

# configurações

ISSN 1646-5075

REVISTA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS

N.º 26 | DEZEMBRO DE 2020

**ECONOMY AND SOCIETY**  
**POLITICS, PRACTICES, AGENTS AND**  
**INSTITUTIONS**

**Título:** CONFIGURAÇÕES 26 / DEZEMBRO DE 2020

**Diretora:** Ana Maria Brandão

**Conselho Consultivo:** Ana Nunes de Almeida (Univ. Lisboa), António Colomer (Univ. Polit. Valência), António Lucas Marín (Univ. Complutense), Carlos Alberto da Silva (Univ. Évora), Claude-Michel Loriaux (Univ. Católica de Lovaina), Daniel Bertaux (CNRS, Paris), Elísio Estanque (Univ. Coimbra), François Dubet (Univ. Bordéus), Ilona Kovács (Univ. Téc. de Lisboa), James R. Taylor (Univ. Montreal), João Arriscado Nunes (Univ. Coimbra), João Ferreira de Almeida (ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa), João Teixeira Lopes (Univ. Porto), John Law (Univ. Lancaster), José Bragança de Miranda (Univ. Nova Lisboa), José Carlos Venâncio (Univ. Beira Interior), José Madureira Pinto (Univ. Porto), José Manuel Sobral (Univ. Lisboa), José Maria Carvalho Ferreira (Univ. Téc. Lisboa), Loïc Wacquant (Univ. Califórnia, Berkeley), Luís Baptista (Univ. Nova Lisboa), Maria Beatriz Rocha Trindade (Univ. Aberta), Manuel Villaverde Cabral (Univ. Lisboa), Manuela Ribeiro (Univ. Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro), Michel Maffesoli (Univ. Paris V, Sorbonne), Ramón Máiz (Univ. Santiago de Compostela), Renato Lessa (Univ. Fluminense), Veit Bader (Univ. Amsterdão)

**Conselho Científico:** Ana Maria Brandão (UM), António Cardoso (Inst. Polit. Viana do Castelo), Domingos Santos (Inst. Polit. Castelo Branco), João Carvalho (ISMAI), José Fernando Bessa Ribeiro (UM), José Lopes Cordeiro (UM), Manuel Carlos Silva (UM), Maria Cristina Moreira (UM), Maria João Simões (UBI), Maria Johanna Schouten (UBI), Rodrigo da Costa Dominguez (CICS-UM), Sílvia Gomes (CICS-UM), Teresa Mora (UM), Vera Duarte (ISMAI)

**Edição:** Rita Moreira (cics@ics.uminho.pt) e Iolanda Fontainhas (configuracoes\_cics@ics.uminho.pt)

**Propriedade, redação e administração:** Centro Interdisciplinar de Ciências Sociais – Polo da Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga – Portugal. Telef.: 253 601 752. Fax: 253 604 696. Site: <https://www.cics.nova.fesh.unl.pt/polos/cics-nova-uminho> e <http://cics.uminho.pt/?lang=pt>

**Coordenadores deste número:** Rodrigo da Costa Dominguez, Lisbeth Rodrigues, Jeremy Land e Jari Eloranta

**Normas para apresentação e avaliação de artigos:** Apresentação de originais: os textos propostos para publicação devem seguir as normas sugeridas no site da revista configurações <https://configuracoes.revues.org/84>

**Avaliação de artigos:** os artigos propostos são submetidos a parecer de especialistas das áreas respetivas, em regime de anonimato. A listagem de avaliadores será publicada cumulativamente a cada dois anos. A decisão final cabe à equipa coordenadora de cada número e, em última instância, à Direção do Centro Interdisciplinar de Ciências Sociais – Polo da Universidade do Minho

Os textos podem ser publicados em português, espanhol, francês e inglês

**Apoios:** A edição deste número foi apoiada pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

**Edição:** *Configurações* é editada semestralmente (2 números/ano) pelo Centro Interdisciplinar de Ciências Sociais – Polo da Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga

**Capa:** Furtacores design; fotografia da capa: Abigail Ascenso

**ISSN:** 1646-5075

**Depósito legal n.º:** 246289/06

Esta revista prossegue a série de Sociologia (6 números) de *Sociedade e Cultura* da revista *Cadernos do Noroeste*

## Índice

Nota prévia Ana Maria Brandão	5
Introduction to the Thematic Dossier: Economy and Society: politics, practices, agents, and institutions Rodrigo Dominguez, Lisbeth Rodrigues, Jeremy Land e Jari Eloranta	7
O financiamento do comércio da Ásia no último quartel de setecentos Tomás Pinto de Albuquerque	19
“Able and willing to bear Arms”: Indentured Servants and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia Ryan Ingerick e Antonio T. Bly	43
“Very Dull & No Business Doing”: A Reassessment of the American Sandalwood Trade between Hawaii and China, 1790-1832 Eric Oakley	63
Economy and Ecology in the Iberian Cork Oak Forests: Land Use in the Second Half of the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Carlos Manuel Faísca	83
A “economia nacional corporativa” e a expressão política dos interesses: orizicultores e industriais nos anos 30 Leonardo Aboim Pires	107
Who Rules the Airwaves? The Influence of Radio in the 1946 and 1948 Argentine National Elections Nathan Widener e Jari Eloranta	125
<b>Recensões/ Recensions</b> Recensão do livro de Daron Acemoglu e James Robinson (2019), <i>The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty</i> , New York, Penguin Publishers Henri Aaltonen e Jari Eloranta	151

Recensão do livro de José Manuel Lopes Cordeiro (2020),  
*1820: Revolução Liberal do Porto*, Porto, Câmara Municipal do Porto 155  
Paulo Jorge Fernandes

**Entrevista/ Interview/ Entrevue**

Pandemics and spill-over effects: an interview with Vincent Geloso 163  
Pandemias e efeitos colaterais: uma entrevista a Vincent Geloso

## Nota prévia

O número 26 da *Configurações*, organizado por Rodrigo Dominguez, Lisbeth Rodrigues, Jeremy Land e Jari Eloranta, reforça a abertura da revista ao grande campo disciplinar das ciências sociais, com destaque para a história económica. Ao fazê-lo, prossegue os desígnios da interdisciplinaridade e do pluralismo teórico-metodológico que integram a missão do Centro Interdisciplinar de Ciências Sociais (CICS.NOVA) e do seu Polo na Universidade do Minho (CICS.NOVA.UMinho) e reforçam, no mesmo passo, o projeto editorial da revista.

Reunindo contributos de autores nacionais e estrangeiros, este número cobre um conjunto diversificado de temas ligados ao comércio, à economia e às finanças, à ecologia e à política, cruzando continentes e momentos históricos, e termina com uma atualíssima entrevista a Vincent Geloso, Professor de Economia no King's University College, sobre pandemias e os seus efeitos colaterais, que não poderia deixar de destacar numa altura em que as fragilidades da nossa humanidade comum e das nossas instituições se tornam, mais uma vez, mais evidentes. Quer individualmente, quer no seu conjunto, os textos agora publicados ilustram, pelo seu alcance e escopo, a importância e o potencial heurístico do diálogo entre as ciências sociais e (re)lançam um desafio: o de pensar o presente e o futuro a partir do conhecimento do passado.

A Diretora da *Revista Configurações*

Ana Maria Brandão



Dominguez, Rodrigo da Costa; Rodrigues, Lisbeth; Land, Jeremy; Eloranta, Jari - Introduction to the Thematic Dossier: Economy and Society: politics, practices, agents, and institutions. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 7-17.

## **Introduction to the Thematic Dossier | Economy and Society: politics, practices, agents, and institutions**

RODRIGO DA COSTA DOMINGUEZ\*

CICS – University of Minho

LISBETH RODRIGUES\*\*

CSG-ISEG – University of Lisbon

JEREMY LAND\*\*\*

University of Jyväskylä and University of Helsinki

JARI ELORANTA\*\*\*\*

University of Helsinki

### **Interplay of the Economy and Society**

The economic orientation or the concept of “economic action” (Wirtschaften) introduced by Max Weber in his essays on the sociology of economics addresses the issue of satisfying desires for “utilities” (Nutzleistungen) as an exercise of an actor’s control over a certain resource. This resource is, originally, driven and directed towards economic ends. Following this common thread, “... the definition of ‘economic action’ must be further manifested in such a way as to include the operation of a modern business enterprise run for profit”, and all economic processes and objects are characterized by the meaning they have for human action in playing such roles as ends, means, obstacles, and by-products (Weber, 1978; see also, Ringer, 2002).

In this context, the basic concepts that economics and economic history use to analyze the society, such as the ideas pertaining to growth, prosperity, development and globalization, and/or expansion/interconnection are essentially modern, distinguished by the transformation from the 14<sup>th</sup> to the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, but also and above all, as some scholars have indicated, “... with a new design of economic frontiers [...], beginning with demographic growth and the recomposition and greater diversification of productive tissues” (Costa, Lains and Miranda, 2011: 14). In fact,

\* E-mail: rcdominguez@ics.uminho.pt

\*\* E-mail: lrodrigues@iseg.ulisboa.pt

\*\*\* E-mail: land25.jeremy@gmail.com

\*\*\*\* E-mail: jari.eloranta@helsinki.fi

we would argue that economic history, understood broadly, can serve as a conduit for interdisciplinary understanding of various topics, problems, and time periods, regardless of the methodology used. However, this type of broad debate is often limited to specific topics that transcend disciplinary boundaries, such as slavery, war, economic activity, and inequality (Szostak, 2006; Eloranta *et al.*, 2010; Lamoreaux, 2015; Wright and Ville, 2017). And certain topics, like the discussion of the impacts and origins of capitalism can get fairly heated, and the methodological boundaries can be hard to overcome (Galambos, 2014; Hilt, 2017; Olmstead and Rhode, 2018; Beckert and Desan, 2018). One broader area where economic, business, and social history have been able to interact with methodological freedom has been the so-called social science history, which has become a big theoretical and empirical arena for many. Many of the conferences linked to social science history have grown very large in the 2010s (Bearman *et al.*, 1999; Komlos and Baten, 2004; Inwood and Stewart, 2020). Our approach is to embody the methodological and topical openness of social science history.

In this volume, we are trying to think about the interplay of the economy and the society as an organism with organizations and agents interacting in an evolving institutional framework over time (North, 2016; Greif and Mokyr, 2017). Thus, this volume aims to approach these issues in an (inter) multidisciplinary way and bring together studies that create interdisciplinary pathways between economic history, sociology, and economics, following the theoretical ideas already set up by Weber and many other scholars since. This is also the path taken by many economic historians in recent years, both with its themes as well as its present and future challenges, and the views of the place of social sciences within the perspective of Western capitalist development (see, e.g., Mokyr, 2002; Clark, 2008; McCloskey, 2010; Piketty, 2014). What they have in common is the idea that the substantial scientific-technological advances and the progress of the medical and other fields of sciences served as building blocks of development, via political action that resulted in the construction of public policies of investment in science, knowledge, and technology. Without losing sight of the current issues, such as the West-East trade wars and global competition, the agenda of sustainable development and preservation of natural resources, the applied social sciences (economics), as well as the humanities (sociology and history, especially economic history), are fundamental in the perception of the various and different contexts related to the states' actions and economic agendas (Frank and Gills, 1993; Oosthoek and Gills, 2005; Borowy and Schmelzer, 2017). In addition, they also play a fundamental role in understanding the proposals, whether radical or moderate, to foster development and to protect domestic economic institutions and dynamics, both nationally and regionally, within their respective trade blocs and agreements that unite them. These themes unite the study of economies and societies in the long run, using a broad variety of methods, and they will guide the future studies of economic history, broadly understood.



In this issue, our goal was to assemble a set of articles that contribute in an original way to the scientific debate on economics, economic history, and social sciences, based on multiple interdisciplinary, theoretical, methodological, and empirical approaches, which will provide the reader, through innovative and enriching visions, the improvement of their understanding in those topics, in particular on the following themes, especially from the modern era onwards. Some of the themes that emerged in the set of articles that made it to the final volume include trade as a historical and sociological phenomenon; economic development over time in various sectors of the economy and time periods; public and private financing of economic activity; organization of societal systems and how they interact with the institutional frameworks over time; social and economic dimensions of markets and how various agents interacted in them. In that sense, while the articles do not form a uniform whole like an edited volume, there are some common themes that correspond to the goals we initially laid out.

While the methodologies of each article vary greatly, all the articles utilize specific micro and macro data sources, such as merchant account books, newspapers, bills of lading, ship logbooks, and various governmental records. Using these sources, this issue seeks to explore specific case studies and sectors of trade to tell a broader story of the intricate nature and fragility of the global economy, past and present. For example, Eric Oakley shows how sandalwood as a source of trade was quite profitable for American merchants as a means to gain access to Chinese ports and goods, but just a few years after the trade was well established it collapsed. This fragility is a key, yet invisible theme throughout this issue where local conditions and the global economy interact in a constant, if not always visible, dance. No matter how isolated a region might seem, global forces influence that locale's economic activity, and local actors can and continue to influence the global flows of commodities and capital.

This issue also engages directly and indirectly with the arguments laid out by Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson in their seminal volume, *Why Nations Fail* (2012), and their latest book (reviewed in this issue, in fact), *The Narrow Corridor* (2019). In essence, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that nations (read: institutions) that foster political and economic inclusiveness tend to succeed, whereas nations who fail to do so tend to fail. With any broad argument, detailed case studies and examples frequently complicate the overall argument. Nevertheless, the general rule seems to hold in the long-run, and some of the articles included in this issue, i.e., the Eloranta and Widener discussion of radio and politics in Argentina, highlight the perils of concentrating both political and economic power in the hands of a few, as well as the institutional dynamics of growing populism.

A weakness in the Acemoglu/Robinson hypotheses is how one measures the effectiveness of institutions. Should we rely solely on military capacity? Or should we consider revenue collection as the primary signal of efficacy? It is in no small part

due to the questions raised by Acemoglu and Robinson that the last decade has witnessed a major increase in the number of articles, books, and well-funded research projects looking at institutional capacity as a primary focus of economic and social history (Dincecco, 2017; Eloranta, *et al.*, 2019; Henriques and Palma, 2020). No doubt, the central thesis that institutions matter is true, but to what extent they matter and how greatly depends on the research questions asked of the sources and societal contexts. As many reviewers have noted, Acemoglu and Robinson gloss over the contingencies of history, and more often than not remove the individual from the collective narrative. The articles in this issue seek to fill these glaring voids in the otherwise instructive model by examining several case studies in the late early modern and modern periods.

This economic, business, and social history has also echoed strongly in Portugal over the last several decades. After the Carnation Revolution of 1974, a new agenda for economic and social history began, mainly stimulated by scholars like Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Joaquim Romero Magalhães, Nuno Valério, and Jaime Reis. The creation of the Portuguese Association of Economic and Social History (APHES) in the early 1980s is symptomatic of this transition. A new political reality ensured by freedom of speech convinced many students to engage in courses in the human and social sciences, creating a new academic context characterized by a great student demand.

The growth of fields and topics that connect economy, social practices, institutions, and policies is well known. Great collective works were created, giving more space to the economic and social aspects of Portugal's history, such as A. H. de Oliveira Marques' *Nova História de Portugal* (1987-2004), José Mattoso's *História de Portugal* (1993), Pedro Lains and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva's *História Económica de Portugal, c. 1700-2000* (vols. 3, 2005), and Leonor Freire Costa, Pedro Lains and Susana Münch Miranda's *An Economic History Portugal, c. 1143-2010* (2016). Other fundamental works have appeared in various fields of Portuguese economic history, such as the areas of financial, banking, and economic policies (Reis, 1993, 1996; Esteves, 2002; Valério, 2007, 2010; Amaral, 2019; Lains, 2021), institutions and institutional development (Hespanha, 2004; Reis, 2011), and the decisive role that those institutions played in the growth of modern Portuguese economy.

These developments led to a substantial increase in scholarship on the economic history of Portugal on a wide range of themes, such as agriculture, fishery, and wine business (Garrido, 2006; Pereira, 2010; Freire and Lains, 2017), migrations, demography and its impact on labor markets (Amorim, 1992; Alves, 1994), industry, and industrial heritage (Macedo, 1982; Pedreira, 1994; Madureira, 1997; Cordeiro, 2017), colonial trade and commodities (Pedreira, 2000; Costa, 2002), slavery and slave trade (Capela, 2002; Richardson and Silva, 2015), empires and networks (Antunes, 2009; Antunes and Polónia, 2016). These works were fundamental in composing a more comprehensive view of Portugal's economic history, combining quantitative

research techniques with traditional sources and new datasets, “revealing the strength of studies in which there is a concern for the interaction of economic history with other disciplines of knowledge” (Magalhães, 2012).

Two main features can be discerned from the recent studies of Portuguese economic history. First, scholars have taken a long-term perspective to search for the causes of Portuguese economic performance. Second, datasets from primary sources have been comprehensively and systematically assembled, many using a comparative approach. Both methodologies have many benefits, but possibly the most apparent of them is bringing the Portuguese case into the greater European debate, from which it had been absent until recently. In fact, Portuguese economic literature has been in dialogue with their European counterparts, and Portugal is slowly gaining greater attention in the field of global economic history, which is appropriate for a society that has had a substantial impact on the global history, especially via its extensive empire.

Although Portugal’s economic backwardness has been studied extensively in the past Portuguese historiography, it has also been frequently revisited and is currently one of the most promising topics. In 2019, Palma and Reis presented the first GDP series from 1527 to 1850, showing that Portugal’s economy began to decline from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. Different topics have been considered to explain the national long-run economic performance. The efficiency of the judicial system (Reis, 2010, 2011), the relevance of the empire (Costa, Palma and Reis, 2015), the private and public interest rates (Costa, Rocha and Brito, 2018), the female participation in the labor market (Silva and Carvalho, 2020), or the political institutions’ quality (Henriques and Palma, 2020) are some of the hot topics. It is also worth mentioning that all these studies take a comparative approach. For instance, the studies of Henriques and Palma (2020) and of Silva and Carvalho (2020) have shed some light on Portugal’s position in the broader debate of the “Little Divergence”. They showed that Iberian political institutions were no worse than in England or the Netherlands and that women participated less in the labor market compared to Northwestern Europe. Both the long-run perspective and the comparative approaches that the recent literature has been pursuing are slowly and steadily allowing the Portuguese case to be considered in the broader economic history literature agenda.

