


Universidade do Minho
Instituto de Letras e Ciências Humanas

Eduardo Jorge Costa Pinto

**Green Republicanism: non-domination for
an ecologically sustainable planet**



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an ecologically sustainable planet**

Doctoral Thesis
Doctoral Degree in Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy

Trabalho efetuado sob a orientação do(a)
Supervised by:

Professor Roberto Merrill
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Finally, I must thank my family for everything. Always. And for Elvira for all the weekends I stole from us – this thesis is dedicated to you.

Statement of integrity

I hereby declare having conducted this academic work with integrity. I confirm that I have not used plagiarism or any form of undue use of information or falsification of results along the process leading to its elaboration. I further declare that I have fully acknowledged the Code of Ethical Conduct of the University of Minho.

Jorge Pinto

Republicanism Verde: Não-dominância num planeta ecologicamente sustentável

Resumo

O republicanismo recebeu um interesse renovado nas duas últimas décadas. No centro da sua definição estão as noções de liberdade como não-dominância, contestação, virtudes cívicas, participação cívica, interesse público sobre privado, combate à corrupção e também a defesa do Estado de direito. Apesar desse interesse, o republicanismo não deu ainda atenção suficiente aos desafios ecológicos do presente. A intenção dos cinco artigos que, juntos, constituem esta tese é ajudar a preencher essa lacuna na teoria política republicana. A tese compara diferentes concepções de liberdade e como estas respondem à implementação de limites ecológicos que, na minha opinião, são necessários para nos afastarmos da insustentabilidade ecológica atual. A conclusão é que a concepção republicana de liberdade como não-dominância está melhor posicionada para justificar a implementação de limites ecológicos. Esta é uma discussão importante, uma vez que muitas vezes os limites ecológicos são recusados com argumento de que estes representam um ataque inaceitável à liberdade. O conceito de republicanismo verde é discutido e apresentado como a interseção da teoria política republicana e da teoria política verde. O republicanismo verde é não-neutro e está interessado em promover a convivialidade, tendo como aspeto fundamental a promoção do pós-produtivismo. Um rendimento básico incondicional (RBI) é assim um elemento importante da teoria republicana verde. Para que isso seja verdade, no entanto, algumas condições na definição do RBI devem ser observadas. Assim, são comparadas duas justificações verdes de um RBI, argumentando que a situação atual de múltiplas crises ecológicas exigirá a mais radical delas e que outras medidas paralelas ao RBI são necessárias. Em relação ao objetivo do republicanismo verde de promover o pós-produtivismo, um RBI é comparado com os sistemas de segurança social existentes e com um rendimento participativo verde. Conclui-se que, dependendo de como é definido, um RBI poderia contribuir para o pós-produtivismo e, ao mesmo tempo, ser não-arbitrário, obedecendo às condições republicanas.

Palavras-chave: Republicanismo; Teoria Política Verde; Pós-produtivismo; RBI

Green Republicanism: non-domination for an ecologically sustainable planet

Abstract

Republican political theory has received renewed interest in recent decades. Central to the definition of republicanism are the notions of freedom as non-domination, contestation, civic virtues, participation in the political life of the community, public over private interest, combatting all forms of corruption, and also the defence of a state based on the rule of law. Despite this renewed interest, republicanism has so far not given enough attention to the ecological challenges of the present. The intention of the five articles that, together, constitute this dissertation is to help fill that gap in republican political theory. The dissertation compares different conceptions of freedom and how they allow room for the implementation of ecological limits that, as I argue, are required to move away from ecological unsustainability. The conclusion is that the republican conception of freedom as non-domination is better positioned to justify the implementation of ecological limits. This is an important analysis as ecological limits are often refused on the grounds that they are limiting freedom in an unacceptable way. The concept of green republicanism is discussed and presented as the subset of republican political theory that overlaps with green political theory. Green republicanism is non-neutral and interested in promoting conviviality, having as a key feature the promotion of post-productivism. An unconditional basic income (BI) is an important element of green republican theory. For this to be true, however, some conditions in the design of the BI need to be true. I thus confront two green cases of a BI, arguing that the current situation of multiple ecological crises will require the more radical of the cases and that parallel measures are required. Regarding the green republican goal of promoting post-productivism, a BI is compared with existing welfare regimes and with a green participation income. The conclusion is that depending on how it is defined, an unconditional basic income could contribute to post-productivism while being non-arbitrary, thereby obeying the green republican conditions.

Keywords: Republicanism; Green Political Theory; Post-productivism; Basic Income

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List of articles

This dissertation consists of five published articles, which will be referred to throughout this general introduction with the Roman numbers I-V. They will be presented in their original format, i.e. with the referencing and formatting rules used by the journals where they were published.

- I. Pinto, J. 2019. Freedom and Ecological Limits. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1698147>
- II. Pinto, J. 2019. Green Republicanism as a non-neutral and convivial politics. *Ethics, Politics and Society*, <http://www.epsjournal.ilch.uminho.pt/index.php/eps/article/view/116>
- III. Pinto, J. 2020. Environmentalism, Ecologism, and Basic Income. *Basic Income Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2019-0026>
- IV. Pinto, J. 2019. Green republicanism and the shift to post-productivism: a defence of an unconditional basic income, *Res Publica*, 26(2), 257-274, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-019-09444-1>
- V. Howard, M., Pinto, J. and Schachtschneider, U. 2019. Ecological Effects of Basic Income. In *The Palgrave International Handbook of Basic Income*, ed. Malcolm Torry, 111-132. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-23614-4>

Introduction

L'homme est la nature prenant conscience d'elle-même.

Élisée Reclus

Capitalism's growth imperative stands radically at odds with ecology's imperative of interdependence and limit. These two imperatives can no longer co-exist with each other. Either we establish an ecological society, or society will go under for everyone.

Ursula le Guin

“Let's do it now - Greta Thunberg¹ crosses the Atlantic and calls for urgent climate action”, “Video - Greta Thunberg tells Trump to ‘listen to the science’”, “Somalia - Severe hunger threatens millions as climate emergency deepens”, “Amazon - ‘Worst of wildfires still to come’ despite Brazil claiming crisis is under control”. The day I am writing this introduction, in late August 2019, these are some of the headlines of the British newspaper *The Guardian*. Similar headlines can be found in very nearly every major European newspaper, highlighting the fact that what we can call the environmental cause is gaining renewed interest and climbing the ladder on the list of people’s concerns.

Finding solutions to this ecological crisis – deeply linked with social and economic crises – is a major present-day challenge. Republican political theory can offer some answers to these challenges but, to do so, gaps need to be filled. The goal of this dissertation and of the five articles that comprise it is to help fill that gap in republican political theory, by bringing the ecological dimension into republican theory. To date, and despite many overlaps, republican theory has failed to address green issues seriously. For this reason, this dissertation is part of the effort to define a green republican theory, which, as I argue, is the subset of republican political theory that overlaps with green political theory. Green republicanism would thus aim at promoting human flourishing by ensuring a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic (ARTICLE II).

¹ Greta Thunberg is a 16-year-old Swedish activist who became known for organizing weekly school strikes advocating for the climate that have spread across the globe.

My intention is certainly not to develop a full political theory, but rather to advance some ideas and concepts that might be included in a green republican theory. As we shall see throughout this introductory text and the articles thereafter, a green republican theory would have to review some of the classical republican definitions in order to answer both climate and social needs.

The present moment of “actually existing unsustainability” (Barry 2012) will arguably require setting up limits in order to bring us back to a situation of ecological sustainability. Quite often, however, the need to act and set up ecological limits is opposed on the grounds that such limits reduce freedom in an unacceptable way. This has been an essential argument used against ecological limits, and is a reason why it is important to challenge it from a green republican perspective. To discuss the impacts that ecological limits will have in terms of freedom, it is crucial to discuss the different conceptions of freedom used. ARTICLE I argues that the republican conception of freedom as non-domination offers a strong justification for ecological limits without coercing freedom.

In this dissertation I also argue that an important element of a green republican theory that would serve to address the ecological, social, and economic crises is an unconditional basic income. However, as a basic income can be designed in various ways, it is important to discuss what the required characteristics are in order to have a positive impact in ecological terms (ARTICLE III; ARTICLE V). A green republican basic income would thus need to serve as a tool to promote post-productivism (ARTICLE IV).

Republicanism and Ecology

Originating in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, republican political theory has had several expressions over the centuries, depending on the era and place (van Gelderen and Skinner 2012a; 2012b). Dispute continues among scholars regarding the classical works that inspire current conceptions of republicanism. For this reason, two different branches of republicanism can be defined. One is commonly identified as neo-Aristotelian or civic humanist and defends a perfectionist philosophy, claiming that the individual is free as long as she expresses patriotic citizenship and is actively involved and participative in the life of the community, identifying and combating any sort of corruption that could put the common good at risk (Pocock 2016; Sandel 1996; Taylor 1995).

The other, and currently predominant branch of republicanism, is known as neo-Roman or civic republicanism. In this version of republicanism, political liberty as non-domination and independence from arbitrary or uncontrolled power is central (Lovett 2018). The principles of common good, civic virtues, participation in public life, and opposition to corruption are essential as well, but unlike the civic

humanistic view, they are not *intrinsically* important, but are instead a way to secure independence from arbitrary or uncontrolled power. As Pettit (1997, p. 19) puts it, “if democratic participation is supported within this philosophy of liberty, that is not because it is a good in itself, but rather because it serves a useful purpose in the protection of the individual”.

Unlike civic humanism, which praises a positive conception of freedom, civic republicanism goes beyond the dual proposal of positive and negative liberties (Berlin 2002) and proposes a third conception of liberty, a concept of freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997; 2012; 2014; Skinner 2008; Viroli 2001). Freedom as non-domination presupposes not only that there might be a reduction of freedom without interferences, but there might also be interferences that do not limit freedom.

The civic republican conception of freedom is often presented as a broadly negative one, as its focus is the protection *from* domination. Despite the prominent difference between these two conceptions of republican freedom, it should not worry us greatly, especially because as Casassas points out, republican freedom must encompass both the positive and negative dimensions as freedom is “always oriented towards an action, a possibility of making” (Casassas 2018, p. 26).

The links between these concepts of freedom, virtues, and participation, and what can be called broadly the “environment” are substantial. It is thus not surprising that, already in Antiquity, the nature and different elements of the ecosphere were linked with other political and social issues. References to the importance of environmental elements can already be found in some of the main classical texts on republicanism, such as Cicero’s “On the commonwealth and on the laws”. While referring to the conditions that allowed the foundation of Rome, he claims the importance of a sane environment: “The site that Romulus chose also abounded in springs and was a healthful spot in a plague-ridden region: the hills not only receive a breeze, but they bring shade to the valleys” (Cicero 1999, Book 2.11).

Later, Machiavelli would refer to destructive natural events – “one of those tempestuous rivers which, in an angry outburst, inundates plains, uproots trees, ruins buildings, and rips up the earth from one place to deposit it in another” – in order to describe fortune (Machiavelli 2008, p. 363). The same Machiavelli would wonder in his “Discourses on Livy” if a sterile place should be chosen to found a republic, as such a place would lead men “to be industrious and less seized by idleness, live more united, having less cause for discord, because of the poverty of the site” (Machiavelli 1996, p. 8).

There are many other references to the natural elements in texts coming down to us from Antiquity.² Let us consider a small extract of Virgil's magnificent poem on farming, "Georgics", from which I select some lines that clearly reveal his interest in protecting the ecosphere:

"But if the soil exhales shifting mists and transient vapors,
if it drinks in moisture that is released at will,
if it always clothes itself in fresh green grass and does not
damage the iron plow with darkening and salt-borne rust,
it will cover your elms with heavy-laden vines, will make
your olive trees fruitful and prove, as you cultivate it,
both nourishing for cattle and kind to your angled plow." (Virgil 2005, p. 28)

It is obvious that neither Cicero, Machiavelli, or Virgil could be referring to the environmental challenges as they are understood today. But it becomes clear that the capacity to found and maintain a republic is linked to the natural environment surrounding it. This highlights an element of extreme importance when analysing republicanism in a time of ecological emergency: the interconnection and interdependence between humans and among humans, other animals, and nature. Republicanism shares with green politics the understanding of "the human dependence on natural forces outside of control, the embeddedness of humankind in metabolic phenomena on which we depend to survive, and the limits of our comprehension of the world" (Fremaux 2018, p. 233).

Despite multiple overlaps between republicanism and green political theory, research on the commonalities is still incipient. I agree with Serge Audier (2015) who, in his book on the history of republicanism, argues that there is a lack of research between green and republican theories, and that the next step for republican theory should indeed be the inclusion of the ecological dimension. He focuses on the interdependencies that link the individual to the society and to the local and global environment to argue that the task of eco-republicanism – or green republicanism as I am referring to it – is "the construction of collective and individual autonomy within the interdependency" (Audier 2015, p. 114).

In this dissertation I claim that a central feature of green republicanism is the transition to a post-productivist society by promoting the activities within the autonomous sphere, i.e. the sphere of activities outside the market and the state spheres (ARTICLE IV). It is in this sphere, I argue, that citizens can be more active in the lives of their communities *while* having a smaller ecological impact (ARTICLE II). This

² See Voisin (2014) for a collection of some, including authors from Rome, Greece, and Carthage.

will imply structural changes at various levels, which are not compatible with thinner green perspectives such as environmentalism (ARTICLE III). Instead, given the dimension of the ecological crisis we currently face, the green republican transition to a post-productivist society implies transformations at the social, economic, and individual levels. It will imply that individuals are seen and treated as citizens rather than as consumers, that unsustainable practices of consumption and production are reviewed, and that our concept of nature as something to be used without limits in order to promote human flourishing is rejected.

Nevertheless, this transition is limited by two conditions. The first is that a positive ecological outcome needs to be observed and the second is that the promotion of ecological sustainability shall not be achieved at the expense of freedom (here conceived as the republican freedom as non-domination). As such, a green republican theory will need to reject many types of eco-authoritarian approaches to the ecological challenges, as they would imply a reduction in terms of freedom. Against eco-authoritarianism and eco-catastrophism, green republicans imagine a future in which sustainability, in its social, economic, and ecological dimensions, is a reality and is not achieved at the expense of freedom-limitation.

Why a Basic Income?

Even if taken to the extreme (possible) end result, the outcome of the ecological crisis will hardly be human extinction. Instead, what we are risking is a “climate apartheid”,³ whereby a small elite will manage to live well while the majority will suffer the consequences of extreme climate and environmental phenomena. I thus follow Ingrid Robeyns (2017) when she claims that it “is clear that thinking about sustainable prosperity cannot be separated from thinking about economic inequalities and injustices”. And an unconditional basic income (BI) could be a tool to answer those needs. A BI is paid in cash, on an individual basis, unconditionally (without means-test or work requirement) and universally to all citizens or long-term residents of a political territorial area (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).

The idea of implementing a BI as part of a revised welfare system has entered the political debate in several countries. The referendum in Switzerland in 2016, the BI experiment in Finland, the role played by the concept during the 2017 French presidential elections, and the private initiatives to start basic income pilots are chief among the cases which have attracted more media and public attention. But despite the common features, all those basic income proposals are part of very different visions of the

³ This is the expression used by United Nations' Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston - <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1041261>

society and the way it should be organized. This dissertation offers the contribution of filling the gap in the discussion of the ecological aspects of a BI and how it can be part of a green republican theory.

Both the greens and republicans have looked into the idea of the basic income. The reasons for support are not always strictly linked to ecological issues and there are at least two green cases for a BI that shall be analysed separately: an environmentalist and an ecologist BI (ARTICLE III). The former would fit an environmentalist approach to solve the ecological crisis, without aiming at any structural change in the productivist economic model. It could then fit a green growth strategy, in which a productivist model of the economy is maintained but seeks to reduce the environmental impact of the human activities. An ecologist BI, on the other hand, would aim at structural changes at the social and economic levels, in support of a non-growth or de-growth model.

As for the republican analysis of a BI, different reasons have been advanced to support the idea. First, by being paid unconditionally and universally, a BI would reduce the risk of arbitrariness in its distribution compared to other welfare policies (Raventós 2007). Second, a BI would help to reduce the risk of domination by supporting individuals fulfilling their basic needs, thus serving as an economic floor (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2016; Lovett 2010; Pettit 2008). Finally, a BI could help to promote civic participation and activism (Raventós 2007).

From a green republican perspective, a BI could help to break the link between labour and income, fostering the shift of activities to the autonomous sphere. To do so, however, a number of conditions need to be met. Of particular importance is the amount of the income because, as I shall argue, only a generous BI would serve green republican goals. The reason for that is that only if set at a generous level will people indeed have the economic floor that allows them to experiment with more ecologically responsible ways of life and shift some of their activities to the autonomous sphere (ARTICLE III; ARTICLE V).

Activities in the autonomous sphere can be seen as having, on average, a lesser ecological impact, while promoting non-domination. Although important, a BI would hardly be a sufficient means by which to achieve a successful transition to a post-productivist economy and society. Measures such as a work-time limit, a maximum salary, and other inequality-reducing measures, the creation of convivial spaces, and providing citizens with the capacity to participate in the democratic processes at different levels would be required (ARTICLE V).

Participation in the autonomous sphere is then different from participation in the other spheres. Unlike the situation in the market sphere, production and consumption in the autonomous sphere might

be more ecologically responsible and suffer less from the pressure of an economic system dependent on economic growth. And unlike what happens in the state sphere, participation goes beyond simply voting in a representative democracy. For this to be true, other measures implemented in parallel with a BI are arguably required. Thus, green republicans will be interested in promoting a convivial society, making participation in the autonomous sphere valuable both as a critical component of safeguarding the autonomous sphere itself and because it has strong direct links to ecologically sustainable production and consumption (ARTICLE II; ARTICLE V).

Depending on how it is designed, an unconditional basic income could contribute to post-productivism while remaining non-arbitrary, thus obeying the green republican conditions (ARTICLE II). Productivism is a structural part of a capitalist organization of the society and of the economy. As such, a basic income can be seen not as a “capitalistic road to communism” (van der Veen and van Parijs 1986) but rather as a capitalistic road to post-capitalism and post-productivism.

Overview of the Articles

This dissertation consists of five articles that build on each other and together intend to map out the key features of a green republican approach to ecological limits and the shape of the post-productivist society of the future. I provide below a short summary of the five articles and then end with a short conclusion of the dissertation.

ARTICLE I – Freedom and ecological limits

Unlike limitations, which are part of nature, limits are a set of laws or rules that are imposed by others or self-imposed. Defining and implementing limits that will allow us to move away from the current situation of unsustainability is, I argue, part of a more radical approach to green issues that goes beyond simple conservationism or environmentalism (Cf. ARTICLE III). One key argument used to refute ecological limits is that they represent an unacceptable limitation of freedom. But is that really so? In seeking to answer this question, ARTICLE I discusses different conceptions of freedom and how they relate with ecological limits.

Surprisingly, the study of the relationship between freedom and ecological limits is still lacking. This is surprising because one of the reasons often presented to reject the implementation of ecological limits is the supposed attack on freedom that such limits would imply. Moreover, the consequences of the multiple ecological crises will very likely impact freedom in the medium and long term – think for example of the consequences if natural resources become scarcer. These are then two parameters associating

freedom and ecological limits. On the one hand, freedom is often described as being in competition with ecological sustainability and the limits that it demands. On the other hand, we must consider the impact on an individual's freedom in the future due to ecological catastrophe if strict limits are not implemented in the present.

With this in mind, ARTICLE I looks into different conceptions of freedom and discusses how they relate with the need for ecological limits. The conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and as non-limitation are closely linked, as both emerged with Thomas Hobbes when he defined a free man as the one who “is not hindered to do what he has a will to” (Hobbes 1996, Ch. 21.2). As such, both conceptions consider that any hindrance, be it the will of another agent or natural limitations, count as freedom-limiting. But although for “freedom as non-limitation”, the greater the sheer number of options available to an agent, the freer she is, for the conception of “non-frustration”, the most important thing is the protection of the favourite option of the agent.

These two conceptions of freedom have “a tight connection with economic growth”, which is normally associated with an increased number of options (Fragnière 2016, p. 39). They are also associated with a productivist and consumerist approach to economy, based on permanent production of new goods, independently of their need. The difficulties to justify ecological limits under these two conceptions of freedom are clear. For non-limitation, any limit – and this certainly includes the ecological limits that I argue to be necessary – is seen as reducing freedom. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that none of the favourite options would be affected by the ecological limits, which would imply a reduction of freedom conceived as non-frustration, as well.

While non-frustration considers a variety of hindrances as limiting freedom, the conception of freedom as non-interference considers only those that are of human origin and deliberate. This makes it difficult to justify the required ecological limits, because even if the conception of freedom as non-interference is less concerned about the total number of options when compared with non-limitation, the ecological limits would represent an interference, thus reducing freedom according to this conception. One could still argue that if limits in the present would avoid stricter limits in the future, then they could be accepted. Analysing this freedom trade-off would be a very difficult task, however, and is a reason why advocates of freedom as non-interference would hardly accept such an argument.

Finally, how would the republican conception of freedom as non-domination perform and justify ecological limits? This conception of freedom argues that freedom might be reduced even in the absence

of interferences and, at the same time, that an interference does not necessarily represent a limitation in terms of freedom – this is so as long as the interference is a non-domination one. Setting ecological limits would appear to be possible without increasing the domination an agent would be under, and so without reducing her freedom conceived as non-domination. And given the dimension of the challenge of moving away from a situation of ecological unsustainability, the promotion of freedom as non-domination might actually require some loss of freedom in non-interference terms. Thus, in times of ecological emergency, non-domination is not only compatible with ecological limits, but might even require such limits in order to be promoted.

Freedom as non-domination, which is less concerned with the sheer number of options that are impacted by ecological limits, accepts that ecological limits do not infringe on freedom under certain conditions, namely having a republican form of government. Moreover, non-domination would emphasize adequate resourcing, and therefore be concerned with forms of structural domination that might limit – via invasion or vitiating – the agent's freedom.

ARTICLE II – Green republicanism as a non-neutral and convivial politics

The republican conception of freedom as non-domination is thus better positioned to justify ecological limits, which are themselves essential to move us away from a situation of ecological unsustainability. ARTICLE II looks into other potential connections between green and republican political theories. A green republican theory, so I argue, is the subset of republican political theory that overlaps with green political theory. Thus, green republicanism can be defined as a political theory focussed on promoting human (and non-human)⁴ flourishing through the assurance of a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic.

Green republicanism seeks to promote conceptions of the good that, on the one hand, promote ecological sustainability, and on the other, preserve and promote freedom as non-domination. These two conditions together imply that some conceptions of the good that might promote ecological sustainability – think of deep ecology, eco-authoritarianism, or eco-fascism – are excluded, as they imply an increase in terms of domination. Similarly, views of republicanism that disregard the ecological limits of the planet and the need to promote ecological sustainability will not fall into the realm of green republicanism. The latter element has been associated with most accounts of republicanism, which is why I agree with Audier

⁴ Although I think that green republicanism should include non-human flourishing as well, this point is not further developed in the dissertation.

(2019) when he argues that a green form of republicanism, based on a post-productivist view of the economy, is essential in order to face the present and future ecological crisis (ARTICLE IV).

The question at this point is if the promotion of post-productivism makes green republicanism perfectionist or non-neutral. I argue that green republicanism would be non-neutral because “a firm commitment to neutrality must rule out any measures that would afford favourable treatment to those conceptions of the good in which active political engagement and civic virtue are valorised relative to those conceptions of the good in which they are regarded with indifference or even abhorrence” (Lovett and Whitfield 2016, p. 127). As those conceptions of the good are at the core of republican political theory, it is difficult to justify how green republicanism, at least in the way I am presenting it, can be neutral.

My point, then, is that green republicanism would promote conceptions of the good that promote ecological sustainability and that reduce domination. This allows for a rather wide range of conceptions to make this non-neutral approach a non-perfectionist one. As Pocock (2016) argues, the exact definition of the common good is not pre-determined, but should instead be the result of civic and political deliberation.

Although some forms of perfectionism are compatible with republican theory, green republicanism, even with a non-neutralist approach to the common good, does not necessarily need to be perfectionist. By ranking different conceptions of the common good according to how they would promote non-domination and ecological sustainability, the state would be non-neutral without limiting the freedom of its citizens, thereby assuming a quasi-perfectionist form, as citizens would nevertheless have the power to discuss and agree on which of those (non-dominating) conceptions of the good they would prefer. This discussion could be part of a politics of conviviality.

Many overlaps between conviviality and green republicanism are discussed in detail in ARTICLE II. This concept, which is mostly associated with Ivan Illich, refers to a way of living in society, cooperating and rivalling, within the natural limits of the planet. It implies the existence of “tools for conviviality” that can be defined as “all rationally designed devices, be they artefacts or rules, codes or operators” (Illich 1975, p. 34) that are created to support conviviality. Such tools could serve to expand the activities of the autonomous sphere at the expense of the activities within the market sphere, supporting the definition of an alternative economic system, one that does not depend on economic growth and has a weaker impact in ecological terms.

Green republicans will see conviviality as a means to promote civic virtues and civic participation. To do so, the places for participation need to be created and the conditions for the citizens to actively participate will need to be assured. More than simply having the possibility to contest decisions taken by their governments in order to ensure that they are not dominated (Cf. Pettit 1997), green republicanism is interested in having proactive citizens who, after discussing and confronting their ideas, might be co-authors of – or at least have a say regarding – the laws that rule them *while* the former are being drafted. The need for rules and measures to promote ecological sustainability is especially evident given the urgency and the dimension of the challenge ahead. Who better than citizens to agree on the measures that will ensure their future?

Unlike other republican approaches, which indeed see the control of the natural world as a condition for human survival, green republicanism accepts that the existing dependencies on natural forces should not lead to a need to control such forces, but rather to accept them and promote human flourishing within them. This is not to say that humans will have to live in an untouched (and quite often fictional) natural world, but rather that the acceptance of the existence of such nature and the interdependence of humans and nature will require humans to determine rights and duties that allow human flourishing while considering the natural limitations imposed by nature (Bookchin 2005).

ARTICLE III – Two green cases for an unconditional basic income

The dissertation continues with ARTICLE III, in which the potential green consequences of the implementation of an unconditional basic income are discussed. I argue that two different approaches to a green BI might be distinguished – environmentalist and ecologist. The distinction between environmentalism and ecologism is an important one, and is based on Andrew Dobson’s definition of the two concepts. He defines “environmentalism” as a “managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption”. This concept differs clearly from the concept of “ecologism”, which requires “radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life” (Dobson 2007, pp. 2-3).

What would then be the differences between the two BI models? The first could be part of a green growth strategy, whereas the second would require structural changes to the economic model, in support of a post-productivist economy.⁵ In this way, an environmentalist BI is defined as having as final objective

⁵ In ARTICLE IV this point is further developed.

a positive environmental impact, without this implying any structural change to the economic model, thus placing no priority on the search for an alternative to a growth-dependent economy. The environmentalist BI could include a package of green growth measures in which economic growth is seen as important, when not essential, to ensure environmental sustainability.

An ecologist BI, on the other hand, would be designed in such a way as to defy the consumerist and productivist society, in which economic growth is seen as essential both for generating jobs and for supporting the social state (Dobson 2007). In this way, ecologists would argue in favour of the reduction of unnecessary consumption, especially in the richest countries, where it is, on average, higher. Contrary to the environmentalist BI, an ecologist BI could be part of a non-growth or even a de-growth policy.

As one of the goals of green republicanism is the promotion of post-productivism, I discuss how the two BI models relate with the concept of work. I argue that an environmentalist model would be interested in boosting employment while the ecologist model would want (or, at least, would not oppose) people to reduce the amount of hours in the labour sphere, moving them to the autonomous sphere. This sphere, unlike the labour sphere, includes the non-remunerated work such as care or volunteering and has, on average, a lower ecological impact. Furthermore, reducing the mandatory time in the labour sphere would give individuals the time to commit to other civic processes, as desired by republicans.

