer*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018. 392 pp.

This is a comprehensive and approachable introduction to ethical leadership. The book has two parts. Part I contains ten chapters on the core ethical theories that readers of *Ethical Perspectives* will undoubtedly be familiar with, including Kantianism, virtue ethics, social contract theory, divine command theory, and ethical egoism. Part II contains five chapters on five models of leadership that, according to McManus *et al.*, "[…] lend themselves well to discussions of ethics and leadership" (239). Examples of such leadership models are adaptive leadership, servant leadership and authentic leadership. The book also contains a useful introduction and conclusion written by the editors. The core chapters are written by academics from a wide variety of backgrounds, such as leadership education, clinical ethics, social entrepreneurship, agricultural education and communication, and philosophy.

In the present review, I first explain how McManus *et al.* define ethical leadership. I then critically discuss one of the many topics that are discussed in the book and that I found of interest. After this, I list and evaluate the editors' conclusions about ethical leadership. I close with my overall assessment of this book.

In their introductory chapter, McManus *et al.* present the so-called "Five Components Analysis of Leadership Model" (7). On this model, understanding leadership requires understanding (i) the leader, (ii) the follower(s), (iii) the goal that the leader and follower are trying to achieve, (iv) the context in which they operate and (v) the cultural values and norms that impact the leadership process. Leadership is subsequently defined as "[…] the process by which leaders and followers work together toward a goal (or goals) within a context shaped by cultural values and norms" (6). *Ethical* leadership, then, is about doing the right thing, or behaving well, as one assumes the role of leader in this process.