## **Main Contributions of the Thematic Dossier**

The first three articles here deal with the late early modern period roughly between 1750-1850. Tomás de Albuquerque’s article focuses on the resurgence of Portuguese trade in Asia in the last quarter of the 18th century. Drawing on the ledgers produced by two expeditions, “Trovoada Pequeno” and “Trovoada Grande”, the author

discusses both the financing of the Portuguese commercial expeditions to Asia and the products involved in these initiatives. The two case studies reveal that the Portuguese Asian maritime trade relied strongly on Lisbon-based capital rather than foreign capital. Albuquerque shows that the capital collected in the metropolis was converted into European commodities which were sold in India, where the Portuguese acquired silver and the credit they needed to trade in China. Moreover, the resurgence of the Portuguese interest in Asia was mainly driven by the business of tea and other Chinese commodities.

Focusing on the role and responses of the oft-ignored indentured servants in Virginia on the eve of the American Revolution, Antonio Bly and Ryan Ingerick offer a new approach to understanding why how indentured servants were caught in the middle between an empire on the one hand and their masters on the other in the 1770s before the Declaration of Independence was signed. Indentured servants in colonial America have been overlooked in the past by historians seeking to understand the role of coerced labor in the origins of the United States. Bly and Ingerick seek to clarify the contemporary view of indentured servants, without allowing the concurrent and subsequent focus on African slavery to overcome the large and active population of indentured servants in the Virginian economy. Focusing their study on the royal Virginian governor's declaration inviting indentured servants to join the war effort to help quell the growing rebellion, the authors reconsider the place of indentured servants within a revolutionary society.

In his article on the sandalwood trade, Eric Oakley engages in a multi-layered approach to understanding the mechanisms and importance of the arrival of Americans in the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies. Newly independent from Britain, American merchants immediately sought to establish a profitable trade with China via the Pacific Ocean. In these efforts, they looked to find the right commodities which they could trade with Chinese merchants for tea, porcelain, and other East Asian goods. Sandalwood offered a key alternative to fur, the initial engine of trade for Americans in East Asia. Oakley shows how sandalwood provided American merchants the time and profits necessary to navigate away from fur as a basis for American economic action in the Pacific Ocean to other, more resilient commodities. His article on the sandalwood trade is the first specialized exploration of the commodity in more than fifty years, and the first to fully explore the American role in the trade.

The final three articles cover the last couple of decades of the 19th century and to roughly 1950. Carlos Faisca's article on the economy and ecology in the Iberian Cork Oak forests discusses the supply of raw material and how it impacted the cork industries in Spain and Portugal, mainly in the 19th century. Here we have an interdisciplinary discussion of the sustainability of industrialization and trade, and the author analyzes for example the impacts of these processes on the soil. The author argues that there were significant impediments to the development of this sector

in the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, the soil mobilization and extractive practices led to a decline in soil fertility, which in turn had negative economic and environmental legacies. Faisca's contribution continues a recent, but important, trend in blending economic and business history research with an eye on the ecological and environmental impacts of economic activity, past and present.

In his article, Leonardo Aboim Pires examines the state intervention in the rice sector in twentieth-century Portugal. The article explores the 1930s economic context, identified as a critical period for the Portuguese economy. Pires seeks to ascertain the role of the rice sector's socio-economic forces and explain how corporatism helped to solve the sector's production, industrial process, and commercialization issues. Based on a thorough analysis of a diverse set of primary sources, he argues that corporatism's institutionalization was the solution found to carry out the necessary readjustments to the rice sector's economic performance. The pressure and consternation of both the oligarchy and the rice sector's industrialists and traders culminated in a more significant state interference, shifting from a free trade model to state participation. During the 1930s, due to the policies adopted, rice imports declined and, consequently, an increase in its production. However, the state also meddled in the latter by restricting rice growing and reducing cultivation areas.

Jari Eloranta and Nathan Widener explore the rise of Juan Perón as a political power in Argentina and the elections of 1946 and 1948. Eloranta and Widener argue that once in power Perón consolidated his political control by gaining ownership over the radio waves of 1940s Argentina. By necessity, the article utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to analyze how radio influenced the two elections. The interplay of institutions, technology, and economy are at the center of this new interpretation of Argentina under the Perón regime, highlighting how the rise of populism can be linked to clever uses of media.

This issue also includes two long-form book reviews which highlight two important contributions to the field. The choice relied in two recent volumes that provides relevant inputs to the debate highlighted by this thematic dossier, namely how institutions play an important role to define and guide states' economic policies and what kind of dynamics a revolution can bring to change institutional paradigms, especially regarding secular economic practices. Henri Aaltonen and Jari Eloranta discuss in detail the newest book from Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson entitled *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, a follow up to their groundbreaking *Why Nations Fail*. The review addresses how the book fits within the larger argument and hypotheses that Acemoglu and Robinson propose in previous works and makes note of areas wherein further research is both warranted and necessary.

Paulo Jorge Fernandes reviews, in detail, the recent book from José Manuel Lopes Cordeiro *1820. Revolução Liberal do Porto* (2020), published within the commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the Liberal Revolution in Portugal.

Through his sharp lens, Fernandes guides us through nine different book chapters, beginning with the revolution's background, moving then to the revolution itself, and culminating with the reception of the revolution in Brazil, which resulted in King João VI's return to Portugal. The book and its review, which broadly cover all political, social, and economic spheres, will undoubtedly be of interest to the readers of this dossier.

The COVID-19 pandemic, as a historical moment, is also approached in this issue. Vincent Gelo's interview offers some insights on the economic impacts of an unexpected global health issue. From a comparative perspective with previous similar events in the history of mankind (and underlining what is the best approach to make such comparisons), Gelo discusses the benefits and perils of liberal democratic institutions and how democracies tend to handle better pandemics in the long-run, based on his recent research examining the impact that pandemics can cause to states and their economies.

Overall, this thematic dossier aims to offer the readers, above all, (inter) multi-disciplinary approaches to the issues addressed in these papers, book reviews, and interview. Moreover, it is intended to bring together studies that create interdisciplinary synergy between economic history, sociology, and economics, following many of the theories previously discussed in this short introduction. The editors of this dossier are pleased to offer this volume which reflects an interdisciplinary and knowledge-building dynamic supported by cooperation and teamwork between scholars from the various areas of the social sciences.

## Bibliography

- ACEMOGLU, Daron, ROBINSON James (2019), *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, New York, Penguin Press.
- ACEMOGLU, Daron, ROBINSON, James (2012), *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*, New York, Crown Publishers.
- ALVES, Jorge Fernandes (1994), *Os brasileiros: emigração e retorno no Porto oitocentista*, Porto, author's edition.
- AMARAL, Luciano (2019), *The Modern Portuguese Economy in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- AMORIM, Maria Norberta (1992), *Evolução demográfica de três paróquias do sul do Pico, 1680-1980*, Braga, Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade do Minho.
- ANTUNES, Cátia (2009), *Lisboa e Amsterdão: Um caso de Globalização na História Moderna*, Lisboa, Livros Horizonte.
- ANTUNES, Cátia, POLÓNIA, Amélia (2016), *Beyond Empires: Global, Self-Organizing, Cross-Imperial Networks, 1500-1800*, Leiden, Boston, Brill.
- BEARMAN, Peter, FARIS, Robert, MOODY, James (1999). "Blocking the Future: New Solutions for Old Problems in Historical Social Science", *Social Science History*, 23(4), 501-533.
- BECKERT, Sven, DESAN, Christine (eds.) (2018), *American Capitalism: New Histories*, New York, Columbia University Press.

- BOROWY, Iris, SCHMELZER, Matthias (eds.) (2017), *History of the Future of Economic Growth: Historical Roots of Current Debates on Sustainable Degrowth*, London, New York, Routledge.
- CAPELA, José (2002), *O tráfico de escravos nos portos de Moçambique, c. 1717-1904*, Porto, Afrontamento.
- CLARK, Gregory (2008), *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*, Princeton, Oxford, Princeton University Press.
- CORDEIRO, José Manuel Lopes (2017), *História da indústria portuense*, Vol. I – Dos finais do século XVIII a 1852, Porto, Afrontamento.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire (2002), *O transporte no Atlântico e a Companhia Geral de Comércio do Brasil (1580-1663)*, 2 vols. Lisboa, CNCDP.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire, PALMA, Nuno, REIS, Jaime (2015), "The Great Escape? The Contribution of the Empire to Portugal's Economic Growth, 1500–1800", *European Review of Economic History*, 19(1), 1–22.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire, ROCHA, Maria Manuela, BRITO, Paulo B. (2018), "The Alchemy of Gold: Interest Rates, Money Stock, and Credit in Eighteenth-Century Lisbon", *The Economic History Review*, 71(4), 1147–1172.
- DINCECCO, Mark (2017), *State Capacity and Economic Development: Present and Past*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- ELORANTA Jari, GOLSON, Eric, HEDBURG, Peter, MOREIRA, Maria Cristina (eds.) (2019), *Small and Medium Powers in Global History: Trade, Conflicts, and Neutrality from the 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, New York, Routledge.
- ELORANTA, Jari, OJALA, Jari, VALTONEN, Heli (2010), "Quantitative Methods in Business History: An Impossible Equation?", *Management & Organizational History*, 5(1), 79–107.
- ESTEVEZ, Rui Pedro (2002), *Finanças públicas e crescimento económico. O crowding out em Portugal da Regeneração ao final da Monarquia*, Lisboa, Banco de Portugal.
- FRANK, Andre Gunder, GILLS, Barry K. (eds.) (1993), *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, London, New York, Routledge.
- FREIRE, Dulce, LAINS, Pedro (eds.) (2017), *An Agrarian History of Portugal, 1000-2000*, Leiden, Boston, Brill.
- GALAMBOS, Louis (2014), "Is this a Decisive Moment for the History of Business, Economic History, and the History of Capitalism?", *Essays in Economic & Business History*, 32(1), 1–18.
- GARRIDO, Álvaro (2006), *Economia e política das pescas portuguesas. Ciência, direito e diplomacia nas pescarias do bacalhau (1945-1974)*, Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
- GREIF, Avner, MOKYR, Joel (2017), "Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Economic Growth: Douglass North and Beyond", *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 13(1), 25–52.
- HENRIQUES, António Castro, PALMA, Nuno (2020), "Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800", *CGEH Working Paper Series, Working paper no. 84*.
- HESPAHNA, António Manuel (2004), *Guiando a mão invisível. Direito, Estado e lei no liberalismo monárquico português*, Coimbra, Almedina.
- HILT, Eric (2017), "Economic History, Historical Analysis, and the "New History of Capitalism", *The Journal of Economic History*, 77(2), 511–536.
- INWOOD, Kris, MAXWELL-STEWART, Hamish (2020), "Selection Bias and Social Science History", *Social Science History*, 44(3), 411–416.
- KOMLOS, John, BATEN, Jörg (2004), "Looking Backward and Looking Forward: Anthropometric Research and the Development of Social Science History", *Social Science History*, 28(2), 191–210.
- LAINS, Pedro (forth. 2021), *A History of Public Banking in Portugal in the 19th and 20th Centuries. The Caixa Geral de Depósitos*, London, New York, Routledge.
- LAMOREAUX, Naomi (2015), "The Future of Economic History Must Be Interdisciplinary", *The Journal of Economic History*, 75(4), 1251–1257.

- MACEDO, Jorge Borges de (1982), *Problemas da História da Indústria Portuguesa no Século XVIII*, Lisboa, Querco.
- MADUREIRA, Nuno Luís (1997), *Mercado e privilégios. A indústria portuguesa entre 1750-1834*, Lisboa, Estampa.
- MAGALHÃES, Joaquim Romero (2012), "Breve panorama da história económica em Portugal, 1860-2004" in *No Portugal Moderno: Espaços, Tratos e Dinheiros – Miúças 3*, Coimbra, Coimbra University Press, 325-354.
- MCCLOSKEY, Deirdre N. (2010), *The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- MOKYR, Joel (2002), *The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- NORTH, Douglass C. (2016), "Institutions and Economic Theory", *The American Economist*, 61(1), 72-76.
- OLMSTEAD, Alan L., RHODE, Paul W. (2018), "Cotton, Slavery, and the New History of Capitalism", *Explorations in Economic History*, 67, 1-17.
- OOSTHOEK, Jan, GILLS, Barry K. (2005), "Humanity at the Crossroads: The Globalization of Environmental Crisis", *Globalizations*, 2(3), 283-291.
- PALMA, Nuno, REIS, Jaime (2019), "From Convergence to Divergence: Portuguese Economic Growth, 1527-1850", *The Journal of Economic History*, 79(2), 477-506.
- PEDREIRA, Jorge (1994), *Estrutura industrial e mercado colonial. Portugal e Brasil (1780-1830)*, Lisboa, Difel.
- PEDREIRA, Jorge (2000), "From Growth to Collapse: Portugal, Brazil, and the Breakdown of the Old Colonial System", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 80(4), 839-864.
- PEREIRA, Gaspar Martins (2010), *História do Douro e do Vinho do Porto*, Vol. 4 - Crise e Reconstrução. O Douro e o Vinho do Porto no Século XIX, Porto, Afrontamento.
- PIKETTY, Thomas (2014), "Capital in the Twenty-First Century: A Multidimensional Approach to the History of Capital and Social Classes", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 65(4), 736-747.
- REIS, Jaime (1993), *O atraso económico português (1850-1930)*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda.
- REIS, Jaime (1996), *O Banco de Portugal – das origens a 1914*, Vol. 1 – Antecedentes, fundação e consolidação, c. 1821-1857, Lisboa, Banco de Portugal.
- REIS, Jaime (2010), "Institutions and Economic Growth in the Atlantic Periphery: The Efficiency of the Portuguese Machinery of Justice, 1870-1910," in Hadi Salehi Esfahani, Giovanni Facchini, Geoffrey J. D. Hewings (eds.), *Economic Development in Latin America: Essay in Honor of Werner Baer*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 73-101.
- REIS, Jaime (2011), "The Portuguese Judicial System in the Nineteenth Century: Rules, Risks, and Judges", in Debin Ma, Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.), *Law and Long-Term Economic Change: A Eurasian Perspective*, Standford, Standford University Press, 277-299.
- REIS, Jaime (2011), *Uma elite financeira: os corpos sociais do Banco de Portugal, c. 1846-1914*, Lisboa, Banco de Portugal.
- RICHARDSON, David, SILVA, Filipa Ribeiro da (2015), *Networks and Trans-Cultural Exchange. Slave Trading in the South Atlantic, 1590-1867*, Leiden, Boston, Brill.
- RINGER, Fritz (2002), "Max Weber on Causal Analysis, Interpretation, and Comparison", *History and Theory*, 41(2), 163-178.
- SILVA, Filipa Ribeiro da, CARVALHAL, Hélder (2020), "Reconsidering the Southern European Model: Marital Status, Women's Work and Labour Relations in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Portugal", *Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 38(1), 45-77.



- SZOSTAK, Rick (2006), "Economic History as it is and Should Be: Toward an Open, Honest, Methodologically Flexible, Theoretically Diverse, Interdisciplinary Exploration of the Causes and Consequences of Economic Growth", *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 35(4), 727-750.
- VALÉRIO, Nuno (coord.) (2007-2010), *História do sistema bancário português*, 2 vols., Lisboa, Banco de Portugal.
- WEBER, Max (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press.
- WRIGHT, Claire, VILLE, Simon (2017), "Visualising the Interdisciplinary Research Field: The Life Cycle of Economic History in Australia", *Minerva*, 55(3), 321-340.



## O financiamento do comércio da Ásia no último quartel de setecentos

TOMÁS PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE\*

GHEC-CSG/ISEG – Lisbon School of Economics & Management, Universidade de Lisboa

### Resumo

O presente artigo procura apresentar uma nova versão sobre a forma de financiamento do comércio asiático português, reanimado a partir da década de 80 do século XVIII. Nesse sentido, com base num conjunto de livros de contas e carga dos navios “Trovoada Pequena” e “Trovoada Grande”, detidos por Luís Machado Teixeira e Joaquim Pedro Quintela, procuramos compreender como se financiaram essas viagens e qual o motivo desse surto, quase dois séculos depois da descoberta do caminho marítimo para a Índia.

**Palavras-chave:** Portugal, comércio, Oriente, financiamento, chá.

### Abstract

#### *The financing of Asian trade in the last quarter of the eighteenth century*

The present article aims to present a new version of the financing of the Asian-Portuguese market, revived in the 80s of the eighteenth century. Considering the accounting and cargo books of the ships “Trovoada Pequena” and “Trovoada Grande”, detained by Luís Machado Teixeira and Joaquim Pedro Quintela, we try to understand how these trips were financed, and what was the motive of this outbreak, almost two centuries after the discovery of the sea route to India.

**Keywords:** Portugal, trade, Orient, financing, tea.

## Résumé

### *Le financement du commerce de l'Asie au cours des derniers vingt-cinq ans du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*

Cet article vise à présenter une nouvelle version sur le mode de financement du marché asiático-portugais, relancé depuis les années 80 du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Dans ce sens, à partir des livres de comptes et du chargement des navires «Trovoada Pequeno» et «Trovoada Grande», détenus par Luís Machado Teixeira et Joaquim Pedro Quintela, nous essayons de comprendre comment ces voyages ont été financés et quel est le motif de cette flambée, près de deux siècles après la découverte de la route maritime vers l'Inde.

Mots-clés: Portugal, commerce, Orient, financement, thé.

## Introdução

Passados mais de 300 anos daquele que foi o período áureo do comércio português na Ásia os portugueses voltaram a descobrir a Carreira da Índia. Na segunda metade do século XVIII observa-se um renovado interesse pelo mercado asiático. Porém, este deixara de ser um negócio exclusivo da Coroa, havendo um maior interesse dos privados na aquisição de produtos provenientes da China e da Índia.

A oportunidade gerada pela conjuntura internacional bélica, que ocupou as principais potências europeias, diminuindo a sua atenção a Oriente, surge aos portugueses como uma oportunidade. No contexto interno, Borges de Macedo (1951) apresentou os anos 60 do século XVIII como o início de uma crise económica, sendo as reformas pombalinas aí efetuadas uma resposta a esse contexto, tendo como um dos resultados a abertura do comércio da Ásia. No entanto, num estudo recente Leonor Freire Costa, Maria Manuela Rocha e Rita Martins de Sousa (2013), demonstraram que essa visão não corresponderia à realidade. Aquilo que deixaram claro foi que o contexto reformista levado a cabo por Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, sobretudo no que ao comércio diz respeito, foi uma forma de criar oportunidades à aplicação dos capitais, que então tinham sobretudo origem nas remessas de ouro do Brasil (Costa, Rocha e Sousa, 2013: 181-187).