There is, however, one important issue to be addressed. For this exit from the labour market to be facilitated, the amount of the BI would need to be generous enough that individuals would be able to leave their jobs while keeping the security conferred by the BI. If for individuals with savings or sources of income other than employment a more modest BI could be a sufficient incentive, for others, only a BI at the level of sufficiency – or close to that value – would serve. This last point is precisely where the two models come into conflict because, for their part, the advocates of the ecologist model would be interested in a BI high enough to allow the transition toward a post-productivist economic model. This, of course, poses additional challenges to the ecologist case, as it would be more difficult to implement.

I focus then on two challenges to a green BI. The first is the financing of a basic income scheme. If the environmentalist model could accept a green BI only for its consequences and having no particular concerns about its source of funding, an ecologist BI would be more demanding, also wanting that the source of financing actively contributes to reduce ecological impacts. From a green republican perspective, and similarly to the ecologist BI, there are two reasons why a model like the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend would not fit. First is the ecological reason, which relates to the fact that such income, even if

financed by putting a cost on the use of a common resource, has no intention to reduce its total usage. The second is because if it is not set at a generous amount, it might not serve to improve freedom in republican terms, even if improving beneficiaries' lives in other terms (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2012).

ARTICLE III discusses possible sources of funding, concluding that a green BI would always have to be funded by a mix of sources and in an evolutionary way: what is at present positive in ecological terms may reveal unwanted side effects in the future. Thus, the sources would have to be responsive and respond, if necessary, to the changes that might arise, in order to ensure that the desired positive environmental impact is actually realized (cf. ARTICLE V).

The second challenge to a green BI is the competition in relation to the use of public funds in order to promote environmental sustainability. A possible argument in favour of a BI is that it serves to give more autonomy to the individuals who would thus be able to self-organize in order to live in a more sustainable and convivial way. The supporters of an ecologist BI would be particularly favourable to this type of initiative since this breaks not only with the logic that only the market can supply goods, but also with the logic that only the state is able to define how citizens shall live in an ecologically sustainable way.

Although showing some overlaps, these two models are in conflict in some central features, such as the role of economic growth in promoting sustainability. For this reason, it might be incorrect to assume that an environmental BI is a step toward an ecological BI.

ARTICLE IV – Green republicanism and the shift to post-productivism: a defence of an unconditional basic income

Having presented green republicanism as non-neutral and as part of a politics of conviviality, and having discussed the green cases for a BI, ARTICLE IV addresses the issue of which welfare system is better suited to promote post-productivism as a green republican goal.

What exactly does the promotion of post-productivism imply? Distinct from anti-productivism, post-productivism aims at using the gains from the increase of productivity to reduce the time societies commit to labour. Doing so will increase personal autonomy and would serve as well as a way to review the economic model based on the permanent and pressing need for economic growth, which is itself based on the extraction of natural resources, production, and consumption. In short, the promotion of post-productivism implies that the core objective of a green republican policy is the promotion of personal

autonomy rather than the pursuit of permanent economic growth and the promotion of labour as a human activity with intrinsic and not simply instrumental values.

To discuss if post-productivism is promoted or not, I use Goodin's (2001) three policy priorities: income adequacy, temporal adequacy, and minimum conditionality. Income adequacy implies an income amount adequate to an individual's basic needs, temporal adequacy refers to the minimum amount of discretionary time⁶ individuals have to spend as they please, and minimum conditionality refers to conditions such as household constitution and (interest in) labour force participation.

There are different ways to promote post-productivism and the way a welfare system is designed will certainly have an impact. Existing welfare regimes will hardly answer the three conditions for the promotion of post-productivism mentioned in the previous paragraph. This is not surprising as the existing welfare regimes, even the social-democratic ones, which are closer to fulfilling the conditions, are focused on promoting employment, understood as labour in the formal economy. This excludes non-employment forms of work, such as volunteering or care work, that not only are essential for society, but are also, at least in some cases, the type of activities green republicans would favour.

Would other regimes perform better? A possible alternative is a participation income (PI), first presented by Anthony Atkinson, and departing from both a pure workfare social scheme and from an unconditional and universal basic income. For Atkinson, the participation required in order to be eligible for the PI "is not limited to labour market participation", including education, training, care work, and other approved forms of voluntary work (Atkinson 1996, pp. 68-9).

Building on this concept, Sophie Swaton (2018) has recently presented the idea of an "Ecological Transition Income". This income is based on three main characteristics: an income given to those performing one of the accepted activities – paid or unpaid – considered as promoting the ecological transition, a technical support structure, and a democratic form of organization such as a workers' cooperative. From a strict ecological perspective, this seems to be a good way to ensure that the activities that will allow us to move away from a situation of ecological unsustainability are performed and that post-productivism can be promoted. Unlike the existing welfare regimes, this green form of a PI would be given to

⁶ The "time the use of which is not dictated by the 'necessities of life'", with such necessities divided into three categories: economic, social, and biological (Goodin et al. 2008, p. 34).

those performing non-employment activities as well, as long as their tasks would fit one of the listed activities.

This is one of the reasons why green republicans would be reluctant regarding a participation income, even if with a green focus. If a list of accepted activities that would be considered for the attribution of a PI needs to be created and maintained, there is a risk that some activities that promote ecological sustainability are not included and, similarly, that ecologically harmful activities are included. The main problem for green republicans is that these errors might occur routinely, rather than accidentally and/or sporadically. Furthermore, even if assuming that a list of activities that would be accepted in order to receive a green PI could be defined and include all or most of the non-labour activities, the issue of arbitrariness arises once again under the guise of control of such activities.

Would a BI perform better? As it would not depend on any employment related condition, a BI could be a tool for post-productivism, enabling a range of diverse contributions and dispositions essential to a healthy democratic republic and moving away from a situation of ecological unsustainability. However, the way a BI is designed will determine just how it is to promote post-productivism. In one sense, a BI represents a more concrete and stable incentive for individuals to consider reducing certain hours of their labour-related activities, as it removes “some of the ‘productivist’ pressures and anxieties and thus pave the political road towards targeted and selective environmental policies, some of which are bound to entail the termination of certain lines of production and production processes” (Offe 1992, p. 76).

Green republicans would need to ensure that the reduction in the amount of time spent in the labour sphere would not result in an increase of discrimination at the workplace regarding issues such as promotions or employment security (Marston 2016), nor other forms of discrimination such as those regarding gender-bias (Cf. Pateman 2004; Robeyns 2001). To be clear, there is no certainty that a BI would automatically lead to activities supporting the ecological transition, which makes the political/cultural collective action for post-productivist activities necessary (ARTICLE V). The point here is that a BI can free time and therefore indirectly favour the social extension of these activities.

ARTICE V – Ecological effects of basic income

Finally, ARTICLE V further details the ecological effects of a basic income. The text begins with an historic review of the research on BI and ecology, showing that it goes back to the 1970s. It then confronts the green growth and the de-growth cases of a BI. Without entering into the discussion about the ecological impact of economic growth – and, just to be clear, by no means am I arguing that *a//* economic growth

is bad – the fact that this dependency on economic growth has promoted a consumerist society is a reason for ecologists to be worried. Consumerism, understood as socially and ecologically negative forms of consumption is inextricably linked with the need for economic growth. The problem with that connection is that the total decoupling of economic growth from resources consumption and environmental impacts has arguably not yet been achieved and even relative decoupling⁷ has had very questionable success. Thus, as I argue, the monetary amount at which the BI is set will have a considerable impact on breaking or not the link between economic security and economic growth (Cf. ARTICLE III).

The relationship between a BI and sustainable consumption is far from clear, especially because, on average, greenhouse gases emissions increase with income. For this reason, despite the possible social and economic benefits, a BI might have a negative environmental impact as collateral damage. A way to influence a shift to consumption with lower ecological footprints per GDP is to impose ecological taxes, which can then be used to finance the BI. The impact of different forms of funding – an income tax, a pollution and resource taxes, and the value added tax (VAT) – is thus discussed.

Assuming that a full basic income would not be funded entirely by pollution taxes, the more the BI is funded by other sources, the less the increase in emissions would be offset by pollution taxes. Perhaps this dilemma can be avoided if a BI were combined with other ecological policies. Not all forms of consumption must be reduced for the sake of environmental protection, especially because some of them already serve that purpose in the first place.

The fact that a BI offers individuals the security to experiment with alternative and more sustainable ways of life is important in green republican arguments for a BI. Nevertheless, the income on its own might not be enough to ensure the shift from unsustainability to sustainability. The list of possible parallel measures includes implementing education policies that foster ecological virtues, legally reducing the maximum number of working hours, setting a maximum income, and levying very high taxes on profits.

ARTICLE V ends with a discussion of different strategies for the implementation of a green oriented basic income. Recognizing the difficulties to build large coalitions to support the implementation of a BI, some possibilities are presented. First, it is proposed that to the existing welfare programmes we associate a new funding principle, which can be legitimized not only as a funding source but also as a necessary

⁷ Jackson defines relative decoupling as “a decline in the ecological intensity per unit of economic output. In this situation, resource impacts decline relative to the GDP. But they don’t necessarily decline in absolute terms. Impacts may still increase, but at a slower pace than growth in the GDP” (Jackson 2009, p. 48).

steering instrument for unsolved environmental problems. This principle translates into the levying of taxes on the use of scarce environmental resources such as the atmosphere, on creating water pollution, on turning to undeveloped land for businesses and housing, and on the extraction of minerals. Second, ARTICLE V argues that new paradigms can be more easily established when prototypes have been built and small pilot schemes carried out. A possibility proposed is an eco-bonus, which consists of sharing the revenue of a resource tax equally with all citizens. This could start with a small amount and be incrementally increased.

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Article I – Freedom and Ecological Limits

Abstract

The need for ecological sustainability has been translated into different indicators such as the ‘ecological footprint’ and the ‘planetary boundaries’. Analysis of both concepts concludes that the planet is currently undergoing a period of ecological unsustainability. For this reason, ecologists argue that various limits are required in order to move to a path of sustainability. The implementation of such limits has mostly been analysed from the perspectives of environmental rights and environmental justice, however research in terms of freedom is (surprisingly) still lacking. In what way do such limits have an impact on freedom? I will argue that there are two different ways to analyse the relation between freedom and ecological limits: on the one hand, freedom is often referred to as being in competition with ecological sustainability and the limits it is required to impose, and, on the other hand, the impact on an individual’s freedom due to ecological catastrophe if strict limits are not implemented. Accepting that freedom is an important topic regarding ecological challenges, I ask which conception of freedom is better suited to answer this challenge as well as the required implementation of ecological limits. I compare and confront the closely linked conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and the closely linked conception of non-limitation, as well as non-interference and the conception of freedom as non-domination. After presenting these conceptions I examine their relationship with ecological limits. The conclusion is that the conception of freedom as non-domination is better placed to justify ecological limits necessary to promote an ecologically sustainable future.

Keywords: Freedom; Ecological limits; Non-frustration; Non-limitation; Non-interference; Non-domination

Introduction

Ecological sustainability is essential in order to ensure human flourishing and human freedom.¹ There is a scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic origin of the activities leading to different climate crises, from a local to a global level. One of the main examples of such a crisis is the global climate change, which, albeit with different levels of severity, will affect all human societies. Despite the fact that it can be assumed that we are currently living in a situation of ecological unsustainability, the implementation of strict ecological limits required in order to put the planet back on a sustainability track has not taken place. Various reasons, mainly financial ones, can help explain this fact, but ecological limits have also been disregarded on the grounds of avoiding freedom-limiting policies.

The list of ecological limits includes elements at both consumption and production levels, ranging from taxes on polluting activities to the interdiction of such activities. As such, some of these limits might be thought to entail more direct reduction of individual liberty than others. How different conceptions of freedom consider the impact of ecological limits has not, however, received much attention. Other aspects such as environmental rights and environmental justice have received more attention.² The purpose of this article is then to discuss how freedom is impacted by ecological limits and, rather than discuss if freedom may be limited in the interest of other values, focus on whether and to what extent limits in the name of sustainability run counter to different conceptions of freedom in themselves.

But what kind of freedom? In this article the focus will be on four conceptions of freedom: the closely linked conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and non-limitation, as well as that of non-interference and non-domination. The first three can be considered liberal conceptions, whereas the fourth is a republican conception of freedom.³

In the next section of the article, the need for ecological limits in order to ensure sustainability is defended. The third section examines the relationship between freedom and ecological limits, followed by a discussion on different conceptions of freedom. In the last three sections, the different conceptions of freedom and their link with ecological limits is discussed.

1 Sustainability is a controversial concept. In this article I follow Callicott and Mumford's (1997, p. 32) definition, defending that ecological sustainability is 'meeting human needs without compromising the health of ecosystems'.

2 See for example solid works on green political theory such as Eckersley (1992), Dobson (2003, 2007), Robbins (2004) or the book edited by Dobson and Eckersley (2006) where freedom features only minimally.

3 Relevant contributions regarding the links between green and liberal and republican theories can be found in Barry (2008, 2012), Barry and Eckersley (2005), Bell (2002), Cannavò (2016), Curry (2000), Dagger (2006a), Hailwood (2004), Hannis (2016), Stephens (2016), Wissenburg (2003) or Wissenburg and Levy (2004).

Ecological sustainability and the need for limits

The past few decades have seen many attempts to operationalise and clarify what activities are required in order to ensure ecological sustainability. Examples of such efforts include the Brundtland Report, the Club of Rome's 'Limits to Growth' (Meadows *et al.* 1972), or, more recently, the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014). One common aspect appears to be present in the majority of these approaches: in order to ensure sustainability, some natural boundaries need to be respected and thus some limits need to be imposed.

Two indicators that try to translate sustainability into a more graphical and measurable format are the 'ecological footprint' and the 'planetary boundaries'. The 'ecological footprint' measures how much nature is being used against the total nature available and affirms that, according to the goods and services we use, humanity currently needs the regenerative capacity of 1.6 Earths (WWF 2016). A particularly interesting concept, the 'planetary boundaries', dictates that the boundaries of nine Earth system processes should not be transgressed in order for the planet to remain within 'safe operating space' (Rockström *et al.* 2009, Steffen *et al.* 2015). The 'planetary boundaries' are thus a comprehensive and simple way to assess the health of our planet.⁴ In terms of these processes, four of them - climate change, biochemical flows, land-system change and biosphere integrity - have already passed beyond the limit which 'may lead to dangerous levels of instability in the Earth system and increasing risk for humans' (WWF 2016, p. 12).⁵

If sustainability might require limits, namely in terms of consumption and production, why were these limits not established in the past, particularly when reports urging for the need for limits were published? One possible answer is the technological optimism associated with ecomodernism, which argues that sustainable development is possible even if implying the extraction of finite natural resources and environmental impacts in the short-term.⁶ Robyn Eckersley identifies such responses to the 'Limits to Growth' report which

'study (...) spawned a plethora of counterarguments to the effect that the problems were susceptible to "technological fix" and pricing solutions that would alleviate the negative ecological externalities

4 Kate Raworth has used these planetary boundaries together with twelve social dimensions in order to develop her 'Doughnut Economics'. This consists of a 'safe and just space for humanity' between a social foundation (not going below a minimum regarding the social dimensions) and an ecological ceiling (not going beyond the 'planetary boundaries') (Raworth 2017).

5 The remaining processes are stratospheric ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosol loading, ocean acidification, freshwater use and chemical pollution and the release of novel entities.

6 See, for example, the 'Ecomodernist Manifesto' <https://www.ecomodernism.org/manifesto-english/>.

of economic growth without the need for any fundamental changes in political values or the pattern and scale of economic activity' (Eckersley 1992, p. 12).

Andrew Dobson has a similar understanding, leading him to distinguish 'environmentalism' as a 'managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved *without fundamental changes* in present values or patterns of production and consumption' from the clearly distinct concept of 'ecologism', which requires '*radical changes* in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life' (Dobson 2007, pp. 2-3, emphasis added). Additionally, after a period during which the discourse on limits was less popular, there might be 'a renaissance of the debate around the possibility and necessity of a path to prosperity without growth, and a revamped version of the limits to growth thesis in the guise of the idea of planetary boundaries' (Dobson 2016, p. 301). We might be entering what Serge Latouche called 'the age of limits' (Latouche 2012).

It is not surprising that ecologists are, to say the least, resistant to the ecomodernist approach (Blühdorn 2000, Eckersley 2004). Rather than assuming a resistant position regarding altering existing ways of living and the way in which the global economy is organised, and putting all their hopes in technological development, ecologists are more interested in changes at an individual level (attitudes and behaviours) and at a systemic level, entering a phase of prosperity without the mandatory need for growth, and thus prefer the implementation of some limits (Cf. Jackson 2017).

This is the line of reasoning I will follow, which is to say, sustainability is worth aiming for, and getting out of the current scenario of unsustainability will require some limits. While not requiring an in-depth analysis of what type of specific limits may be required, it is important to distinguish some categories where these limits may apply.

The limits consider both supply and demand. This means that ecomodernist approaches which focus only on the supply side (production) and ignore the demand side (consumption) is not enough. The limits will also apply at different levels, starting from the individual and progressing to the state level. First, at individual level, there may be limits in consumption, both in terms of quantity (reduction of the number of options available) and in terms of quality (e.g. prohibition of consumption of certain rare or scarce products). Secondly, these limits in terms of consumption will be linked to limits in terms of production as well. Such production limits could be determined both at individual and collective levels (e.g. companies), production quotas, for example. Thirdly, there may be limits at state level. Consider for example the planet's carbon budget, which, if divided and attributed to all countries in the most equitable and just

manner, could become responsible for ensuring that the state would not emit more than the attributed amount of carbon.

According to certain conceptions of freedom, such limits could be interpreted as being contrary to freedom. Would this, however, be the case with all conceptions of freedom? Could such limits be seen as promoting freedom in some way, or under different conceptions of freedom and thus serve as a powerful argument for ecologists, thereby avoiding the exclusively catastrophic discourse? Answering these questions will require further discussion on the concept and definition of freedom.

Why freedom? Which freedom?

Despite the importance of freedom in political theory, little attention has been paid to the possible relationship between freedom and green politics (Fragnière 2016, Hannis 2016). This is surprising, since, as Lambacher (2016, p. 391) argues, green conceptions of freedom can support and enhance sustainable ways of life and serve as 'a source of imaginative, aesthetic, and practical reflection about the world and the human place in it'.

If so, what are the possible relations between freedom and ecology, and how do the two concepts interact? On the one hand, freedom is often referred to as being in competition with ecological sustainability and the imposed limits it requires. On the other, one must consider the impact on an individual's freedom as a result of ecological catastrophe if strict limits are not implemented. Given the present scenario of ecological unsustainability as well as the unknown implications of continuing on this path, priority shall be given to setting up limits in the present. Thus, analysis in the next sections will focus on how freedom might be affected by such limits.

The first of these two relationships is linked to the impact on freedom if ecological limits are defined. As Lambacher (2016) notes, concepts like carrying capacity, limits to growth, regulatory policies and behavioural prohibitions set in the past decades led to green policies being seen as restrictive or even authoritarian (Cf. Shahr, 2015). The second relationship is linked to the consequences of not setting such limits. Ecologists have repeatedly warned of potential catastrophic consequences linked to our current lifestyle. Examples include the unknown and worldwide impact of having a global increase in temperature of 1.5°C or more, or, the passing of the 'planetary boundaries' thresholds, both of which might lead to restrictions on freedom. Put simply, to exercise one's freedom may not be possible if healthy ecological systems are not in place.

Accepting that the connection between freedom and ecology is of interest, which conception offers the best answer to ecological challenges? A prominent topic of discussion within political theory, the study of freedom is 'a continuing enterprise' (Pettit 2012a, p. 90). Among the different conceptions of freedom, Berlin's distinction presented in 1958 still proves very popular. In his lecture, Berlin distinguishes negative from positive freedom. The former refers to liberty *from* external restraints, meaning that 'a person or group of persons is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons' (Berlin 2002, p. 169), while the latter refers to freedom *to* live according to one's will and to self-realization.

According to Berlin, freedom is dependent on having the possibility to choose between the maximum number of options (not only the most attractive in a given moment) without suffering the intentional interference by others that could reduce the number of choices available. In his words, 'the extent of a man's negative freedom is, as it were, a function of what doors, and how many are open to him; upon what prospects they are open; and how open they are' (Berlin 2002, p. 41).

Another possible way of separating different definitions of freedom is between option-freedom and agency-freedom (Pettit 2003). Option-freedom is dependent on 'the character of the options accessible - their number, diversity or significance' - and the 'character of the access' - i.e. asking if the physical possibility is enough to consider the access to a choice as free, or if other questions such as a (prospect of) penalisation or reward are relevant (Pettit 2003, pp. 391-3). Agency-freedom focuses on the individual - the agent - and is not directly linked to the number of options they enjoy. Rather it is a 'matter of social standing or status (...) [where freedom] means not having to depend on the grace or mercy of others, being able to do one's own thing without asking their leave or permission' (Pettit 2003, p. 394).

Within this distinction between option and agency freedom, Pettit distinguishes three broadly negative definitions of freedom: non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination.⁷ Non-limitation would be a form of option-freedom, non-domination primarily a form of agency-freedom, and non-interference 'is born of a confusion between the two' and inadequately addresses both (Pettit 2003, p. 402).

There are, of course, positive conceptions of freedom and it is certainly interesting to analyse their connection with ecological limits. The reason I will not do such discussion here is the fact that positive freedom is very demanding. Probably too demanding. Even if it might offer good answers to ecological challenges, namely by having stronger arguments to impose limits, positive freedom would likely be in

⁷ In his later works, Pettit addresses freedom as non-frustration rather than non-limitation (Pettit 2011, 2012a, 2012b).

conflict with the modern world and the shared existence of multiple views of the good life (Pettit 1997). To be clear: I am not intending to argue that there is no place for positive freedom in the future or for green forms of positive freedom. Such possibility requires a much deeper analysis than the one I can afford to do here. Thus, the rest of this article will focus on the conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and non-limitation, and as non-interference and non-domination, and will discuss which is better suited to promote ecological limits.

Freedom as non-frustration and non-limitation, and ecological limits

The conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and non-limitation emerged and became popular with Thomas Hobbes. In *Leviathan*, he defined a free man as the one who 'is not hindered to do what he has a will to' (Hobbes 1996, Ch. 21.2). This means that promoting freedom requires avoiding the agent's frustration in any given choice. Certain recent influential theorists of freedom follow this Hobbesian approach in its claim that, as long as an option is physically possible, the agent will have the freedom to choose, independently of any possible consequences (Cf. Steiner 1994, Carter 1999, Kramer 2003).

Both conceptions can be considered as option-freedom approaches as both consider that any hindrance, be it the ill will of another agent or natural limitations, count as freedom-limiting. They also share the opinion that as long as it is physically possible for an agent to choose an option, the agent is free in that decision, independently of all other possible negative or positive consequences. The main difference between these conceptions lies in that, while the focus of non-limitation is quantitative - the bigger the sheer number of options available to an agent, the freer she is -, the focus of non-frustration is on the protection of the favourite option of the agent.

Non-limitation is at odds with any limits to the number of choices available to an individual. Any limit will be seen as reducing freedom, independently of the consequences. If the two relationships between freedom and ecological limits referred in the previous section are considered, it quickly becomes clear that non-limitation faces serious challenges. Forbidding private vehicles into cities while allowing public transport, for example, does not constitute a radical limit. One could still access the city but the number of options to do so would be limited, thus reducing one's freedom according to non-limitation. Due to legal restrictions, the same reduction of freedom would happen with limits at the level of production of goods - past examples of such limits include the interdiction of CFCs in order to preserve the ozone layer - thus limiting the number (and variety) of available products.

The fact that non-limitation considers all ecological limits as reducing freedom puts advocates of this conception in front of a dilemma: on the one hand they cannot support ecological limits in the present

and, on the other, they cannot accept the impacts on freedom if limits are not set. If ecologists are correct, the current track of unsustainability may lead to extreme and severe weather events, which will certainly lead to a reduction of the number of available options. Furthermore, in a planet with finite resources, the unsustainable levels of consumption will eventually lead to their depletion, in turn reducing freedom in terms of non-limitation. It could be argued that there need be no overall reduction of freedom entailed by a policy of ecological limits, should the total number of options increase. But this scenario is highly unlikely as the number of (green) options to be created would hardly compensate for the options limited in order to move away from unsustainability.

Would non-frustration perform differently? Coercion, threats or even benefits related to a given option will not have an impact on the agent's freedom to choose an option. Only the removal of an option, and not its replacement, will count as a freedom infringement (Pettit 2012b). According to this conception, an agent's freedom will only be limited if some hindrance affects an option that she prefers and has a will to. If an option that the agent is not interested in is blocked but the preferred option is not hindered, then the agent would be free in his or her choice (Pettit 2012b, p. 29).

Like non-limitation, this conception of freedom is at odds with ecological limits. As we have seen, the removal of some options would be certain, and in order to avoid frustration, 'you must be lucky enough, or perhaps powerful enough, for none of your choices to be frustrated' (Pettit 2011, p. 696). It is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the choices removed by ecological limits would not include those preferred by any individual or that all individuals would be lucky or powerful enough to avoid frustration. This applies both to limits in the present in order to avoid further ecological crisis, and to the consequences in terms of natural limitations if the ecological degradation continues.

The final option is that all individuals whose preferred options have been negatively impacted by the ecological limits adapt their wishes to the remaining and available options. This scenario, however, in which a large number of individuals would have to change their wishes, hardly constitutes an acceptable or viable option. Moreover, as Pettit notes when presenting his example of the prisoner that makes herself free by wishing to be in prison, if adaptation is required, there will *always* be a loss in terms of overall freedom (Carter 1999; Kramer 2003, Pettit 2011, p. 700).

Finally, as Fragnière notes, freedom as non-limitation (and as non-frustration, I would add) 'has a tight connection with economic growth', which is normally associated with an increased number of options (Fragnière 2016, p. 39). These conceptions, moreover, might be compatible with an ecomodernist ap-

proach to the ecological challenges, claiming that limits are simply not required as technological improvements would emerge as part of the free market and eventually put the planet back on a sustainable track. However, as discussed in section 2, this assertion is far from being certain, thus proving the difficulties and potential limitations presented to both conceptions by ecological challenges.

Freedom as non-interference and ecological limits

There are two key differences between non-interference and non-frustration. The first lies in what is considered to reduce freedom. Non-frustration, as we have seen above, considers all sorts of hindrances as limiting freedom, whereas non-interference only considers those that are of human origin and deliberate. Even if natural limitations, therefore, impact freedom, those hindrances would not limit freedom in a given choice. Conversely, all human-related interferences (e.g. laws, rules) would count as limiting freedom (Pettit 2012a, p. 80).

The second refers to what options need to be protected in order to preserve one's freedom (Pettit 2011). While non-frustration denies that obstacles to a non-preferred option limit freedom, non-interference claims the opposite. 'The sense of freedom in which I use this term entails not simply the absence of frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to *possible* choices and activities - absence of obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk' (Berlin 2002, p. 32, emphasis added). Miller follows a similar line of thought, reasoning that interference is an act of coercion or obstruction that an individual will perform in an intentional way, meaning that such acts are, at the very least, negligent (Miller 1983, pp. 74-5). Both Berlin and Miller agree that not only will the removal of an option count as a hindrance affecting freedom, but also that the replacement of a given option by another which is penalised will also count. This proves yet another difference in thinking between Berlin and Hobbes, who considers that solely removing an option effectively limits freedom.⁸

Maximising freedom as non-interference therefore requires the minimisation of (expected) interference, not only avoiding interference to the preferred option, but also to possible options. But as it becomes clear, as the interferences considered as freedom-limiting according to this approach do not include impersonal ones, this conception of freedom is less worried about the total number of options, departing in that sense from a pure option-freedom conception (Pettit 2003).

Let's now look at the two relations between freedom and limits referred to in section 3. The consequences associated with climate change are many and include extreme weather events such as long

⁸ See Pettit (2011) for a comment on this.

droughts and floods, global temperature increase and the rise of the sea levels. While these catastrophic events would certainly impact the agent's freedom, they would only do so in an indirect way, by limiting their access to food, housing or even land should they live by the coast. As such, freedom as non-interference would not be impacted.