O ressurgir do interesse pelo negócio a Oriente não passou despercebido aos historiadores portugueses que alimentaram um debate sobre as causas do despertar da Carreira da Índia. Não só procuraram compreender as suas causas, como tentaram também explicar a forma como se financiaram essas viagens, embora, em muitos casos, apenas repetindo teorias já defendidas por historiadores como Acúrsio das Neves (1814). Parece-nos que o mais recente e importante aporte reside no trabalho de Jesus Bohorquez (2020a) que, para além de apresentar uma versão alicerçada numa visão global desse negócio, assenta as suas premissas em fontes primárias. No seu trabalho o historiador apresenta um sistema de financiamento assente numa escala planetária, onde os vários continentes se encontram

conectados. Assim, os comerciantes partiriam de Lisboa, reunindo ali o capital necessário, tendo ele as mais variadas origens. Dali seguiriam para o Brasil, descontando as letras em prata, depois utilizada para o negócio na Ásia. O objetivo nesse continente seria o de comprar panos, depois reencaminhados a Lisboa. Da casa da Índia eram depois embarcados em direção a África para o escambo dos negros, redirecionados às plantações brasileiras, fechando-se assim o ciclo. No entanto, as suas explicações procuram sobretudo justificar o comércio com a Índia, não contemplando todo o negócio português com o Oriente.

Mas, então, como é que se financiou esse negócio? Terá sido com investimento estrangeiro? Como é que se obtinha prata para esse negócio? Estava o modelo próximo daquele que Bohorquez apresentou para o comércio com a Índia?

Compreender o interesse português na Ásia e mais concretamente em Macau, como se financiou esse negócio e quais os produtos que alimentavam essas viagens nos finais do século XVIII é precisamente aquilo a que nos propomos responder neste estudo. Para isso analisaremos em detalhe os livros de contas de duas negociações, ocorridas entre 1782 e 1785, dos navios “Trovoada Grande” e “Trovoada Pequeno”, duas viagens organizadas pelos sócios armadores Joaquim Pedro Quintela e Luís Machado Teixeira, homens de negócio da praça de Lisboa e dois dos mais ricos comerciantes da sua época.

## 1. Novas oportunidades a Oriente

A historiografia é unânime quanto ao facto da década de 80 do século XVIII representar um período de aumento do comércio asiático, no que se entendeu chamar de ressurgimento da Carreira da Índia (Pinto, 1994, 1995; Carreira, 1995; Pedreira, 1995; Alves, 1998; Miranda, 2002; Guinote, Frutuoso e Lopes, 2002; Cunha, 2006a, 2006b; Domingues, 2015; Bohorquez, 2020a). Se no século XVI a Carreira da Índia era a viagem anual organizada pela Coroa ao Estado da Índia, na segunda metade do século XVIII estava transformada num movimento de navios que, quase na sua totalidade, eram financiados pelos privados. Assim, a Carreira da Índia passara a ser, tal como lembrou Amaral Lapa (1968), um percurso entre dois pontos, a ligação por via marítima entre Lisboa e a Ásia. Nesta integravam tanto os espaços coloniais atlânticos, como o Brasil, a Madeira ou a África Ocidental, bem como portos no Índico para onde os navios se dirigiam, seja na África Oriental (Moçambique), seja noutros portos mais orientais que não estavam sob administração portuguesa, como Bengala, Madrastra ou Calcutá, estendendo-se até Macau (Cunha, 2006a: 411).

Pelo estudo efetuado por Guinote *et al.* (2002: 32-38) ficou demonstrado o incremento do número de navios que saíam dos portos da Ásia em direção a Lisboa no período entre 1780 a 1823.

Não se pense, no entanto, que esse redescobrimto do interesse português pela Ásia é equiparável ao período inicial do funcionamento da Carreira da Índia. Jorge Viana Pedreira (1995: 336), no seu estudo sobre os comerciantes da Praça de Lisboa, lembra que no cômputo do comércio colonial (onde o Brasil tem um peso determinante) a Ásia apenas representou cerca de 12 a 18%.

Embora a sua importância comercial comparativamente a outros espaços do império português não seja determinante, não deixa de ser imperativo procurar uma explicação para esse ressurgimento.

Tabela 1: Conjunto das viagens com destino a Lisboa no período de 1770-1799

Porto Origem	N.º Viagens	%
Macau	64	36
Índia	48	27
Bengala	35	20
Goa	26	15
Outros	6	3
Total	179	100

Fonte: (Guinote, Frutuoso e Lopes, 2002: 223–232).

Através da Tabela 1 conseguimos ter uma ideia do número de navios que se dirigiram a Lisboa. Mas, qual a razão para o interesse dos comerciantes portugueses nos portos a Oriente? São diversas as justificações apresentadas para este ressurgimento. A primeira delas, apontada por Acúrcio das Neves, foi a reforma levada a cabo pelo ministro de D. José I. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo seria o principal responsável pelo rejuvenescido interesse dos comerciantes portugueses pelo Oriente. Depois de gorada a sua tentativa de implementar uma companhia de comércio para a Ásia, nos primeiros anos do seu ministério, a sua estratégia mudaria (Neves, 1814: 285–292; Carreira, 1995: 83–84; Pinto, 1995: 218; Cunha, 2006b: 334–335). Sobretudo a partir de 1761 começou a ser produzido um conjunto de leis, decretos, alvarás e avisos, que reconfiguravam e abriam o comércio português a Oriente. Ainda em 1755 abriu-se o comércio moçambicano a todos os moradores da Ásia portuguesa, seguindo-se, em 1761, a abertura do comércio entre Angola e Moçambique, bem como, a permissão aos navios que seguissem a Rota do Cabo, de aportarem a Luanda. Em 1765 coloca-se fim à navegação em frotas (Cunha, 2006a: 396–399).

Ernestina Carreira (1995: 83–84) corrobora esta ideia mas, segundo a autora, o principal motivo do redespertar do interesse português pelo Oriente prende-se com o contexto político europeu. Afirma que, na segunda metade do século XVIII, os conflitos bélicos que decorreram entre as potências europeias e a contínua

neutralidade de Portugal fez com que Lisboa se pudesse transformar numa plataforma de abastecimento, onde os congéneres europeus que tinham deixado de ter acesso direto ao Oriente se podiam abastecer.

De acordo com a historiadora, também o contexto interno do comércio intra-asiático, com a abertura em 1770 pela Companhia das Índias Inglesa (EIC) ao comércio dos privados ingleses nas costas indianas, terá sido um fator de importância. Na sua ótica isto foi uma oportunidade para os comerciantes portugueses de Lisboa e da Índia, “que começaram rapidamente a exportar para Macau, por conta própria ou com capitais britânicos” (Carreira, 1995: 85).

Estas são ideias suportadas tanto por Celsa Pinto como por João Manuel de Almeida Teles da Cunha, que, ao argumento para a justificação do “ressurgimento”, acrescentam o interesse tanto de nacionais como de estrangeiros em financiar viagens a partir de Lisboa, sobretudo fintando o monopólio da Companhia das Índias Inglesa (Pinto, 1995: 218; Cunha, 2006b: 333), que depois da batalha do Plassey, em 1757, consolidou a sua posição de potência dominante na Índia (Pinto, 2006: 339).

Esse interesse estaria sobretudo ligado ao comércio dos panos asiáticos, primeiro os de algodão estampados e, depois, os não tingidos ou crus que eram estampados no reino e reexportados para o Atlântico Sul (Pedreira, 1991: 540-544; Cunha, 2006b: 338). Pinto (1995: 219) aponta que 95% das importações feitas a partir de navios despachados dos portos da Índia para Lisboa correspondiam a isso mesmo. Este argumento historiográfico é sustentado pelos dados apresentados na Tabela 1, onde se observa uma primazia dos vários portos indianos nas saídas para Lisboa. Se somarmos os portos referidos na generalidade como Índia, com 27%, os de Bengala e Goa, com 20 e 15% respetivamente, vemos que essa região é de facto a responsável pelo maior número de despachos, com 62%.

Compreendendo a importância desse comércio, Jesus Bohorquez (2020a: 19-20) chama a atenção para a sua escala global. O autor demonstra uma relação direta entre o aumento do interesse no comércio de panos da Índia e o negócio do tráfico de escravos para o Brasil, sobretudo na segunda metade do século XVIII. No entanto, estão ainda por aclarar quais os motivos do interesse dos portugueses em Macau, representando 36% das viagens com direção a Lisboa.

## 2. O financiamento da viagem

Apresentadas as causas do desencadear do movimento que leva à redescoberta do comércio oriental por parte dos portugueses, falta, então, responder de forma mais concreta à questão de como é que se financiaram essas viagens.

É aceite pela historiografia que para o negócio na Ásia eram precisos elevados capitais e uma rede estruturada. As despesas da armação e o risco impunham a necessidade de cooperação. A rede ajudava a estruturar a organização a Oriente, ao garantir contactos que permitissem o acesso às mercadorias pretendidas, bem

como à prata, elemento fundamental para os negócios com a Ásia. Acúrcio das Neves (1814: 280), escrevendo sobre esse comércio no século XIX é perentório na sua afirmação: “Armam-se estas negociações em Lisboa com letras de Inglaterra”. O papel dos capitais estrangeiros no financiamento do negócio a oriente foi também apontado por outros, como já dissemos (Carreira, 1985: 85; Pinto, 1995: 218; Cunha, 2006b: 333).

Nesse sentido vai o estudo de Ernestina Carreira (1995: 87) sobre as famílias Loureiro e Ribeiro Neves. Neste, a historiadora procura demonstrar a rede de contactos que as duas famílias construíram desde a Europa à Ásia, sem esquecer o Brasil e a África, no sentido de assim conseguirem canalizar capitais e escoar as mercadorias. Entre as principais mercadorias da torna viagem estavam a pimenta e café, embarcadas a partir de Bombaim e os panos provenientes das feitorias portuguesas de Damão e Surrate.

Jorge Pedreira (1995: 336-338) concorda com a complexidade que o negócio impunha, pela logística que requeria, pelo elevado capital que exigia, pelos riscos que acarretava. Estas eram as medidas da sua atração e repulsa. Se, por um lado, os riscos podiam ser dissuasores da participação, por outro, os ganhos podiam ser elevadíssimos. Assim, todos aqueles que podiam participavam, mas aqueles que maior acesso tinham eram precisamente os grandes comerciantes, por reunirem capitais e redes.

Relativamente às formas de financiamento, Pedreira (1995: 352-353) apontou vários mecanismos. O primeiro eram as letras de risco, uma das formas de crédito onde se financiavam as viagens contra um prémio nunca inferior a 30%, ocorrendo, normalmente, o pagamento trinta dias passados da chegada a bom porto. Os possíveis atrasos nesse pagamento resultariam no acréscimo de um juro de mora de 5% sobre o capital e prémio. Aqui contemplavam-se alguns riscos como de naufrágio, fogo e aprisionamento por inimigos, que ocorrendo, contemplariam a perda total de capital e prémio, ficando o tomador isento. Contudo, em certos casos, em vez de se avançar com o dinheiro, eram adiantadas as mercadorias, que corriam com um prémio de risco de 35%, a pagar no regresso.

Outra das formas era a concessão de empréstimos, dando-se como garantia o frete do navio. Neste caso, o frete a cobrar funcionava como o colateral que suportava o empréstimo. Pedreira (1995: 354-355) analisou também um outro instrumento, as letras de favor. Estas eram uma espécie de título executório, passado por um comerciante a um outro, que não recebia dinheiro ou mercadorias, mas apenas um título de obrigação. Segundo o autor, este era um mecanismo fácil para obter dinheiro fresco. Essas letras eram rapidamente descontadas e utilizadas para acudir a qualquer necessidade.

Teles da Cunha e Celsa Pinto, como já referido, deixam antever a existência de interesses ingleses a financiar estas viagens, seja para o negócio na Ásia, seja para o negócio na China. No entanto, não deixam claro como é que esse financiamento se processava.



Jesus Bohorquez (2020a) deu recentemente um importante aporte a esse respeito. Analisando um conjunto de viagens tendo como destino o comércio asiático, concluiu que na sua maioria foram financiadas por contratos marítimos, onde os capitais com diferentes origens europeias e asiáticas, se reuniam em Lisboa. Assim se obtinham os recursos para dar início ao percurso que seguia da metrópole diretamente ao Rio de Janeiro, onde se embarcava a prata, originária das Índias de Castela, que era fundamental no comércio com a Ásia. Ali chegados, proceder-se-ia à compra dos têxteis, que eram depois enviados de volta ao reino, devendo dar entrada na Casa da Índia. De Lisboa seguiam os navios negreiros com a carga de panos em direção a África, onde adquiriam os nativos, que eram posteriormente encaminhados para o Brasil, fechando-se dessa forma o ciclo (Bohorquez, 2020a: 30–37).

Se, por um lado, isto explica os números apresentados para as viagens aos portos do subcontinente indiano, falta, por outro, explicar os números que apresentámos quanto às viagens realizadas a partir de Macau, bem como, o financiamento dessas viagens, uma vez que, os produtos ali adquiridos não eram utilizados no comércio africano, estando pois apartada a solução explicativa apresentada por Bohorquez (2020a).

Com o intuito de oferecer uma solução para ambas as premissas, debruçamo-nos sobre o estudo dos livros das negociações dos navios “Trovoada Grande” e “Trovoada Pequeno”, que nos anos 80 do século XVIII empreenderam viagens a Macau. No entanto, a inexistência de séries completas dos livros que compunham o registo de toda a operação obriga-nos a recorrer a uns e outros, sem podermos fazer um estudo de cada viagem de forma independente.

### 3. A preparação da viagem

O primeiro passo a dar na organização da viagem era o pedido de uma licença<sup>1</sup> à Junta do Comércio, imposição feita pelo Alvará de 24 de novembro de 1770<sup>2</sup>. Era uma forma da Coroa e da própria Junta controlarem quem tinha acesso ao comércio. No sentido estrito do termo, a licença era uma autorização, mas no sentido mais lato, a Coroa e os homens de negócio, representados na Junta, influenciavam de forma evidente quem podia ou não ter acesso, garantindo os seus interesses pessoais, bem como os das suas redes e parceiros de negócio. Além disso, esta era ainda uma forma de garantir que quem patrocinava as viagens eram homens de largo capital, delimitando-se que apenas aqueles que tivessem um fundo de maneio superior a 120 contos de réis poderiam patrocinar a armação evitando-se negócios ruinosos.

1 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (doravante ANTT), *Junta do Comércio*, Livro 121, fl. 29.

2 *Vide* (Neves, 1814: 293–294).

Assim, não é de estranhar que a armação destes navios tenha sido feita precisamente por Joaquim Pedro Quintela e Luís Machado Teixeira. As suas posições na praça do comércio lisboeta colocavam-nos entre os mais ricos e influentes homens, o que lhes garantia os requisitos necessários para obter a referida licença: capital e redes.

Os livros do navio “Trovoada Pequeno” permitem-nos perceber como é que se constituía o capital em Lisboa, antes de se iniciar uma viagem. Era, pois, da responsabilidade dos armadores a organização da empresa. O navio era pertença de Luís Machado Teixeira, um dos sócios principais. No caso português esta era uma prática normal (Pedreira, 1995: 341). Mas a necessidade de cooperação impunha-se, decorrente da exigência dos capitais e o elevado risco, o que levava a que a negociação fosse aberta a outros. O seu parceiro principal foi Joaquim Pedro Quintela. A eles correspondia grande parte do capital reunido em Lisboa, logo na primeira viagem feita, em 1782, pelo navio “Trovoada Pequeno”, como evidenciado pela Tabela 2.

Tabela 2: Investimentos feitos no navio “Trovoada Pequeno”

Investidores	Valor (réis)	%
Luís Machado Teixeira	56802,28	18
Joaquim Pedro Quintela	89969,98	29
Demais sócios	162389,47	53
Total	309161,73	100

Fonte: ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 35.

A viagem do “Trovoada Pequeno” (1782-1784) acabou por ser alargada a 35 pessoas. O valor total reunido em Lisboa foi de 309.161,73 réis. Desse valor, 56.802,28 réis pertenciam a Machado Teixeira e 89.969,98 réis a Quintela, compreendendo 47% do capital. O restante investimento foi reunido pelos demais 35 sócios desta viagem, respeitando 53% do investimento (162.389,47 réis)<sup>3</sup>.

Relativamente à composição do grupo de sócios, temos aqueles que investiram individualmente, a quase totalidade dos ativos, mas também aqueles que investiram em parceria com outros, havendo cerca de 6 sociedades representadas. Todos os investidores eram homens. Embora fossem maioritariamente comerciantes, também vemos funcionários da coroa, militares e desembargadores a investir. Eram, quase na sua totalidade, de origem portuguesa, estando apenas presentes três estrangeiros (dois alemães e um italiano) que não representavam mais de 1% do capital investido. Ainda a propósito da composição acionista, parece-nos relevante dar conta que tanto o capitão do navio, como os sobrecargos tinham a sua

3 ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro, 40, fls. 21, 28.

quota de investimento. Esta era uma forma de garantir que também eles pudessem beneficiar do empreendimento, ao mesmo tempo que se minimizava o risco de uma conduta desviante ou de deslealdade, incrementando a possibilidade de sucesso da negociação. Evitavam-se, também, eventuais problemas de agência.

Pelo que depreendemos da análise dos livros, o capital era entregue aos armadores que compravam os bens na China, remetendo-os depois a Lisboa. Isto fica claro sobretudo pelos recibos dos navios e respetivas contas. Esta ideia é reforçada pelos recibos das contas finais da navegação onde, depois de feitas as vendas na Casa da Índia, se fazia um balanço das dívidas e a quem deviam ser pagas, correspondendo os valores em falta aos aportes feitos por cada investidor.

Esta ideia é reforçada pelo modelo societário que supomos estar na base desta negociação. No nosso entender, o mais provável é que essa fórmula correspondesse às práticas da Praça de Lisboa. Falamos, pois, da sociedade em comandita. Não tendo sido encontradas referências à celebração de escrituras destas sociedades entre os registos notariais de Lisboa, podemos propor que estas tenham sido criadas a título particular. Atente-se que, à data, não era ainda (tal como é hoje) exigida a forma escrita e registada, para formalizar a constituição de uma sociedade comercial.

Como dissemos, Bohorquez apresentou o contrato marítimo<sup>4</sup> como o modelo que subjaz às sociedades que analisou para o comércio asiático. No entanto, isso está em contra corrente com o que sabemos sobre as práticas societárias portuguesas, mas também com o levantamento que fizemos nos documentos encontrados.