Alternatively, the implementation of ecological limits in the present, which ecologists claim are essential in order to avoid the impacts mentioned in the previous paragraph, would be done through rules, regulations or laws. This would directly impact the agent and therefore be considered as an interference. Examples such as laws limiting the amount of CO₂ per country, strict fishing quotas, or new taxes that absorb the environmental cost into the final product price, are direct and intentional interferences. Berlin is clear when he says that even if used as a means to increase other liberties, all laws - and certainly the laws considered as part of the ecological limits in this article - will 'curtail *some* liberty' (Berlin 2002, p. 41, emphasis in the original). Thus, the restrictions to freedom that are avoided by the imposition of limits in the present might be indirect, whereas the present limits would be direct.

One could argue that although freedom as non-interference would involve curtailing freedom to some, the ecological limits could be accepted and justified under the assumption that the total sum of attainable freedom as non-interference would be observed. Berlin argues that freedom could be limited by appealing to other values, but one can as well consider that freedom might be limited in the name of freedom itself. This is the case if in order to preserve and promote freedom as non-interference of many, there is the need to curtail freedom as non-interference of some. Freedom of X must be weighed against the freedom of Y and Z and, in the end, we presumably want to have a maximising policy. It would be hard to imagine a position where the freedom of X cannot be outweighed by the severe lack of freedom of Y, Z.⁹

This reasoning, however, faces challenges, particularly due to the extreme difficulty in developing a model capable of assessing and calculating the sum of attainable freedom based on different freedom restrictions due to ecological limits. Were one to imagine a law which strictly limited the number of cows in a given country with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not this limitation represents a smaller freedom reduction than the one that would be observed if the effects of climate change were to become a reality.

⁹ On this, although focusing on different conceptions of freedom, see Carter (1999) where he discusses issues of aggregating and comparing both the quality and quantity dimensions of freedom and Pettit (1997) and Nadeau (2003) on consequentialism and republican liberty.

Nonetheless, one could still argue that certain limits today could be accepted in order to increase freedom in the future. The temporal comparison of freedom is a very complex issue which cannot be discussed in this article. It can, however, be inferred that in addition to issues such as social discount rates, it would be very difficult to compare the losses and gains of freedom as non-interference based on the ecological limits. Taking climate change and possible policies to counter it as an example, one could say that both taxes on carbon emissions and a limitation on the total number of flights authorised would impact the agent's freedom. It becomes clear in the second scenario, however, that the curtailing of freedom is bigger than in the first, since flying would still be possible (even if at an extra cost). But assessing how both scenarios would impact the future freedom is a herculean task: which of the two situations would provide the best relation of present-freedom-limitation versus future-freedom-increase? How would both policies perform in mitigating climate change and protect future options?

Freedom as non-domination and ecological limits

The conception of freedom as non-domination goes further back than other aforementioned definitions (Skinner 1998). According to this conception, the primary goal 'should be to guard people against domination, and the secondary to maximize the range in which, and the ease with which, people can exercise their undominated capacity for choice' (Pettit 2003, p. 401). Domination, understood as arbitrary or uncontrolled power, implies that in order to be free, no other person has the capacity to interfere with us in an uncontrolled way (Skinner 2008, Lovett 2012, 2018).

To make these concepts clearer, consider the example of the master and the slave (cf. Pettit 1997, pp. 31-41). If the slave has a good relationship with the master and does not suffer any punishment throughout his life, conceptions of freedom such as non-interference would consider such a slave to have more freedom than another who is regularly punished. Conversely, according to the conception of freedom as non-domination, it could be argued that although this enslaved person has slightly better life conditions, he is not free, because all the agents - slave and master - are aware of the power imbalance and understand that the master decides when the enslaved person shall be punished. It is this capacity to act that represents an arbitrary or uncontrolled form of power. As Lovett simply puts, 'interference is an action, whereas domination is an ability to act' (Lovett 2016, p. 110).

Unlike non-frustration, non-domination is concerned with the protection of all possible choices, not only the preferred option. Regarding ecological challenges, this clarification is particularly significant, because, as I have been arguing, ecological limits will most likely imply the reduction of the total number of options due to laws and regulations. But those interferences do not represent domination by default. As

Lovett argues, 'provided the government issuing those laws or policies is suitably controlled, it will not subject its citizens to domination, and thus not detract from their freedom', which makes him conclude that 'the rule of law is a necessary condition for our enjoying freedom in the first place' (Lovett 2016, p. 112). Pettit has a similar understanding and argues that 'state interference will not be dominating (...) so long as it can be subjected to the effective, equally shared control of the people' (Pettit 2014, p. 111; see as well Pettit 1997, pp. 55-6).

Looking again to relations between freedom and ecological limits, how would non-domination measure up when faced with the implementation of limits as a way to reduce ecological impacts and avoid furthering the ecological crisis? Consider, for examples, laws and rules against programmed obsolescence, which could be viewed as an ecological limit as they are implemented as a way to avoid the production of new goods (and the extraction of natural resources). Assume that such laws certainly reduce the need for buying new products, thus *de facto* limiting the number of options available.

Does such interference affect the individual's freedom? If such laws are implemented by a government controlled by its citizens, their strict freedom from interference might be reduced but they would not face an increase in terms of domination. This is an important remark as, for advocates of the conception of freedom as non-domination, the main goal is to reduce the domination an individual is subject to, even if it implies a reduction of freedom in strict non-interference terms.

Regarding what has been discussed thus far, setting ecological limits would appear possible without increasing the domination an agent would be under, and so without reducing her freedom conceived as non-domination. And given the dimension of the challenge of moving away from a situation of ecological unsustainability, the promotion of freedom as non-domination might actually require some loss of freedom in non-interference terms. Thus, in times of ecological emergency, non-domination is not only compatible with ecological limits, but it might require such limits in order to be promoted.

This is clear regarding the need to restrict the accumulation of critical resources that give some people (or states) the status of dominator over others. As some critical resources, such as drinking water or arable land, become scarcer due to global climate change or due to contamination, republicans need to worry about avoiding situations of domination. If an agent or a small group of agents control the majority of a given critical resource which is becoming scarcer, this increases the potential for domination. To counter this risk, republicans would support setting limits on the accumulation of such resources, thus reducing freedom in non-interference terms but not in non-domination terms.

Moreover, a non-domination account could provide some answers regarding the equity and fairness of the distribution of different limits. In one of his most recent accounts of non-domination, Pettit refers to two kinds of factors that count as hindrances to a free choice: vitiating and invasive. Vitiating factors are the indirect resource failures that affect the agent's possibility to satisfy her will. Such factors affect the use of resources for any purpose and thus are not specifically targeting an agent's specific will; if a hindrance were to specifically affect the use of resources for a given choice, this would prove to be an invasion (Pettit 2012b, pp. 37-8).

Examples of vitiating include not having the physical capacity or not having the financial possibility to perform a given act. Both situations count as hindrances but not as interferences because, as seen in the previous section, interferences require human will. It seems Pettit considers vitiating factors to be less significant than invading factors, apparently because they do not require domination, while invasion always involves domination. But Pettit is not always clear in this distinction and the line separating both factors is somewhat blurred.¹⁰

The conception of freedom as non-domination acknowledges the existence of structural domination which might create masters who do not want that role (Pettit 2012a, pp. 81-2). And vitiating may be a consequence of such structural domination. It is not necessary to refer to the potential 'conspiratorial bents' of Marxists (Lovett 2016) who claim that every economic disadvantage is a deliberate consequence of capitalism's attempt to undermine freedom, to argue that, where ecology is concerned, structural conditions will create more hindrances to some individuals than others. This is especially true if one considers ecological issues such as climate change as being global. The recognition of this structural form of domination by ecological elements - let's call it ecological domination - offers a reason for non-domination to support strict ecological limits.

But what if structural domination regarding ecology is impersonal? Should the vitiations it would produce be dismissed from the concerns of those defending freedom as non-domination? A good answer is provided by Lovett in his claim that 'even if we decline to include a non-vitiating condition in our conception of freedom, the non-domination condition itself necessarily entails some concern for adequate resourcing' (Lovett 2016, p. 120). The reason is the fact that lack of resources will render people more vulnerable to domination. For this reason, republicans welcome interventions in market relations and structure in order to protect freedom. Such interventions can be aimed at protecting 'women from subjection to men, workers from subjection to employers, and members of some racial, ethnic, or cultural

¹⁰ See Pettit (2012b, pp. 38-9) for an attempted clarification.

groups from subjection to others - all in the name of both equality and freedom' (Dagger 2006b, p. 155). And the list of interventions can be extended to ecological-related aspects in order to protect individuals from ecological-related domination via ecological limits.

Conclusion

In this article I have argued that indicators such as the 'ecological footprint' and the 'planetary boundaries' show that we are currently living in a period of ecological unsustainability. To move towards a path of sustainability, certain ecological limits will need to be set up. These limits have been called for by ecologists for decades, but have not yet been set up on a scale which avoids the worsening of various ecological crises. They have been ignored for different reasons including the potential attack on freedom they represent.

Surprisingly, the study of the relationship between freedom and ecological limits is still lacking. I have claimed that there are good reasons why the study of freedom is relevant regarding the establishment of limits. I have also confronted these reasons with four different conceptions of freedom: as non-frustration and the closely linked conception of non-limitation, as well as non-interference and the conception of freedom as non-domination.

The establishment of the kinds of limits ecologists state are required would involve serious infringements of freedom according to the Hobbesian conceptions of non-frustration and non-limitation. Ecological limits also infringe the conception of freedom as non-interference. Such interference, however, could be accepted if the limits proved to increase the total attainable freedom by limiting the effects of the ecological crisis. Analysing that freedom trade-off would be, however, a very difficult task.

Finally, freedom as non-domination, which is less concerned with the sheer number of options that are impacted by ecological or 'more important' limits, would accept that ecological limits do not infringe on freedom under certain conditions - namely having a republican form of government. Moreover, non-domination would emphasise adequate resourcing and therefore be concerned with forms of structural domination that might limit - via invasion or vitiation - the agent's freedom.

We conclude then that freedom as non-domination is the conception that best accommodates the institution of ecological limits that is required to move away from unsustainability. This conclusion, nonetheless, does not solve the problems of political implementation. As Pettit (1997, 2011) notes, the institutional requirements for promoting non-frustration are weaker than the requirements for promoting non-

interference, which in turn are weaker than the requirements for promoting non-domination. But what challenge is more important than human freedom and ecological sustainability?

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Article II – Green Republicanism as a non-neutral and convivial politics

Abstract

Green republicanism can be described as a subset of republican political theory that aims to promote human flourishing by ensuring a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic. It expands the republican idea of social interdependence with the natural world, and therefore requires promoting and protecting the autonomy within those interdependencies. As such, green republicanism will focus on moving away from the current situation of ecological unsustainability while protecting freedom as non-domination. In this article, I offer a green republican justification for non-neutrality while remaining non-perfectionist. Furthermore, I argue that participation and deliberation is essential in defining the concrete politics that should guide green republicanism. To do so I examine the idea of conviviality and argue that green republicanism is the political theory best placed to ensure the objective of conviviality: it allows individuals to confront their views and to cooperate, acknowledging the finitude of the planet's natural resources.

Keywords: Republicanism; Ecology; Conviviality; Neutrality; Contestation

Introduction

Republican political theory has received renewed interest in the last couple of decades.¹ Republicanism as a political theory has its roots in Ancient Greece and Rome, with figures such as Aristotle or Cicero among its main thinkers. Central to the definition of republicanism are the notions of freedom as non-domination, contestation, civic virtues, participation in the political life of the community, public over private interest, combatting all forms of corruption, and also the defence of a state based on the rule of law.

The revival of republicanism results, at least partly, from the need to find answers to some of the most pressing questions of the 21st century, including global environmental challenges (Slaughter, 2005, p. 210). Despite the lack of research on the commonalities between republican and green political theories, there are several areas of overlap between them (Barry, 2008; 2012; 2017; Barry and Eckersley, 2005; Barry and Smith, 2008; Cannavò, 2012; 2016; Curry, 2000; Lambacher, 2013; Slaughter, 2005; 2014; Wall, 2014).

Green republicanism can be defined as the subset of republican political theory that overlaps with green political theory. Accepting that we are currently living in a situation of ecological unsustainability (Barry, 2012), green republicanism is interested in promoting conceptions of the good that, on the one hand, promote ecological sustainability and, on the other hand, preserve and promote freedom as non-domination. As such, and unlike other approaches to republicanism, green republicanism is non-neutral regarding the common good.

Together, these two conditions imply that some conceptions of the good that might promote ecological sustainability - deep ecology, eco-authoritarianism or eco-fascism, to name a few - are excluded as they imply an increase in terms of domination (Cf. Gorz, 1980). Similarly, views of republicanism that disregard the ecological limits of the planet and the need to promote ecological sustainability will not fall under green republicanism. The latter element has been associated to most accounts of republicanism, reason why Audier (2019) claims that a green form of republicanism, based on a post-productivist view of the economy, is essential in order to face the present and future ecological crisis.

The acknowledgment of social interdependencies is central to republicans (Honohan, 2002). It is because the former exist that there might exist relationships of domination., In a more demanding argument, green republicanism expands the idea of interdependency to the natural world, making freedom a

¹ Among many others, the following authors have made a crucial contribution for this revival: Honohan (2002), Laborde and Maynor (2008), Lovett (2010), Pettit (1997; 2012), Skinner (1978; 1998), and Pocock (2016).

social *and* ecological matter. On this line of reasoning, Audier (2015, p. 114) focuses on the interdependencies that link the individual to society and to the local and global environment to argue that the task of eco-republicanism - or green republicanism as we prefer to refer to it - is “the construction of collective and individual autonomy within the interdependency”.

Thus, green republicanism acknowledges both “the human dependence on natural forces outside of control, the embeddedness of humankind in metabolic phenomena on which we depend to survive, and the limits of our comprehension of the world” (Fremaux, 2018, p. 233). But this has not always been the case; in fact, some republicans have defended mastery of the natural world as a way of promoting non-domination (Audier, 2019). As Bookchin argues, analysing the relation between man and nature, “the counterpart of domination of nature by man (...) has been the domination of man by nature”. So, he follows, both Marxism and liberalism - and republicanism, one could add - “see the former as a desideratum that emerges out of the latter” (Bookchin, 1990, p. 119). This conclusion is clearly problematic when thinking of sustainable development and of ecology from a green republican perspective.

Unlike other republican approaches, which agree that the domination of the natural world is a condition for human survival, green republicanism accepts that the existing dependencies on natural forces should not lead to a need to dominate such forces but rather to accept them and promote human flourishing within them. This is not to say that humans will have to live in an untouched (and quite often fictional) natural world, but rather that the acceptance of the existence of such nature (as well as the interdependence of humans and nature) will require the former to determine rights and duties that allow for human flourishing while also considering the natural limits imposed by nature (Bookchin, 2005). Understood as such, green republicanism opens space for a politics of conviviality. This concept, which is mostly associated with Ivan Illich, refers to a way of living in society, cooperating and rivalling, within the natural limits of the planet.

However, even if one is non-neutral regarding the common good and the need to move to a situation of ecological sustainability and convivial republicanism, the definition of this idea is subject to discussion. I argue that a critical aspect of green republicanism is the need to promote civic participation and deliberation regarding the future of communities and that, unlike other green approaches, consensus might not be the final goal. This is so because the approach to move away from ecological unsustainability cannot be depoliticised, be it by a technocratic view or by a mystic approach to nature. On the contrary, green republicanism aims to educate citizens regarding the ecological challenges ahead of them and to give them a place to express their doubts, certainties and thoughts.

The rest of this article is organised as follows. In the next section I argue that green republicanism is non-neutral while remaining non-perfectionist. In section 2 I discuss the concept of conviviality and argue that green republicanism offers the conditions for the promotion of a convivial way of living. Finally, in section 3 I argue that green republicanism requires the creation of places for civic participation and contestation.

Non-neutrality as a green republican condition

In times of ecological urgency, green republicanism is non-neutral regarding the common good. The concept of neutrality is not straightforward and different definitions and approaches thereof have been presented.² As Merrill (2014, p. 1) notes, “is mostly within liberal theory that the debate on neutrality has been conducted in its contemporary form”. However, Merrill follows, even among liberals, there are those who defend neutrality as condition of liberalism (“liberal neutralists”) and those who claim the pursuit of the neutrality ideal shall be abandoned (“liberal perfectionists”).

Patten, who argues against the liberal turn away from neutrality, presents a reinterpretation of the idea of liberal neutrality and argues that the state violates neutrality “when its policies are more accommodating, or less accommodating, of some conceptions of the good than they are of others” (Patten, 2012, p. 257). Neutrality in this sense “refers to neutrality in the treatment of differing conceptions of the good, and not neutrality in the actual effects of whatever policies, institutions, and so forth we ultimately adopt” thus demanding that “public policies, institutions, and so forth ought to be equally accommodating of all worthwhile conceptions of the good” (Lovett and Whitfield, 2016, p. 125).

Surprisingly, discussions on the (non-)neutrality of the state are not very common within republicanism. Philip Pettit, for instance, has no reference to it in his “On the People’s Terms” (2012) and in “Republicanism” (1997) only says that his vision of republicanism can be seen as neutral because it “is motivated by the assumption that the ideal is capable of commanding the allegiance of the citizens of developed, multicultural societies, regardless of their more particular conceptions of the good”, which is why “republicans satisfy neutrality through having the state acknowledge only the ecumenical or non-sectarian good represented by the freedom of its citizens” (Pettit, 1997, p. 96).

A notable exception to the lack of research on the links between neutrality and republicanism is presented by Roberto Merrill (2007) who has looked into how the different conceptions of republicanism

² See, among many others, Dworkin (1978), Goodin and Reeve (ed.) (1989), Merrill and Weinstock (ed.) (2014), Raz (1986), Wall and Klosko (ed.) (2003).

relate with neutrality. He distinguishes three variants of republicanism: the first close to communitarianism and represented, among others, by Sandel (1996), the second close to liberalism and represented by Pettit and a third, which he refers to as critical republicanism, represented by Laborde and Maynor. In the first variant the idea of neutrality is rejected, in the second neutrality is considered as a shared value and, finally, in the critical variant, as I shall argue below, neutrality is rejected while a robust and paternalistic perfectionism is rejected as well.

Political neutrality, it must be said, is incompatible with perfectionism. This fact is relevant because republicans can be divided between those who defend a sort of perfectionism and those who prefer an anti-perfectionist approach (such as Pettit). Perfectionism, in this political sense, is understood as the arrangement of political institutions and the adoption of state policies “that promote or impede perfectionist values in various ways and to varying degrees” (Wall, 2017). Whereas the non-neutrality regarding the common good would not pose a problem for those having a perfectionist approach to republicanism, those who defend non-perfectionism would have a harder task.

Lovett and Whitfield detail why that is the case. They claim that as the promotion of political engagement and civic virtues, which can be done with measures such as mandatory voting, subsidies for political activities or republican education programmes, is a core aspect of republicanism the neutrality principle would always be violated.³ They thus conclude that republicans cannot endorse neutrality because “a firm commitment to neutrality must rule out any measures that would afford favourable treatment to those conceptions of the good in which active political engagement and civic virtue are valorised relative to those conceptions of the good in which they are regarded with indifference or even abhorrence” (Lovett and Whitfield, 2016, p. 127). For this reason, since republicans cannot reject the principles of perfectionism based on the defence of the principle of neutrality, those among them who do not want to endorse the principles of perfectionism must find other justification.

Considering that at least some forms of perfectionism are compatible with republican theory, green republicanism, even with a non-neutralist approach to the common good, does not necessarily need to be perfectionist. As Lovett and Whitfield argue, perfectionist principles, on top of encouraging or discouraging certain concepts of the good, must do so based on the objective value of those conceptions and not simply because of their instrumental use. As they put it, “to support Calvinism merely because it

³The authors present the concept of toleration, defined as the theory where “public policies, institutions, and so forth should impose no special disadvantages on any worthwhile conception of the good” (Lovett and Whitfield, 2016, p. 126); if these republican measures will not obey the neutrality principle, if well designed they might respect the toleration principle.

promotes economic prosperity, say, might not count as perfectionist, while doing so because it genuinely reflects the will of God obviously would” (2016, p. 122). Similarly, defending that the state should promote ecologically sustainable conceptions of the good because they are essential to put us back into a situation of sustainability and reduce ecological-related domination can be seen as an instrumental way to ensure not only human flourishing (and the preservation of the natural world) but also a sane eco-system and, ultimately, human survival.

Of course, to accept this argument one needs to agree that we currently live in a situation of ecological unsustainability and that, if no changes are observed, the consequences will impact - even if at different levels - most of the planet and the majority of human population, resulting in an increase of possible sources of domination. Several studies highlight and support this statement and there is scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic origin of the increase of greenhouse gases, which are the main contributors behind some of the most pressing ecological problems, namely global climate change. Regarding the planet’s ecological sustainability, the idea of ecological footprint and the indicators of Planetary Boundaries are of particular interest.

The ecological footprint measures how much nature is being used against the total nature available, concluding that according to the amount of goods and services that we currently use, humanity needs the regenerative capacity of 1,6 Earths (WWF, 2016). The Planetary Boundaries are a particularly interesting concept. It defines the boundaries for nine Earth system processes that should not be trespassed if the planet is to remain within a “safe operating space” (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). Among the nine system processes, the limits of four of them - climate change, biochemical flows, land-system change and biosphere integrity - have already been crossed, which “may lead to dangerous levels of instability in the Earth system and increasing risk for humans” (WWF, 2016, p. 12).

Accepting these facts, whatever conceptions of the good that intend to promote ecological sustainability and reduce ecological domination can be supported, whereas conceptions that will not do so - or, worse, which will contribute to the worsening of the ecological unsustainability - shall be discouraged. The exact definition of the common good, however, shall not be determined in advance but rather through civic and political deliberation (Pocock, 2016). We then face a situation where there is a non-neutral approach to the common good but where the range of conceptions of such common good is wide enough to avoid perfectionism.

This means that green republicans need to pose themselves the following question: can a non-neutral approach to the common good that promotes sustainability and discourages unsustainability be

itself dominating? As the answer is probably yes, they will need to find a good justification to avoid the risk of domination. The answer probably lies in the fact that domination only occurs if the kind of interference that individuals face is uncontrolled (Pettit, 2012). This means that a suitable degree of control by the people needs to be guaranteed and a plural *and* democratic debate ensured (Sandel, 1996). Guaranteeing popular control would reduce the risk of domination on green republican grounds while promoting civic engagement.

An interesting approach to neutrality that can inspire green republicanism was presented by John Maynor (2003). In his account of republicanism, which he claims to be a neo-Roman one (as opposed to its neo-Athenian version), Maynor argues that there are two interdependent forms of power that are associated with freedom as non-domination. The first is reciprocal power - manifested in values and ideals such as civic virtue and citizenship - and the second is constitutional power, which corresponds to the republican institutions (e.g. legislative, executive, judicial) that are intended to support reciprocal power. These two forms of power are relevant to the discussion of neutrality because:

“(...) the type of instrumental goods associated with both the reciprocal and constitutional power of non-domination help to constitute republican liberty and secure individuals from external or internal threats to their freedom. This allows a modern republican state to put forth richer and more robust forms of republican values and virtues. In making this move, modern republicanism abandons liberal neutrality.” (Maynor, 2003, p. 69)

The goods associated with the reciprocal and constitutional powers shall then be promoted by the state, breaking away from neutrality. Maynor presents two arguments to justify this. The first is that the state shall “actively promote these goods because they help form a resilient and secure system of liberty that offers individuals certain benefits unavailable to them otherwise”; the second refers to the fact that the promotion of these non-dominating virtues and values will expose individuals to “different ways of life and alternative dimensions of personal identity” thus contributing to the development of the self (Maynor, 2003, pp. 70-1).

It follows that such approach can be considered as quasi-perfectionist since it demands “individuals to attain certain substantive values and virtues (...) [securing] them from any actual or threatened arbitrary interference and thus enhance the choices available to them (...) [ensuring] a vast range of final ends which are consistent with republican liberty, which individuals can pursue while securing them from any interference that does not track their interests” (Maynor, 2003, pp. 80-1). In this sense, the ideals and

virtues promoted by the state are not only instrumental but also constitutive and intrinsically valuable as part of republican freedom.⁴

The state could then intervene - even if only in a controlled way - by promoting the ideals and values of reciprocal power, which would reduce domination and, via constitutional power, regulate life choices that would promote non-domination. As such, by ranking different conceptions of the common good according to how they would promote non-domination, the state would be non-neutral without limiting the freedom of its citizens, assuming thus a quasi-perfectionist form, as citizens would nevertheless have the power to discuss and agree on which of those (non-dominating) conceptions of the good they would prefer.

Elsewhere, I have defended the need to define some ecological limits at both the production and the consumption sides, arguing that such limits would not necessarily curtail freedom understood as non-domination (Pinto, forthcoming). However, such limits would have different impacts in terms of freedom. Taking climate change and potential policies to counter it as an example, one could say that both taxes on carbon emissions and a limitation on the total number of flights authorised would impact the agent's freedom. This said, the curtailing of freedom is bigger in the second scenario since flying would still be possible (even if at an extra cost).

Two comments need to be made at this point. The first is that individuals do not have a fixed conception of the good and that the latter might change as a consequence of the state's non-neutral policies. From a green republican perspective, this is indeed one of the expected outcomes because forming green citizens - as opposed to simply consumers - can be seen as an objective of green republicanism. So, by promoting non-dominating and ecologically sustainable conceptions of the good, the state would be exposing citizens to different ideals and, by promoting green civic virtues and allowing them to experiment with different ways of living that they would not otherwise have experienced, contributing to a change in their behaviour. Andrew Dobson argues that this is part of the building of an environmental citizenship (Dobson, 2003; 2007). According to him, behaviour change towards sustainable development that is driven by environmental citizenship considerations is more likely to last than behaviour driven by financial incentives.

⁴ Iseult Honohan presents a somehow similar argument regarding political participation, when she argues that "political activity can be intrinsically valuable without being the sole, or ultimate value in human life. A concern for common goods does not fundamentally and of itself conflict with freedom" (Honohan, 2002, p. 11).

The second remark is that not all conceptions of the good that promote ecological sustainability could be supported under a green republican approach. I have already referred the need for some ecological limits that might not curtail republican freedom but there might be other approaches. Think, for example, of the drastic measures that are advanced by eco-authoritarians and deep ecologists who argue, even if with very different political reasons, that losing some freedom is the price to pay to ensure ecological sustainability (Cf. Ophuls and Boyan, 1992; Hardin, 1968). But the challenges posed to green republicans are not only those of extreme measures as proposed by eco-authoritarians. These measures and limits could indeed promote the reduction of ecological-related impact but would most certainly promote different sources of domination and thus could not be supported by green republicans. The challenge lies, then, on the definition of ecologically sustainable ways of living that promote non-domination. A possible solution lies in the promotion of conviviality, which I will discuss in the next section.

Conviviality as an expression of green republicanism

How can all the different elements of green republicanism discussed so far be brought together? A possible answer lies on the concept of conviviality. This idea has made a surge in the recent past (in particular in France) thanks, among others, to the publication of the “Manifeste Convivial” (Convivialist Manifesto) in 2013 as well as to the work of several authors from different academic fields.⁵ However, the author who has worked the most to promote the concept of conviviality is arguably Ivan Illich, who defined it as follows:

“I choose the term 'conviviality' to designate the opposite of industrial productivity. I intend it to mean autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment. I consider conviviality to be individual freedom realised in personal interdependence and, as such, an intrinsic ethical value. I believe that, in any society, as conviviality is reduced below a certain level, no amount of industrial productivity can effectively satisfy the needs it creates among society's members.” (Illich, 1973, p. 24)⁶

⁵A number of those has contributed to a special edition of the *Revue du MAUSS* (2014) focusing on conviviality and with the title “Du convivialisme comme volonté et comme espérance”.

⁶The world of Illich while defining the tools for conviviality was rather different than the one of today and not all of his proposals would fit green republicanism. Take for example the need for “deschooling” he proposes. A green republican approach would rather foster a civic form of education with a focus on green republican values (Cf. Peterson, 2011). Here I focus only in the aspects that are somehow linking conviviality and green republicanism.

In the French edition of the book, which is slightly different from the English one, he adds that a shift from productivity to conviviality includes a shift from having repetitive needs to the spontaneity of the gift (Illich, 2014, p. 28; Cf. Mauss, 2002).

There is a lot to unpack in such a small paragraph, so let us do it separately. First, what does Illich mean when he suggests that industrial productivity represents the nemesis of conviviality? According to him, the industrial mode of production refers to a system based on the permanent creation of needs - real or perceived - that individuals are constantly asked to fulfil. This is linked to an economic growth-dependent system, which is why Illich claims that an essential element in moving to a “post-industrial age” is “to set pedagogical limits on industrial growth” (Illich, 1975, p. 10). This approach is similar to the promotion of a post-productivist society defended by green republicans.

On that topic, Illich defined the concept of radical monopoly, which would occur when one “industrial production process exercises an exclusive control over the satisfaction of a pressing need and excludes non-industrial activities from competition” (Illich, 1975, p. 69). For such a monopoly to emerge, individual and small-scale production is replaced with standardised industrial products in such a way that most needs - including the simplest ones - can only be met by the market. Additionally, as the only way for the market to thrive is by selling the goods that it produces, Illich concludes that “radical monopoly imposes compulsory consumption and thereby restricts personal autonomy” (Illich, 1975, p. 67).

Green republicanism could play an important role in this context. By promoting the expansion of the activities of the autonomous sphere, i.e. the activities that do not belong to the market nor the state spheres (Van Parijs, 2010) (at the expense of the activities within the market sphere), green republicanism could serve as a way to not only limit and avoid the creation of a radical monopoly, but also to define a different and alternative economic system, one that is not dependent on economic growth and is less impacting in ecological terms. Think for example of cooperatives or organisations within social economy that are under less pressure to impose the selling of their products and, as such, are less dependent on economic growth (Barry, 2017).

Second, it is interesting to note that Illich highlights dependencies and relationships, both personal and with the surrounding environment. The terminology used refers to republican arguments, namely when he claims that conviviality is individual freedom realised in personal interdependence. So, as argued in section 0, freedom is always a matter of interdependency, both with others and with nature. According to Illich, then, conviviality is a matter of both freedom *and* autonomy, both conditioned by existing interdependencies. Comparing this to the description of Audier of an eco-republicanism, which he says is

based on “the construction of collective and individual autonomy within the interdependency” (Audier, 2015, p. 114), the similarities between conviviality and green republicanism are once again made clear.

Third, Illich refers to autonomous action against a conditioned response. He adds that individual autonomy needs to be preserved by convivial tools, which shall be limited by the conditions for survival, the conditions for the just distribution, and the conditions for convivial work. So, as Deriu (2014) notes, “convivial tools for Illich are a condition for the realisation of autonomy understood as the power to control the use of resources and on the satisfaction of our own needs”.

But what does Illich mean when referring to tools? In a rather wide definition he claims that tools are “all rationally designed devices, be they artefacts or rules, codes or operators” (Illich, 1975, p. 34). As such, rules and other tools need to be created and to be in place in order to promote conviviality. But that creation also needs to involve citizens in a participatory process, “constantly adjusted under the pressure of conflicting insights and interests” (1975, p. 27). Again, the links with green republican political theory are substantial and he later clarifies that from this participatory process the result shall not be a single or a limited number of tools. On the contrary, a large and plural number of tools shall be encouraged to “encourage a diversity of life styles” (1975, p. 29).

The overlaps between green republicanism and conviviality are indeed substantial, and that is made clear in the subtitle of the already referred Convivialist Manifesto “A declaration of interdependence”. The interdependence between humans is a central element of republican theory and, as I have argued, such interdependence is expanded to the natural world in the framework of a green republican theory. The manifesto refers to both connections.

On the one hand, it highlights the fact that humanity, even if organised in different political communities defined by borders, shares some common principles that make individuals interdependent. On this issue, recurring to a terminology close to the one used by republicans, Humbert (2018, p. 23) says that the convivialist principle of common humanity means that discrimination between individuals can only be the result of some arbitrary will. On the other hand, the dependence that we have regarding nature should make us abandon the idea of being its masters and accept that we are part of it. By doing so, the signatories of the Manifesto argue, we shall give back to nature as much, or even more, than we take or receive from it.

Conviviality, the Manifesto argues, is the principle within existing doctrines that “allows humans to both rival and cooperate, having full conscience of the finitude of natural resources and a shared concern about the care for the planet and our [human] belonging to that planet” (Alphandéry et al., 2013, p. 25).

In this sense, conviviality can be seen as a complement to existing political theories, namely (green) republicanism. However, according to the Convivialist Manifesto, in order to be legitimate and convivial, any political theory needs to obey to the following four principles:

1. Principle of common humanity - despite differences, there is only one humanity, i.e. a principle of fraternity;
2. Principle of common sociality - social relationships is the greatest wealth of humanity, i.e. a principle of equality;
3. Individuation principle - each individual needs to have the possibility to express her singular individuality, without harming others, i.e. a principle of freedom/liberty;
4. Mastered and creative confrontation principle - expressing singular individuality will naturally lead to opposition between individuals, which is legitimate as long as it is not a destructive one.

Alain Caillé, a leading figure of the convivialist movement in Europe, argues that in order to build the new kind of society based on conviviality, one needs to both preserve but also go beyond existing political ideologies (Caillé et al., 2011). He links four political philosophies - communism, socialism, anarchism and liberalism - to the four principles of conviviality. Communism is associated with the principle of common humanity, socialism with the principle of common sociality, anarchism with the individuation principle and liberalism with the confrontation principle. Liberalism, however, shall be seen in the wider sense, which is why he argued that on its original form it is not dissociable from republicanism.⁷ Additionally, he argues that the best way to face the environmental, economic and social challenges of the present is by bringing together these four principles, without privileging one at the expenses of another. Green republicanism, I argue, could offer a ground to bring the four principles together, obeying the moral, political, ecological and economic considerations discussed in the Convivialist Manifesto.

First, at the level of the moral considerations, convivialists defend a number of conditions that relate closely to green republican theory. It is argued that all individuals need to be recognised as having equal dignity and, as such, have the possibility to access the minimum material conditions to pursue their own conception of the good life. Moreover, it is specifically referred that all individuals shall have the

⁷ See <http://www.lesconvivialistes.org/theorie/democratie/196-convivialisme-et-autres-doctrines-politiques> where he associates at least one part of liberalism to the republican theory coming from Ancient Greece and pre-imperial Rome.

possibility to enjoy recognition by others, by having the opportunity - should they so wish - of participating in political life and in the decision-making processes that impact their lives and the life of their communities.

Furthermore, in what is yet another connection with republican theory, they argue that there is a duty for each citizen to oppose corruption, both passively - refusing benefits in exchange of money or power - and actively - opposing corruption in the others to the point of "one's means and courage" (Alphandéry et al., 2013, p. 30). Two strong republican elements are present in this consideration: not only the opposition to all forms of corruption is central to republicanism, as courage is one of the republican cardinal virtues (Honohan, 2002).

Second, the Manifesto discusses the political considerations of conviviality. On top of the already referred need to respect the four guiding principles, convivialists present a number of proposals. That list includes ensuring a minimum of resources and a basic income protecting everyone from living in a situation of misery. But it includes as well a maximum income that would contribute to avoiding the creation of individuals with extreme wealth going beyond a point of common decency, which would thwart the principles of common humanity and common sociality. It is important to mention at this point that the principles of an economic floor and an economic ceiling are essential parts of a republican political economy (Casassas and De Wispelaere, 2016; Casassas, 2018).

Such political considerations also include other aspects that are specifically linked to green republicanism. In particular, the argument that a convivialist approach would favour the preservation of the common goods - the commons - and foster the creation and consolidation of new common goods for all the humanity is particularly relevant. Indeed, a group of self-proclaimed commoners replied to the Convivialist Manifesto arguing that "the commons can be seen as the foundation of the convivialist society, commoning as its living expression" (Acksel et al., 2016). They continue by saying that "the rules of commoning shall be set by equal peers whose needs are at the focus of a shared process".

Green republicans will have a particular and unique approach to the management and preservation of the commons, favouring a multi-level approach. While some commons might be managed directly by local communities (e.g. a local forest), others, such as the oceans or the radio spectre, will require the state or supranational political entities to coordinate their management. Green republican institutions need to consider this fact and allow room for citizen participation in the decision-making processes that impact those commons.

Other relevant point is the call for the multiplication of community and associative activities, to be constitutive of a global civic society, and in which the self-government principle beyond the rule of the state or of the market would be a rule. These are precisely the domains of the autonomous sphere that I claim that green republicanism should privilege. This is relevant because the autonomous sphere has a critical role in both green republicanism and convivialism. Alphandéry (2014, p. 92), for example, links the success and advances of convivialism to the promotion of activities of the social economy, i.e. of the autonomous sphere.

Third, green republican elements are also present in the ecological considerations. The Manifesto opens the list thereof by claiming that humans can no longer consider themselves as masters of nature. Even the terminology that is used refers yet again to republican theory. In this set of considerations, the authors propose a shift to renewable energies as well as a more radical proposal: whatever is taken from nature shall be given back at least in the same amount. This is of course not without difficulties, and detailing exactly what it implies is a complicated task.

Fourth, regarding its economic considerations, the Manifesto highlights the need to balance the market, the state and the associative economy (the autonomous sphere) in order to ensure an economically plural model that can promote prosperity without growth. Accepting the existence of market practices and the desire for profit-making, they clarify that those activities are only legitimate if they respect the already mentioned principles of common humanity and common sociality, and only if these are coherent with the ecological considerations discussed in the previous paragraph. Green republicans would probably accept these points.

Green republicanism and the need for contestation

Having established green republicanism as non-neutral and convivial, I now argue that the definition of the common good shall be made in a cooperative and participatory process. The Convivialist Manifesto highlights this need as well. After presenting some initiatives that are associated with the autonomous sphere and that are followed by millions of people and at different scales, from the “slow food, slow town, slow science movements” to the “economy of digital contribution (e.g. Linux, Wikipedia)” and mentioning consumption and production cooperatives, the manifesto claims that they have in common the “research of conviviality” of a way of living together that valorises social relations and cooperation (*con-vivere*) (Alphandéry et al., 2013, pp. 13-4).

However, they subsequently argue that, as part of living in a society where groups and individuals have different interests, conviviality implies opposition and confrontation. This approach must nonetheless

allow “opposition without massacring, taking care of the others and of nature”, making “conflict a force of life and not of death and rivalry a means for cooperation” (Alphandéry et al., 2013, p. 14). As Barry (2012) puts it, green republicanism should create spaces where citizens of good faith can disagree, and disagree robustly and honestly.

Contestation is an essential aspect of republicanism; it is only when having the opportunity to contest the decisions made by the state that individuals can be truly free. As Pettit (1997) argues, having the possibility to contest a decision taken by the state is an essential condition to ensure non-domination. Republicanism argues for a dispersal of power and the promotion of a model of democracy that is based on contestation as a way of securing freedom as non-domination. In that sense, Pettit claims that “non-arbitrariness requires not so much consent as contestability” (Pettit, 1997, pp. 184-5; 2012). Contestation and deliberation among citizens is an essential part of republican theory, especially because it gives citizens a way of better controlling the state and reducing its power of uncontrolled interference - *imperium* - while contributing as well to reducing the potential of domination amongst each other - *dominium* (Maynor, 2003).

From a republican perspective, political participation can be seen as “a means to protect liberty (...) encouraging a political culture that is hostile to domination” (Viroli, 2001, p. 11). If intended to promote freedom as non-domination, political participation cannot simply be reduced to the voting right in elections. However, direct democracy will hardly be an alternative (Pettit, 2012). Political participation, from a republican standing point, shall allow individuals to deliberate and, to that end, shall create the spaces where deliberation is possible.

Nevertheless, green republicanism would want contestation to take place not only after the decisions by the state have been made but rather during the actual process of decision-making (Cf. Honohan, 2002; Maynor, 2006). More than simply providing citizens with a saying and with the possibility to contest decisions once they are taken, green republicans want to give people the capacity to initiate and to be co-authors of the politics that will impact their lives. This, of course, involves a series of different conditions such as having enough economic means, or enough time to commit to such exercises, as well as having the knowledge or access to a team of experts that could support individuals during the decision-making process. This is particularly relevant regarding the kind of politics and measures required to move away from a situation of ecological unsustainability, which might demand structural change regarding current patterns of consumption and production.

Green republicanism would then need to think about the type of institutions in which citizens could participate, deliberate and cooperate in a more permanent basis, hence keeping a close contact with the elected political representatives and legislators. On top of providing the possibility to recur to the courts, to an ombudsman or other forms of contestation, green republicanism shall give individuals the possibility to bring new subjects of discussion forward and bring such discussions to elected politicians. Green republicanism is thus interested in forming proactive rather than reactive citizens.

As Stuart White argues, political participation through deliberation and contestation “entails a willingness, and capacity, to think in terms of the common good (...) [and this is why] the democratic citizen must try to form some conception of the common good, and use this to consider whether there are good reasons for other citizens to accept specific policy proposals” (White, 2008). Regarding environmental topics, when individuals disagree and in cases where compromise is inappropriate, they might still be willing to resolve such disagreements through argument (Dryzek, 2002).

Additionally, unlike most green political theory approaches that are based on consensus-seeking, the kind of deliberation and participation model preferred by green republicans is based on confrontation and opposition of ideas.⁸ Barry and Ellis (2011) propose that the discussion of how exactly the common good is determined needs to be done in a participatory and agonistic way. This is because those actions will need to be agreed collectively as some will be on the losing side and risk being dominated as a consequence of the politics that is promoted to foster sustainability. Think for example of the closure of a coal-based energy plant to give place to a solar park: despite creating jobs and improving local air quality, those who will lose their jobs will see their freedom reduced as their risk of being dominated increases. This participatory process needs to be a continuous task since individuals will not have fixed and immutable conceptions of the good.

Citizens’ assemblies and juries that put together criteria of inclusivity, deliberation and citizenship (Smith and Wales, 2002) are a good source of inspiration for green republicans. These juries, already tested and in place in some countries, consist in putting together a group of randomly selected people so that they can comment on and review a specific set of proposals, contributing therefore to policy formation. The duration of such juries and the amount of topics discussed is variable but the process often lasts for several days. From an environmental perspective, there are some indications of positive outcome of those juries (Kenyon, Nevin and Hanley, 2010; Ward, 2007).

⁸This is the proposal of Strong Democracy presented by Barber (2003, p. 151) who, by transforming the idea of conflict, wants to turn “dissensus into an occasion for mutualism and private interest into an epistemological tool of public thinking”.

The exact scope and geographic extension of citizens' assemblies is open for discussion. One can think of assemblies at communal level to discuss more day-to-day issues. There can also be national assemblies working together with the national Parliament and being consulted before the legislation process. At the European level, one can think as well of a European Assembly with representatives from the different Member States. The essential aspect of these assemblies is that citizens can participate fully and that their opinions are taken into account. More than replacing representative democracy, citizens assemblies could serve as a way to empower citizens by giving them a stronger voice *during* the legislative process. In a moment of ecological crisis and when the definition of ecological limits is arguably required, citizens need to be involved in this decision-making process and to have a say on how such limits are defined and implemented. It is thus not surprising that different ecologist groups and activists such as the ones from the Extinction Rebellion are claiming that citizens' assemblies are essential in order to answer the climate crisis.

Conclusion

In this article I have argued that green republicanism can be considered as the subset of republican political theory that overlaps with green political theory. As such, it will only accept the promotion of freedom as non-domination as long as this does not imply an increase of the current situation of ecological unsustainability and, in parallel, it will only be interested in conceptions of ecological sustainability that do not imply a reduction of republican freedom.

Having defined green republicanism, I argued that it is non-neutral regarding the common good as it will promote conceptions thereof that will actively try to bring the planet to a situation of ecological sustainability. Nevertheless, being non-neutral does not imply that green republicanism shall be perfectionist, as the exact definition of the politics and measures to move away from unsustainability need to be defined and agreed in a way that allows citizens to add their contributions in a non-dominating way.

A convivial form of politics is, I argue, a possible expression of green republicanism. Conviviality is mostly linked with Ivan Illich and has seen a renewed interest in the last decade. The concept refers to the principle within existing doctrines that "allows humans to both rival and cooperate, having full conscience of the finitude of natural resources and a share concern about the care for the planet and our [human] belonging to that planet" (Alphandéry et al., 2013: 25). As such, a green republican and convivial theory needs to ensure that citizens have the means to participate and confront their ideas.

More than simply having the possibility to contest decisions taken by their governments in order to ensure that they are not dominated (Cf. Pettit, 1997), green republicanism is interested in having proactive citizens that, after discussing and confronting their ideas, might be co-authors of – or, at least, have a say regarding – the laws that rule them *while* the former are being drafted. The need for rules and measures to promote ecological sustainability is particularly evident given the urgency and the dimension of the challenge ahead. Who better than citizens to agree on the measures that will ensure their future?

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Article III – Environmentalism, Ecologism, and Basic Income

Abstract

The Greens are the political group in which the support for the implementation of a basic income is stronger. Nevertheless, the reasons for that support are not always clear and quite often not related to environmental issues. For this reason, two different approaches to a green BI – environmental and ecological – are discussed in this article. The first could be part of a green growth strategy, whereas the second would require structural changes to the economic model, in support of a post-productivist economy. Although showing some overlaps, these models are in conflict in some central aspects, such as the role of economic growth in promoting sustainability. For this reason, it might be incorrect to assume that an environmental BI is a step toward an ecological BI. We will focus on the green aspects as a consequence of implementing a BI and independently of its sources of funding – namely by looking into the amount a BI needs to be in order to support shifting activities from the market to the autonomous sphere – and on the green potential of its sources of financing.

Keywords: ecologism, environmentalism, post-productivism, sustainability, unconditional basic income.

1 Introduction

The idea of distributing unconditionally an income to the citizens or residents of a given geographical and political area is far from being recent. As early as 1516, Thomas More argued in *Utopia* that the means of subsistence should be ensured to all individuals, even if not unconditionally. Later, in 1795, the North-American revolutionary Thomas Paine defended the payment of a lump sum to all individuals reaching adulthood, together with a pension, when they would stop working, noting that such payments were not defended under a principle of charity, but rather under a principle of justice, compensation for exclusion from a fair share of the commons.

Several proposals for an unconditional basic income (BI) emerged in the last centuries but it was during the 20th century that the debate became more concrete and structured (Vanderborght and Van Parijs, 2005). From a fringe idea, the discussions around the unconditional basic income have entered some of the most important global forums of discussion (De Wispelaere and Haagh, 2019).

Despite the existence of different proposals, there are three features common to most definitions of an unconditional basic income (BI) (Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017, p. 8):

- 1) Unconditionality: not depending on past social contributions and without any conditionality such as the obligation to work or prove willingness to work;
- 2) Universality: given to all citizens and long-term residents of a given area without means-testing;
- 3) Individuality: given to each individual independently of the household situation.

There are yet other aspects about which there is less consensus, such whether one may accumulate the BI along with other sources of income, or the frequency of the payment. Another important aspect of the BI is its amount, which might be set at a value that would ensure the individual's basic needs without need for any other source of income - thus being a real *basic* income - or, instead, it might be set below that threshold, thus being a partial BI. Considering all this, more than talking about *a* basic income, one should consider the different variations and possibilities that highlight BI's "many faces" (De Wispelaere, 2015, p. 49).

The idea of a basic income has supporters and opponents across the political spectrum. From the radical left to the most neoliberal right, different (and often antagonistic) propositions for a BI are presented. Nonetheless, a particular political group seems more prone to defend the idea: the Greens (Birnbau, 2009), demonstrated by the fact that the defence of BI appears in the political programmes of green parties in different European countries, South Korea, and Canada. Nevertheless, the reasons for this defence are not always very clear and often seem too optimistic regarding the role a BI just by itself

and independently of all other policies could play in the promotion of a more sustainable way of living. Even green-minded supporters of a BI can be caught in the trap of defending such an income for its own sake, de-emphasising the actual (environmental) impacts it might have.

The question that needs to be answered is thus whether, despite all the support by the Greens, there is an actual green case for a BI or just a case for a BI by the Greens; and, if so, how the theoretical background for such a case can be articulated. Also essential is the definition of two possible green cases: a weaker one that I shall name “environmental” and a more radical “ecological” case. The former is interested in achieving positive environmental impacts within the current economic framework, whereas the latter would be interested in supporting the transition to a post-productivist society. In this article, I defend the ecological case as the better solution to the ecological challenges the planet and Humanity currently face.

There are two ways a BI can be green: on the one hand, as a consequence of its implementation, independently of the sources of its financing and, on the other hand, because of the positive ecological impacts of its financing (e.g. Pigovian taxes). Regarding the former I will focus on the discussion of the amount of a BI and its impact in terms of participation in the labour market. Regarding the latter, I will discuss possible sources of funding a BI.

In the next section I discuss the relationship between a BI and ecological sustainability. In Section 3 I present the definitions of both environmentalism and ecologism and how a BI fits such concepts. The impacts of the green cases for a BI in the labour market are discussed in Section 4, and in Section 5 two challenges to a green BI are presented.

2 Basic Income and environmental sustainability

The enduring social and global climate crises are challenging society to look for alternatives to existing economic models. Nevertheless, in order to move away from the existing situation of unsustainability (Barry, 2012) we face, old solutions will hardly be enough, as the Anthropocene is characterised by countries already living above their limits.¹ This is strongly suggested by indicators such as the ecological footprint and the planetary boundaries. With the ecological footprint we conclude that according to the

¹ As never before in History, humankind has shaped the planet on a global scale, leading some scientists to call our current epoch the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002; Waters et al., 2016). Following a rather climate stable Holocene, the Anthropocene - from the Greek Anthropos (human) - is characterised by a series of rapid and severe changes in several ecological areas that range from global climate change to biodiversity loss, which might result in the 6th mass extinction. Although not being yet considered as a sub-division of the geological time, proponents of the Anthropocene as a new epoch argue, even if disagreeing on the exact start date for the epoch, that human activities have shaped the planet in a way that is substantial enough to deserve that classification as a new geological period.

goods and services we use, humanity currently needs the regenerative capacity of 1.6 Earths (WWF, 2016). The concept of planetary boundaries is particularly interesting. It consists of the definition of boundaries for nine Earth system processes that should not be passed in order for the planet to remain within “safe operating space”, with four of those systems having already passed beyond the limit (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015).

Although not mentioning the green case for a BI in his seminal *Real Freedom for All* (1995), and even at some point arguing that a BI would be friendly toward economic growth (1992, p. 28), Philippe Van Parijs later argued that there is a strong connection between political ecology and basic income (Van Parijs, 2010; 2013). This connection is justified by the fact that a BI might promote activities within the autonomous sphere, where the ecological impacts are lower than in the market and state spheres. Van Parijs defines the autonomous sphere in negative terms as all the “productive activities whose products are neither sold on the market nor commissioned by a public authority” (2010, p. 2; cf. Gorz, 1985; 2013).

The compatibility between a BI and ecological sustainability is not, however, obvious (Andersson, 2010). One question immediately comes to mind: if one of the causes of the current ecological crisis is the productivist model of the economy, based on the ever-increasing extraction of natural resources, over-consumption, and the search for permanent economic growth, will not an extra income contribute even further to the promotion of such a system? Questioning the existence of an environmental justification for the BI, Van Parijs presents two possible reasons why the Greens would support the implementation of a BI, concluding that there is a fundamental, albeit indirect, relationship between BI and ecological issues.

The first reason is the fact that economic growth is associated with the unsustainable consumption of natural resources and, as the Greens wish to preserve these resources as much as possible, they will be sceptical regarding a model that depends on permanent economic growth. However, the reduction of economic growth accompanied by an increase in productivity will result in an increase of unemployment, which is why, according to Van Parijs, there will be popular support for measures that stimulate economic growth and prevent unemployment. The role of the BI would thus be to provide individuals with an economic safety net, regardless of their contribution to the gross domestic product, thus encouraging the performance of activities according to their wishes, in particular the activities outside the formal sphere of the labour market. The author argues however that this reason, on its own, is insufficient to justify the Greens’ support of a BI.

A second reason is then put forward by Van Parijs, and is the fact that many individuals who consider themselves as Green give little importance to the growth of their incomes and to the accumulation of material goods, attributing, on the contrary, great importance to the availability of time for performing the activities they desire. So being "green" and defending a BI share a common cause - the preference for free time - which is why, in order to avoid cognitive dissonance, BI advocates are proportionately more represented in the Green parties. For this reason, Van Parijs concludes, although there is no direct link between BI and ecology, such income would give individuals real freedom, making it more attractive to engage in other non-employment activities, which are typically "far more labour-intensive and less natural-resource-intensive than formal production is" (Van Parijs, 2013, p. 270).

3 Environmentalism, Ecologism and Basic Income

In this section I will introduce the concepts of environmentalism and ecologism and discuss how a BI can be integrated into each perspective. A clear and concise definition of both terms was made by Andrew Dobson (2007, pp. 2-3). He classifies "environmentalism" as a "managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved *without fundamental changes* in present values or patterns of production and consumption"; this definition is clearly distinct from "ecologism", which requires "*radical changes* in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life" (emphasis added).

Others like Gorz (1975) and Bookchin (2005) have made similar distinctions. In 1975 André Gorz confronted two views on environmental issues: on the one hand an environmentalist (reformist) approach in which the capitalist system adjusts to the ecological limits and, on the other, a (revolutionary) political ecologist in which a new relationship between individuals and the collective, as well as with the environment and nature, takes place (Gorz, 1975, pp. 9-10). This distinction is quite striking because if environmentalism calls for an improvement of environmental policies under a model based on productivism and economic growth, then ecologism is intended not only to improve environmental conditions but also change the development model itself into a model of post-productivism. Thus, ecologism finds that reaching the goals of those policies will require more profound changes in the economic system, such as limits to economic growth.

The environmental approach to economics – environmental economics – is distinct from the ecological approach – ecological economics. The former can be described as a subset of classical economics that is concerned with environmental and resource topics. As such, environmental economics will analyse the economic costs and benefits of environmental protection (Smith, 2011; Cf. Asafu-Adjaye, 2005). For

example, future environmental damage is given a (discounted) price and weighed in the balance with current benefits from carbon emissions.

In contrast, ecological economics is a transdisciplinary field of study that aims at linking economics and ecology, incorporating into the discipline the biological and ecological constraints that environmental economists tend to ignore. As Costanza says in the opening of an article explaining what ecological economics is about and that is the first article of the journal “Ecological Economics”, ecological economics “addresses the relationships between ecosystems and economic systems in the broadest sense” (Costanza, 1989, p. 1).² Acknowledging the finite character of the planet, ecologism is associated with a politics of limits (e.g. carrying capacity, ecological footprint, planetary boundaries) being thus more concerned with sustainability rather than growth.³ Ecological economists are more likely to embrace absolute limits that should not be crossed, rather than putting a price on crossing those limits and comparing that cost to the cost of mitigation.

A key aspect of environmental economics is that the current consumption and production patterns can be maintained and that permanent economic growth – even if green growth – is not only possible, it is also desirable. In order to face the environmental problems, the environmental economist will look primarily to market solutions such as Pigovian taxes, alongside regulations and tax incentives and research.