Na essência, a sociedade em comandita traduz-se num contrato onde uma parte, o sócio comanditado, recebe dos demais o capital, obrigando-se a gerir a empresa e a partilhar com o(s) sócio(s) comanditário(s) os lucros. Este(s) tinha(m) uma responsabilidade limitada ao aporte feito por cada um (González de Lara, 2018: 71–72). Começou por ser entendido como um contrato de serviços, mas evoluiu ao longo do tempo para um investimento por ações. O resultado era uma sociedade em comandita que juntava vantagens do contrato marítimo, mas também da companhia. Compreendia uma responsabilidade limitada para o investidor; permitia algum grau de liquidez a partir da transmissão da quota detida; esboçava um princípio de responsabilidade da empresa perante terceiros, compreendendo já a sociedade enquanto ente e, portanto, separando entre o que

4 Este modelo de contrato remonta as suas origens até à Antiguidade. Era utilizado sobretudo para financiar viagens marítimas com elevado risco. Estava próximo do contrato de mútuo, onde mediante o empréstimo de dinheiro se vencia um juro. No caso do contrato marítimo, existiam pelo menos duas modalidades, uma que era o empréstimo de dinheiro, sob o pagamento de um prémio, outra era aquela onde se adiantavam as mercadorias, mediante o pagamento de um prémio de risco, um modelo desenvolvido pelos portugueses e chamado de *respondência*. No entanto, o pagamento do capital e prémio, estavam dependentes da chegada a bom porto da negociação em causa, apenas havendo suspensão do mesmo em caso de naufrágio, incêndio ou pirataria, correndo esse risco pelo investidor (González de Lara, 2018: 67-69; Harris, 2020: 112-118).

eram os acionistas e o que era o capital; e permitia já uma imobilidade do capital, seja pela duração de um ano ou vários. No entanto, pressupunha ainda uma partilha de responsabilidades entre o sócio comanditário/administrador e a empresa, sendo o primeiro responsabilizável pela segunda. Impunha-se também, quanto à transmissibilidade, que tivesse autorização dos demais parceiros para que ela se efetivasse (Roover, 1963: 50–53, 70–74; Costa, 2002: 399–401; Gonzáles de Lara, 2018: 74–75; Harris, 2020: 130–136).

No caso português este modelo foi aplicado tanto nas rotas atlânticas como nas asiáticas (Costa, 1997: 201, 2002: 391–413, 2013: 38–61). Leonor Freire Costa (2002: 395–396) dedicou algum do seu trabalho a estudar as questões ligadas ao transporte e chamou a atenção para a utilização desse tipo de sociedades, tanto para ajustar as partes sobre a construção dos navios, como para o comércio atlântico ou asiático. Neste caso esse modelo foi utilizado no comércio da Carreira da Índia, onde o Rei participava na empresa como se de um sócio comanditário se tratasse, partilhando investimento e risco com os privados (Costa, 1997: 201, 2013).

No caso específico das viagens dos “Trovoada”, pela informação dos livros de contas podemos depreender que os sócios comanditados da empresa eram os seus principais investidores, Joaquim Pedro Quintela<sup>5</sup> e Luís Machado Teixeira<sup>6</sup>. Esta ideia parece ser claramente justificada dado que, além de terem investido a maior fatia do capital, a licença emitida pela Junta do Comércio conferia-lhes a responsabilidade da organização da viagem. Além disso, segundo os livros de contas era sobre Quintela e Teixeira - nunca sobre os demais sócios - que recaía o risco<sup>7</sup>; e era a estes que cabia a função de liquidação das respetivas viagens.

Reunido o capital era preciso dar seguimento à viagem. Mas, como é que tal se processava? Esse capital ia sob a forma de letras a descontar num qualquer porto asiático? E se sim, como eram descontadas em locais longínquos? Ou era convertido em prata para depois adquirir os produtos na China? Qual o papel das redes neste processo? Como é que os portugueses solucionaram estes problemas?

5 Era neto de comerciante, filho de funcionário da coroa e sobrinho e herdeiro de um dos maiores capitalistas de Lisboa no tempo de Pombal, Inácio Pedro Quintela. Dele recebe os bens e a posição social que o vão colocar entre os mais proeminentes homens de negócio da praça de Lisboa e detentor de uma das maiores fortunas do país, onde cabem as sociedades da Pesca das Baleias, do Estanco do Sal, do Tabaco, dos Dízimos do Brasil ou dos Diamantes (Costa, 1992; Pedreira, 1995; Madureira, 1997; Albuquerque, 2019).

6 Filho de um comerciante da Baía, João Machado Miranda, que envia o seu filho a Coimbra, onde se torna doutor de capelo vindo a ser leitor no Desembargo do Paço. Quando o seu pai morre regressa à Baía assumindo os negócios, na sua maioria ligados ao comércio de escravos. No período que estudamos está já entre os principais negociantes da praça de Lisboa, dedicando-se também ao investimento em manufaturas. Foi proprietário de vários navios para além do “Trovoada Grande” e “Trovoada Pequeno”, como o navio “São Luís” e “Santa Maria Madalena”, o navio “Vigilante” (em sociedade com Joaquim Manuel dos Santos e Diogo Francisco dos Santos), a galera “Carolina”, entre outros. Ocupava-se, então, não só do comércio com a Ásia, mas também com o Brasil. ANTT, HOC, Letra L, mc.10, n.º 12 (1775); ANTT, *Junta do Comércio*, Livro 123, fl. 112v.

7 ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livros 23, 24, 26, 39, 40, 41.

## 4. O negócio na Ásia

Embora, como vimos, diversos historiadores tenham tentado chegar a uma solução para estas questões, a análise crítica do registo do navio “Trovoada Pequeno” oferece-nos uma nova perspetiva.

Bohorquez (2020a) deu-nos conta de que as letras reunidas em Lisboa serviam ou para ser descontadas no Rio de Janeiro, garantindo a obtenção de prata, ou eram deduzidas nos portos da Ásia, para esse mesmo efeito. Era por isso fundamental a existência de uma estrutura assente num grande número de correspondentes (Bohorquez, 2020a).

No entanto, não é isso que os livros de contas da negociação do “Trovoada Pequeno” nos dizem. Pelo que depreendemos da nossa análise, esse capital inicial era maioritariamente convertido num conjunto de mercadorias europeias<sup>8</sup> como cobre, ferro, peças de lonas, âncoras, pregos, alcatrão, peixe, fio de vela, barris de alvaiade (chumbo), barris de azarcão<sup>9</sup>, cabos, peças de caxemira e barris de cochinha<sup>10</sup>.

Tabela 3: Cargas e valores a bordo do navio “Trovoada Pequeno” (1782-1784)

Local	Tipo carga	Valor (réis)
Lisboa	Géneros	51059,892
Madeira	Vinho	19740
Rio de Janeiro	Água Ardente	296,912
Madrasta	Alvaiada	633,055
Madrasta	Azarcão	1324,298
Madrasta	Lacredas	36786,4
Madrasta	Algodão	6225,5
	Total	116066,057

Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 37.

Tabela 4: Dinheiro a bordo do navio “Trovoada Pequeno” (1782-1784)

Local	Réis
Lisboa	4000
Rio de Janeiro	12000
Total	16000

Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 37.

8 ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livros 36, 42.

9 Zarcão, derivado de chumbo.

10 Pigmento que de cor azul.

Como podemos ver pelas tabelas 3 e 4, a maioria da carga embarcada em Lisboa era composta de géneros europeus e apenas uma pequena quantidade de dinheiro. Tal não é uma novidade, pois, como defendeu Ernestina Carreira (1995: 87), esses produtos serviam para o comércio indiano.

Depois de sair da capital do império, a primeira paragem era a Ilha da Madeira, onde se complementou a carga com vinho madeira. O destino dessa mercadoria foi precisamente o primeiro porto de paragem na Ásia, Madrasta. Essa cidade, sob domínio inglês, recebia o vinho para acudir à demanda criada pelos ingleses que aí se tinham fixado (Carreira, 1995: 87; Cunha, 2006a: 400).

Ainda antes de seguir viagem para a Ásia o navio aportou no Rio de Janeiro, onde carregou cachaça, mas também uma pequena quantia em dinheiro, por conta de Joaquim Pedro Quintela. Só depois de cumpridas estas etapas o navio seguiu em direção ao Cabo da Boa Esperança.

A partir da leitura destes livros observamos que não há qualquer registo da entrada de prata, fundamental para o negócio no oriente. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (1968) foi o primeiro a dar conta da diminuição dos afluxos de prata espanhola à Europa a partir da segunda metade do XVII e princípio do XVIII. Pegando nessa questão, mais recentemente, Rita Martins de Sousa (2011) analisou os registos da Casa da Moeda onde se assentam as entradas da prata em Lisboa. A historiadora afirma que, de facto, se verifica uma escassez no período identificado por Godinho, mas que a partir de 1713, com a assinatura do Tratado de Utrecht e a passagem da Colónia do Sacramento para administração portuguesa, a prata espanhola passa a ser enviada a Lisboa a partir do Rio de Janeiro (Sousa, 2011: 393). Esta ideia é reforçada pelos trabalhos de Bohorquez (2020a, 2020b), o que por um lado estabelece o Rio de Janeiro como a principal fonte de acesso à prata pelos navios que saíam de Lisboa, e por outro tornam-no o principal centro de fornecimento de prata à metrópole.

Contudo, como vimos, no momento da travessia do oceano Atlântico o navio “Trovoada Pequeno” não transportava prata. Assim, atendendo às mercadorias embarcadas, nomeadamente as de origem europeia, sugerem-nos uma outra hipótese. Sabemos que esses produtos eram enviados para serem vendidos na Ásia, porém não tinham como destino os portos do Estado da Índia, mas antes a cidade portuária de Madrasta (atual Chennai). Os artigos aí vendidos eram a garantia da obtenção do capital necessário para depois comprar outras mercadorias mais a Oriente, na China.

Esta nossa teoria é reforçada pela historiografia. A prata era conseguida nos portos indianos sob domínio inglês. As cidades do Golfo de Bengala eram os principais pontos de concentração da prata, a qual era trazida pelos europeus, sobretudo pelas Companhias Inglesa e Holandesa. No caso da VOC correspondia a mais de 50% dos produtos por ela introduzidos na Ásia (Chaudhuri, 1998: 86). Já no caso inglês, a prata era trazida pela companhia, embarcada a partir de Londres,

que funcionava como um importante centro de distribuição desse metal precioso (Sousa, 2011: 392).

Mas a estes portos chegava também o metal branco resultante do comércio intra-asiático, com as mais variadas origens, uma realidade que não começa apenas com a presença europeia, tendo já tradições anteriores (Chaudhuri, 1998: 92–93).

Pelos livros de contas e carregação dos navios “Trovoada” sabemos que estes artigos tinham já um destino e que era responsabilidade dos sobrecargas contactar os destinatários e vender-lhes os respetivos bens. Em Madrasta tinham como correspondentes António de Sousa (português), Chocapá Chety (indiano), Smith Naval (inglês), Robert Barclay (inglês) e John Thompson (inglês)<sup>11</sup>. Todos eram comerciantes e desenvolviam as suas atividades no Oriente. Embora não tenhamos conseguido obter informações sobre todos estes indivíduos, sabemos que tanto Robert Barclay, como John Thompson estavam ligados à administração da Companhia das Índias Inglesa<sup>12</sup>. Neste mesmo porto eram ainda deixadas mercadorias a entregar a José Barreto, provavelmente um português que, sediado em Calcutá, mantinha negócios na Ásia<sup>13</sup>.

Foi desta forma que Quintela e Teixeira contornaram as dificuldades de acesso à prata ou a necessidade de terem que enviar dinheiro sob a forma de letras. O dinheiro reunido em Lisboa era convertido em mercadorias a serem vendidas na Índia. Mediante a venda desses itens a destinatários específicos no porto de Madrasta obtinha-se, então, a prata e as letras necessárias para as trocas a Oriente. As letras endossadas sobre comerciantes reconhecidos no Oriente, ou então sobre Quintela e Teixeira, eram depois descontadas em Macau, junto dos seus correspondentes<sup>14</sup>.

Mas, será que esta foi uma prática apenas seguida por estes dois comerciantes? Claramente que a resposta é negativa. Por um lado, certamente que as viagens empreendidas pela mesma parceria Quintela e Teixeira utilizaram os mesmos moldes, premissa que se nos torna impossível confirmar uma vez que não tivemos acesso ao mesmo tipo de livros do “Trovoada Pequeno”, que nos permitisse chegar a essa conclusão.

Podemos, no entanto, olhar para outras viagens, como aquelas desenvolvidas pela Companhia Geral do Grão-Pará e Maranhão (CGPM) e pela Companhia Geral do Pernambuco e Paraíba (CPP).

11 ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livros 37, 40.

12 É apontado para um cargo da mesma companhia em 1790, tendo já ligação à mesma. Vide, *East India Company, Commission Appointing Robert Barclay Lieutenant of Infantry*, James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.

13 ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 40.

14 Foi precisamente esse o caso de Francis de Labour, comerciante de origem francesa sediado em Madrasta com uma importante casa de comércio. Quando chega o navio, adquire 75 barris de vinho Madeira, que paga precisamente em dinheiro e letras sobre Bangala e Calcutá, ou seja, sobre comerciantes ingleses. Esses títulos eram facilmente descontados, em qualquer praça com presença de comerciantes europeus com casa no Oriente. ANTT, *Feitos Findos*, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 42, fls.8-9; Madras Tercentenary Celebration Committee. *The Madras Tercentenary Commemoration Volume*, Asian Educational Services, 1994.

Pouco sabemos sobre essas primeiras viagens levadas a cabo pela CGPM, tendo a primeira tido lugar em de 1759<sup>15</sup>. António Carreira (1988: 315) dá-nos conta que depois dela ocorreram mais duas, ainda durante a vigência do monopólio, findado em 1777. Uma delas foi a de 1761, com um rendimento de aproximadamente 130 contos de réis (Carreira, 1988: 315). Mas a que melhor analisou foi a realizada em 1781. Segundo o historiador, foi pedida autorização pelos administradores da liquidação das sociedades para que se empreendesse a viagem. Tal foi autorizado pela rainha nos decretos de 22 de fevereiro e 11 de março desse mesmo ano. O financiamento fez-se com a emissão de 730 ações, das quais 569 tinham o valor nominal de 200 mil réis e as restantes 161 o valor nominal de 400 mil réis, pelo que foi reunido um capital de 178.200.000 réis, com um total de 73 acionistas (Carreira, 1988: 316). Relativamente à composição da carga, dá conta que saíram de Lisboa 28.454.051 réis em fazendas, além de 96.000.000 réis de ouro e prata de (Carreira, 1988: 317).

Ao dar conta da rentabilidade da negociação diz-nos que tiveram um lucro bruto de 267.366.034 réis aos quais, abatendo os 178.200.000 réis de capital investido, dá o valor de 89.166.034 réis o que corresponde ao capital distribuído pelas ações, ou seja, cerca de 50% do investimento.

Essas viagens foram também postas em prática pela Companhia Geral do Pernambuco e Paraíba. Thiago Alves Dias (2019) aborda precisamente o tema da organização e financiamento de viagens que a companhia realizou à Ásia, através da análise dos livros da negociação das naus “Neptuno” e “Polifemo”, datados de 1777. Depois da autorização concedida em 1775, pela qual se previa que apenas uma nau fosse aos portos da Ásia, os planos sofreram algumas alterações, por conveniência da Junta Liquidatária, mas também da Coroa, que participava na empreitada. Assim, as naus apenas partiram de Lisboa em 1777. A nau “Neptuno” saiu da metrópole em direção ao Rio de Janeiro, aportou a Moçambique, de onde seguiu para o Estado da Índia, efetuando paragens em Diu, Damão, Surrate e Goa. Daí partiu para Madrasta, de onde tomou rumo a Macau. Já a sua irmã “Polifemo”, depois de abandonar a capital do reino, dirigiu-se à Baía. Daí seguiu em direção ao Cabo da Boa Esperança e aportou em Moçambique, de onde se dirigiu depois a Goa (Dias, 2019: 160–161).

Quando partiram da Europa as suas cargas eram constituídas na totalidade por produtos europeus como: missangas, avelórios, vidros da Boémia, açafraão, água de cheiro, vinho, azeite, pólvora, espingardas, ferro, chumbo, cobre, pregos, chapéus, barras, chapas, papel e corais. Completam as duas cargas o valor de 191.680.958 réis a que se somam 1.016 patacas de prata castelhana. A “Neptuno” completou a sua carga no Rio de Janeiro com açúcar e água ardente, além de mais 20 mil réis de prata castelhana (7.422 pesos). Já a “Polifemo” adquiriu tabaco por conta da Fazenda Real na Baía (Dias, 2019: 161). Como podemos, então, concluir a

15 *Diário da Navegação de Macau, 1759-1761*, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1970.



quantidade de prata reunida no Rio de Janeiro não era suficiente para a aquisição dos efeitos chineses. Ora, também aqui nota Alves Dias (2019) que os produtos europeus, bem como os brasileiros, eram vendidos ao longo do percurso, primeiro em Moçambique, embora com maior dificuldade e depois na Índia, com especial destaque para Madrastra, com o intuito de recolher prata. Coincidência ou não, os sobrecargas da nau “Neptuno” foram recomendados a António de Sousa, precisamente o mesmo homem que identificamos no caso da viagem do navio “Trovoada Pequeno” (Dias, 2019: 163).

Dias (2019: 164) termina a sua análise dando conta que no final da negociação, ela teve um lucro líquido de 122.923.125 réis, decorrentes da venda dos produtos chineses em Lisboa, na sua maioria loiças, porcelanas e chá.

Esta não era uma estratégia exclusiva dos portugueses, tendo também outras potências europeias aproveitado a oportunidade e participado no comércio oriental. Disso mesmo nos dá conta Teles da Cunha (2006a: 383), relativamente à Dinamarca que, entre o final do século XVIII e princípio do século XIX, terá tido cargas no valor de 2 milhões de florins. Essa foi também a prática recorrente nas viagens da Companhia Sueca das Índias Orientais. Fundada em 1732, com uma licença de 15 anos de monopólio, a empresa era uma sociedade em tudo semelhante aos modelos inglês e holandês. O trabalho de Koninckx (2007) sobre a empresa sueca é claro. Os produtos que ela transportava nas viagens entre a Europa e a Ásia eram todos de origem europeia. Tinham como fim a Índia, de modo a obter a prata necessária para comprar produtos na China, mais concretamente o chá. Deste modo resolviam a falta de acesso à prata espanhola, que, como temos vindo a observar, era um elemento fundamental para comerciar a Oriente (Koninckx, 2007: 223-ss).

## 5. Macau, às portas da China

Explicadas as conjunturas que permitiram aos portugueses o retomar do interesse na Rota do Cabo e demonstrada uma outra forma de financiar o comércio com o Oriente, parece-nos ainda faltar um esclarecimento quanto ao interesse em Macau. Para isso é determinante perceber o papel que essa cidade e os seus homens de negócio tinham para ultrapassar a barreira do Sistema de Cantão<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Macau esteve durante quase 500 anos na dependência dos portugueses, mas a sua localização geográfica manteve-a numa enorme dependência face à China. A partir de 1757 viu um incremento da sua importância sobretudo depois da implementação do Sistema de Cantão. Esta é a expressão da política levada a cabo pela dinastia Qing que abria o porto ao comércio estrangeiro, mas ao mesmo tempo proibia a sua presença em território chinês. Assim, Macau tornara-se um espaço estratégico determinante no comércio com a China, para todos os europeus que ali tentavam fazer negócio. Grande parte desse sucesso coube aos comerciantes da cidade, pois a sua capacidade de adaptação aos contextos ao longo do tempo, colocou a Macau com um interposto entre a China e a Europa, além das suas relações comerciais se estenderem a grande parte da Ásia. No que toca ao comércio de Macau, este estendia-se desde as Ilhas Maurícias até Manila. Destaca-se a Cochinchina, a Índia, a Malásia e Manila. No que toca à Índia há uma perda de importância em favor dos

Por um lado, a Cidade do Nome de Deus tinha uma posição privilegiada com a China, pois agia como interlocutora entre o Império do Meio e os Europeus. Por outro, os seus comerciantes detinham capital que lhes permitia fazer comércio com toda a Ásia. No século XVIII estabeleceram negócios com a Costa de Bengala, com as famílias indo-portuguesas estabelecidas na Costa do Coromandel, como foi o caso de Calcutá, mas também com a própria companhia inglesa, sem esquecer os comerciantes britânicos que, depois de 1770, faziam o seu negócio privado (Cunha, 2006a: 390–391).

Mas só isso não é suficiente para compreendermos o porquê de Macau ser um dos portos de interesse. Mais uma vez recorremos a Teles da Cunha. Segundo o autor, seriam os comerciantes ingleses que procuravam, a partir de Lisboa, introduzir produtos chineses no velho continente, “contornando [assim] o monopólio da EIC para abastecer a Europa, com destaque para o chá” (Cunha, 2006b: 333).<sup>17</sup> Segundo o mesmo autor, parte dos navios enviados para Macau tinham capital português, nomeadamente com origem no Brasil, mas também investimento estrangeiro, tanto inglês como francês, havendo ainda capitais espanhóis, gadianos e italianos, neste último caso com especial destaque para os genoveses (Cunha, 2006b: 334).

Como pudemos verificar, no caso do “Trovoada Pequeno”, a maioria dos capitais era português, apesar de haver a presença de outros estrangeiros. Esse foi também o caso das viagens feitas pelas companhias portuguesas. Não negamos que num estudo que abarque uma maior quantidade de viagens se possa detetar a presença de capital estrangeiro com mais expressão, tal como Bohorquez verificou para o negócio dos panos. No caso do negócio do chá e demais produtos chineses, os portugueses investiam nestas viagens, sendo depois a partir de Lisboa que distribuíam os produtos obtidos. O chá surge como uma enorme oportunidade, sobretudo porque, a partir de Lisboa, os europeus o podiam introduzir nos mercados inglês e americano, por via legal ou ilegal, as mercadorias que conseguiam em Lisboa a um menor preço do que os obtidos através da EIC.

Até à data, o principal produtor e fornecedor europeu eram as colónias inglesas da América do Norte, que, em 1776, se revoltaram contra a metrópole, dando-se início à Guerra da Independência, que resultara na criação dos Estados Unidos da América.

Foi, então, preciso encontrar uma alternativa para alimentar a constante procura. É assim que os países europeus se viraram para a China. Entendendo os portugueses que aquela poderia ser uma oportunidade de negócio, ressurgem

tratos com a Cochinchina e a Malásia. *Vide* (Pires, 1993; Vale, 1997; Alves, 1998; Figueiredo, 2000; Guimarães, 2000; Miranda, 2002; Souza, 2010; Cranmer-Byang e Wills, 2011).

<sup>17</sup> Esta não é uma ideia nova, pois a propósito da criação da Companhia de Ostende em 1722, alguma da historiografia apresenta como causa, precisamente a intenção de um grupo de comerciantes se furtar ao monopólio da companhia inglesa (Dreijer, 2017).

os investimentos nas viagens privadas para o Oriente (Figueiredo, 2000; Hodacs, 2016).

Esta necessidade de contornar esse monopólio surgia sobretudo associada aos impostos cobrados em Inglaterra sobre esse produto (Pritchard, 1934: 285). Tal gerou uma larga competição entre a EIC que, como já dissemos consolidou a sua posição na Ásia em 1757, e todos os demais europeus. Esta “luta” deu-se por um período de cerca de 30 anos, entre 1762 a 1784, onde nomeadamente a França e a Holanda, mas também o Império Austro-húngaro, a Prússia, a Itália e os Estados Unidos da América, estes últimos sobretudo por via do contrabando, procuraram competir com a companhia introduzindo chá na Europa, mas também na América (Pritchard, 1934: 289–290). A situação só começou a inverter-se com a chegada ao governo inglês de William Pitt, que tomou um conjunto de medidas, nomeadamente a descida de impostos, tentativa de controlar os contratos do chá na China e a abertura dos seus portos apenas aos ingleses. Como consequência direta houve uma descida do contrabando e, assim, um impacto nos negócios dos demais europeus.

Os livros de registos dos navios que temos vindo a tomar como base da nossa análise dão-nos conta da importância de um conjunto de comerciantes portugueses sediados em Macau, na concretização do negócio com os chineses. Eram eles os interlocutores com Cantão.

Era o caso de António José Gamboa e de Manuel Homem de Carvalho, dois homens pertencentes ao grupo dos comerciantes portugueses da cidade de Macau e que eram correspondentes de Quintela. António José Gamboa é apontado como um rico comerciante de ópio e algodão, proprietário de diversos navios. Conseguimos datar a sua atividade em Macau desde 1780. Por via do matrimónio conseguiu ligar-se às famílias de comerciantes reinóis locais, sendo dessa forma que entra no grupo, tal como a maioria dos comerciantes daquela cidade, chegando a ser vereador do Senado de Macau várias vezes (Teixeira, 1969: 52, 278). À semelhança de Gamboa, Manuel Homem de Carvalho não era natural de Macau, mas aí se tinha fixado pelo menos desde 1780, tendo também ele integrado a oligarquia local por via do matrimónio. Estava ligado à família Vicente Rosa, uma das mais importantes da cidade, com bastante peso na administração e relevância nos negócios, sendo genro de Simão Vicente Rosa. Fruto da sua proeminência foi também membro das vereações do Senado (Vale, 1997).

Como podemos perceber, estes eram homens que pertenciam à elite comercial de Macau, a quem estavam ligados por laços familiares, o que lhes permitia ocupar lugares de relevo na governança da Câmara e da Santa Casa da Misericórdia. Este seu estatuto conferia-lhes acesso às instituições de crédito e por sua vez ao capital (Vale, 1997). Isto mesmo era possível porque, a partir de 1761, a Coroa permitira que a Câmara pudesse fazer empréstimos, prerrogativa que depois se estendeu à Santa Casa da Misericórdia, os chamados ganhos de mar e ganhos de terra. Os primeiros eram assim chamados porque diziam respeito aos empréstimos feitos


para a realização de viagens marítimas, os segundos eram para financiamento de outros tipo de atividades (Vale, 2006: 378). Essa posição poderia ser uma das formas encontradas para ter acesso à prata. Os negócios da venda dos produtos europeus na Índia tanto podiam ser feitos de forma a se arrecadar esse metal precioso, como por letras sacadas sobre os armadores, Quintela & Machado, que depois eram descontadas em Macau, junto dos seus correspondentes. Facilitava-se, assim, o desconto das letras pela prata que posteriormente era empregue no comércio com os chineses.

Esta nossa hipótese é reforçada pelo estudo de António Martins Vale (1997) que aponta os comerciantes de Macau como sendo testas de ferro de vários comerciantes estrangeiros, contraindo empréstimos em seu nome, que depois eram utilizados para financiar negócios com os chineses. Jorge dos Santos Alves (1998) chama também a atenção para a necessidade de rever as posições historiográficas sobre as redes de negócios luso-asiáticas, destacando também ele o papel dos comerciantes portugueses de Macau. A verificação desta hipótese obrigará a uma análise mais cuidada, não só a partir de correspondência à qual, até à data, não tivemos acesso, mas dos registos da própria Misericórdia de Macau. Contudo, parece-nos lícito propor que se esses homens operavam a função de intermediários para os estrangeiros<sup>18</sup>, também o fariam certamente para os portugueses.

Era, deste modo, que se obtinha a prata para comprar aos chineses o chá que depois era vendido à Europa, onde, desde a segunda metade de setecentos, se vinha a observar um incremento da procura por esta mercadoria. Era uma resposta às necessidades do mercado que se virava para o Oriente de modo a colmatar as falhas decorrentes das Guerra de Independência dos EUA, principal produtor e fornecedor deste produto (Figueiredo, 2000; Cranmer-Byang e Wills, 2011). Disso mesmo nos dão conta os registos dos despachos de mercadorias dos navios “Trovoada Pequeno” e “Grande” nas viagens de regresso a Lisboa em 1784, 1785 e 1787. Se parte da carga ficava em terra, não especificando os seus destinatários, outra era diretamente baldeada para navios estrangeiros. Embora na viagem de 1785 a totalidade dos destinos tenham sido portos europeus, ao contrário do que aconteceu na de 1784, já na de 1787 houve um peso significativo dos portos americanos nomeadamente Baltimore, Boston, Filadélfia e Nova Iorque.

18 Era o caso de ingleses, arménios, franceses, dinamarqueses, holandeses, suecos, americanos, alemães e os espanhóis de Manila.

Figura 1: Baldeações em Lisboa em 1784, 1785 e 1787



Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livros 43, 23, 49.

Quanto aos produtos, observa-se que o chá é preponderante, como podemos ver pelas Tabelas 5, 6 e 7, embora a carga fosse também composta por outros produtos como panos, sedas, canela, etc.

Tabela 5: Produtos e quantidades baldeadas (1784)

Produtos	Quantidade	Unid. Medida
Cangas	9664	peças
Chá	80460	Kg
Cetins	6	peças

Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 43.

Tabela 6: Produtos e quantidades baldeadas (1785)

Produtos	Quantidade	Unid. Medida
Atados	225	Kg
Canela	6000	Kg
Cangas	31270	unidade
Chá	175860	Kg
Seda	60	Kg

Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 23.

Tabela 7: Produtos e quantidades baldeadas (1787)

Produtos	Quantidade	Unid. Medida
Bengalas	2701	unidade
Canela	18180	Kg
Cangas	43005	unidade
Chá	19020	Kg
Flor de Anis	120	Kg
Pimenta	17460	Kg

Fonte: ANTT, Feitos Findos, Livros dos Feitos Findos, Livro 29.

## Conclusão

Através deste estudo procurámos dar um contributo para o debate em torno do ressurgimento da Carreira da Índia, que desde o século XIX tem estado nas preocupações dos historiadores portugueses.

O primeiro ponto que nos pareceu importante deixar claro é que não estamos perante um reflorescimento da Carreira nos moldes do século XVI. No século XVIII, o objetivo dos comerciantes portugueses já não são apenas os panos indianos, mas também o comércio com a China, mais concretamente o comércio de chá com a Europa.

Esse renovado interesse pelo Oriente era fruto da reunião de fatores conjunturais internos e externos, como a política bélica europeia ou os contextos de crise económica vividos na segunda metade do século XVIII em Portugal. Os comerciantes portugueses, sobretudo aqueles com maior dimensão, souberam aproveitar as oportunidades trazidas por tais circunstâncias, justificando-se assim o ressurgimento do interesse português pelo Oriente.

Quisemos sobretudo neste trabalho abordar o tema do financiamento dessas viagens. Se por um lado, Bohorquez conseguiu demonstrar uma forma de custear os empreendimentos, sobretudo alicerçado numa escala global, em que participavam capitais com diferentes origens, focados num circuito entre quatro pontos (a Europa, a América, a Ásia e a África), onde a prata, os panos e os escravos eram a locomotiva do negócio, por outro, vemos que isso não é suficiente para justificar o interesse pelos negócios na China. O que percebemos, apesar das parcas fontes, é que os portugueses encontraram outra forma de financiamento.

Os livros dos “Trovoada Pequeno” deram-nos, então, conta que os navios partiam de Lisboa carregados de produtos europeus, carga a ser completada nas paragens dos portos atlânticos (Ilha da Madeira e Rio de Janeiro), seguindo depois viagem para o Índico. Era ali que pela venda dos ditos efeitos se obtinha a prata e

as letras para comerciar na China. Esta é uma ideia reforçada pelos casos apresentados pela historiografia para as viagens realizadas pelas companhias de comércio colonial portuguesas, mas também as estrangeiras, nomeadamente a Companhia Dinamarquesa e a Sueca.

Aquilo que concluímos na nossa análise, assente nos livros da negociação de dois navios, é que o envolvimento de capitais lisboetas tem um elevado peso, bem como as estratégias para participar nesse negócio que evitava estar dependente de capitais maioritariamente estrangeiros ou coloniais.

Concluímos também que, tal como já tinha alertado Jorge Pedreira, as redes têm um papel preponderante. Percebemos que elas têm um relevo determinante particularmente no acesso ao mercado chinês, pois eram os comerciantes de Macau, correspondentes de Lisboa, que viabilizavam a viagem ao aceitarem descontar ali as letras que lhes chegavam pelas mãos dos sobrecargas, convertiam-nas na prata que era utilizada para comprar o chá, produto chave na torna viagem.

## Referências bibliográficas

- ALBUQUERQUE, Tomás Pinto de (2019), "Negociar a partir do dentro: a Casa Comercial de Jacinto Fernandes Bandeira (1775-1806)", in Bruno Lopes, Roger Lee de Jesus (eds.), *Finanças, economia e instituições no Portugal moderno: séculos XVI-XVIII*, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra / Coimbra University Press, 309-339.
- ALVES, Jorge M. Santos (1998), "Diplomacia e comércio em Macau na Ásia do Sudeste, em inícios do século XIX, in Maria Johanna Schouten (org.), *A Ásia do Sudeste. História, cultura e desenvolvimento*, Lisboa, Veja, 129-138.
- BOHORQUEZ, Jesus (2020a), "Linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans: Asian Textiles, Spanish Silver, Global Capital, and the Financing of the Portuguese–Brazilian Slave Trade (1760–1808)", *Journal of Global History*, 15(1), 19–38.
- BOHORQUEZ, Jesus (2020b), "Rio de Janeiro and the Silver Mining Economy of Potosi: Trans-Imperial, Global, and Contractual Approaches to South Atlantic Markets (18th Century)", *Almanack*, 24.
- CARREIRA, António (1988), *A Companhia Geral do Grão-Pará e Maranhão*, São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional.
- CARREIRA, Ernestina (1995), "O comércio português no Gujarat na segunda metade do século XVIII: As famílias Loureiro e Ribeiro", *Mare Liberum*, 9, 83–94.
- CHAUDHURI, Sushil (1998), "The Inflow of Silver to Bengal in the Global Perspective c.1650-1757", in Clara Eugenia Núñez (ed.), *Histoire Monétaire: Une Perspective Globale, 1500-1808*, Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 85-96.
- COSTA, Fernando Dores (1992), *A crise financeira, dívida pública e capitalistas (1796-1807)*, Dissertação de Mestrado, Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire (1997), *Naus e galeões na ribeira de Lisboa: a construção naval no século XVI para a Rota do Cabo*, Cascais, Patrimonia.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire (2002), *O transporte no Atlântico e a Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil, 1580-1663*, Vol. I, Lisboa, Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimientos Portugueses.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire (2013), "Portuguese Resilience in Global War: Military Motivation and Institutional Adaptation in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Cape Route", in Lucia Coppolaro, Francine

- McKenzie (eds.), *A Global History of Trade and Conflict since 1500*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 38–61.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire, ROCHA, Maria Manuela, SOUSA, Rita Martins de (2013), *O Ouro do Brasil*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, Casa da Moeda.
- CRANMER-BYANG, John L., WILLS, John E. (2011), "Trade and Diplomacy with Maritime Europe 1644-c.1800", in John E. Wills (ed.), *China and Maritime Europe 1500-1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 183–254.
- CUNHA, João Manuel de Almeida Teles e (2006a), "A Carreira da Índia e Goa - apogeu e declínio crepusculares (1760-1835)", in Joel Serrão, A. H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs.), *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Vol. V, Tomo 1, Lisboa, Estampa, 361-449.
- CUNHA, João Manuel de Almeida Teles e (2006b), "A rede económica do estado da Índia (1660-1750)", in Joel Serrão, A. H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs.), *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Vol. V, Tomo 1, Lisboa, Estampa, 162-339.
- DIAS, Thiago Alves (2019), "Os negócios globais de uma companhia colonial: a Companhia Geral de Pernambuco e Paraíba e os negócios da China (1759-1783)", *Afro-Ásia*, 59, 131–167.
- DOMINGUES, Francisco Contente (2015), "A Carreira da Índia. Percursos comparativos de uma empresa marítima", in Amândio Jorge Morais Barros (coord.), *Os Descobrimentos e as Origens da Convergência Global*, Porto, Câmara Municipal do Porto, 111–126.
- DREIJER, Gijs (2017), *Bargaining for Shelter. An Entrepreneurial Analysis of the Ostend Company, 1714-1740*, MA Thesis, Leiden, Leiden University.
- FIGUEIREDO, Fernando (2000), "Os vectores da economia", in A. H. Oliveira Marques (dir.), *História dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente*, Vol. III, Lisboa, Fundação Oriente, 95–298.
- GODINHO, Vitorino Magalhães (1968), "Portugal, as frotas do açúcar e as frotas do ouro (1670-1770)", in *Ensaio II*, Lisboa, Livraria Sá da Costa, 294–315.
- GONZÁLES DE LARA, Yadira (2018), "Business Organization and Organizational Innovation in Late Medieval Italy", in Harwell Wells (ed.), *Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law*, Cheltenham, Northampton MA, Edmard Elgar Publishing, 65-87.
- GUIMARÃES, Ângela (2000), *Uma relação especial. Macau e as relações Luso-Chinesas (1780-1844)*, Lisboa, Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia.
- GUINOTE, Paulo Jorge Alves, FRUTUOSO, Eduardo, LOPES, António (2002), *As armadas da Índia: 1497-1835*, Lisboa, Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses.
- HARRIS, Ron (2020), *Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 1400-1700*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- HODACS, Hanna (2016), *Silk and Tea in the North: Scandinavian Trade and the Market for Asian Goods in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- KONINCKX, C. (2007), "Sweden and India in the Eighteenth Century: Sweden's Difficulty in Gaining Access to a Crowded Market", in *Merchants, Companies and Trade Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 212-226.
- LAPA, José Roberto Amaral (1968), *A Bahia e a Carreira da Índia*, São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional.
- MACEDO, Jorge Borges de (1951), *A situação económica no tempo de Pombal: alguns aspectos*, Lisboa, Livraria Portugália.
- MADUREIRA, Nuno Luís (1997), *Mercado e privilégios. A indústria portuguesa entre 1750-1834*, Lisboa, Estampa.
- MIRANDA, Susana Munch (2002), "Os circuitos económicos", in A. H. Oliveira Marques (dir.), *História dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente*, Vol. II, Lisboa, Fundação Oriente, 259–288.
- NEVES, José Acúrsio das (1814), *Variadas, sobre objectos relativos ás artes, commercio, e manufacturas: consideradas segundo os principios da economia política*, Lisboa, Impressão Regia.