The ecological economist, on the other hand, while not rejecting these instruments, questions whether they are enough to answer the multiple climate crises the planet and Humanity currently face, such as the mitigation of climate change adequately (e.g. keeping global warming below 1.5°C). As such, ecological economists are interested in looking beyond market solutions and, importantly, beyond an

² There are yet other possible distinctions between environmentalism and ecologism, namely the substitutability of the natural capital. On that topic, Neumayer (2013) has suggested the existence of two different paradigms: a weak and a strong one. The former (environmental) is named by the author as the “substitutability paradigm” and can be seen as an extension of neoclassical economics, which considers the natural capital as substitutable. This means that the main concern for future generations using such approach is the “total aggregate stock of ‘man-made’, human and ‘natural’ capital”. As he puts it, this approach “puts the present generation into a strong position of dominance” in comparison with the future generations (2013, p. 16). On the other hand, a strong sustainability (ecological) approach does not consider the natural capital to be substitutable; this is the reason why the author calls it the “non-substitutability” paradigm. This latter concept is more difficult to clearly define but it can be seen as including but also going beyond the weak approach. Two different aspects of this strong sustainability concept can be distinguished, regarding the preservation of the natural capital: the first claims that it shall be preserved in terms of value, while the second defends that the definition shall not be done in terms of value, but rather in terms of “preservation of the physical stock of those forms of natural capital that are regarded as non-substitutable” (2013, p. 26) - the critical natural capital. Basically, this second strong sustainability approach does not claim that natural capital shall not be used, but rather that its functions shall remain intact, not exceeding their regenerative capacities.

³ On the connection between ecological limits and freedom, see Pinto, 2019a.

economy based on permanent economic growth, thus considering a steady-state economics (Daly, 2014) and degrowth (Victor, 2019).

There are many reasons ecologists reject an economy based on permanent growth, but chief among them is the fact that the decoupling between economic growth and the ecological impacts is not observed. In fact, a recent report observed that

“there [is] no empirical evidence supporting the existence of a decoupling of economic growth from environmental pressures on anywhere near the scale needed to deal with environmental breakdown, but also, and perhaps more importantly, such decoupling appears unlikely to happen in the future” (Parrique et al., 2019, p. 3; Cf. Hickel and Kallis, 2019).

How would a BI be part of an environmental or ecological approach to economy? First, in an environmental approach, a BI could be introduced to achieve a positive environmental impact, without this implying any structural change to the economic model - and, taken to the extreme, even opposing such structural changes. This model of BI could be introduced as part of the current economic model and, as such, the search for an alternative to a growth-dependent economy would not be a priority. The environmentalist BI could integrate a package of green growth measures in which economic growth is seen as important, if not essential, to ensure environmental sustainability.

The environmental economist will look primarily to Pigovian taxes, perhaps alongside regulations and tax incentives and research, and a dividend is a partial BI that could be one use of the revenue. By internalising the environmental costs of the economy, this environmental model would be interested in promoting sustainability but it weakens the case for a BI, because it is only one use of the revenue (more on this below).

Since environmentalism does not require changes to the levels of production and consumption, and since the separation between growth and resource consumption (total or relative⁴ decoupling) has not yet been observed (Jackson, 2017; Parrique et al., 2019), the environmental would likely be technologically optimistic. According to this view, the current patterns of production and consumption, even if environmentally unsustainable, can be maintained because new technological solutions that will correct and compensate for those impacts will eventually be developed. This is also the position advocated by some environmentalists, such as the 19 scientists who signed the "Ecomodernist Manifesto" arguing that there

⁴ Relative decoupling is defined by Jackson as “a decline in the ecological intensity per unit of economic output. In this situation, resource impacts decline relative to the GDP. But they don't necessarily decline in absolute terms. Impacts may still increase, but at a slower pace than growth in the GDP.” If total decoupling was not yet observed, relative decoupling has had very limited success.

is no need for more radical changes to the economic model or limits in terms of consumption; what is required are technological solutions that will allow the decoupling of human development from environmental impacts (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015).⁵ This type of proposal is sometimes associated with the need to have market incentives in order to promote green innovation (Friedman, 2008).

It is not surprising that ecologists look to this approach reluctantly. Even if technological solutions to compensate for the environmental impact of human activities are created and the separation between economic growth and consumption is achieved, should this happen after the loss of biodiversity (including the extinction of animals and plants) or after passing the planetary boundaries beyond the point of no return - that is, the critical point after which the consequences for the planet are unpredictable - then it may be too late. Instead of taking a defeatist attitude toward the possibility of changing the economic system, advocates of ecologism will, in a proactive way, try to promote these changes, defending a model of prosperity that does not depend on economic growth (Jackson, 2017). For the sake of clarity, it is this vision of ecologism I subscribe to.

The ecological BI would then be designed in such a way as to defy the consumerist and productivist society, in which economic growth is seen as essential both for generating jobs and for supporting the Social State (Dobson, 2007). An ecological BI, although not technophobic, would be sceptical about the role that technological solutions alone can play. In this way, ecologists would argue in favour of the reduction of unnecessary consumption, especially in the richest countries, where it is, on average, higher (WWF, 2016; Cf. Victor, 2019). Furthermore, technological developments could allow this BI model to contribute to the definition of a new way of life, independent of the economic growth paradigm.

Contrary to the environmental scenario, an ecological BI could be part of a non-growth or even a degrowth policy. It should be clarified that degrowth should not be understood as an uncontrolled economic recession that would have disastrous social (and ecological) consequences. On the contrary, a policy of sustainable degrowth would imply a smooth transition "through a range of social, environmental, and economic policies and institutions, orchestrated to guarantee that while production and consumption decline, human welfare improves and is more equally distributed" (Kallis, 2017, p. 12; cf. Latouche, 2009; Victor, 2019).

According to D'Alisa, Demaria and Kallis (2014), authors of a dictionary of degrowth, this concept is based on three main reasons to oppose policies based on economic growth: 1) growth is unfair and

⁵ Regarding consumption, the manifesto argues that "even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation", which is why technological solutions are essential (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, p. 21). Cf. Pollin, 2015.

unequal in terms of the distribution of benefits, 2) growth is ecologically unsustainable, and 3) growth will never be enough. They add that growth is likely to have both internal and external limits, such as limits on the creation of demand and limits on the access to natural resources. For these reasons, they argue, a degrowth society would be different, from energy usage to interpersonal relations, including different distributions of work, paid or unpaid, favouring the latter.

The debate between green growth and degrowth advocates has been extremely rich in the past couple of years. Robert Pollin, a green growth critic of degrowth, points out that even a 10% global contraction of Gross World Product over twenty years— a contraction four times larger than that of 2007–2009— would reduce emissions by only 10%. As such, the bulk of emissions reductions must come from other policies beyond contracting GDP. Furthermore, Pollin argues, a degrowth policy resulting in mass unemployment has little chance of being politically acceptable (Pollin, 2015).

And it is precisely at this level that a BI might enter an ecological strategy, as it arises here as a necessary measure to deal with the unemployment and impoverishment that would otherwise accompany a large recession, in a way that is not just palliative, but positively an improvement in everyone's lives. As mentioned in the previous section, this is not, in itself, a "green" reason to support a BI. Thus, from an ecological perspective, this BI would serve not only to avoid popular opposition to measures that reduce economic growth, but as well to foster a reduction of labour hours, promoting better distribution of available jobs. It would as well reduce the pressure for individuals to accept jobs that they might not be interested in and that have a negative ecological impact. Finally, ecologists would see a BI fitting their strategy of promotion of the autonomous sphere and promotion of more frugal ways of living.

This ecological BI would support post-productivism and degrowth policies, contributing to rethinking of the role of paid employment in society. However, as noted in Section 2, measures that result in increased unemployment will most likely have popular opposition. The degrowth advocates are aware of this fact, which is why they are proposing a series of measures that, together with a BI, can facilitate and promote the transition from a society of employment to a society of work. These measures include job-sharing, substantial reduction in the number of working hours, the introduction of complementary currencies, or even a maximum income (Howard, Pinto and Schachtschneider, 2019).

4 Basic Income and Work

We can divide the expected effects on the labour market as a consequence of the implementation of a BI into two groups. On the one hand, the BI could serve as an incentive to job creation and entry into the

labour market of those outside it, independent of the reason that has led them to this situation.⁶ This would be so because, thanks to its unconditionality, the BI would avoid the poverty and unemployment traps associated with conditional schemes. If the payment of an unemployment subsidy ceases after finding a paid job, individuals might not be interested in accepting a job which offers a salary close (or even below) the amount received as unemployment subsidy. On the other hand, a BI could have the opposite effect, i.e., to facilitate and even promote the exit from the paid labour market. An environmentalist would probably favour the first effect, in order to foster economic growth, while the ecologists would favour the second.

While a productivist model gives greater social and moral value to paid work and is interested in having as many individuals as possible performing a paid job, a post-productivist model is focused on the promotion of personal autonomy. As such, all the gains from the increase of productivity should serve to significantly reduce the amount of hours that societies commit to labour, increasing individuals' discretionary time, i.e. the "time the use of which is not dictated by the 'necessities of life'", such necessities being divided into three realms: economic, social, and biological (Goodin, Rice, Parpo, & Eriksson, 2008, p. 34). For advocates of post-productivism, labour would be a matter of social choice, whereby many people could opt for a more relaxed way of life (Goodin, 2001, p. 15).⁷ Advocates of ecologism would certainly support the post-productivist approach, as removing the social relevance of a paid job and promoting the autonomous sphere is part of most of the ecological and degrowth accounts.

By breaking the link between employment and income, a BI would also help to reduce the social importance that employment currently has. This would devalue (paid) employment and promote (unpaid) work, which would encourage - or, at least, would facilitate - the exit from the labour market.⁸ As Offe notes, the BI contributes to the creation of conditions for the humanisation of work: workers would be able to refuse an unattractive and underpaid job, making it the employer's burden to ensure better conditions. In this way, individuals could consider reducing some hours of their labour-related activities, as it "removes some of the 'productivist' pressures and anxieties and thus pave the political road towards targeted and selective environmental policies, some of which are bound to entail the termination of certain lines of production and production processes" (Offe, 1992, p. 76).

6 This was one of the expected outcomes of the Finnish experiment that lasted from 2017 until the end of 2018.

7 On why a BI is preferable to other alternatives in the promotion of post-productivism, see Pinto, 2019b.

8 On the difficulties of exiting the labour market see Birnbaum and De Wispelaere (2016).

There is, however, one important issue to be addressed. For this exit from the labour market to be facilitated, the amount of the BI would likely need to be generous enough that individuals would be able to leave their jobs while keeping the security conferred by the BI. If for individuals with savings or sources of income other than employment a more modest BI could be a sufficient incentive, for others, only a BI at the level of sufficiency - or close to that value - would serve. Nevertheless, it should be noted, even if it were high and even assuming that it could be set at the level of subsistence, there would still be individuals who would not have the freedom to stop taking paid employment, namely those who have contracted debts or loans.

How would the environmental and ecological strategies see the discussion about the amount of a basic income? This is a substantial difference between the two green cases for a BI, since the environmental model would not have any special condition regarding the amount of the income, as long as it would fit a policy of green growth. Even if set at a relatively low amount, advocates of an environmental BI would not oppose it, provided that some positive environmental contribution would be expected. On the other hand, if the BI were defined at subsistence level, there could be some opposition if it would lead to a mass exit from the labour market to the autonomous sphere, thus limiting the economic growth.

This last point is precisely where the two models come into conflict because, for their part, the advocates of ecologism would be interested in a BI to allow the transition to a post-productivist economic model. A model that would allow individuals to exit the labour market or to reduce the number of hours spent in a paid work if they wished to do so, devoting themselves to other activities with less environmental impact and contributing to a revision of the productivist model. But would such BI need to be at subsistence level?

Several authors share this defence of a substantial BI in order to have a positive environmental impact. In her defence of a BI, Carole Pateman is clear, saying that a BI that is not enough to exit paid employment will foster consumption but, on the other hand, if it is enough to live, it will have the opposite effect:

“by breaking the link between income and the labour market it would allow individuals, if they so wished, to abstain from the race to accumulate ever more material goods and help combat the identification of freedom with consumerism.” Pateman (2004, p. 96)

This position is shared by others, such as Gorz (1999; 2002) and Mylondo (2010; 2012). In the same vein, Perkiö (2015) argues that only a sufficiently high BI can be the basis for a cultural shift in which individuals opt for a lifestyle less dependent on material consumption.

Requiring a BI to be at the subsistence level may be too demanding, and diminishes the prominent role that a generous BI - even if not at subsistence level - may have on the ecological transition. Moreover, the definition of subsistence value would be an arduous task, if not impossible. For this reason, it seems to me that defining a BI that is sufficiently high and as close as possible to the subsistence value is a more appropriate formulation. Of course, as I have been arguing, this value would have to be high enough to have, *de facto*, an impact on the transition from the current economic model to a post-productivist model, since one of the main reasons for an ecological basic income is its role in breaking the link between economic growth and jobs creation and maintenance of social security systems. This delinking may also be supported by a de-commodification of several goods, moving them from the market to the public and autonomous spheres (Boulanger, 2010).

Moreover, I think that claiming that only a full BI fits an ecological strategy might be incorrect for at least two reasons. First, as argued by Van Parijs (1992), a full BI would likely fit better into a highly productive economy, offering high levels of taxable resources that may sustain such a BI over time, which will likely require that the majority of people remain within the labour sphere. If so, there would exist a link between environmentalism (not ecologism) and a high BI. If such a full BI would imply a massive exit from the labour market, environmentalists would certainly reconsider this position.

Second, if the ecological/degrowth strategy of moving people's activities from the labour sphere into the autonomous sphere works, to maintain the BI at a high level will require increasing the taxation to a (likely) unacceptable level. Thus, advocates of ecologism should not dismiss so quickly a partial BI. Such a BI could indeed be the first step in creating the conditions for individuals to reduce at least a part of the time they currently commit to labour activities and shift them to the autonomous spheres, committing to projects such as transition towns, cooperatives, and repair cafés, among others. To do so, parallel measures would be required (Howard et al., 2019; section 5-b below). Another possibility I explore elsewhere is the possibility of having a BI in the form of a complementary currency (Merrill, Bizarro, Marcelo and Pinto, 2019).

The relationship between basic income, work, and economic growth is complicated, however, especially from an ecological perspective. Guy Standing, although declaring that his primary justifications to support a BI are social justice, freedom, and security, includes economic advantages of a BI and argues that it would bring "higher, more sustainable, economic growth" (2017, p. 97). Arguing that the people with higher incomes tend to have a different consumption pattern than those with lower incomes, namely by consuming more imported goods, he tries to make the case for a positive environmental impact that

would arise from a BI, namely by encouraging a shift to “work” rather than “labour” and by “reducing the pressure to create jobs solely for the sake of boosting employment” (Standing, 2017, pp. 99-100). This defence, however, seems to contradict what is written just a few paragraphs before, where Standing argues that a BI “could create more jobs, further increasing incomes, spending power and *production*” (Standing, 2017, p. 98, emphasis added). If the ecological case for a BI is interested in the reduction of consumption, it certainly is even more interested in reducing production. Thus, Standing’s link between economic growth, increased production, and positive environmental outcomes is not clear.

As mentioned in the Introduction, it is expected that there will be opposition from the population to measures that result in mass unemployment. This will be true if spaces of personal fulfilment outside the sphere of the market are not created, which is why an ecological BI has, once again, a more complex mission than the environmental BI. An interesting proposal to overcome this issue was presented by Bert Hamminga, who, referring to the need to demoralise the labour market, suggested the possibility of creating a “work credit” so that those who do not want a job can sell their credit to those who want, thus allowing them to have a BI and live without a job (Hamminga, 1995).

5 Two challenges to a Green BI

Both of the green BI models discussed in this article face two major challenges: their funding and competition with other environmental policies. Before addressing these two challenges, it is important to note that a BI might have positive ecological impacts in two ways: on the one hand, the possible positive impacts as a consequence of its implementation and regardless of its form of financing and, on the other hand, the ecological impact as a consequence of its financing. Some of the questions related to the first point, in particular regarding the impact on the work relation, have been discussed in the previous section. Next, we will discuss the ecological impact through the financing of a BI. The questions associated with the financing of a BI are, regardless of the model advocated, one of the most discussed topics between both opponents and supporters of a BI. But if positive environmental results are to be achieved, this task becomes even more complex.

a) Financing a green BI

The number of proposals on how to fund a BI is as large as the number of existing BI models. One can group proposals into two according to the source of the funding: through the existing budget or through additional new sources of funding (De Wispelaere, 2015). Both green BI proposals would agree on the importance of finding funding sources that have a positive environmental impact. The sources of funding that a green BI could have might have another positive side effect: that of promoting better environmental

behaviour. Thus, possibilities such as levying taxes on polluting activities or imposing a cost on the use of common resources are interesting from a green perspective (Birnbaum, 2012; Boyce and Barnes, 2016).

An example of a BI funded by imposing a cost on the use of common resources is currently seen in Alaska, where a fund was created - the Alaska Permanent Fund - financed by the sale of oil from the territory. From this fund, an annual dividend is paid to all residents in the territory (Widerquist and Howard, 2012). Other proposals, such as Pigovian taxes that serve to internalise the cost of the environmental impacts, or cap-and-trade systems also seek to reduce polluting activities (Howard, 2017).

Regarding the green models discussed in this article, the points highlighted in the previous paragraphs are very important. If the environmental model could accept a green BI only for its consequences and having no particular concerns about its source of funding, an ecological BI would be more demanding, also wanting that the source of financing actively helps to reduce ecological impacts. Thus, an ecological BI would likely reject a model such as the one currently in place in Alaska, where, although there is a redistribution resulting from the use of a common resource (non-renewable and with a high environmental impact in its extraction), there is no goal of reducing its consumption. In this case in particular, since oil is the common resource, it is even more difficult to justify this choice by taking account of its impact on climate change (Winter, 2012).

I must, however, make a note: assuming that we are currently living in a situation of ecological unsustainability and that technological developments may not be able to correct this trajectory, then total emissions (whether in an emissions trading scheme or not) would have to be constantly reviewed. The reason for this strict limitation resides in the fact that, with current technology, radical measures are needed in order to comply with the environmental sustainability objectives agreed upon (such as limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C), since the market-based emissions measures will hardly suffice (Fitzpatrick, 2010).

The balance between the total value collected through taxing polluting activities and the amount at which a BI can be set is an extremely complex one. The risk of financing a BI based exclusively on fees on polluting activities is that it may fall victim to its own policy: success in reducing polluting activities can mean the failure of economic sustainability of the BI. This could lead to a scenario whereby in order to maintain the financing source of a BI, the continuation of the polluting activities would be accepted or even encouraged.

This problem could be minimised if the ecological model could achieve one of its objectives: persuading individuals to live in a more frugal and convivial way, passing activities from the spheres of the market and of the state to the autonomous sphere. Simply put, as the ecological model is interested in the revision of the productivist model of an economy that depends on continuous growth, it would support the reduction of total consumption. Thus, if there were a reduction in total consumption, the level of subsistence itself could be revised downward as the amount collected by the collection of taxes on polluting activities would be reduced as well. This strategy would be in line with the degrowth policies that the ecological BI would support.

We are now confronted with two scenarios: the first, endogenous, in which funding of a BI through polluting activities would lead people to a radical change of their behaviours and habits, opting for a more sustainable way of life and, the second, exogenous, in which in addition to these measures of taxing polluting activities other complementary activities would promote such behavioural change. As Howard, Pinto, and Schachtschneider (2019) argue, a green BI, by itself, can hardly ensure the positive ecological consequences that it proposes, which is why additional measures, such as reducing the number of working hours, introducing educational programmes aimed at ecological preservation, and defining a maximum income are necessary. In this way, advocates of an ecological BI would also have to insist on the need for these measures.

Still, as it is not certain that the value achieved through taxing polluting activities would be sufficient to ensure the financing of a BI over time, other sources of funding, preferably with a positive environmental impact, would need to be obtained. Thus, a green BI would be interested in reducing economic inequalities, as they are responsible for an increase of unnecessary consumption which, in turn, promotes inequality (Lorek and Vergragt, 2015; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011). Thus, the ecological and environmental proposals for a BI could support their financing through taxes levied on wealth, financial transactions, and inheritances, and higher marginal income tax rates, in order to reduce inequalities. And although these measures may not appear to be directly linked to reducing the ecological impact, it is important to note, as Marston (2016) does, that the redistribution of wealth is essential for the reduction of carbon emissions.

Other sources of funding that proponents of a green BI could support would be charging fees for the use of common resources - from resources such as minerals and forests to broadcasting frequencies (Pereira, 2014) and digital work (Cardon and Casilli, 2015). It should be noted that advocates of an ecological BI could support financing by charging for the use of common resources only if these were

renewable and exploited in a sustainable way. Otherwise, as we have already mentioned in relation to the Alaskan case, taxation would have to be done in a Pigovian way, i.e., internalising the environmental costs and expecting that the use of the resource would decrease.

A green BI would always have to be funded by a mix of sources and in an evolving way: what is at present positive in ecological terms may in time reveal unwanted side effects. Thus, the sources would have to be reconsidered and revised, if necessary, in response to the observed changes, in order to ensure that the positive environmental impact is actually realized.

b) Green BI and other Environmental policies

The second challenge to a green BI is the competition in relation to the use of public funds in order to promote environmental sustainability. As Michael Howard (2017) notes, a possible purpose for the revenue collected through carbon taxes - or, one can add, from other eco-taxes - would be to support the transition of workers from jobs with high environmental impact to environmentally sustainable jobs. Similarly, there will be competition between a green BI and public investment in environmental policies - such as support for improvements in terms of energy efficiency or support for the production of energy from renewable energy sources.

From an ecological point of view, there are also some proposals for basic income in the form of services such as free public transport (Calder, 2010). Other alternative proposals include free essential services and goods such as water, health, energy, housing, and mobility - the use would be free up to a certain value considered to be responsible, and then charged at a very high price after this "misuse" threshold (Ariès, 2007; Liegey et al., 2013). Unlike a BI, applied universally and unconditionally, the definition of the level of "misuse" would be quite complex and probably unfair. Still, advocates of a green BI will have to come up with arguments that justify public investment in a BI and not in other public policies.

A possible argument in favour of a BI is that it serves to give more autonomy to the individuals who would thus be able to self-organise in order to live in a more sustainable and convivial way (Cf. Illich, 2014). At present, there are already many experiences along these lines - from cities in transition, to energy cooperatives using complementary currencies, or short-distance, sustainable, and local production and consumption systems. Participation in these types of initiatives can be fostered by a BI, which would serve as an ecological transition tool (Johnson and Arnsperger, 2011). The supporters of an ecological BI would be particularly favourable to this type of initiative since this breaks not only with the logic that only

the market can supply goods, but also with the logic that only the state is able to define how citizens shall live in an ecologically sustainable way.

Nevertheless, hardly any defender of a green BI will oppose public investment in environmental policies. That being so - and knowing that the costs associated with such policies will be high - the competition of funds between a BI and other environmental sustainability policies is a discussion that must take place.

6 An environmental basic income as a first step to an ecological BI?

From the descriptions above of the two green BI models, it is clear that they coincide in several features. In particular, they coincide in the ultimate objective of environmental sustainability. Despite this, they are in competition in some central aspects, which is why it may be difficult to assume that a BI as part of an environmental approach could be a first step toward an ecological BI. Three main reasons justify this belief.

First, as decades of discussions prove, the implementation of a BI - or even a pilot project - is an extremely complicated task. Achieving political and popular support for a project requires a long and extensive national discussion on the different impacts on people's lives and how the economy is organised. Assuming that this discussion chooses a model of BI along the lines of the environmental case (or other than the ecological), it is not clear that in the short and medium term future there will be either the interest or the motivation to discuss a new, more radical model.

Second, seeking to avoid systemic changes to the organisation of the economy, an environmental BI may not only not be a step toward an ecological BI, but actually actively discourage the implementation of that model. As it is already a very radical idea, if an environmental BI can be put into practice as part of the existing economic and social system, why should there be interest in implementing an even more radical version? Presented in such a way, the environmental BI would offer a good argument for the maintenance of a productivist and growth-dependent economic system, even if including some positive environmental measures.

Finally, a third reason relates to the urgency of taking measures to prevent an environmental catastrophe of planetary dimensions. As discussed in the Introduction, indicators such as planetary boundaries suggest that we may be approaching a point from which the negative effects on humans and the planet will be irreversible and unknown. If so, the need to take drastic measures that might avoid this course is clear. These measures include large cuts in fossil fuel use in the next decade. That will prove so disruptive

of the normal growth economy, that a substantial BI needs to be given serious consideration as a part of the transition to net zero carbon emissions.

7 Conclusion

In this article I have argued that there is a “green” approach for a basic income. Depending on how it is designed and implemented and on the measures implemented in parallel, a BI might be an important tool in the promotion of ecological sustainability. Following that line, I have distinguished two green cases for a basic income: an environmental and an ecological. Although sharing some commonalities, these two models will be in conflict regarding some of their core goals and features, notably the roles of economic growth and paid employment in the promotion of ecological sustainability and the shift to a post-productivist model of the economy. I have accepted the arguments of the proponents of the ecological model, given the currently existing situation of ecological unsustainability.

A BI might be green in two ways, the first being due to the way the income is used and independently of the sources of financing, and the second being the financing sources themselves. Regarding the first aspect, I have discussed the role of a BI in the promotion of a post-productivist society, in which individuals could shift activities from the market and state spheres - namely by exiting employment or reducing the amount of time spent in the job market - to the autonomous sphere. I have thus argued that the environmental model would not be interested in such a shift, while the ecological one would make it a priority.

A green BI would be one out of a package of other measures that could promote either a model of green growth (environmental BI) or a model of degrowth (ecological BI). The changes needed to support one these projects - clearly more complex and radical in the ecological and degrowth case - require a more detailed analysis. Issues such as the legal reduction of working hours, the reform of the fiscal system, or the institution of a maximum salary need to be analysed together and in an in-depth way, which I cannot afford to do in this article. Another question is whether a BI should be given on a regular basis (e.g. monthly or yearly), or as a single lump sum payment, or even as a mix of these two (Fitzpatrick, 2007). Finally, I have discussed two daunting challenges that both green models face: ecologically sustainable financing and the competition for the use of the funds with other environmental policies. I have argued that the ecological model would need a wider source of financing, preferably via Pigovian taxes, but probably requiring additional taxation of income and wealth, which might make its financing more difficult.

Regarding which of the two models would be better prepared to offer an answer to the ecological crisis, if the supporters of an environmental model are correct and the technological evolution will allow

humans to correct the ecological impacts witnessed so far, perhaps an environmental BI would suffice. However, if the technological optimism is, as ecologists argue, unjustified - and the available information so far seems to support this claim - then the more radical version of an ecological BI should be chosen. This version of a green BI brings larger and more complex political challenges than the environmental model, but in times of social and ecological crisis, one needs to dare to aim at radical and yet realistic goals.

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Article IV – Green Republicanism and the shift to post-productivism: a defence of an unconditional basic income

Abstract

Green republicanism can be described as a subset of republican political theory that aims at promoting human flourishing by ensuring a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic. An essential aspect of green republicanism is the promotion of post-productivism while preserving or expanding republican freedom as nondomination. Post-productivism implies the promotion of personal autonomy rather than the pursuit of permanent economic growth and the promotion of labour as an intrinsically positive human activity, which for green republicans will have three positive aspects: reduced ecological impact, more time available for civic participation, and the extension of democratic decision-making and norms to the sphere of production. An important aspect in the definition of a post-productivist society is the way welfare schemes are designed. In this article, I will thus compare the existing welfare regimes with a (green) participation income and with an unconditional basic income, and analyse how they promote green republican goals. I conclude that the current systems are one of the elements of the productivist society and that would not answer the green republican conditions. A green participation income could have a positive ecological impact and contribute to a shift to post-productivism but would face serious challenges from a republican perspective, namely in terms of the non-arbitrariness of its attribution. Finally, I conclude that depending on how it is defined, an unconditional basic income could contribute to post-productivism while being non-arbitrary thus obeying the green republican conditions.

Keywords: Republicanism · Welfare · Green republicanism · Basic income · Participation income

Introduction

Republican political theory has seen renewed interest in the past couple of decades. The focus of this interest has ranged from the review of the concept of liberty as non-domination to the challenges posed to republicanism by an ever more globalised economy and society. At the same time, scientific evidence has shown the damaging and lasting role of human activities with regard to global climate change and other environmental-related problems, leading scientists to dub our current geological epoch ‘The Anthropocene’. Republicans have started to look into green political theory but, despite some overlaps, research on the common aspects of the two theories remains limited.

Assuming there are links between republicanism and green political theory, is it possible to talk about green republicanism? In this article, I will argue that there is a case for a green republican theory, consisting of a restrictive view of the overlaps between both republican and green political theories. A key aspect of green republicanism is the promotion of post-productivism, which implies that the core objective of a green republican policy is the promotion of personal autonomy rather than the pursuit of permanent economic growth and the promotion of labour as a human activity with intrinsic and not simply instrumental values. As such, all gains from an increase in productivity should serve to significantly reduce the amount of hours that societies commit to labour, thereby increasing individuals’ discretionary time, i.e. ‘time the use of which is not dictated by the “necessities of life”’. Such necessities can be divided in three realms: economic, social, and biological (Goodin et al. 2008, p. 34).

It is unlikely that all forms of labour will disappear in the near future. Green republicans, however, would not be anti-labour or anti-economic growth, but would rather be interested in selecting necessary labour activities that would contribute to the promotion of republican freedom while also respecting the ecological limits of the planet. This is to say that labour or employment is not intrinsically wrong—under certain conditions (i.e. with an unconditional basic income (UBI)), labour could constitute a non-dominating, non-discretionary activity. In the end, it would all depend on how it is shaped.

Green republicanism would look to the distribution of both required labour and distribution of discretionary time made available in order to ensure that it would not foster forms of domination (e.g. patriarchal domination), ecological unsustainability, or a social division between those with and without paid jobs. According to green republicans, autonomous and discretionary time in a post-productivist society would arguably need to be spent participating in activities with a low ecological impact and/or activities that serve the republican ideal consisting of civic participation, deliberation, and protection of freedom.

The way in which welfare schemes are designed when drafting policies that promote republican freedom and ecological sustainability must be taken into account, and issues such as the financial sustainability of current welfare schemes and ecological sustainability point towards a paradox. On the one hand, welfare schemes are financed by labour and economic growth, which have a significant ecological impact. On the other, low economic growth also results in a reduced level of taxable economic activities, thus challenging the maintenance of the current welfare scheme and its services and goods itself (Bailey 2015; Jackson 2017).

Naturally, not all economic growth will have the same ecological and social impact. As Latouche (2009) correctly notes, an increase in public spending, even in areas boasting a clear positive ecological impact (such as public transport), will contribute to economic growth. Moreover, it could be surmised that, in order to move away from the current difficulty presented by ecological unsustainability, governments, nations, and states would implement a thorough and extensive programme of ecological transition. The result would be an increase in economic growth *and* a positive ecological impact. This share of economic growth most likely falls short when faced with the many other activities contributing to orthodox GDP growth. Advocates for degrowth, however, argue that given the dimension of the ecological crisis, structural changes to reduce consumption and growth rather than the promotion of a green form of growth are required (Latouche 2009; Jackson 2017).

If welfare schemes continue to be financed by a combination of labour and economic growth and the decoupling of growth and its ecological impact remains a mirage (Jackson 2017), then such schemes will be actively contributing to the maintenance of a productivist model of economy. The aim of this article is to compare how different models of welfare contribute to or take away from the green republican goal of post-productivism. Existing welfare regimes will be compared with both a green form of participation income (PI) and a UBI. Despite their differences, existing welfare regimes have a set of common characteristics that allow us to assess how they contribute to a post-productivist society. Concerning participation income, a specific green-oriented version will be used for the comparison. Finally, the universal basic income will be discussed, comparing different elements of its composition and how they might impact the promotion of post-productivism.

Green Republicanism

Despite the lack of research on common aspects of both theories, there are several overlaps between green and republican political theories (Barry 2008, 2012, 2017; Barry and Eckersley 2005; Barry and Smith 2008; Cannavò 2012, 2016; Curry 2000; Slaughter 2005; Wall 2014). Examples include non-

neutrality regarding the common good, the promotion of civic virtues, deliberative and agonistic approaches to political discussions, and the recognition of the existing interdependencies (both social and nature-oriented).

The acknowledgement of social interdependencies is relevant to republicans as it is through the existence of such interdependencies that domination may occur (Honohan 2002). Green republicanism expands this idea of interdependency to the natural world, making freedom a social *and* ecological matter. This is because the natural environment might limit (or expand) the number of choices available to an individual. As Pettit (2012, p. 36) puts it, one will not be able to raise one's hand 'if it is so cold that you are frozen stiff'. The recognition of these two interdependencies makes the promotion of post-productivism a key aspect of green republicanism.

Moving away from the dichotomous distinction between positive and negative freedom (Berlin 2002), republicanism conceives freedom in a third way: as non-domination (Lovett 2018; Pettit 1997; Skinner 1998, 2008). This conception is distinct from that of freedom as non-interference in two ways. Firstly, the mere existence of interference may not be considered as freedom-limiting, should such interference be non-arbitrary. Secondly, although interference may not be present, domination could be, should one of the agents have the capacity to interfere in an arbitrary or uncontrolled way. As Lovett simply sums up, 'interference is an action, whereas domination is an ability to act' (Lovett 2016, p. 110).

For republicans, the concept of arbitrariness—and the opposition to it—is extremely relevant, as they define freedom as the absence of arbitrary power. There are two ways in which non-arbitrariness is defined with regard to republican freedom. The first—the procedural way—argues that power will not be arbitrary if constrained by a set of rules and regulations (Lovett 2010); the second—the democratic method—argues that power will be non-arbitrary as long as concerned individuals have the capacity to directly or indirectly resist it and control it (Pettit 1997, 2012). In practical terms, however, both strategies are compatible and there are important synergies between them that need to be explored. In effect, having individuals and groups with the capacity to control rules and regulations is the best way to turn such rules and regulations into a compelling device, and the other way around, having good procedures is a necessary condition to channel and strengthen civic participation.

Philip Pettit, arguably the leading thinker of the republican revival, is well aware of the risks that the 'climate and ecological emergency' (as recently declared by the UK and Irish parliaments for example) poses for republican freedom. Recognising that republicanism might be at odds with more radical approaches to ecologism, he argues that certain approaches of green political theory could find common

grounds with his definition of republicanism. He links freedom to the natural world arguing that any damage done to the environment 'means that there is an assault on at least the range of our undominated choice' thus limiting republican freedom (Pettit 1997, p. 137).¹

As such, any republican theory needs to focus on maintaining a viable and healthy natural environment, including the sustainable use of renewable resources, the responsible use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels, and the general 'care of the natural and precarious environment' (Pettit 2014, p. 84). Despite these small references, Pettit never goes into detail on what impact ecological limits could have on republican freedom and, in particular, on a republican government. Here Pettit sadly shares the acknowledgement of the ecological and climate crisis but failure of political theorists to fully examine their implications for human society and established modes of political theorising.

Pettit's notion that simply caring for the environment is enough should be challenged. As I will discuss below, the planet is currently in a situation of profound and deepening ecological unsustainability and, as such, more than simply 'caring for the environment', there is a need to actively and urgently move away from our current situation of 'actually existing unsustainability' (Barry 2012). Thus, I follow Cannavò (2016, p. 73) when he claims that there are few similarities between republicanism and environmentalism as understood in a reformist and conservationist context, which refuses confronting existing political and economic structure values. However, 'commonalities exist between republicanism and more radical environmental perspectives that articulate a social and political programme beyond reformist or conservationist goals' with a non-neutral approach to the common good, and are focused on moving away from a situation of ecological unsustainability.

Serge Audier (2015) distinguishes 'productivist' from 'ecologist' republicanism, and argues that the next step for republican theory lies in examining ecological challenges. Criticising the fact that republicanism has focused on an unlimited transformation of nature while adopting a productivist model since the nineteenth century, Audier argues in favour of an eco-republicanism which would not refuse science and technology, but rather use both in order to preserve the commons and promote an ecological society.

He continues this reflection in his latest book by analysing how productivism became the main goal for different ideologies and different conceptions of the common good (Audier 2019). In order to move towards post-productivism, Audier proposes a green form of republicanism based on civic participation, deliberation, and the confrontation of different ideas and conceptions of the good. In contrast to other

¹ Elsewhere Pettit links the need for a sustainable natural environment in order to protect basic liberties (2012 pp. 111–112; Cf. Pettit 2008).

conceptions of republicanism, the uniqueness of this approach hinges on the fact that the unlimited transformation of the natural world in order to promote freedom as non-domination is rejected.

To this end, green republicanism can be defined as a political theory focused on promoting human (and non-human) flourishing through the insurance of a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable republic. Unlike other approaches to republicanism, green republicanism could be defined as post-productivist and non-neutral concerning the common good (Pinto forthcoming).² Accepting that humanity is currently undergoing a period of ecological unsustainability (Barry 2012), green republicanism is interested in promoting conceptions of the good that, on the one hand, promote ecological sustainability and, on the other, promote freedom as non-domination. A means to achieve this lies in promoting post-productivism.

What exactly does the promotion of post-productivism imply? Goodin (2001) claims that the core post-productivist value is autonomy, which he interprets as three policy priorities: income adequacy, temporal adequacy, and minimum conditionality. Income adequacy implies an income amount adequate to an individual's basic needs, temporal adequacy refers to the minimum amount of discretionary time individuals have to spend as they please, and minimum conditionality refers to conditions such as household constitution and (interest in) labour-force participation. In this article, I will compare the different welfare options with the three aforementioned policy priorities in order to assess if the green republican condition of post-productivism promotion is addressed or not.

Offering a similar approach, Fitzpatrick (1998, 1999) presents three key ideas for post-productivist welfare: welfare associationalism, moving from an employment ethic to a work ethic, and self-actualisation. By welfare associationalism, Fitzpatrick examines the need to look beyond the state and the market in terms of social policy-making by promoting 'non-market decentralisation and social participation, where individuals and groups either produce the welfare services which they consume or, where this is unrealistic, have the greatest practicable control over their design and delivery' (Fitzpatrick 1998, p. 18). Moving to a work ethic implies rejecting the idea that paid activity in the formal labour market should be valued over other forms of human activity. Self-actualisation refers to the need for individuals to change their

² Being true that at least some forms of perfectionism are compatible with republican theory, green republicanism, even with a non-neutralist approach to the common good, does not necessarily need to be perfectionist. As Lovett and Whitfield argue, perfectionist principles, on top of encouraging or discouraging certain concepts of the good, need to do so based on the objective value of those conceptions and not simply because of their instrumental use. As they put it, 'to support Calvinism merely because it promotes economic prosperity, say, might not count as perfectionist, while doing so because it genuinely reflects the will of God obviously would' (2016, p. 122). Similarly, defending that the state should promote ecologically sustainable conceptions of the good because they are essential to put us back into a situation of sustainability and reduce ecological-related domination can be seen as an instrumental way to ensure not only human flourishing (and the preservation of the natural world) but also a sane ecosystem and, ultimately, human survival.

expectations and values in terms of consumption and production patterns, namely by accepting a more frugal way of consumption.

Insisting on a productivist and growth-based economy combined with refusing limits to production and consumption runs the risk of producing serious negative ecological impacts also capable of harming republican freedom. In ecological terms, such limits are required in order to move away from the current situation of unsustainability proven by indicators such as the Ecological Footprint and the Planetary Boundaries. The Ecological Footprint measures to what degree nature is being used against the total amount of nature available, and concludes that, presently, humanity would need the regenerative capacity of 1,6 Earths (WWF 2016). The Planetary Boundaries is a particularly interesting concept that consists of defining boundaries for nine Earth system processes that should not be exceeded in order for the planet to remain within 'safe operating space'—four of these systems have already passed beyond the limit (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015).

In one of the best approaches to the concept of limits from a green perspective and proposing an alternative to a growth-based economy, Kate Raworth has used these Planetary Boundaries together with 12 social dimensions in order to develop her 'Doughnut Economics'. Examples of the social dimensions include social equity, political voice, income, and work, as well as access to water, energy, food, education, and healthcare. The 'doughnut' designed by combining both dimensions consists in a 'safe and just space for humanity' between a social foundation—not going below a minimum regarding the social dimensions—and an ecological ceiling— not going beyond the Planetary Boundaries (Raworth 2017).

Furthermore, the productivist model of society has recently led to the concentration of wealth in a reduced number of individuals and enterprises, implying an increased risk of uncontrolled interference (Casassas 2018), as well as an increase in social-economic inequalities that have an impact in terms of ecology, but also in terms of undermining active democratic citizenship (Gourevitch 2015), social solidarity, levels of volunteering, recycling, trust in other people and welfare state institutions, and a whole host of other practices and values (Wilkinson and Pickett 2011; White 2011). Finally, it also leads to a reduction in leisure time used for cultivating and maintaining democratic citizenship and deliberative capacity—essential conditions to promote republican freedom (White 2008).

For these reasons, green republicanism would interest itself in promoting post-productivism by pushing activities from the market *and* the state spheres to the autonomous sphere, which Philippe Van Parijs (2010, p. 2) defines in negative terms as all 'productive activities whose products are neither sold on the market nor commissioned by a public authority'. Examples of activities within the autonomous sphere

could include volunteering, time-banks, and local exchange trading systems (LETS). In this sphere of activity, Van Parijs follows, ecological impact is lower than in the others. Moreover, participation in activities within this sphere might also contribute to post-productivism by reducing the social role of paid employment thereby breaking the link between production, consumerism (i.e. socially and ecologically negative forms of consumption), and economic growth.

How, then, could this brief definition of green republicanism be promoted via a welfare regime? The way in which a welfare regime is designed impacts the relationship between welfare, social justice, republican freedom, and ecological sustainability. Social justice and republican freedom may be achieved at the expense of ecological sustainability, and ecological sustainability may, in turn, be achieved without any concern for social justice or republican freedom. Nevertheless, as argued in the previous paragraphs, none of these scenarios would be acceptable under a green republican approach. For the purpose of this analysis, I will argue that a green republican welfare regime must promote post-productivism, while also protecting and promoting republican freedom.

Existing welfare regimes

Currently existing welfare regimes are very different, and no single model can be used as a standard. Esping-Andersen (1990) divides the existing models into three relevant categories—liberal, corporatist, and social democratic. Liberal regimes are those in which entitlement rules tend to be stricter and are often associated with stigma. These regimes are means-tested and normally imply modest transfers and modest social insurance. The market has an important role in liberal regimes, as private welfare schemes are either passively or actively supported by the state. In corporatist or conservative regimes, the state has a heavier role and the benefits are normally attributed to workplace contributions—the benefits are proportional to the contributions or previous earnings. Corporatist regimes are normally conservative and based on a (male) breadwinner and thus do not include the family and non-labour work. Finally, social democratic regimes are more universal in terms of where benefits exist, which, in principle, are given to everyone with a minimum of conditions. Moreover, they tend to be more generous than the liberal regimes concerning distributable benefits.

Of particular interest for this paper is the distinction made by Goodin (2001) on the relationship between the existing welfare regimes and their approach to work. He argues that liberal regimes follow the ‘work, not welfare’ slogan, corporatist regimes follow the slogan ‘welfare through work’, whereas social democratic regimes follow the slogan ‘welfare and work’. A clarification is required at this point. By ‘work’ Goodin (2001, pp. 13–14) means mostly employment, as he refers to work in the formal economy,

i.e. paid employment in the public or private sector, which is a condition that these regimes have as a way to finance welfare state programmes. Thus, existing welfare regimes are all essentially productivist as they promote labour in the formal economy, i.e. employment as a central aspect of their policies (Goodin 2001; Standing 2009; Van der Veen and Groot 2006).

This focus on labour was also highlighted by Goodin and Rein (2001), who argue that there is a tendency in existing welfare regimes to put participation in the labour market as a condition in order to access welfare. Consequently, all three welfare regimes typically require individuals to engage in formal employment, should they meet certain conditions (e.g. physical, psychological) to do so. I will thus consider that existing welfare regimes include a labour-oriented approach that is interested in the benefits of the labour market and working towards some kind of productive contribution.

As feminist literature has argued, care or domestic work—mostly performed by women—as well as non-productive work such as volunteering, is not considered as work that current welfare regimes are interested in promoting in exchange for welfare benefits (Daly and Lewis 2000; Lewis 2002; Meyer 2002). Thus, existing welfare regimes promote participation in the paid labour market while also actively limiting participation in the autonomous sphere of activities, and, by doing so, simultaneously limit access to welfare benefits.

Focusing on participation in labour markets as a means of accessing welfare benefits implies yet another reason of concern for green republicans, namely the arbitrary manner in which who is fit to work is defined. Goodin (1985) highlights that welfare administrations run the risk of erring on either the side of harshness or generosity. The former could occur when those deserving of welfare benefits would not be receiving them, and the latter when those who do not deserve the benefits would be receiving them. Owing to the fact that making either error is inevitable, a trade-off is required. To reduce a large number of one type of errors may come at the price of increasing the number of cases of the other type.

While Goodin defends welfare administrations' decision to err on the side of generosity during times of economic crisis, he also recognises that the dominant or default political impulses normally err on the side of harshness. Indeed, one of the two types of errors is deemed more politically serious than the other, and so the direction of error is shifted to ensure no citizen benefits from what they should not. Subsequently, this approach hits the most vulnerable and results in more exclusion errors. Ken Loach's fictional character of Daniel Blake, for example, finds himself in a paradox of being seriously ill while also trapped in a maze of bureaucracy that found him fit to work—as such, he had to actively job seek.

It should be clear at this point that existing welfare regimes would face serious challenges answering the green republican conditions of post-productivism. However, given their differences, it can be argued that social democratic regimes could be in a better position to promote a green dimension of the state—an environmental state—including the promotion of post-productivism (Gough et al. 2008; cf. Gough 2017). The environmental state challenges the productivist framework based on permanent and environmentally blind economic growth. The fact that such regimes are normally more generous and carry fewer conditions makes them the best candidate for obeying green republican conditions.

Gough argues that the paradigm of ‘ecological modernisation’ could act as a bridge between green and productivist perspectives (Gough 2016). This balance between welfare and ecological sustainability requires a redistribution of income, wealth, work, time, and carbon emissions (Fritz and Koch 2019). Some empirical research, however, does not support the theoretical argument that social democratic regimes are promoting an environmental state (Koch and Fritz 2014).

Furthermore, even if obeying two of the conditions for post-productivism—minimal conditionality and income adequacy—the temporal adequacy would hardly be addressed. This is due to the fact that the focus of current welfare regimes, including social democratic ones, is on employment activities—welfare *and* work as Goodin puts it—which results in a limitation of the time available to participate in activities outside the market or the state (e.g. volunteering or care work). Such activities do not fall under the type of work existing welfare regimes consider valid in order to receive social benefits. Thus, reducing the amount of hours in the labour sphere and moving them to the work sphere while maintaining the three conditions for post-productivism—income adequacy, temporal adequacy, and minimal conditionality—would not be possible unless a substantial reduction in the legal minimum of labour hours took place.

Additionally, even social democratic welfare regimes may be far from minimal conditionality. Goodin and Rein (2001) distinguish existing welfare regimes according to who receives benefits as well as the conditions set to receive them being the principle of conditionality central for the distinction. They define the three ideal-typical regimes as unconditional (social democratic), with means-tested benefits (liberal), and under the condition of workplace contributions (corporatist). They warn, however, that practice departs from principle, and, that in this sense, real-life examples may be quite different from the ideal-typical cases and, in most cases, mix several ideal types. Practically all of existing schemes are means-tested, even if with different degrees of conditionality.

Participation income

The idea of a PI was first presented by Anthony Atkinson (1996), departing both from a pure workfare social scheme and from an unconditional and UBI. Despite being in favour of unconditionality and refusing means-tested schemes, Atkinson argued that in order to ensure political support, an unconditional income would not be the best solution, instead preferring an income paid under the fulfilment of at least one of a wide range of conditions.³ What, then, constitutes criteria for required participation? The first remark refers to the fact that participation ‘is not limited to labour market participation’, and includes education, training, care work, and other approved forms of voluntary work (Atkinson 1996, pp. 68–69).

Even without other measures in place, a PI could promote post-productivism by motivating people to reduce their amount of hours in the labour market, and instead incite them to dedicate time to activities outside the market and state spheres without losing their benefits. Considering Atkinson’s criteria of participation, this would be the case for those wishing to follow educational or training programmes, volunteering activities, as well as those dedicated to home care. A PI, moreover, might serve as a tool to promote the expansion of the concept of social participation and the creation and sustaining of social solidarity, highlighting activities such as caregiving and volunteering (Hiilamo and Komp 2018). It is worth noting that Atkinson only wished to exclude access to income for ‘those who devoted their lives to pure leisure’ (Atkinson 2015, p. 221).

Atkinson’s case for a PI was rather wide and abstract, and the number of detailed defences or criticisms towards a PI remains low— notable exceptions being the works of Pérez-Muñoz (2016, 2018) and De Wispelaere and Stirton (2007). A particularly interesting green defence of a PI—green participation income—was recently made by Sophie Swaton (2018), who makes the case for a PI that would specifically support the ecological transition. This ‘Ecological Transition Income’ is based on three main characteristics: an income given to those performing one of the accepted activities—paid or unpaid—considered as promoting the ecological transition, a technical support structure, and a democratic form of organisation.

Even if a green PI answers most of the conditions to promote post-productivism (more on this below), numerous reasons exist for why green republicans would be sceptical about such an income, namely its arbitrariness. This is the case regarding the definition of the list of activities that contribute to the ecological transition or the list of unmet social needs (including environmental-related ones). The latter refers to

³ It should be noted that Atkinson later claimed reciprocity originating from participation criteria is ‘both *intrinsically* justified and more likely to garner political support’ (Atkinson 2015, p. 221, emphasis added).

Pérez-Muñoz's (2015, p. 175) defence of PI, which consists of promoting civic services aimed at addressing unmet social needs including, among others, 'neighbourhood clean-ups and environmental protection projects'.

Who has the power to define and maintain such a list, as well as who has the capacity and power to influence what appears on the list or how frequently it is updated are questions that must be answered. In Sophie Swaton's proposal, any individual could propose an activity to be added to the list of activities contributing to the ecological transition; however, this begs the question who or what institution or agency or process would be responsible for accepting them and on what conditions? What criteria would be used to consider proposals 'green enough' to contribute to an ecological transition?

As such, there is the risk that certain activities required to promote ecological transitions and address unmet social and environmental needs have not yet been identified, and consequently, not met. The main problem for green republicans is that these needs are systematically, rather than accidentally, unmet. Certain activities that could contribute to the ecological transition might never be published, whereas activities that do not contribute to an ecological transition could be published—a situation green republicans would rather avoid.

The definition and calculation of the total amount of participation can also lend itself to arbitrariness. As Torry questions, 'how much self-employment would count? How much voluntary activity? Caring for whom? How such disability would exempt someone from satisfying a participation condition?' (Torry 2016, p. 125). All these questions highlight the arbitrariness of a participation income, namely the exact definition of what activities within the non-labour sphere would count as participation (arguably, not all would fall under that list), but also regarding what amount of participation would be considered a minimum in order to receive a PI.

Finally, even if assuming that a list of activities which would be accepted in order to receive a green PI could be defined *and* include all or most of non-labour activities, the issue of arbitrariness arises once again under the guide of control of such activities. This issue is particularly relevant for those performing a reduced number of hours in multiple activities. Consider an unemployed citizen choosing to dedicate time to following her dream of becoming a painter, gardening in order to cultivate food, working in a community garden, buying certain food items from a cooperative of local farmers, and collecting a full bag of litter every day. Assuming that even some of these activities could be seen as contributing to the ecological transition, controlling how such activities are performed (and at least in the amount of time defined as minimum to access the green PI) is a task prone to arbitrariness.

And what of the promotion of post-productivism? Given that Swaton's proposal remains rather abstract regarding certain significant elements, such as the amount of the PI and the amount of participation required as a minimum in order to benefit from it, this green PI might answer differently to the green republican conditions set for this article. I will thus make some assumptions that might make a green PI likely to answer the conditions set.

The first criterion for a post-productivist welfare, namely income adequacy, is dependent on the amount of green PI. Swaton's proposal is not clear regarding her ecological transition income; however, one is to assume its level resembles that of subsistence, thus obeying the income adequacy clause. Moreover, a green PI could be accumulated with other sources of income, namely from formal employment. This is an important difference from existing welfare schemes which might contribute to post-productivism by allowing individuals to shift hours currently spent in employment to other non-labour or reproductive activities outside the market or state spheres.

The second criterion, temporal adequacy, is dependent on the time individuals need to spend in activities identified as contributing to the ecological transition thereby giving them access to the green PI. If too high a number is required, the amount of discretionary time will be low, thus failing the time adequacy clause. Even assuming a scenario where the green PI is generous, the availability of temporal adequacy is nevertheless dependent on the minimum number of hours—be it in the labour or in the work sphere—required to benefit from the PI. Let us assume a scenario where a reduced number of hours is accepted, thus answering the temporal adequacy clause.

The minimum conditionality clause is another point of difficulty for a green PI. A PI has, by definition, a condition of participation. Unlike participation required in existing welfare regimes, the kind of participation required by a green PI includes non-labour activities such as volunteering, education, or care work. As such, even if there are conditions in accessing a PI, they are less demanding than in existing welfare schemes. For green republicans, however, independently of how conditionality is shaped, it will always open up the doors to arbitrariness. This is so because someone will always end up being in the position to accept and reject people/applications.

Even if conditions are less harsh, they are still conditions, and therefore they bring all freedom-limiting effects of conditionality. Furthermore, as Zelleke (2018) notes, the fact that a PI is defended from a normative perspective implies a work/leisure dichotomy—the former obeying the reciprocity condition and the latter failing at it. She continues by stating that a third category of human activity, care work, exists. Although Atkinson includes care work in his criteria of participation, the fact that he starts from a

point which minimises care work carries two main problems. Firstly, prioritisation would be given to the identification of potential free-riders rather than ensuring that income would go to those in need of support. Secondly, 'selective reciprocity' of a PI regarding care work obliges 'caregivers to document the care they provide (...) but not for recipients of care to document what they provide in exchange for the care they require' (Zelleke 2018, p.277). This selective reciprocity would favour the rich or powerful enough to decide reducing their working hours without the need of a PI, thus not having to continually prove that they are participating.

Unconditional basic income

Unlike the idea of a PI, the idea of an unconditional basic income has not only received wide attention in the past years, but has also featured in some of the most important global forums of discussion (De Wispelaere and Haagh 2019). A UBI implies an income paid in cash, on an individual basis, unconditionally (without means-test or work requirement) and universally to all citizens or long-term residents of a political territorial area (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017). The amount of such an income, however, is disputed. While some argue that a UBI needs to be set at a level of sufficiency, others defend a below-sufficiency (i.e. partial) amount. For green republicans, as shall be seen below, this is an important discussion.

Despite appearing a promising tool for green republicans, a green participation income would face challenges promoting post-productivism while being nonarbitrary. Could an unconditional basic income perform better? Several papers and books have looked to both the republican and green cases for a UBI.⁴ The following section will aim to examine a specifically green republican approach, namely by discussing if a UBI can (and under which conditions) be a non-arbitrary tool for post-productivism.

It is not surprising that both advocates of a green UBI and republican theorists have looked into the connections of both concepts. Casassas and Birnbaum (2008) argue that a UBI can promote republicanism by ensuring economic conditions for individuals to live free from domination and ensure participation in a genuine democratic self-government, making them better capable of exercising republican civic virtues thanks to the fact of having such economic/income security. They agree with ecologists criticising those who focus exclusively on paid work as an essential tool for citizenship. For them, the basis of citizenship, community and participation cannot exclusively be defined by paid work because, by doing

⁴ Among many others, see the special editions of the Basic Income Studies on republicanism (Volume 2, Issue 2, 2007) and on sustainability and post-productivism (Volume 4, Issue 2, 2009).

so, those unable to do such work are devalued. Thus, a UBI would be a tool for post-productivism, enabling a range of diverse contributions and dispositions essential to a healthy democratic republic *and* moving away from a situation of ecological unsustainability.