- PEDREIRA, Jorge Miguel Viana (1991), "Indústria e negócio: a estamperia na região de Lisboa, 1780-1880", *Análise Social*, 26, 537-559.
- PEDREIRA, Jorge Miguel Viana (1995), *Os homens de negócios da praça de Lisboa. De Pombal ao Vintismo (1755-1822). Diferenciação, reprodução e identificação de um grupo social*, Tese de Doutoramento, Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
- PINTO, Celsa (1994), *Trade and Finance in the Portuguese India. A Study of the Portuguese Country Trade 1770-1840*, Nova Deli, Concept Publishing Company.
- PINTO, Celsa (1995), "Lisbon Investment in the Indian Textile Commerce: the Surat Feeder", *Mare Liberum*, 9, 217-233.
- PINTO, Celsa (2006), "Rede económica do Estado da Índia: 1750-1830", in Joel Serrão, A. H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs.), *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Vol. V, Tomo 1, Lisboa, Estampa, 339-380.
- PIRES, Benjamin Videira (1993), *A vida marítima de Macau no século XVIII*, Macau, Instituto Cultural de Macau & Museu Marítimo de Macau.
- PRITCHARD, E. H. (1934), "The Struggle for Control of the China Trade During the Eighteenth Century", *Pacific Historical Review*, 3(3), 280-295.
- ROOVER, Reymound (1963), "The Organization of Trade", in M. M. Postan, E. E. Rich, Edward Miller (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, Vol. III, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 42-118.
- SOUSA, Rita Martins de (2011), "A prata no século do ouro - Portugal (1700-1797)", in Álvaro Garrido, Leonor Freire Costa, Luís Miguel Duarte (eds.), *Estudos de Homenagem a Joaquim Romero de Magalhães. Economia, Instituições e Império*, Coimbra, Almedina, 391-404.
- SOUZA, George Bryan (2010), "Merchants and Commerce in Asia and the Portuguese Empire over the Long 18th Century", *Review of Culture*, 34, 7-19.
- TEIXEIRA, Manuel (1969), *Macau e a sua dioceses, O culto de Maria em Macau*, Macau, Tipografia da Missão do Padroado.
- VALE, António Martins (1997), *Os Portugueses em Macau (1750-1800)*, Lisboa, Instituto Português do Oriente.
- VALE, António Martins (2006), "Macau", in Joel Serrão, A. H. de Oliveira Marques (dirs.), *Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa*, Vol. V, Tomo 2, Lisboa, Estampa, 333-433.



Bly, Antonio T.; Ingerick, Ryan - "Able and willing to bear Arms": Indentured Servants and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 43-62.

## **"Able and willing to bear Arms": Indentured Servants and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia**

ANTONIO T. BLY\*

Peter H. Shattuck Endowed Chair in Colonial American History  
California State University, Sacramento

RYAN INGERICK\*\*

University of Helsinki

### **Abstract**

The subject of indentured servants who were urged to abandon their masters by the Royal Governor, John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, has been overlooked by scholars. Since 1775, his incendiary Proclamation begs a series of questions historians have yet to answer. Why, for instance, did the Governor include servants? What circumstances prompted him to make such an invitation to bound persons? How did the elites in the colony respond? These, and other questions, are the focus of this essay that explores indentured servitude in Virginia during the age of the American Revolution. Besides enslaved African Americans, indentured servants influenced Dunmore's Proclamation that, in turn, encouraged the gentry in Virginia to break with England.

**Keywords:** indentured servant, colonial Virginia, bound labor, servant law.

### **Resumo**

*"Capazes e dispostos a portar armas": servos contratados e o avanço da Revolução Americana na Virgínia*

O assunto dos servos contratados, que foram encorajados a abandonar os seus mestres pelo governador real, John Murray, o Conde de Dunmore, tem sido descurado pelos estudiosos. Desde 1775, a sua Proclamação incendiária despoleta uma série de questões às quais os historiadores ainda precisam de responder. Por exemplo, porque é que o governador incluiu os servos? Que circunstâncias o levaram a fazer tal convite às pessoas vinculadas? Como

\*E-mail: antonio.bly@csus.edu

\*\* E-mail: ryan.ingerick@helsinki.fi

é que as elites da colônia responderam? Essas e outras questões são o foco deste ensaio que explora a servidão contratada na Virgínia durante a era da Revolução Americana. Além de afro-americanos escravizados, os servos contratados influenciaram a Proclamação de Dunmore que, por sua vez, incentivou a nobreza da Virgínia a romper com a Inglaterra.

**Palavras-chave:** servidão contratada, Virgínia colonial, trabalho forçado, lei da servidão.

### Résumé

*«Capable et prêt à porter les armes»: Les serviteurs sous contrat et l'avènement de la Révolution Américaine en Virginie*

Le sujet des serviteurs engagés qui ont été encouragés à abandonner leurs maîtres par le gouverneur royal, John Murray, comte de Dunmore, a été négligé par les universitaires. Depuis 1775, sa Proclamation incendiaire soulève une série de questions auxquelles les historiens doivent encore répondre. Pourquoi, par exemple, le gouverneur a-t-il inclus des serviteurs ? Quelles circonstances l'ont poussé à adresser une telle invitation aux personnes arrêtées ? Comment les élites de la colonie ont-elles réagi ? Ces questions, ainsi que d'autres, sont au centre de cet essai qui explore la servitude sous contrat en Virginie à l'époque de la Révolution Américaine. Outre les Afro-Américains asservis, les serviteurs sous contrat ont influencé la Proclamation de Dunmore qui a encouragé la noblesse de Virginie à rompre avec l'Angleterre.

**Mots-clés:** servitude sous contrat, Virginie coloniale, travail forcé, droit des serviteurs.

## Introduction

On 25 November 1775, the following proclamation, written by John Murray, the Fourth Earl of Dunmore and the Governor of the Royal colony of Virginia, appeared in John Pinkney's *Virginia Gazette*:

"I have ever entertained Hopes that an Accommodation might have taken Place between Great-Britain and this colony, without being compelled by my Duty to this most disagreeable but now absolutely necessary Step, rendered so by a Body of armed Men unlawfully assembled, bring on His Majesty's [Tenders], and the formation of an Army, and that Army now on their March to attack His Majesty's troops and destroy the well-disposed Subjects of this Colony. To defeat such unreasonable Purposes, and that all such Traitors, and their Abettors, may be brought to Justice, and that the Peace, and good Order of this Colony may be again restored, which the ordinary Course of the Civil Law is unable to effect; I have thought fit to issue this my Proclamation, hereby declaring, that until the aforesaid good Purposes can be obtained, I do in Virtue of the Power and Authority to me given, by His Majesty, determine to execute Martial Law, and cause the same to be executed throughout this Colony: and to

the end that Peace and good Order may the sooner be [effected], I do require every Person capable of bearing Arms, to [resort] to His Majesty's standard, or be looked upon as Traitors to His Majesty's Crown and Government, and thereby become liable to the Penalty the Law inflicts upon such Offences; such as forfeiture of Life, confiscation of Lands, &c. &c. And I do hereby further declare all indentured Servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels), free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty's Troops as soon as may be, for the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty, to His Majesty's Leige Subjects, to retain their [Quitrents], or any other Taxes due or that may become due, in their own Custody, till such Time as Peace may be again restored to this at present most unhappy Country, or demanded of them for their former salutary Purposes, by Officers properly authorized to receive the same" (Pinkney, 1775).

If not read in taverns or in the front of most of the courthouses in eighteenth-century Virginia, the Governor's decree was read aloud in or about churchyards. Because like the county court clerks who *published* public documents, churchwardens were responsible for keeping their parishioners informed. Before weekly sermons, they were obligated, as a matter of social custom and law, to read such articles that were printed in the newspaper (Fithian, 1968; Isaac, 1982).

Published less than a year after the infamous Magazine Incident in which the Governor had stoked the fears of the colony's leaders by seizing fifteen half barrels of gunpowder used for the purpose of defending the colony, Dunmore's Proclamation further stirred the passions of many Virginians, especially the grantees of the colony, those who defined their status by having "Money, Negroes and Land enough". By declaring martial law, the Royal Governor usurped their authority and denounced their actions as being those of "Traitors to His Majesty". Despite his best effort to reach a peaceful resolution, he felt compelled to act on behalf of the Crown. For their disobedience, he threatened not only their lives, but also the source of their prosperity. Striking at the heart of their autocracy, the King's man promised to confiscate the rebels' "Lands", as well as offer freedom to their servants and slaves who would elect to side with the King. While not stating it in explicit terms, the Earl's proclamation intimated a radical redistribution of the wealth in the colony. Because as most servants and slaves enjoyed few opportunities to own land, the question of what would be done with those lands taken probably represented an additional incentive to those very persons who had been bounded to the land of their former masters. In this subtle offer of rebel lands to those who would elect to side with the King of England, Lord Dunmore threatened to destroy the rebellion in Virginia before it began in earnest. He also changed the course of Virginia history by transforming those solicited subjects into uncelebrated

founding fathers whose presence forced the power brokers of Virginia to break with Great Britain (Dabney, 1971; Holton, 1999).

Ironically, despite the inflammatory nature of the Governor's proclamation, his solicitation of the public, particularly of indentured servants, has eluded critical attention by historians. Nowhere, for example, in his study of debtors, Native Americans, and enslaved African Americans in Virginia as active historical actors who forced the founding fathers to choose revolution did Woody Holton take into account the plight of thousands of bondservants in the colony. Bound servants whose numbers were thought considerable enough to warrant the Earl's attention are overlooked in his analysis of how ordinary Americans from different walks of life informed the colony's decision to break from England. The same is true of Michael A. McDonnell's study. In his examination of race, class, and conflict in revolutionary Virginia, he does not fully consider indentured servants as significant actors in the social and political events transforming life in the Chesapeake (Holton, 1999; McDonnell, 2010).

Other studies also do not consider bonds people as noteworthy participants in the events that inspired England's largest North American colony to sever its ties with Great Britain. Instead, many have focused on whether or not servitude had been an economically viable system in the development of the New World (Smith, 1947; Galenson, 1981; Bailyn, 1986; Coldham, 1988, 1992; Jordan and Walsh, 2007; Tomlins, 2010; Grubb, 2013). Others have examined the institution within the broader context of the evolution of racial slavery in the Americas (Morgan, 1971; Berlin, 2000; Dressler, 2019). As a result, neglected has been the subject of indentured servants who were also encouraged to enlist in Virginia. To put the matter another way, Dunmore's Proclamation begs a series of questions historians have yet to answer. Why, for instance, did the Governor include servants in his Proclamation? What circumstances would have prompted him to make such an invitation to bound persons? How did the disbanded Virginian forefathers respond? How did indentured servants respond to Dunmore's Proclamation? These questions are the focus of this essay that delves into the context in which the Royal Governor encouraged indentured servants to break with their masters in Virginia during the age of the American Revolution. In addition to black slaves, white servants in the eighteenth-century Chesapeake inspired Lord Dunmore's 1775 Proclamation, an action that forced an otherwise reluctant colony into breaking with Great Britain.

## **1. Life after Bacon**

Contrary to the long-held view that Bacon's Rebellion in 1676 marked the death knell of the institution, indentured servitude thrived in the colony up until the American Revolution. While recent studies of servitude have noted the significance of the institution in the development in the colony, none have observed

the role that the institution played in coaxing Virginia's leaders into breaking with Great Britain. Much in the same way that enslaved African Americans played an important role in Virginia's decision to declare independence, so did indentured servants. While the number of servants in the colony at the time had not been as large as that of slaves, they numbered enough nonetheless to represent a significant threat to the authority of their masters. Surprisingly, while recent scholarship regarding servitude in America all recognize the importance of the institution in America, especially in the South, all neglect a discussion of servants during the turbulent times of the 1760s and 1770s (Morgan, 1971; Smith, 1971; Galenson, 1984; Bailyn, 1986; Coldham, 1988; Fogleman, 1998; Jordan and Walsh, 2007; Tomlins, 2010; Vaver, 2011; Grubb, 2013).

The laws the power brokers of the colony passed, however, tell a different story. Prior to the events that would lead Virginians to dissolve their bonds with Great Britain, servitude remained a viable institution in the Chesapeake, one that mandated periodic maintenance. Ever fearful of another possible rebellion, the most famous being the revolt that occurred in 1676 under Nathaniel Bacon, the leaders in the colony offered indentured servants a number of incentives to remain obedient over the course of the eighteenth-century. Starting in 1705, for example, the House of Burgesses passed legislation that made it illegal for Christian servants to be purchased by Native Americans, mulattoes or persons of African descent. This ban also applied to the dispossessed sons of Abraham. In other words, as a matter of law, neither Jews nor Muslims were allowed to enter into contracts with their Christian counterparts. At the time, the word Christian signified race. Even though this legislation had not been the first law to draw a distinction between blacks and whites, it did nonetheless play an important part in shaping the development of servitude and slavery in the Chesapeake (Hening, 1812; Morgan, 1971; Vaughan, 1995).

Its purpose had been two-fold. First, regulate the indentured population by separating servants from those whose plight resembled their own. Second, the law created another psychological wedge among the poor, landless, working classes in the colony to deter the possibility of a mass rebellion. To reinforce these racial lines, the colony's leaders passed another law that same year (1705) that set definite terms on all indentured contracts. While enslaved African Americans were expected to serve for the term of their natural life and Native Americans could be compelled to work for indefinite periods of time, the terms of Christian servitude in Virginia came to an end after age twenty-four (Hening, 1812).

With this proverbial carrot, however, came a stick. Servants who forged or stole passes to move about more freely were punished if taken up. The penalty for their wrongdoing: two hours in the pillory and a proscribed number of lashes. That same year, the Burgesses also forbade servants for owning watercraft that could potentially facilitate escape, threatening thus their master's authority over their time (Hening, 1813). Many of the grandees in the colony, who judged these

prescriptions as being more than reasonable, came to adopt the view of themselves as benevolent patriarchs. William Byrd II certainly thought of himself in such favorable terms. The lord of Westover, he took pride in this fatherly role: "I have a large family", he boasted to an English autocrat in 1726. "Like one of the Patriarchs, I have my Flocks and my Herds, Bond-men and Bond-women, and every Soart of Trade amongst my own Servants, so that I live in a kind of Independence on everyone but Providence". But "I must take care", he continued, "to keep all my people at their duty, to set all the spring in motion, and to make every one draw his equal share to carry the machine forward". In Byrd's mind, and likewise other grandees in the colony, servants were thought child-like individuals who required parental oversight. To ensure that "the machine" worked according to its design, Byrd and those of his particular distinction passed additional legislation (Byrd, 1726). Such administration, they reasoned, not only protected their economic interest, but also to assuaged their latent fears of bound servants. To be sure, that same year in which William Byrd II wrote to a friend in England, reveling in his own sense of magnanimity, his well-to-do contemporaries passed additional legislation to curtail their bonds people's aspirations for their freedom. Truancy and the act of running away, for instance, were not to be tolerated. With that in mind, they added years to the contracts of servants who had run away, assumed a new name, and who pretended to be free. They also extended the terms of years for those servants who pretended to be a tradesman when they were not. These social measures and others further highlighted the fact that most grandees considered servants chattel—if not in full than most certainly in measurable parts (Hening, 1813).

By the middle of the eighteenth century, they placed more restraints on bondservants to calm their latent fears of landless servants. If their masters, for example, died before they completed the terms of their agreements, bondservants were subject to transfer, as their contracts were deemed a matter transferable to other persons. Not surprisingly, in these precarious settings, servants were not allowed to keep horses, as horses, like watercraft, provided a means of transportation and escape. What is more, unclaimed servants could be, and many were sold at public auction (Hening, 1813).

Masters could be particularly cruel in their oversight over their bondswomen. While both sexes were forbidden from engaging in sexual activities, women bore an additional burden if her unlawful transgression resulted in children. In both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the grandees of the colony struggled to control women's bodies, as pregnancies not only posed a real and symbolic challenge to their authority, but also threatened their economic bottom lines. As a way of deterring women's "saucy" behavior in that particular regard, masters again employed the legal structure of the colony as a tool of intimidation. When discovered with children, for example, pregnant bondswomen's contracts could be extended to include a full additional term of years. If their children survived infancy, they could be taken away from their mothers and become the property of the church



until the child reached the age of twenty-one (Hening, 1811, 1813; Hodges; Brown, 1996; Block, 2006).

Bondswomen who copulated with mulattoes or black slaves probably encouraged the full wrath of their masters for their indiscretions. Besides additional years of service and the loss of their children, bondswomen who transgressed the racial divide had to bear the stigma of sullyng their bodies with persons who were thought less than human. In most instances, they were the subject of gossip. They were also the subject of their masters' distemper. For their pretentious action threatened the fine line that divided slaves and servants and between those who were free, bound or unfree, and slaves. In the minds of most owners, interracial sex disrupted the natural order of the cosmos in which masters imagined themselves as central figures, if not kings or minor lord. In their trespass of the racial etiquette of the day, the actions of these bondswomen further highlighted the fact that slaves and servants outnumbered their masters and that in their numbers lay the seeds of truly turning the world upside down (Hening, 1813).