Would this, however, really be the case independently of the way in which the UBI is designed? A big challenge for UBI lies in that extra income unconditionally given to all citizens might not promote the reduction in participation in the labour sphere and the increase in participation in the autonomous sphere. On the other hand, it could serve as a way of promoting further unsustainable and inequality producing consumerism. This is indeed one of the expected outcomes of several defences of a UBI, including certain green perspectives (Howard et al. 2019). In summary, such proposals argue that a UBI could foster individuals' purchasing power, thus promoting consumerism, presenting a UBI as a way of promoting (green) growth. As we have seen, the current scenario of ecological unsustainability is one of the reasons why green republicans would be interested in reducing total consumption; therefore, they could hardly support a UBI proposal aimed at fostering it.

It is thus clear that a UBI will not have an automatic effect on the promotion of the autonomous sphere or a reduction in overall consumption. A possible response is that a UBI could support breaking the link between income and formally paid employment. An income unconditionally given to everyone would contribute to this effort by breaking the 'unholy link' between the need for employment (and the respective economic growth and environmental impact) and economic security (Andersson 2010). It would perform better than a PI because such economic security would automatically be available to everyone, avoiding the kind of problems around arbitrariness discussed in the previous section.

In one sense, a UBI would represent a more concrete and stable incitement for individuals to consider reducing certain hours of their labour-related activities, as it would remove 'some of the "productivist" pressures and anxieties and thus pave the political road towards targeted and selective environmental policies, some of which are bound to entail the termination of certain lines of production and production processes' (Offe 1992, p. 76). Green republicans would, however, need to ensure that the reduction in the amount of time spent in the labour sphere would not result in an increase in discrimination at the workplace regarding promotions or security of employment (Marston 2016), nor other forms of discrimination, such as gender-biased jobs (Cf. Pateman 2004; Robeyns 2001). To be clear, there is no certainty that a UBI would lead automatically to activities supporting the ecological transition, which makes the political/cultural collective action for post-productivist activities necessary (Howard et al. 2019). The point here is that a UBI can free time and therefore indirectly favour the social extension of these activities.

A key question arises at this point: would any UBI have the possibility to contribute to breaking the link between productive work and income? That is hardly the case. There are different reasons for which green republicans would favour a generous and close to sufficiency-level UBI. Firstly, if a UBI is set to a low amount, it might improve the individual's life but would hardly have an effect on the promotion of republican freedom (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2016, p. 288). This is due to the fact that the economic floor required by republicans ensures that it makes a real impact in the individual's bargaining power and their possibility to satisfy basic needs.

Secondly, from an ecological perspective, a generous UBI is better placed to promote post-productivism, and the shift to a post-productivist model of economy as individuals would have less pressure to participate in the labour market (Cf. Gorz 1999; Mylondo 2010; Pateman 2004; Perkiö 2015). In order for a positive ecological impact and the avoidance of an increase in production and consumption to follow this shift towards post-productivism, other measures such as a maximum income or stronger redistribution policies aimed at increasing equality would be required (Casassas 2018; Casassas and De Wispelaere 2016; Fitzpatrick 2010; Howard et al. 2019; Robeyns 2017).

A UBI can yield positive ecological results in two ways: first, as a result of what individuals decide to do after receiving it independently of the way it is funded, and, secondly, based on the way it is financed (Pinto 2018). Thus, even if a generous UBI could help achieve the former, the positive ecological impact would still be dependent on sources of funding. As such, green republicans would prioritise forms of financing aiming to reduce the ecological impact of human activities *and* reduce the risk of domination. Examples include taxation of wealth, inheritances and Pigouvian taxes, i.e. taxes in products and activities that have negative ecological impact, aiming at internalising the cost of impact.

Finally, and particularly relevant for this paper, a generous UBI is best placed to ensure that individuals feel safe enough to reduce their participation in the labour market and engage in activities within the autonomous sphere. For green republicans, a UBI at subsistence level allowing individuals to live without performing any kind of job is not the only option. A generous UBI, even if below subsistence level, might allow the reduction in hours spent in the labour sphere, namely in polluting activities, by devoting those hours to other activities with a smaller ecological impact. Furthermore, a generous UBI could also serve as a way of promoting jobs in the social economy, which would normally be less remunerated but have a smaller ecological impact as they are less subject to the obligation of economic growth (Barry and Smith 2005). Freed from the need to seek and perform paid productive activity in order to access an income

that ensures sufficiency, individuals receiving a UBI would be less pressured to perform unwanted yet obligated tasks.

Basic income could motivate people to participate in autonomous sphere activities (e.g. time-banks) which could, in turn, contribute to the effort of completing state welfarism through co-production at a more local level (Bailey 2015). As such, individuals could make use of their autonomous time by using their knowledge, skills, and leisure time in areas such as care work, thereby complementing state welfare (or filling the gap, should it not be covered) without falling back on market solutions. This is part of the welfare associationalism proposed by Fitzpatrick and referred in the 'Green Republicanism' section.

Thus, a UBI would appear better prepared than the two other options regarding the promotion of post-productivist goals of temporal and income adequacy as well as minimal conditionality. Moreover, a UBI would avoid—or at least reduce—the risks of arbitrariness in its attribution, thus being preferable from a green republican perspective. Another reason for which green republicans could favour a UBI lies in the fact that, unlike a PI, it avoids selective reciprocity, which favours those rich enough or powerful enough to decide to reduce their working hours without the need of a PI or UBI and, thus, without having to constantly prove that they are practising some sort of participation. Consequently, a UBI promotes the increase in social value of activities outside the labour market.

Conclusion

Green republicanism aims at promoting republican freedom while remaining within the ecological limits of the planet and ensuring the resources for human flourishing for all, and ensure that 'good lives do not have to cost the earth'. Given that an employment-obsessed and growth-dependent economy has resulted in 'actually existing unsustainability', green republicans are interested in the promotion of post-productivism while preserving freedom as non-domination. Post-productivism implies that the focus of a state's policies is not on the promotion of employment as a central aspect of citizenship nor that economic growth is a goal unto itself. The focus lies rather in the promotion of personal autonomy, which involves three main characteristics: income adequacy, temporal adequacy, and minimum conditionality.

An important element in the promotion of post-productivism is the way in which welfare schemes are designed. In this article, I have compared existing schemes with a green-oriented PI and a UBI. I conclude that current systems are an element of a productivist society incapable of answering green republican conditions. A green PI could have a positive ecological impact and contribute towards a shift to post-productivism, but would face serious challenges from a republican perspective, namely in terms of the non-arbitrariness of its attribution. Finally, I conclude that, depending on how it is designed, a UBI

could contribute to post-productivism while being non-arbitrary and thus obeying the green republican conditions.

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Article V – Ecological effects of basic income

Introduction

Basic Income (BI) has supporters and opponents along the political spectrum. From the radical left to the most neoliberal right, different (and often antagonistic) propositions for a Basic Income are presented. Of all political parties, the Greens are the most prone to defend the idea (Birnbbaum 2010).

However, the reasons given for that support refer variously to the emancipation of individuals, fighting poverty, and increase of real freedom. Although such proposals fit the Green ideology, they are not directly linked to environmental issues and could even result in a negative environmental impact. Moreover, the green proposals for a Basic Income are not always very clear and often seem too optimistic regarding the role a Basic Income just by itself and independently of all other policies that could play a role in the promotion of a more sustainable way of living. Even green-minded supporters of a Basic Income can be caught in the trap of defending such an income almost for its own sake, and only then considering actual (environmental) impacts that it might have.

The question that needs to be answered is whether, despite all the support offered by the Greens, there is an actual green case for a Basic Income or just a case for a Basic Income by the Greens. In this chapter we will examine some green approaches to a Basic Income that have been presented in the past, and will discuss their pros and cons.

Basic Income and Ecology

Linking Basic Income and the environment goes back to the 1970s. In *Toward a Steady-State Economy*, Warren Johnson proposed a 'guaranteed income as an environmental measure' (Johnson 1973). He claimed that promoting continuous economic growth leads to overproduction and overconsumption, that a Basic Income could remove the need for continuous growth and job creation while still providing a flexible device for economic stability, and that Basic Income would therefore be an environmental measure (cf. Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 309n99).

Separating economic security from growth seems to be a key aspect of some green Basic Income proposals, and Andersson (2010) has referred to the connection between growth and economic security as an 'unholy link' that could be broken by an adequate Basic Income. However, as we will discuss in the next section, the relationship between growth and an environmentally-oriented Basic Income is not straightforward.

A number of green Basic Income proposals are based on the fact that such an income, especially if at subsistence level, would allow individuals to experiment with different forms of living outside the productivist and growth-based paradigm (Boulanger 2009; Schachtschneider 2012; Widerquist et al. 2013: 259–310). According to them, such a Basic Income would give to individuals the security to move their activities to the autonomous sphere where the environmental impact would arguably be smaller. Outside the formal economy, people might focus more on ecological and emotional values (Fitzpatrick 2010); those living only on the Basic Income would be able to choose more leisure and less material consumption (Goodin 2001; Johnson and Arnsperger 2011); work sharing would become more feasible relative to full employment dependent on growth (Fitzpatrick 1998, 1999); and work could be more labour intensive and less natural-resource intensive (Van Parijs 2013).

A current reality is substantial inequality, which causes health problems and encourages the development of needs that are positional. A Basic Income, to the extent that it reduced inequality, would reduce inequality related illness, and would reduce the felt need for positional goods (Schachtschneider 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).

Green Basic Income and Economic Growth

As noted earlier, of all the political groups, the Greens have generally been most supportive of Basic Income. This suggests that Basic Income might be a policy that can contribute to ecological goals. However, there is a divide between those environmentalists who support ‘green growth’, and those who argue for some variation of slow growth, no growth, or degrowth (Pinto 2018). The role of Basic Income in environmental policy varies accordingly.

A Carbon Dividend/Green Growth

Among the numerous environmental threats, probably the greatest and most immediate is that of climate change. There is widespread agreement that to avoid catastrophic climate change, human beings must reduce their carbon emissions, and among the most effective policies toward this end are those that put a price on carbon. Carbon pricing can be achieved through a carbon tax, or a carbon cap with an auction of emission permits (Boyce 2016; Boyce and Barnes 2016; Boyce and Riddle 2010; Citizens’ Climate Lobby, n.d.; Climate Leadership Council, n.d.; Carbon Tax Center, n.d.-a, n.d.-b; Howard 2012, 2016, 2017). Either policy will generate a large amount of revenue. One possible use of such revenue is payment of a carbon dividend, which, if granted to all residents without means test or other conditions, would constitute a partial Basic Income.

There are competing uses for the revenue from carbon pricing, such as investment in renewable energy, tax shifting, and compensation to workers displaced by the phasing out of fossil fuels (Dorman 2016). Arguments for a carbon dividend appeal to equity and political feasibility (Howard 2012; Schachtschneider 2012). A carbon tax, like other consumption taxes, is regressive. Lower income households spend a larger proportion of their income on energy, and so will pay a higher percentage of their incomes in carbon taxes than will upper income households, even though the latter typically have larger carbon footprints. If most of the revenue is returned to residents as equal individual dividends, then a majority of households will experience a net financial gain, turning the regressive tax into a progressive redistribution of income (Boyce and Riddle 2010; Carbon Tax Center, n.d.-a).

Since the carbon tax will need to rise steadily over a decade or more, securing strong popular support could be challenging. If the revenue were to be used to pay an equal dividend to every individual then the economic benefit of the carbon dividend would overcome popular resistance to rising taxes, and would secure support for the tax. While a carbon tax and dividend can be part of a degrowth strategy, most advocates stress that it is compatible with economic growth and expanding employment (Carbon Tax Center, n.d.-b; Citizens' Climate Lobby; Climate Leadership Council). The rising cost of fossil fuels because of the tax will shift demand to renewable energy, and, as a result, investment in wind, solar, and other forms of renewable energy will result in many new jobs (Citizens' Climate Lobby/Regional Economic Models, Inc. 2014).

There is a strategic reason for focusing on just tax and dividend, without mentioning degrowth. The possible coalition is bigger, and it could include proponents of a Green New Deal, and even conservatives concerned about climate change (Climate Leadership Council). Even the proponents of degrowth should concede that the results of a sufficiently high ecological tax would be positive in any case: a decline of CO₂ emissions, whether with or without growth (Ludewig 2017).

Robert Pollin, a green growth critic of degrowth, points out that even a 10% global contraction of Gross World Product over twenty years—a contraction four times larger than that of 2007–2009—would reduce emissions by only 10%, so the bulk of emissions reductions must come from other policies anyway. And a degrowth policy resulting in mass unemployment has little chance of being politically acceptable (Pollin 2015).

Degrowth

The case for green growth rests on the possibility of decoupling growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from growth in energy and resource consumption: but there is reason to be sceptical about the possibility

of decoupling on the scale required to avoid environmental disaster. Absolute decoupling has arguably never been achieved, and even relative decoupling has had very little success (Giljum et al. 2014; Nørgård and Xue 2016; Vergragt et al. 2014). For this reason, although remaining a possibility, economic growth without growth of resource consumption is an idea without strong empirical support.

While granting that some relative decoupling is possible, critics of green growth point out that if consumption continues to rise then carbon emissions will not fall fast enough by means of carbon pricing and technological innovation to avoid catastrophic global warming (Jackson 2009; Victor 2008). Victor and Sers (2018) argue that there is an ‘energy emissions trap’: that is, a shift to alternative energy adequate to avoid intolerable emissions increases will involve energy shortages, effectively precluding growth (see also Jackson 2009: 199). Thus, it is not enough to raise the price of carbon while continuing to pursue economic growth. It is necessary to reduce absolute consumption (Gough 2017: 146–170), and for this it will be necessary to improve our measures of wellbeing, and to recognise that it is possible to live well with less consumption of energy and material resources.

It is conceivable that a carbon tax alone, if rising rapidly, could reduce consumption of fossil fuels enough to avoid catastrophic temperature rise: but it would be likely to simply suppress demand, without effective alternatives at hand, and thus drive the economy into recession. Such a policy, without any planning for the economic, social and political effects, would not be politically feasible (Jackson 2009: 64, 128, 134–136; Pollin 2015; Pollin and Chasman 2015).

What is needed therefore is degrowth ‘by design not by disaster’ (Victor 2008). In such an approach, Basic Income would not be simply a policy to address the inequity of a regressive carbon tax, nor simply a material benefit to compensate for the rising cost of fossil fuel. In the decades after World War II, economic growth was the necessary condition for rising wages and inclusion of a rising population in economic prosperity: but if it is now necessary for ecological reasons to slow, stop, or reverse growth, then we must learn how to share fairly a shrinking pie. This could mean abandoning the goal of full employment: or it could mean sharing the employment more widely through work-time reduction. In either case, Basic Income would ensure that each person’s income would not fall below a decent minimum, regardless of willingness to work. It would also facilitate simpler ways of living, and the growth of what André Gorz has called the autonomous sphere, encompassing activities in the household, non-profit organisations, community gardens, and so on: that is, purposely activity outside the market and the State spheres (Gorz 1985, 1987). It should be stressed that Basic Income is not likely to achieve these results

by itself. Other policies would be needed to entice people to use their Basic Income in sustainable ways (see the section on ‘complementary conditions’ below).

Basic Income and Consumption

The relationship between a Basic Income and sustainable consumption is far from obvious because greenhouse gas emissions increase with income. For this reason, a Basic Income, despite possible social and economic benefits, might have a negative environmental impact as collateral damage. Analysing the possibility of poverty eradication in a world where ecological limits (such as those on carbon emissions) are required, Hubacek, Baiocchi, Feng, and Patwardhan find that

eradicating extreme poverty, i.e., moving people to an income above \$1.9 purchasing power parity (PPP) a day, does not jeopardize the climate target even in the absence of climate policies and with current technologies. On the other hand, bringing everybody to a still modest expenditure level of at least \$2.97 PPP would have long-term consequences on achieving emission targets. (Hubacek, Baiocchi, Feng, and Patwardhan 2017).

Along the same lines, Hubacek, Baiocchi, Feng, Muñoz Castillo, Sun, and Xue (2017) argue that an increase of income leads to an increase of the carbon footprint, which is why achieving global targets on reducing greenhouse gases (such as those agreed in Paris in 2015) would be difficult given the slow pace of technological progress and current levels of dependence on fossil fuels. Given that policy on poverty eradication has often been presented as depending on economic growth, the issue becomes clear: eradicating poverty might come at the expense of deepening the ecological crisis. These conclusions open two different paths: one that leads to a commitment to a redistribution of wealth (and of carbon shares) and another focused on (green) growth as a way to ensure poverty eradication.

Sager (2017) has quantified the ‘equity-pollution dilemma’: ‘Given the higher pollution intensity of consumption per expenditure by poorer households, progressive redistribution may result in higher aggregate pollution from consumption’ (Sager 2017: 5). Sager estimates that in 2009 a marginal transfer of \$1000 USD from rich to poor could increase the CO₂ content of income by 5%, or 2.3% if there were to be complete redistribution. For a hypothetical redistribution of income in the US similar to that of Sweden, he predicts a 1.5% increase in household carbon pollution (Sager 2017: 5). Of course, if the tax that funds the redistribution takes the form of a pollution tax, then that should more than offset the pollution increase that would result from the transfer. This dilemma should always be factored into expected ecological effects of a Basic Income.

Assuming that a full Basic Income would not be funded entirely by pollution taxes, the more of the Basic Income that is funded by other sources, the less the increase in emissions would be offset by pollution taxes. Perhaps this dilemma could be avoided if a Basic Income were to be combined with other ecological policies.

A green growth Basic Income would not require changes in production and consumption, so the green growth case, if interested in avoiding further consequences linked to global climate change, would have to be technologically optimistic. That is, it would have to believe that technological development would allow wealthier countries to keep their currently unsustainable patterns of production and consumption because some technological solution would be developed that would compensate for the negative impacts. Supporters of such a case might even be able to support measures such as geo-engineering or nuclear power as good 'green' alternatives to ensure sustainability, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other causes of global climate change. Some green theorists follow this technological-optimistic path. In their *Ecomodernist Manifesto*, nineteen scientists argue that 'even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation' (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015: 21), so only technological improvement will be able to promote meaningful climate mitigation.

On the other hand, the degrowth case for a Basic Income would prioritise challenging the consumerist society. Sceptical about the role of technology on its own in finding solutions that would avoid ecological catastrophe, this case would aim at structural changes in production and consumption patterns, and specifically a reduction of total consumption in wealthier countries. Moreover, the degrowth case would aim to define a new way of living, outside the economic growth paradigm and based on other measures of prosperity.

Robert and Edward Skidelsky (2012) argue for an economy that is able to ensure the satisfaction of basic needs such as personal development, community, health, recognition, real friendship, life, and security, but that does not require growth (compare Gough 2017). They ground this list of basic needs in the results of inquiries all over the world in which people had to answer questions about what was really important in their lives. The authors defended a Basic Income as a social policy that would support the required economy, would provide for a good life, and would maximise human happiness at the same time as being compatible with conceptions of a liberal state that allows people to decide for themselves what will make them happy. Whether the State is responsible for enabling individuals to pursue a good life or to realise capabilities, a Basic Income could assist the process (O'Neill 2018), and could enable society

to revise the roles of work and labour in a post-productivist world, and in particular could break the link between work and income in the cause of creating a more convivial and frugal way of living.

Not all forms of consumption must be reduced for the sake of environmental protection, especially because some of them serve already that purpose in the first place. It makes a big difference in terms of resource usage, whether someone spends 10,000 € for guitar lessons or for a new car; and it makes an even bigger difference whether this person buys a small car with low emissions, or a SUV. Ecological taxes, such as a carbon tax, and the Basic Income that they could pay for, could be two matching parts of the financial underpinning that a shift to lower consumption would require.

A Basic Income will generally result in some redistribution of income, so its impact on consumption patterns has to be examined. Part of consumption above the poverty line is what we call status consumption: the consumption of positional goods, which are used to express one's social position in relation to others. The expectation that consumption would be lower if inequality were to fall has some empirical support: survey evidence shows that 48% would accept lower income (and consequently lower consumption) if their neighbours were also to have less (Solnick and Hemenway 2005). If a Basic Income were to reduce inequality then consumption could be lower, because consumption of positional goods would decline; but it could also be higher, because low income households tend to spend a higher percentage of their incomes. The expectation that consumption would be lower if inequality were to fall is based on an assumption which is supported by some empirical survey evidence (Solnick and Hemenway 2005).

Basic Income and the Labour Market

Assuming technological progress and rising labour productivity, slower growth (not to mention degrowth) might generate higher unemployment (see Chapter 4 of this Handbook). Basic Income is essential to ensure that everyone has an income whether or not they are working. It also makes it attractive to engage in other non-employment activities, which are typically 'far more labour-intensive and less natural-resource-intensive than formal production is' (Van Parijs 2013: 270).

For real freedom to be 'at as high a level as is sustainable' (Van Parijs 2013: 271), the level at which the Basic Income is paid will need to be at the highest possible feasible level, but that in itself does not tell us whether it will be below or at a sufficiency level. If it is below sufficiency level then it will not enable individuals to exit paid employment and it will tend to increase consumption, whereas if it is enough to live on then it will not (Gorz 2002, 1999; Mylondo 2010, 2012; Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 2016).

By breaking the link between income and the labour market it would allow individuals, *if they so wished*, to abstain from the race to accumulate ever more material goods and help combat the identification of freedom with consumerism. (Pateman 2004: 96, our italics)

Whether a Basic Income of a particular level would enable someone to leave the labour market would be specific to the individual. Some US residents would find themselves liberated from the need to seek employment with a Basic Income of \$500 per month, whereas others would feel compelled to work for wages when earning \$2000 per month. Needs vary from person to person and across the lifecycle.

Even assuming that the activities in the autonomous sphere are more ecologically sustainable than in the other two spheres, if we want to increase the possibilities that individuals will want to live in a more frugal way, it will not be enough to give them an income—even if sufficient—and expect ‘good’ ecological behaviour to follow automatically (Fitzpatrick 2010). The question is whether individuals will actually *wish* for a non-consumerist way of life.

A Basic Income might have yet another positive effect regarding the shift from ‘employment’ to ‘work’: the demoralisation of the labour market. If having paid employment becomes less socially relevant—and this will arguably be the case with a sufficiently high Basic Income—then exit from a paid job market will be easier, and individuals will have more free time and energy to participate in activities outside the market sphere. Thus, by supporting the shift to post-productivism, and facilitating the exit from the job market, a degrowth Basic Income would support sustainable consumption and the related reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.

Ian Gough (2017: 184–188) opposes Basic Income as ‘neither feasible nor desirable’, but favours instead reduced working time as offering ‘a direct and effective route to just post-growth’. Once we examine his arguments, it is apparent that Basic Income and reduced working time should be seen as complementary rather than conflicting. His feasibility objection, that a ‘full’ Basic Income at say 50% of average income (for the UK) would be too costly and would require very high tax rates, fails to distinguish between the gross cost and the net cost (Widerquist 2017). Once the Basic Income is subtracted from the additional taxes that would be paid by net contributors, the net cost can be seen to be much lower, and would of course be the same as that of a Negative Income Tax (Van Parijs 1995: 35–37, 57). Gough himself favours a minimum income guarantee, which would be means-tested and subject to a work or participation requirement. Given the higher administrative costs of this, and the possibility that government funded employment would require subsidy, the overall cost of the conditional scheme could well be higher than the net cost of Basic Income. Assuming that most recipients of a Basic Income would voluntarily engage

in the sorts of non-waged work that would be required for a Participation Income, the difference might come down to whether it is worth the administrative cost and bureaucratic interference of a Participation Income in order to exclude the few slackers who would otherwise benefit from a Basic Income.

The point is well taken that

from a human need perspective, participation in productive and reproductive activity, as well as contributing to collective welfare, is a crucial component of self-respect, contributes to cognitive development and provides the site for purposeful socialisation. (Gough 2017: 185)

A Basic Income would enable both withdrawal from the paid labour market and also participation in the autonomous sector, in care work, and in forms of productive work that are attractive for non-monetary reasons but would otherwise be unaffordable.

It is unfortunate that Gough confuses Basic Income with its most conservative versions, such as that of Charles Murray (2016). An ecological Basic Income would not divert attention 'from collective goods, services and investment', or re-commodify existing welfare states, but would be an important part of the 'mixed package of policies' favoured by Gough, including collective in-kind provision of health care, education, and other basic needs, reduced working time, policies to reduce consumption, and investment in renewable energy.

The Impact of Different Forms of Funding for Basic Income

Income Tax

While other forms of tax could fund the Basic Income, income tax is a natural fit to fund a Basic Income adequate for basic needs, and to ensure that the more affluent are net contributors and the less affluent are net recipients. Because the scheme could be progressively redistributive, it might have the ecological effects that we have already discussed. A more thorough comparative assessment of the ecological effects of income tax vis-a-vis other forms of taxation is beyond the scope of this article.

Pollution and Resource Taxes

In the green growth strategy, a partial Basic Income is one possible use of a carbon tax (or a cap and auction scheme), the principal purpose of which would be to internalise the environmental costs of pollution. The Basic Income would serve social justice by remedying the otherwise regressive nature of such a tax, but beyond this purpose there is no intrinsic reason in a green growth strategy for a Basic Income sufficient to meet basic needs.

In a degrowth strategy, on the other hand, pollution taxes are likely to be only one source of funding, because even the most optimistic assumptions about the revenue from a carbon tax show that it would fall far short of a full Basic Income.

Peter Barnes (2014) has estimated that a ‘base income’—insufficient for basic needs, but enough to raise many families out of poverty and provide more economic security—could be funded from taxing the rents from the use of common resources, broadly construed to include natural resources such as atmospheric carbon storage and electromagnetic spectrum use, but also shared social assets such as new money creation, intellectual property protection, and securities transactions (Barnes 2014: 94). Such a base income is understood as a resource dividend, that is, each person’s share of common natural and social wealth.

By itself, such a policy would not guarantee any particular use of the income, although pollution taxes, such as a carbon tax, would encourage a shift to renewable energy, and resource taxes generally, by raising the cost, would encourage conservation of the resources. Hence from an ecological perspective, such a base income might need to be complemented by other policies to encourage ecological spending. Resource taxation would not necessarily generate enough revenue to fund a full Basic Income; but Florenhaft (2012) has found that a ‘resource poor’ state like Vermont could generate enough revenue from resource taxation for a full Basic Income if the resources required could be reappropriated into the commons for the rents to be available for taxation, and if some revenue could be redirected away from other uses and towards Basic Income.

Like a carbon tax, taxation on other resources can serve to discourage overuse, but to the extent that this goal is served, the revenue will decline, at least in the case of fossil fuels. For example, ultimately there should be no revenue from fossil fuels, because they will have been priced out of the market entirely. There is a concern that if a carbon tax is used to fund a Basic Income, there will be some interest on the part of the Basic Income recipients in halting the tax increase at the point of maximum revenue, rather than continuing to raise the tax in order to further discourage consumption.¹ To address this possibility, policy makers should consider a phase-in of other sources for the Basic Income when the carbon tax revenue declines.

In the case of renewable resources, the tax rate has to rise continuously, so that the revenue will be constantly large enough, and the pressure to make further changes both of technologies and lifestyles to

¹ Expressed to one of the authors by Jurgen De Wispelaere, in conversation.

reduce resource consumption will continue. Theoretically this process will end in a balance between acceptable resource usage and sufficient resource tax revenue to finance a Basic Income. In practise culture, technology and environmental problems will never come into a steady state, so we can assume that we shall always have to adapt the resource tax rates (Schachtschneider 2014). There will always be a tension between the ecological goal of reducing consumption, and the Basic Income goal of raising revenue. The optimal level of taxation to sustain the highest revenue stream might be less than the optimal level to achieve maximum ecological benefits.

Value Added Tax (VAT)

Walker (2016) has proposed funding a basic income of \$10,000 per annum for all working age adult citizens in the US from a Value Added Tax (VAT) of 14%. Although by itself this would be a regressive flat tax, when combined with the Basic Income everyone earning up to \$81,000 per annum would be financially better off. The VAT could discourage consumption, and so might be seen as an ecologically friendly source of funding, but this possible effect could be overshadowed by increased consumption resulting from redistribution.