But, the Burgesses of the colony, cognizant of this threat to their power, were not completely tyrannical in their treatment of servants. Quite the contrary, many voted and passed legislation that registered their awareness that their bond servants were in fact fellow Christians and countrymen. In 1748, for example, they decreed that "if any person shall... whip a Christian white servant naked", the offending person shall pay a fine of "fifty shillings current money, to the party injured... [and] within six months after such whipping". Unlike servants and slaves of African or Native American descent, bonds men and women of European stock did not have to suffer the indignity of being beaten naked. Instead, the planter class in the colony extended to their bonds people a modicum of modesty (Hening, 1811).

Their generosity with servants did not end there. In 1753, they revisited the subject of who could purchase white labor. Like before, they declared that "no negroe, mulattoe, or Indian, altho' a christian, or any Jew, Moor, Mahometan, or other infidel, shall at any time purchase any christian servant, nor any other except of their own complexion". Much like the legislation they enacted in 1705, the grantees of the colony judged themselves good stewards of the bonds people. By reinforcing the real and imagined divide between servants and slaves along racial lines, they offered their bondspeople a symbolic laurel in which they could identify themselves as being better off than those persons who were neither Christian nor white (Hening, 1817). In Orlando Patterson's comparative study of slavery over time and space, such overtures to servants represented a part of an artfully constructed system of control in which Virginian planters downplayed the fact that servants were at once socially dead and "naturally alienated". Even the *better* Sort... would chuse to be *Slaves*", one eighteenth-century observer noted in more explicit terms in 1741, "provided they might exercise an *Arbitrary* and *Tyrannical* Rule over all *below them!*" (Patterson, 1982; Anonymous Author, COMMON SENSE, 1741, 1).

Despite their best efforts to convince their bondservants that they were well treated, many servants did not agree as many were compelled to surrender, even if for a select period of time, their freedom. Over the course of the eighteenth-century, many protested the terms of their servitude by running away. Before the American Revolution, over one thousand absconded (See Appendix A). Fugitive advertisements not only document the discontentment of servants, but also the disgust of their masters with the rebellious actions of their fictive family members (Patterson, 1982). Not long after their servants challenged their masters' authority by running away, masters in Virginia turned to the newspaper in an effort to reclaim their *stolen* property. Overwhelmingly, a close reading of those notices reveal a complex story in which masters fought with their unruly servants. Most, for example, had advertisements placed for their people within a matter of days after their servants had absconded. Few were those instances in which they gave their bonds men and women time to return of their own volition. Unlike fugitive slaves who were given longer periods of time before they became the subject of a newspaper advertisement, many masters believed that their servants had a better chance than their black or mulatto counterparts in *passing* themselves off as *free* persons (See Appendix B).

Denied their freedom and rendered persons unfree, many servants probably did not think much of their master's overtures of *concern*. In the minds of many of them, for example, the law passed in 1748 that forbade the whipping of white servants naked did more harm than good. What the grandees thought an act of benevolence actually encouraged sickness and dangerous infections. For in an era in which bathing had not yet been a common practice, the Burgesses' generosity with respect to correcting servants served only to exacerbate their suffering. Indeed, as Jack Larkin's study of early America has demonstrated, dirt, disease, and pestilence were the hallmarks of American life prior to the 1840s (Larkin, 2010). For many servant's cleanliness and hygiene were not commonplace. Clothes were infrequently washed and proved a double edge sword when the lash had to be applied. In other words, while allowing servants the dignity of wearing their garment during the administration of the law, the shirt, coarse and soaked in sweat and dirt, made the business of receiving lashes dangerous, if not perilous to a servant's well-being. Between the filth of their bodies and that of their clothes, a whipping more than likely opened wounds and those wounds were only made worse by the dirty material beaten into their flesh. Consequently, masters' efforts to treat servants mildly better could and did in some instances resulted in infections that could potentially prove deadly (Hening, 1817).

## 2. Latent fears

The volume of the servile population in Virginia probably explained the uneven nature of the legal proscriptions enacted by the colony's power brokers. It might also explain the language the Earl adopted in his proclamation. While historians are divided on the subject of how many servants there were in the colony, one thing is certain. The numbers of servants in the colony were numerous enough to be thought a threat. Dunmore certainly thought so. Less than 200,000 people of European descent resided in Virginia at the advent of the eighteenth-century. A generation later, that figure had nearly doubled. That trend continued in the years leading up to the American Revolution (Fogleman, 1999).

According to Galenson's study of indentured servitude in America, for instance, the Chesapeake had been the most important destination for many of the servants transported to the mainland of British North America. While extant records suggest that the number of servants transported to the West Indies shifted from Barbados to Nevis to Jamaica, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Chesapeake remained a central destination for servants. Despite fluctuating tobacco prices and the emergence of racial slavery, Virginia continued to attract large numbers of bondservants. Between the 1650s and the 1770s, English servants entered into contracts wherein they agreed to work in the colony for a proscribed number of years in exchange for the cost of transportation and the promise of a parcel of land or freedom dues, and, of course, clothes, food, and shelter. Before the Revolution, a significant number appeared in the archival records that document the importation of servants into the New World. Before 1760, for example, forty-two percent of those servants who were transported to British America were brought to the Chesapeake. By the 1770s, that figure almost doubled. Compared to the colonies in the West Indies, Pennsylvania, and New England, Virginia and Maryland represented significant hubs for bondspople. According to Galenson's estimates, between one-half and two-thirds of the white immigrants to the British colonies before the American Revolution were servants (Galenson, 1984; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1976).

Aaron Fogleman's recent study offers a more conservative assessment of the number of servants in America. While Fogleman's estimates are not as high, his study does underscore the strong presence of servants in Virginia during the years leading up to Dunmore's Proclamation. Prior to the American Revolution, servitude represented an important aspect of life in the Chesapeake. In his study of slavery and servitude during the age of the American Revolution, Fogleman revealed that, before Independence, slaves and indentured servants accounted for "three-fourths" of the population in colonial America. By his estimates, bondservants represented approximately twenty percent of the people in the colonies. In this context, reasonable figures for servants can be discerned for the population

in the His Majesty's Royal colony (Fogleman, 1999). In 1700, for example, there were approximately 8,500 servants in Virginia. By the 1730s, that number grew by fifty percent. By mid-century, Virginia had a total white population of almost 130,000 of which 26,000 were bound or unfree. A small number were convicts and felons who were forced to immigrate to the colony. Most, however, were English servants who had entered into contracts with planters for a term of years. On the eve of the American Revolution, there were 259,500 white Virginians in the colony. Approximately 52,000 were bound persons of European descent. These figures help to explain the incendiary nature of Dunmore's Proclamation that called servants to bear arms against the revolting Gentry class. Servants clearly represented an important, if not significant group in the tobacco colony (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1976).

Michael Walsh and Donald Jordan's study of indentured servants in colonial America highlights further the threat servants posed to the colony's grandees who were sympathetic to the patriotic cause. Instead of twenty percent of the population, their work suggests that the number of bound persons in the colony were a full quarter. Rather than 8,500 servants residing in Virginia in 1700s, Walsh and Jordan's study estimates there were more than 10,500 indentured servants in the colony at the time. By the 1730s, that number had grown to 21,000. By the time of Dunmore's Proclamation, Virginia had a servile population of 65,000 (Jordan and Walsh, 2007; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1976).

While it is impossible to know for certain, given extant records, what their actual numbers were in the colony at the time the Royal Governor issued his Proclamation, one thing is clear. Like enslaved African Americans, indentured servants were thought a dangerous group by the elites of Virginia. In his solicitation of them, the Earl documented their fears. He also documented his understanding of the social dynamics of the colony. Servants, he noted, represented a useful means through which to control those Virginians who were fanning the embers of revolt. In his implicitly articulated offer of land, Dunmore, in one stroke, transformed the colony in the minds of many indentured servants into the New Canaan they had been promised. Unwittingly, in that promise to redistribute the wealth of Virginia and to free the colony's property in persons, the Governor inspired men like George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and other prominent Virginians to split with Great Britain.

Both alarmed and incensed, the colony's House of Burgesses responded in typical fashion. They enacted legislation. "The earl of Dunmore", the disbanded assembly announced that December, "by his many hostile attacks upon the good people of this colony, and attempts to infringe their rights and liberties, by his proclamation declaring freedom to our servants and slaves, and arming them against us, by seizing our persons and properties" has made it necessary to organize military units to protect and defend the colony. For that cause, they declared that six

additional regiments would be raised. Registering their latent fears of servants, fears almost one hundred years old, fears still simmering from Bacon's Rebellion, they elected to discount the enlistment of servants. "That no recruiting officer shall be allowed to enlist into the service", they explained, "any servant whatsoever, except apprentices bound under the laws of this colony, nor any such apprentices unless the consent of his master be first had in writing; neither any man unless he be five feet four inches high, healthy, strong made, and well limbed, not deaf, or subject to fits" (Hening, 1819).

Their decision in this regard can be read in several ways. First, their decision recorded their long-standing distrust of individuals who did not own any property but were in fact property themselves. Like Thomas Jefferson, who characterized servants and other poor white people who owned no land as "rubbish", most of the grandees in the colony came to regard servants as precarious subjects at best who required direction, or at worse, troublesome, wayward types whose numbers defied their authority. Secondly, their decision captured their deep-seated belief that servants were unredeemable people. Unlike Jefferson who articulated a plan to convert some of their numbers in his *Notes on the State of Virginia*, the Burgesses' decision reflects old fears that can be traced back to Bacon's Rebellion. Thirdly, their refusal to enlist servants disclosed their understanding of the paradoxical nature of the revolutionary rhetoric they opted to adopt. Simply put, the Gentry of the colony could not have been completely ignorant of the fact that the very language of their grand oratory, sermons, and treatises, both private and public flourishes that routinely characterized the well-to-do as slaves to the King, created something of a problem between themselves and the servant class. That is to say, to offer to servants the opportunity to join their ranks more than likely would have fallen on deaf ears because servants understood and in truly intimate ways that joining their masters would not transform appreciably their lives or their former status (Jefferson, 1785: 156; Morgan, 1971; Hening, 1819; Isenberg, 2016).

The Burgesses' reasoning notwithstanding, William Scott agreed with the measures to keep servants from enlisting. When his "convict servant man named CHARLES SHERRY" disappeared, the Prince William County resident made it a point to remind the public at large that he desired "that no recruiting officer may enlist" his bondsman". Considering the politics of the day, Scott had been more than aware of the threat servants posed to the patriotic cause. His protestation against using servants, however, might have been premature. Two years after Dunmore issued his inflammatory proclamation, the colony struggled to raise soldiers (Purdie, 28 February 1777).

Confronted with the prospect of not being able to protect their interest, the colony's power brokers responded again in typical fashion. Because "many counties in this commonwealth, from various causes" have "failed to furnish their quota of men as directed by an act of assemble", the disbanded Burgesses declared that each resident must serve. Those who refused were subject to a fine of

“two hundred pounds”. Interestingly, the grandees did not consider servants to meet their manpower needs. Ever steadfast in their distrust, they elected not solicit bound persons. In many of their minds, the prospect of soliciting servants probably came at too high of a price: freedom or land or the possibility of both. Neither of these options seemed viable for the well-to-do as they represented those persons who held a monopoly on both. Not until 1777, would the founding fathers of the colony change their minds about enlisting servants. Even so, in their minds, all servants were not thought equal. Only hired “servants” and “apprentices” could be recruited (Hening, 1821).

### 3. Answering the call

Whatever their reasons might have been for not soliciting servants, masters’ fears were not misplaced. Not long after Dunmore issued his Proclamation, servants elected to leave their masters. Not even a week had passed when an unnamed “white servant” who belonged to Andrew Leitch left his master to make his way to the Earl. In addition to documenting the burgeoning problem of servants in the colony, the fugitive advertisement that appeared in the newspaper captured the full scope of the Earl’s solicitation. For when the bondservant left his master, he did not leave alone. According to the notice printed in Pinkney’s *Virginia Gazette*, he ran away in the company of a “negro man named CHARLES”. As a matter of fact, it appears that the “sensible fellow” might have persuaded the servant to join him as he made his way to the Dunmore. As his master, Robert Brent, told it, Charles had been “remarkably indulged, indeed, too much so”. Prior to the publication of Dunmore’s Proclamation in the *Virginia Gazette*, the runaway had been aware of the document’s content before it had been set in print. Because he could “read and write”, it is possible that he might have come across it in manuscript form. Because he served his master as a domestic, it is also possible that he became aware of the document as he waited on his master whose parlor talk include news about Dunmore. Either way, when Charles left his master, he shared the news about the revolution coming to Virginia. Among those who decided to join him in answering the Governor’s call: Leitch’s man (Dunmore, 1775; Pinkney, 16 November 1775).

After almost a year after Dunmore’s proclamation, a month after the colonies declared their independence from England, more servants in Virginia continued to answer the British call for liberty. In August, Andrew Kelly, “an Irish servant man . . . by trade a brick maker” left his master in Alexandria. To the best of James Parsons’ recollection, the “very talkative” man had a plan. Despite his fondness for liquor, he believed his bondsman “may offer to enlist in the land or sea service or attempt again to go to the British troops”. Evidently, Kelly found little in the way of merit in the colonial declarations that they were, in fact, slaves to the king of England and that they were therefore justified in severing the bonds of imperial tyranny.

(Incidentally, Kelly had been unsuccessful in his endeavor to join Dunmore's ranks. Several days after he absconded, Alexander Purdie printed a notice in his *Virginia Gazette* that informed the public that Kelly had been taken into custody and was ready to be delivered to" his master (Purdie, 20 September 1776).

As more time elapsed, additional servants answered the Earl's call to arms. "BAKER FULLAM", for example, ran away from his master, one Thomas Blackburn of Prince William County. Before leaving to "offer his services to lord Dunmore", the domestic robbed the family's tutor for additional articles of clothes. Reportedly, Fullam found refuge among "some of the free mulattoes or negroes" in the county. Like Leitch's unnamed man, the "well set fellow, about 27 years old" probably thought Dunmore's Proclamation offered him perhaps his best chance to acquire his freedom. Similarly, when Isaac Zane turned to the *Virginia Gazette* for help in securing his "two English convict servant men" and a "country born negro", he believed that the rebellious party were making their way for the British side (Appendix C). Besides enumerating their ages and their physical descriptions for the public, the owner of the Marlboro Iron Works recalled that at least one of the absconded groups expressed contrary thoughts regarding the political crisis of the day. Charles White, he noted, "by trade a stocking weaver, born in Rutlandshire", remained loyal to the crown. He has been heard, Zane continued, "to say soe atrocious things in respect to the dispute between Great Britain and the colonies" (Dixon and Hunter, 29 June 1776).

In addition to Charles White, fugitive notices reveal perhaps most fully servant's willingness to bear arms for their King. Between 1736 and 1789, over one thousand servants left their masters. More servants probably left, considering the non-extant issues of the *Virginia Gazettes* printed in the colony. In the first three years of the paper's publication, 133 absconded, twice as many as those reported in the following decade. The 1750s marked the beginning of a significant rise in fugitives. Compared to the previous decade, the number of servants who left their masters increased 32 percent. Not surprisingly, during the burgeoning crisis between the colonies and Great Britain, that figure increased exponentially. In the following decade, 557 servants were reported as having disappeared. Caught between the First Great Awakening and the American Revolution, servants seized upon the social and political instability of the day and declared themselves free (See Appendix A).

Incidentally, most of their declarations of independence were not declarations against the crown or members of Parliament. To be sure, neither held them in bondage. Rather, their declarations were against the tyranny of their Virginian masters, the property laden Burgesses, the esteemed members of Committees of Correspondence, many of whom proudly declared themselves no longer tethered to Great Britain, many of whom were blind to the plight of their servants. Between 1765 and 1775, numerous instances of servants' flight appeared in the colony's newspapers, revealing additional details of their complex story in which they too

demanded their natural rights. Thomas Spears and William Webster, for instance, “two servant men”, ran away from George Washington a few months after he had been unanimously elected commander in chief of the Continental army. Surely, Dunmore’s Proclamation gave grandees like Washington a reason to be concerned. Along with the Magazine Incident months before, the Royal Governor’s declaration of martial law in Virginia signaled a dangerous call to action that promised to undo the class structure in the colony (Pinkney, 4 May 1775).

#### 4. Forced Founders

Like Bacon’s Rebellion, Dunmore’s Proclamation threatened to turn upside down the orderly cosmos that the planter class enjoyed in Virginia since the beginning of the colony. Prior to its publication, they responded to the developing crisis between Great Britain and its North America subjects in largely moderate terms. Instead of allowing themselves to get caught up in bellicose language of the day in which republican ideas were connected with the problematic notions of freedom, tyranny, and slavery, Virginians watched as things heated up in the North cautiously. While New Englanders passionately declared themselves as slaves of the King, most Virginians responded in a more reserved manner. A radical alteration of their blissful way of life had been the furthest thing from their minds (Bailyn, 1967; Maier, 1972; Wood, 1991).

Their restraint is perhaps best captured in their responses to the violent events that would ultimately lead up to the ‘Shot Heard Around the World’. In 1773, as that often recounted story goes, New Englanders protested the Tea Act by disguising themselves as Native Americans and in the dead of night, boarding His Majesty ships, the *Beaver*, *Dartmouth*, and *Eleanor*, anchored in the Boston Harbor, and throwing more than hundred chests of the King’s tea overboard. The Crown retaliated by passing the Boston Port Act that ultimately closed off the harbour of Boston to all imported goods. When the news of the King’s wrath had reached Virginia, the leaders there meet to discuss how to respond. On the evening May 23, 1774, they decided to stand with their compatriots in Massachusetts. To that end, they adopted a measure in which they would observe a day fasting, prayer, and humiliation. Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and other grandees in colony believed that their moderate response to the Crown’s clampdown on their New England counterparts a bold act (Dabney, 1971; Maier, 1972).

Dunmore agreed. Less than a week had passed before he dissolved the House of Burgesses in Virginia. In his view, the grandees had crossed the line. Their observance served only to challenge the authority of the King and Parliament. As their representative, he had little choice in the matter, but to respond. While the Burgesses disagreed with the Governor, they were not prepared to sever their relationship with Great British. Instead, George Washington and others decided that



best of course of action, at least at that moment, would be for them to go to church and fast all day. Hoping for an equitable resolution between the two parties, they went to church. They fasted all day (Dabney, 1971).