Complementary Conditions for Green Effects Through Basic Income

A Basic Income would offer individuals the security to experiment with alternative, more sustainable ways of life. This is an important Green argument for a Basic Income. Nevertheless, the income on its own might not be enough to ensure a shift from unsustainability to sustainability. In this section, we shall focus on some possible complementary conditions that would enhance the green effects of a Basic Income: education, reduction of working hours, and a maximum income.

Education

A first and important aspect is education. In his defence of a Basic Income, Christian Arnsperger (2010) argues that, confronted with the capitalistic way of life, individuals are trapped in a form of life, and that current and future generations will have the 'inevitable task' of creating and putting in place a more frugal way of life. To do so, two things would be required: (a) radical educational reforms for teaching how to live outside a productivist and consumerist framework, and (b) a Basic Income. One of those two actions without the other would not be successful, so they should be implemented in parallel. A Basic Income would allow those who had acquired 'existential lucidity' to experiment with new ways of life that would be more frugal, cooperative, alternative, and non-capitalist.

Working Time Reduction

Another way of reducing environmental impact would be to reduce the legally permitted maximum working hours (Gough 2017; Kallis et al. 2013; Knight et al. 2013; Schor 2005). Schor is sceptical that unregulated markets and technological innovation alone can achieve environmental sustainability. 'Rates of diffusion of green technologies have been disappointingly slow' (Schor 2005: 48). For poor countries, cutting-edge innovations are costly. Consumption growth is likely to involve further use of natural resources, and higher incomes have been found to result in a rebound effect, where more efficient energy use results in 'rising vehicle ownership and miles driven, larger homes, and a growth in appliances' (Schor 2005: 48). She argues that it is necessary for the affluent of the world to reduce consumption. One way to do this would be to divert productivity increases from increased consumption towards greater leisure, through work time reduction. Thus, work-time reduction may be a necessary complement of a green Basic Income.

Van Parijs and Vanderborght, on the other hand, point out difficulties with legislated work time reduction. First, if accompanied by a reduction in income, it could drive the lowest paid workers into poverty. This is an effect that could be mitigated by a Basic Income, but still the costs would fall on those least able to bear them. Or, if pay was maintained, then labour would become more costly, which would lead to more involuntary unemployment. There are also dilemmas between fair allocation of the privilege to work (if only some occupations were subject to work time reduction) and bottlenecks with regard to scarce talents (if all occupations were included), and between 'nightmarishly expensive and intrusive bureaucracy' to achieve fair implementation and (if limited to wage workers) a proliferation of fake self-employed workers undermining the goal of shared work.

A Basic Income would achieve at least some of the same effects while allowing for labour market flexibility and individual choice. Workers who wished to reduce working time could do so.

The employment capacity thereby freed up by current incumbents can be occupied by those currently unemployed, especially as basic income's universality enables the unemployed to start off with part-time jobs or to accept low pay for jobs with significant training components. (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 48–50).

It is difficult to know how close the reduction in working time brought about by a Basic Income would be to a legislated work time reduction (Kallis et al. 2013).

A Maximum Income

A third complement to Basic Income would be to legislate for a maximum income and a very high taxes on profits. The argument is that if the race for profit were to become less interesting, or the need for positional goods less compelling, then the need for perpetual growth would become less appealing. Daly has argued that ‘we will not be able to shift from growth to steady state without instituting limits to inequality’ (Daly 1996: 215). For this reason, Daly defends both a Basic Income and a maximum income (Christensen 2008).

Defenders of degrowth often favour a maximum income. Liegey et al., for example, claim that a Basic Income ‘might not go far enough and will work as a palliative of a deeply sick society’, and for this reason they also call for a maximum income (Liegey et al. 2013: 38). Samuel Alexander (2015), in his entry to the degrowth dictionary, follows a similar line, and claims that Basic Income and maximum income could help to achieve egalitarian goals without relying on growth. Thus, by contributing to reducing inequalities, both policies would contribute to reducing overconsumption (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), and would therefore reduce inequality (Lorek and Vergragt 2015). A maximum income is a policy that might find approval among more diverse political interests than we might think (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2012).

The Impact of Alternative Policies

Opponents of a Basic Income sometimes propose in-kind transfers (such as food or education vouchers, or the free usage of public services) as an alternative (Bergmann 2004; Gough 2017: 163; Heath and Panitch 2010; Portes et al. 2017). Proposals for in-kind transfers are sometimes made for environmental reasons. Calder (2010) proposes free public transport, which would serve both social and environmental justice, and thus, he argues, would be consistent with a green case for Basic Income. Gough (2017) cites evidence that public consumption results in fewer emissions than private consumption, and that publicly funded welfare states emit less carbon than privately funded alternatives. In-kind provision, however, does not preclude a Basic Income as a complementary policy, unless all basic needs are to be met through in-kind provision.

Other proposals for in-kind services include a basic amount of some essential goods, normally followed by an exponentially higher taxation on the consumption of such goods above the ‘bad-use’ level (Ariès 2007; Gough 2017: 161–164; Liegey et al. 2013). Once again, the definitions of the ‘fair’ and ‘sufficient’ levels of consumption are extremely difficult to assess because only a part of daily goods

needed by everyone in pluralist modern societies could be reached with such provision, and the discussion about that problem is generally absent from proposals for such schemes.

Alf Hornborg (2017) proposes that each country should establish a complementary currency for local use only, and that it should be distributed to all local residents as a Basic Income. Merrill et al. (2019) suggest the creation of an ecological income in the form of a local convertible complementary currency which could be used in local shops, with public authorities and the community deciding which businesses could be part of the scheme. Experiments have taken place, such as 'Basic Income Circles' (BGE-Kreise) in Germany. Every local circle gave their members a monthly income in its own local currency (often in the form of cryptocurrencies), with the scheme funded by taxing economic activities undertaken with that money. But almost nothing happened. The local currencies were not valued highly enough in daily practice, because the currency was not sufficiently universal.

Another interesting idea from Tony Fitzpatrick (2007) is to convert or mortgage Basic Income streams into occasional capital grants. Such conversion into a capital grant should only be permitted if it would serve post-productivist goals such as care, sustainability, or other desirable ends. But precisely identifying businesses and shops to be accepted as suitable for post-productivity goals is nearly impossible, due to the diversity of lifestyles in pluralist modern societies—as it is with the definition of material basic needs.

Strategies for the Implementation of Green Oriented Basic Income

Most funding conceptions are based on the idea of financing a Basic Income with money taken from present public budgets and programmes. Contemporary social welfare systems, with their historically generated balances of giving and receiving, would be changed suddenly into radically new ones: so politicians and citizens hesitate to switch from current systems even if they perhaps agree with the fundamental idea of a Basic Income as the core of an emancipatory and less bureaucratic modern welfare state. To put it in other words, path dependency will place constraints in every social context on the introduction of a Basic Income: on the level, on how it is funded, and on how it intersects with previously existing programs.

A significant increase in ongoing taxes even for a partial Basic Income would cause a big legitimization problem. Perhaps that dead end can be avoided if the historically new principle of social security can be combined with a historically new funding principle, which can be legitimated not only as a funding source but also as a necessary steering instrument for hitherto unsolved environmental problems: the taxation

of scarce environmental resources such as the atmosphere, of water pollution, and of the development of natural land for businesses and housing and the extraction of minerals, and so on.

New paradigms can be more easily established when prototypes and small pilot schemes have taken place. So, for instance, an eco-bonus, that is, the sharing of the revenue of a resource tax equally with all citizens, could be a prototype of a Basic Income funded via ecological taxes. Starting with a small amount could be the way for an incremental implementation of a Basic Income. It could be introduced slowly and parallel to the ongoing social security scheme in order to establish the principle. Every citizen would receive unconditionally a share from the common inheritance of society (Schachtschneider 2014). The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend—the sharing of revenues from Alaska’s state-driven oil exploration—shows that the principle of sharing the revenues of natural resources can be popular, even if the motivation for its introduction was not an ecological one (Widerquist and Howard 2012). An eco bonus for an ecological reason already exists in Switzerland, although the amount is very low (approximately \$100 per annum). The law implemented in 2007 says that if the CO₂ emissions are higher than they should be according to the national emission reduction plan, then a tax on various fossil fuel usages has to be raised the revenues from which have to be paid to the population via a reduction in the contributions to the obligatory public health service (Federal Office for the Environment 2016).

Funding a Basic Income with eco taxes would avoid ecologically oriented Basic Income proponents having to decide whether they should plea for green growth or degrowth. In any case, the environmental benefit would be useful (Ludewig 2017). We can achieve reduced resource use either with green technology (green growth) or with cultural change (degrowth), and in practise there will be a combination of both: so there is a chance to form a political coalition of these two main fractions of environmental discourse and movement. Moreover, to use economic instruments for environmental policies could be the main road for liberals concerned about environmental problems. However, such a coalition will meet with resistance both from those who think that a focus on a carbon tax is insufficient for uniting a left coalition of environmentalists, workers, and marginalised groups for radical system change (Klein 2015), not to mention from conservatives who favour a carbon tax and dividend, but oppose any dampening of economic growth (Halstead 2017).

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Conclusion

The next years will be crucial to determine how societies answer the pressing issues around the social, economic, and ecological crises. If nothing is done, the risk is that we might create an even more unequal world in all dimensions, including the ecological one. But more than the extinction of the human race, the risk lies mostly in the rising of eco-fascism, eco-authoritarianism, and eco-apartheid. Even if improving the ecological situation of the planet, such political views would reduce the citizens' freedom, which is the reason why a green republican approach as presented in this dissertation would oppose them. In short, green republicans would claim that there shall not be an ecologically sustainable planet without free citizens, the same way that there cannot be a planet with free citizens that is not ecologically sustainable.

Examples of this possible eco-apartheid future are becoming a reality at different points of the globe. In India, for example, during a period of peak air pollution in 2019, new businesses arose, proposing the sale of pure oxygen (Raj and Schultz, 2019). At around 500 Rupees (approximately 6 euros) for each 15 minutes of pure air, such places and services are not accessible to the majority of the Indian population. Similar examples can be found in other countries such as China and Iraq. Consider too the luxurious bunkers being built by the very wealthy people in order to avoid extreme events – not only calamities such as a meteor strike or nuclear war, but also to protect them against extreme weather events such as hurricanes, typhoons, floods, or others.

This dystopian future was the subject of the 2013 movie *Elysium*. The action is placed in the year 2154, when a small wealthy elite of Humans live on a station orbiting the planet Earth, named Elysium, in an obvious reference to the Elysian fields of the Greek mythology. On the ground, where the vast majority of the people live, there is widespread hunger, disease, misery, and a global lack of basic services such as medical care, while on the orbital station life is indeed similar to paradise.

Far from being a cinematographic masterpiece, this movie has the merits to highlight the risks of this “escape by the elites”. In this reality, a (very) small number of people manage to continue living with access not only to the basic goods, but to the luxurious ones, as well, while the vast majority of people struggle daily to fulfil their basic needs. This movie also highlights another possibility of the eco-apartheid, namely the technological improvement of human beings. In this trans-humanistic approach, the human

technological enhancements – be they intellectual or physical – are reserved for a very few individuals, thus reinforcing the risks of domination of those that cannot afford or gain access to such improvements.

The risks ahead of us are multiple and green republicanism could serve as a theoretical background for the definition of a non-dominating and ecologically sustainable planet. With this dissertation I hope to advance the definition of some of the elements of a green republican theory. The five published articles present some of the characteristics that might shape a green republican theory, such as its focus on promoting post-productivism, the promotion of the participation within the autonomous sphere and in a more convivial way, and the need to define some limits in order to remain within the “safe operating space” of the planet.

Limits, as I argue, are a critical part of the green republican theory. Nevertheless, such limits shall not be seen as imposed and limiting freedom. This is indeed a key challenge of the near future: regain the idea of freedom as a progressive idea and as conceived by republicans. After a period when the republican conception of freedom as non-domination was pushed into the background (when not completely forgotten), the multiple social, economic, and ecological crises we currently face open the path for a renewed approach to this conception. Thus the need to think about ecological limits and the need to promote republican freedom in parallel. As I have argued in ARTICLE I, “in times of ecological emergency, non-domination is not only compatible with ecological limits, it might require such limits in order to be promoted”.

The existence of stricter ecological limits without reducing republican freedom as non-domination could be supported by promoting the autonomous sphere. This sphere of activities corresponds to all activities that do not fall into the market or the state spheres. Even if it is not the case by default, it is within this sphere of activities that we can expect a lower ecological impact. This would be the case for someone who reduces her labour hours to spend them in a less ecologically impacting activity such as reading, for example. Assuming that all human activities fall under the triangle defined by the market, state, and autonomous spheres, the goal should not be to make *all* activities part of the autonomous sphere but rather to push as many activities as possible to the autonomous zone of the triangle.

But in order to answer the urgent ecological, social, and economic needs, the promotion of the autonomous sphere would need to be thought of at a systemic level. This implies the creation of the conditions that foster mutual aid, free exchanges, participation in cooperative projects, and the (re-)occu-

pation of the public space. A possible practical example of such a space is the kind of cooperative supermarket I have the pleasure of being a member of.¹ With more than 1500 members, the supermarket runs almost exclusively with their work under a simple principle: only members can access the supermarket and, if you are a member, you must work three hours every four weeks. The price of the products has a fixed percentage of profit kept as low as possible in order to keep the supermarket running. This is a practical example of activities divided between the market and the autonomous spheres, whereby the members of the cooperative are at the same time owners, workers, and clients.

Moreover, green republicans would want to foster civic participation. Unlike what is common in green political theory, I argue that green republicanism should find inspiration in the more radical republican tradition, fostering contestation. For that, republicans will need to think of the political institutions that might allow room for citizens to become involved in the political life of the community and to make their voice heard. For that, some republican institutional innovation might be required; but such institutions might already exist in the shape of citizens' assemblies. This is indeed the point made by Grant (2013), who presents citizens' assemblies as a republican institutional innovation that supports the republican political theory.

The question then is what kind of power shall the citizens' assemblies have in order to fit a (green) republican conception of democracy. Stuart White (2020) has recently presented a good compromise solution that could inspire green republicans. White rejects giving all the political power to the citizens' assemblies and, as such, having them replace parliaments, while at the same time rejecting citizens' assemblies that serve merely as a consultation body created at parliamentary discretion. He argues then that the best way to integrate citizens' assemblies into a republican democracy is via a petition-assembly-referendum scheme. In such a scheme, citizens could form assemblies via popular petitions and without the need for parliamentary approval. Once formed, such citizens' assemblies would have the power to send their recommendations to referendum, independently of parliament.

In this dissertation I have also focused on a particular element that might be important in a green republican theory: an unconditional basic income. I argue that a UBI can play an important role answering the economic, social, and ecological crises. To be clear, there is no certainty that a UBI alone would automatically lead to activities supporting the ecological transition, which makes the political/cultural collective action for post-productivist activities necessary. The point here is that a UBI can free time and

¹ More information about this supermarket can be found here: <http://bees-coop.be/en/>.

therefore indirectly favour the social extension of these activities. And that would have positive consequences in social and ecological terms.

Nevertheless, one needs to be wary about the role of a UBI in the promotion of ecological sustainability. As I discuss at length in ARTICLE III, even amongst green advocates of a UBI there will be some serious differences between those advocating for an economic model based on green growth and those defending a degrowth society. The green growth model is inspired by the technological optimism that argues that (only) the technological improvements will put the planet on a track of sustainability, which is why radical changes to the existing economic model are not required. On the other hand, the ecological/degrowth model requires radical changes in the way our economies and our societies are organised.

The green republican approach I defend in this dissertation argues that, given the point of ecological unsustainability we are currently in, the more radical ecological solution should be given priority. This of course poses extra challenges to the implementation of a UBI part of an ecologist strategy. Those are the challenges faced by green republicans which, due to an unfortunate pandemic in this beginning of the year 2020, might become urgent and might enter the public debate.

From fear to hope

As I type these lines, the world is facing the COVID-19 pandemic. With hospitals without the means to cope with the numbers of infected people, schools and businesses closed, factories running at half-power, people closed at home and respecting the “social distancing” policies, and the short, medium, and long-term impacts of this pandemic are completely unknown. Could the result of this pandemic be a serious shift to the way societies and economy have been organised? And if yes, what would this new model of organisation look like?

In an illustration published in France on March 10th 2020, during the period in which people were asked to remain at home and entitled “the real danger of confinement”, we see a father, with a face of joyful surprise, preparing a meal with his son and saying “but... after all, we are fine at home... and my work is useless ... but ... what a fool this world is!”. Of course, the real dangers of the COVID-19 are the thousands of lives lost, as well as the millions of people that will suffer the economic impact should strong measures not be taken to support them. Nevertheless, this illustration is paradigmatic and makes clear a discussion that, in society, will have to take place in the post-COVID-19 crisis.

With millions of people working from home for weeks in a row, with classes being given remotely, with fewer flights, with factories stopped, this crisis will force us to rethink many of our certainties. Ironically, as an article published in *Forbes* magazine argues, these measures might ultimately save more lives for what they imply in reducing pollution than for the lives saved from the virus itself (McMahon 2020). But if these measures are much more radical than those that ecologists advocate in order for us to embark on an ecological sustainability route, why have we never been able to apply them, unlike measures to combat COVID-19? In my opinion, there are two main reasons: the lack of fear and the lack of an alternative imaginary.

The first reason, fear, is explained by the fact that the multiple ecological crises, with climate change at their fore, are not able to cause the same level of fear as a pandemic such as COVID-19, which has a directly observed outcome, namely the deaths of thousands of people and the (extremely) quick dissemination of the virus at different points of the planet. Despite the scientific evidence highlighting the catastrophic consequences of the ecological crises, the perception of distance toward such scenarios – geographical and temporal distance – makes people feel less scared about long-term consequences of the ecological crises than about the short-term pandemic effects. This justifies the fact that despite a great deal of literature and proposals on ways to reduce the ecological impact of human activities, including some of the measures currently being taken to face COVID-19, they have never taken a concrete shape, nor have they been implemented.

The second reason is the lack of a post-growth imaginary. This aspect has been highlighted in the degrowth literature and can be summarised as follows: in order to create a new world, one needs to first imagine it and want it. And, so far, this post-productivist world defended by the ecologist and supported by the green republican approach here defended has not yet been dreamt of or desired by enough people to provoke a paradigmatic shift. Hence the relevance of the aforementioned illustration. Forced by fear to change daily practices, it is not at all impossible that the collective imaginary will change as well, especially in relation to the role that employment plays in our societies.

This might be true for both workers and for employers. In case of wide success of this forced experience of lower working hours and of teleworking, employees might wonder why they should dedicate so many hours of their lives to performing a job and not to some other activity, whereas employers might

rethink the need of having their staff working so many hours.² Proposals for an emergency UBI to address the current crisis have jumped into the public debate in the United States and Europe, reaching many more people than the usual UBI activists and advocates. “In desperate times, desperate measures”, seems to be the motto in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis, opening the path for the possible definition of a UBI programme, even if for a short period of time. And if such programmes go forward, in particular if defined at EU level, their impact on the collective imaginary might be tremendous.

The COVID-19 crisis is also revealing the abnegate and solidary character of people, with several initiatives to support neighbours at risk being put in place. Solidarity groups share information and resources are created. *Geeks* offer their knowledge and produce essential medical material, namely via 3D printing. Depending on what will happen in the next months, a new imaginary – post-productivist and based on mutual-aid and solidarity – might indeed take root in our societies.

Another consequence of the pandemic the world currently faces is the reinforcement of the idea that humanity does not yet dominate nature. Let us remind ourselves that this Promethean approach that sees humanity as mastering nature is intimately associated with the freedom conceptions of non-limitation and non-frustration. But it is also an essential aspect of eco-modernist approaches to solving the ecological crises, based on technological solutions and geo-engineering processes that assume the controllability of the Earth systems. The novel coronavirus highlights, as ecologists claim, that assuming that nature can be controlled is, at the least, a dangerous assumption. And, as argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, more than desiring to master nature, green republicans will accept the existence of a nature that shall not be mastered and with which humanity has a relationship of interdependence. Such dependencies on nature will thus lead us to promote human flourishing within a nature that is not mastered.

It goes without saying that the COVID-19 crisis involves many risks as well. Of those, there are three that deserve mention in this Conclusion. The first can be summarised as the “let them die, save the economy” risk and is based on the principle that, in order to maintain the existing economic system, governments should not allow countries to stop. Social distancing, quarantines, and the closure of schools and especially, businesses should not be promoted, as that would impose too great of an impact on the

² Not being the purpose here, I will not extend this discussion, but working remotely and with reduced contact with the colleagues raises dangers that republicans would be worried about. In particular, such dangers would arise at the level of workplace democracy, as well as the level of fairness in terms of conditions to work from home (e.g. quality of the internet connection, hardware available, house dimension, kids at charge).

economy. Those advocating this solution are well aware of the consequences, namely the deaths of thousands (millions?) of people, especially the elderly or people in health risk groups. However, so the argument goes, those deaths are a necessary price to pay for keeping the economy running.

The second risk is the anti-humanist approach to this crisis, which can be summarised as “let them die, it is nature” risk. This approach consists in arguing that the current pandemic is the planet’s answer to the excesses of humanity, and is thus a price that we, collectively and as a species, need to pay. Not neglecting the role of human activities in the actual situation of ecological unsustainability the planet is in – that was, after all, the starting point of this dissertation – this view has many problems. Again, not being the focus here, I cannot afford a long discussion of this topic, but it is worth mentioning that this anti-humanist approach is deeply unfair because, as we have seen, those who have contributed the most the ecological crisis are the ones who will have the greatest chances of avoiding it.

Finally, the third risk resides in the promotion of an authoritarian state as the sole guarantor of a country without crisis, which can be summarised as the “it is an authoritarian state, but at least no one dies” risk. The answer to the novel coronavirus outbreak in China, one of the first countries to be impacted, was based on an authoritarian response and strict policies of confinement and quarantine. Such strict measures were replicated in Europe but with much less success in ensuring that people would remain confined in their homes, given the democratic regimes in place. And indeed, in countries such as Portugal, where the state of emergency was declared for the first time in the democratic period, the strict measures are, according to a poll, supported by the vast majority of the population, which can probably be linked to the above-mentioned fear of the consequences of the pandemic.³ This raises yet another problem, such as expanding the extraordinary measures of a state of emergency after the pandemic in order to advance authoritarian policies and to limit parliamentary powers.

At this point of the dissertation, I hope to have proven that green republicanism refuses the three approaches discussed in the previous paragraphs. Against keeping the economy running at all costs and independently of the consequences for the people and the planet, green republicanism is interested in promoting shared republican freedom *independently* of the consequences to the economy. Against the anti-humanistic stance, green republicans want to promote a vision that goes beyond the Manichean distinction between Human and Nature and present the former as an intrinsic part of the latter. As the 19th-century anarchist geographer and precursor of ecology Élisée Reclus brilliantly put it, “Man is nature

³ According to a poll made a week after its declaration, more than 75% of the Portuguese people support the declaration of the state of emergency and the extra powers this gives the government to enforce strict measures.

getting conscience of itself". Against the authoritarian view, suffice it to say that one of republicanism's principles of freedom pillars is the protection against abusive state power – *imperium*.

The way states will address this crisis will determine the definition of the post-COVID-19 reality. Does it make sense to, despite the slowing of the economy, keep it alive and expect to, sooner or later, go back to that "normal" status that we were in before the crisis? Is there even a normal to go back to? Proposals to help defining a new way of living, in which the ecological sustainability and republican freedom are promoted, will need to be put forward. With this dissertation I hope I have advanced some such proposals that are part of a green republican package and that can serve for inspiration in this critical point of our existence.

So what does green republicanism propose as a post-COVID-19 society? Right from the start, it proposes a post-growth society in which the priority is shared prosperity and not growth at all costs. And to the question about how to achieve this, green republicanism answers: slowing down the pace of life and promoting policies of sustainability. Fostering more friendly ways of life, green republicanism proposes to review the scales of our action, proposing a kind of cosmopolitan localism.

It proposes a more frugal and more cooperative way of life, betting on mutual aid and sharing, supported by an unconditional basic income. It also proposes to drastically reduce the number of hours dedicated to employment, moving them to other areas where we are able to work as citizens and autonomous individuals. As the need for some forms of labour will not disappear in the near future, green republicans will be interested in selecting the kind of labour deemed necessary and useful for the society, and following that selection, distribute it fairly among those wishing to perform a labour activity.

To avoid the risks of an authoritarian state and to promote civic participation, green republicans will want to free the citizenry's time and create the conditions for contestation and for their participation in deliberative processes. These republican innovations in terms of political institutions might take the shape of citizen's assemblies, which are already in practice in different locations around the globe.

Possible further paths to explore

This thesis opens the path for further research on different topics. One is in the definition of ecological domination. The revival of the republican tradition expanded the number of topics that are analysed under the republican banner. However, the focus has hardly been on how the concept of domination fits a green republican theory. This is rather surprising given the central role domination plays in republican theory.

Further research could thus discuss the concept of ecological domination and if the neo-republican conception of domination put forward by Pettit will have to be revised in order to fit the ecological dimension. In particular, the definition of ecological domination might challenge three aspects of neo-republican conception of domination: that it needs to be interpersonal, intentional, and that there must be common knowledge.

For republicans, as discussed in this dissertation, the concepts of arbitrariness – and the opposition to it – is extremely important, as they define freedom as the absence of arbitrary power. There are two ways in which non-arbitrariness is defined with regard to republican freedom. The first – the procedural way – argues that power will not be arbitrary if constrained by a set of rules and regulations (Lovett 2010); the second – the democratic method – argues that power will be non-arbitrary as long as concerned individuals have the capacity to directly or indirectly resist it and control it (Pettit 1997; 2012).

In practical terms, however, both strategies are compatible and there are important synergies between them that need to be explored. In effect, having individuals and groups with the capacity to control rules and regulations is the best way to turn such rules and regulations into a compelling device, and the other way around, having good procedures is a necessary condition to channel and strengthen civic participation. How, then, would ecological domination be defined? In a procedural way or in a democratic way? Would it be structural or dyadic? These, among other questions, would need to be answered in the definition of ecological domination.

Another interesting research topic that could be done as a follow-up of this thesis is presented by Ronzoni (2019) when she argues that the concept of transnational republican solidarity can serve as a way to promote a green new deal at international level. A green new deal is a big investment plan aimed at answering economic, social, and ecological challenges with its exact definition varying according to the proponent. The idea of a green new deal started in Europe in 2008 and has gained renewed interest in recent years, not only in Europe but in the United States as well. There are different approaches to the concept, some arguing that it must promote growth and others arguing that it could be a good opportunity to promote degrowth. A more detailed look into this proposal and how a green republican approach would support it is a promising topic for research.

Further research could focus on the geographical scope of green republicanism. Historically associated with a rather small geographical area (e.g. city or state), what would be the republican proposals for a globalised world? Should priority be given to the idea of a global republic or, instead, to an even more

localised group of small republics? Is there space for a local *and* global republicanism? And, if so, what would be its shape? Some of these questions have been discussed by some eminent figures of republican political theory, but the topic remains largely under-studied.⁴ From a green republican perspective, knowing both the impacts of global processes in the local realities and the impacts of local actions in global processes, this is indeed an interesting line of research.

The way we, as a society, act now will shape the future. Green republicanism is an intergenerational theory, looking into both the past and the future. The way we leave the planet to the next generations will define how such generations refer to us. It is thus our duty to promote the ecological sustainability of the planet, but we need to do so while promoting republican freedom. Green republicanism will need to reject all eco-authoritarian approaches to the ecological challenges, as they would imply a reduction in terms of freedom. Green republicanism must be a politics of hope in times of fear. The challenge in front of us is one of the greatest ever faced by humanity, but what challenge is more important than human freedom and ecological sustainability of the planet?

⁴ See, for example, Bohman (2004; 2007), Laborde (2010), Laborde and Ronzoni (2016), Marti (2010) and Pettit (2016).

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