Almost a year would pass before the patience of those who once governed the colony would be tested again. By mid-April 1775, British authorities attempted to suppress the emerging rebellion in the colonies by seizing the rebel's capacity to resist. Accordingly, the word had been sent out to the King's men, capture their stockpiles and silence their ability to rebel. On the night of April 18, several hundred Regulars based in Boston crossed the Charles River to Cambridge and began their march to Concord. At the North Bridge, the Minutemen confronted the Regulars and so began the American Revolution in New England (Maier, 1992; Gross, 1976).

Three days later, some 600 miles to the south of Boston, Regulars aboard H.M.S. Magdalen, quietly made their way into Williamsburg, the capital of Virginia, and stole away with 15 half-barrels of gunpowder. By the time the rebels in the colony knew what had happened, the Redcoats were gone. In the days that followed, Virginians organized militia units and threatened to march on Williamsburg. They were angry because the Governor had successfully secured their property without any resistance. They were also angry because the Magazine incident made them feel defenseless. Before marching to the Governor's Palace, however, they sent word to the King's representative. Return the gunpowder or face the consequences. Negotiations ensued. Calmer heads prevailed. At the end of the Magazine Incident of 1775, no shots were fired. No lives were lost. Instead, reasonable men reached a sensible conclusion. If the King wanted to keep the powder, the former Burgesses had reasoned, he may have it, but only if he agreed to pay for it. In both of these decisions, the power brokers in Virginia put off for another day the American Revolution (Dabney, 1971; Holton, 1999).

Their willingness to moderate the contagion of liberty that seemed to be sweeping over certain parts of the North American colonies ended on November 7, 1775. On that day, the Governor declared that the colony's leaders were in a state of rebellion. On that day, the Earl reaffirmed his position as the King's man. On that day, he established martial law in Virginia. On that day, indentured servants became another group of forced founders, who alongside enslaved African Americans and other willing persons, pushed the leaders of the colony of Virginia into the American Revolution.

## Works Cited

### Primary Sources

Anonymous Author (1741), "COMMON SENSE: The first Principles of Religion necessary to the Preservation of Liberty", *Pennsylvania Gazette*.

- BYRD, William II (1726), "William Byrd to the Earl of Orrery July 5, 1726", *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol 32, p. 27.
- DIXON, John & William Hunter (June 29, 1776), *The Virginia Gazette*, Williamsburg, Va.
- FITHIAN, Phillip Vickers (1968), *Journal and Letters 1767-1784*, Charlottesville, Va, University Press of Virginia.
- HENING, William Waller (1811-1821), *Hening's Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619*, Richmond, Philadelphia, and New York.
- JEFFERSON, Thomas (1785), *Notes on the State of Virginia*, Philadelphia, Pritchard and Hall.
- Library of Congress, Eighteenth-Century American Newspapers in the Library of Congress in Microfilm.
- MURRAY, John, Earl of Dunmore (1775), *Proclamation of November 7, 1775*.
- PINKNEY, John (November 10-23, 1775), *The Virginia Gazette*. Williamsburg, Va.
- PURDIE, Alexander (September 20-27, 1776 & February 28, 1777), *The Virginia Gazette*. Williamsburg, Va.
- Readex: America's Historical Newspapers Database.

## Secondary Sources

- BAILYN, Bernard (1967), *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, Boston, Mass, Harvard University Press.
- BAILYN, Bernard (1986), *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution*, New York, Alfred Knopf, Inc.
- BERLIN, Ira (2000), *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America*, Boston, Ma, Harvard University Press.
- BERLIN, Ira (2004), *Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves*, Boston, Ma, Belknap Press.
- BLOCK, Sharon (2006), *Rape and Sexual Power in Early America*, Chapel Hill, UNC Press.
- BLY, Antonio T. (2013), *Escaping Bondage: A Documentary History of Runaway Slaves in Eighteenth-Century New England, 1700–1789*, Maryland, Lexington Books.
- BLY, Antonio T., HAYGOOD, Tamia (2015), *Escaping Servitude: A Documentary History of Runaway Indentured Servants in 18th Century Virginia*, Maryland, Lexington.
- BROWN, Kathleen (1996), *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs; Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia*, Chapel Hill, UNC Press.
- COLDHAM, Peter Wilson (1988), *Emigrants from England to the American Colonies, 1773-1776*, Baltimore, MD, Genealogical Pub Co.
- COLDHAM, Peter Wilson (1988), *Emigrants in Chains: A Social History of Forced Emigration to the Americas of Felons, Destitute Children, Political and Religious Non-Conformists, Vagabonds, Beggars and Other Undesirables, 1607–1776*, Baltimore, MD, Genealogical Pub Co.
- DABNY, Virginius (1971), *Virginia the New Dominion: A History, 1607 – Present*, Charlottesville, Va., University Press of Virginia.
- DRESSLER, Nicole (2019), "Enemies to Mankind": Convict Servitude, Authority, and Humanitarianism in the British Atlantic World", *Early American Studies*, 17(3), 343-376.
- FOGLEMAN, Aaron (1998), "From Slaves, Convicts, and Servants to Free Passengers: The Transformation of Immigration in the Era of the American Revolution", *Journal of American History*, 85(1), 43-76.
- GALENSON, David (1984), *White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis*, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
- GROSS, Robert (1976), *Minutemen and Their World*, New York, Hill and Wang.

- GRUBB, Farley (2013), *German Immigration and Servitude in America, 1709-1920*, New York, Routledge.
- HODGES, Graham Russell, BROWN, Alan Edward (1996), *'Pretends to Be Free': Runaway Slave Advertisements from Colonial and Revolutionary New York and New Jersey*, New York, Fordham University.
- HOLTON, Woody (1999), *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- ISAAC, Rhys (1982), *Transformations of Virginia*, Chapel Hill, UNC Press.
- ISENBERG, Nancy (2016), *White Trash: The 400 Year Untold Story of Class in America*, New York, Viking.
- JORDAN, Don, WALSH, Michael (2007), *White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America*, New York, New York University Press.
- LARKIN, Jack (2010), *The Reshaping of Everyday Life: 1790-1840*, New York, Harper Collins Publishing.
- MAIER, Pauline (1992), *From Rebellion to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776*, New York, W.W. Norton and Company.
- MCDONNELL, Michael A., HOLTON, Woody (August 2000), "Patriot vs. Patriot: Social Conflict in Virginia and the Origins of the American Revolution", *Journal of American Studies*, 34(2), 231-256.
- MCDONNELL, Michael A. (2010), *The Politics of War, Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- MORGAN, Edmund (1975), *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company.
- PATTERSON, Orlando (1982), *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- SMITH, Abbot Emerson (1947), *Colonists in Bondage: White Servitude and Convict Labor in Colonial America, 1607-1776*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- SMITH, Billy G., WOJTOWICZ, Richard (1989), *Blacks Who Stole Themselves: Advertisement for Runaways in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728-1790*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- TOMLINS, Christopher (2010), *Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civil Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865*, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
- United States Bureau of the Census (1976), *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, New York.
- VAUGHAN, Alden T. (1995), *Roots of American Racism: Essays on the Colonial American Experience*, Oxford, England, Oxford University Press.
- VAVER, Anthony (2011), *Bound with an Iron Chain: The Untold Story of How the British Transported 50,000 Convicts to Colonial America*, Westborough, MA, Pickpocket Publishing.
- WINDLEY, Lathan A. (1983), *Runaway Slave Advertisements: A Documentary History*, New York, Greenwood Press.
- WOOD, Gordon S. (1991), *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, New York, New York, Vintage Books.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix A

Runaway Servants in Colonial Virginia Measured over Time in Extant Copies of the *Virginia Gazettes*.

Periods	Number of Servants Absconded
1730s	133
1740s	67
1750s	98
1760s	168
1770s	557
1780s	43

Source: Readex: America's Historical Newspapers Database; and Eighteenth-Century American Newspapers in the Library of Congress in Microfilm. BLY, Antonio T., HAYGOOD, Tamia (2012), *Escaping Servitude: A Documentary History of Runaway Servants in Eighteenth-Century Virginia*, Maryland, Lexington Books, 352.

## Appendix B

Intervals between when servants and slaves absconded and when masters placed advertisements for fugitive in extant newspapers in Virginia (Measure by Percentages)

Periods	Less than 1-month	one month	two months	3-5 months	6-12 months	n/a months
Servants						
1730s	73%	4.5%	3%	4.5%	1.5%	14%
1740s	50%	21%	7%	6%	3%	13%
1750s	64%	6%	1%	2%	0%	27%
1760s	66%	4%	3%	5%	2%	20%
1770s	53%	2%	5.5%	3%	1%	35.5%
Slaves						
1730s	54%	25%	9%	6%	3%	3%
1740s	22%	26%	11%	7%	15%	19%
1750s	43%	26%	4%	6%	13%	4%
1760s	23%	20%	11%	14%	8%	20%
1770s	26%	22%	10%	16%	8%	16%

Source: (Servants) BLY, Antonio T., HAYGOOD, Tamia (2015), *Escaping Servitude: A Documentary History of Runaway Indentured Servants in 18th Century Virginia*, Maryland, Lexington, 352. (Slaves) WINDLEY, Lathan A. (1983), *Runaway Slave Advertisements: A Documentary History*, 4 vols., New York, Greenwood Press; SMITH, Billy G., WOJTOWICZ, Richard (1989), *Blacks Who Stole Themselves: Advertisement for Runaways in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728–1790*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press; HODGES, Graham Russell, BROWN, Alan Edward (1996), *'Pretends to Be Free': Runaway Slave Advertisements from Colonial and Revolutionary New York and New Jersey*, New York, Fordham University; BLY, Antonio T. (2013), *Escaping Bondage: A Documentary History of Runaway Slaves in Eighteenth-Century New England, 1700–1789*, Maryland, Lexington; Readex: America's Historical Newspapers Database; and Eighteenth-Century American Newspapers in the Library of Congress in Microfilm.

## Appendix C

## Respondents to Lord Dunmore's Proclamation

**SIXTEEN DOLLARS REWARD.**

*FREDERICK COUNTY (Virginia) November 10, 1775.*

**R**AN away last night, from Marlborough iron works, two English convict servant men, imported last summer, and a country born negro, viz. Charles White, by trade a stocking weaver, born in Rutlandshire, about 28 years of age, 5 feet 10 inches high, slim made, short dark brown hair, pug nose, high cheek bones, fallow countenance, having had the flux lately, and his hands broke out in bites; had on, or took with him, a small felt hat, an old black cloth coat, old brown cloth breeches, mottled worsted stockings, tow shirt and trowsers, and new shoes, with carved metal buckles. James Leighton, born in Cambridgeshire, about 20 years of age, 5 feet 8 or 9 inches high, strong and clumsy made, swarthy complexion, full face, thick lip, grey eyes, and straight hair; had on a small felt hat, brown cloth jacket, with sleeves, tow shirt and trowsers, and good shoes, tied with strings. Negro man named Will, about 20 years of age, 5 feet 9 or 10 inches high, slim made, large eyes, and shows the whites of them much; had on an old cloth coat, tow shirt, old oznabrig trowsers, good shoes, tied with strings, and had about his neck an iron collar, with the horns cut off, being a notorious runaway, and much given to drinking. It is probable they may change their dress, as they are supposed to have stolen the following articles, viz. a dark brown cloth coat, with plated buttons, an old ash coloured duroy coat, black velvet jacket, with leather pockets, a new ash coloured cloth jacket, with high topped horn buttons, a pair of light coloured Germantown stockings, a pair of white cotton ditto, a fine shirt, two fine shirts, and a check apron. White has been heard to say some atrocious things in respect to the dispute between Great Britain and the colonies, from which it is suspected they may part, and some of them make to sea ports. Whoever secures the said servants, so that I get them again, shall receive eight dollars for each of the white servants, and what the law allows for the negro. **ISAAC ZANE.**

This notice appeared in Pinkney's *Virginia Gazette* on November 23, 1775. In this advertisement, Isaac Zane reported that three fugitive servants had absconded on November 10, 1775, three days after Dunmore's Proclamation appeared in print. This notice captures fully the social implications of the Royal Governor's solicitation of "all indentured Servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels), free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty's Troops".

## **"Very Dull & No Business Doing": A Reassessment of the American Sandalwood Trade between Hawaii and China, 1790-1832**

ERIC OAKLEY\*  
Kennesaw State University

### **Abstract**

This article is a critical reassessment of American trade in sandalwood between Hawaii and China from 1790-1832. It makes three contributions to the historiography of early commerce in the Pacific. First, it argues that American navigators did experiments with sandalwood throughout the 1790s. Second, it presents a price history that corroborates the influence of geopolitics upon the development of the sandalwood trade. Third, it demonstrates that a combination of deforestation, competition, and market saturation contributed to the decline of the trade in the 1820s.

**Keywords:** sandalwood, maritime, american, Hawaii, China trade.

### **Resumo**

*"Muito aborrecido e um negócio que nunca deveria ter sido feito": uma reavaliação do comércio americano de sândalo entre o Havai e a China, 1790-1832*

Este artigo é uma reavaliação crítica do comércio americano de sândalo entre o Havai e a China entre 1790 e 1832. Faz três contribuições para a historiografia do comércio inicial no Pacífico. Primeiro, argumenta que os navegadores americanos fizeram experiências com o sândalo ao longo da década de 1790. Segundo, apresenta um histórico de preços que corrobora a influência da geopolítica no desenvolvimento do comércio de sândalo. Terceiro, demonstra que uma combinação de desflorestação, competição e saturação do mercado contribuiu para o declínio do comércio na década de 1820.

**Palavras-chave:** sândalo, marítimo, americano, Havai, comércio da China.

\* E-mail: eric.oakley@kennesaw.edu

### Résumé

*«Très ennuyeux & sans affaires à faire»: une réévaluation du commerce américain de bois de santal entre Hawaï et la Chine, 1790-1832*

Cet article est une réévaluation critique du commerce américain de bois de santal entre Hawaï et la Chine entre 1790 et 1832. Il apporte trois contributions à l'historiographie des premiers échanges commerciaux dans le Pacifique. Tout d'abord, il soutient que les navigateurs américains ont expérimenté le bois de santal tout au long des années 1790. Ensuite, il présente une histoire des prix qui corrobore l'influence de la géopolitique dans le développement du commerce du bois de santal. Pour finir, il prouve qu'une combinaison de déforestation, de concurrence et de saturation du marché a contribué au déclin de ce commerce dans les années 1820.

**Keywords:** bois de santal, maritime, américains, Hawaï, commerce de la Chine.

### Introduction

In May 1823, Charles Hammatt, commercial agent for the Bostonian firm of Bryant & Sturgis, disembarked at Honolulu. The Hawaiian Islands were beautiful, no doubt, but other considerations weighed on his mind. William Heath Davis, a legendary sandalwood trader, had died. Moreover, the sandalwood trade itself seemed to have imploded over the previous eighteen months. In July, after a fruitless struggle to recover debts and revive the sandalwood trade, Hammatt remarked that Honolulu "is very dull & no business doing." He resolved "to send the ship on a cruise around the islands, with the possibility of collecting some wood" but confided that "my expectations are not great." In August, when the vessel returned to Honolulu, he concluded that "the Ship has done much as I expected, tho' that is very little" (Hammatt, 1999: 6-7, 20-21).

The American sandalwood trade began as an outgrowth of the more extensive transpacific fur trade between Northwestern America and China. Companions of Captain Cook first discovered that otter skins "which did not cost the purchaser six-pence sterling sold in China for 100 dollars," an astronomical profit margin (Ledyard, 1783: 69-70). British captains pioneered the maritime fur trade in the 1780s, often punctuating the long voyage with a replenishment stop in the Hawaiian Islands. In 1788, *Columbia and Lady Washington*, Bostonian fur-trading ships, became the first American vessels to cruise the Pacific. From the beginning, Americans looked for other branches of commerce to offset the unpredictable market in furs. Hawaiian sandalwood was the first such opportunity.

Sandalwood, genus *Santalum*, is an aromatic hardwood native to the tropics. One of the most valuable commercial tree species, sandalwood contains the compound santalol ( $C_{15}H_{24}O$ ) which emits a "sweet, fragrant, persistent aroma"



(Subasinghe, 2013: 1). Four species, out of sixteen worldwide, are endemic to the Hawaiian Islands. Sandalwood (*'iliali*) was traditionally used as ritual firewood, as well as in the making of medicines, perfume, and musical instruments. In China, sandalwood (tanxiang, 檀香) was used in the manufacture of drugs, cosmetics, incense, furniture, and funeral pyres (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 50). Sometime around 1790, American navigators began an experimental trade in sandalwood between producers in Hawaii and consumers in China.

The sandalwood trade suffered from a paradoxical fate—becoming commercially viable, only to collapse a few years later. How did this happen? The historiography of the Pacific sandalwood trade is thin. The sole monograph concerning this fascinating subject is Dorothy Shineberg's *They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of the Sandalwood Trade in the South Pacific, 1830-1865* (1967). Nonetheless, Shineberg concentrates upon later developments in Melanesia rather than upon the Hawaiian origins of the business. "The Sandalwood Trade of Early Hawaii" offers a retrospective view of the sandalwood trade, albeit in a journalistic form suitable for *Thrum's Hawaiian Almanac* (1904). More recently, scientists and historians published a collection of articles as the *Proceedings of the Symposium on Sandalwood in the Pacific* (1990). Sandalwood also assumed a central place in Paul Fontenoy's short article "Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum of the China Trade" (1997). James Gibson gave a shorter treatment of its significance as an outgrowth of the maritime fur trade in *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods* (1992). James Fichter's *So Great a Proffit* (2010) situated the sandalwood trade among various U.S. industries that undermined the commercial muscle of the British East India Company. Despite occasional appearances in the historiography of the Pacific World, however, no full treatment of the American trade in Hawaiian sandalwood exists.

This essay offers a critical reassessment of the American sandalwood trade, and it makes three contributions to the commercial historiography of the Pacific World. First, I contend that consistent experimentation with sandalwood began a decade earlier than is commonly recognized. In contrast to writers who deemed the origins of the trade to be "unknown," documentary evidence suggests that American captains tested the commodity throughout the 1790s (Thrum, 1904: 48). Second, I present the first price history for sandalwood imports at Canton, in China. Quantitative analysis enables us to corroborate or discern the impact of geopolitical events (embargos, piracy, and conflicts) upon the development of a reliable, profitable trade. Third, I argue that the collapse of the sandalwood trade from 1822-32 resulted from more than a glut of "inferior" produce on the market. In fact, the decline of sandalwood must be attributed to a constellation of factors including deforestation, competition, and market saturation. These conclusions contribute to our understanding of sandalwood as a business that helped to bridge the U.S. transition from the maritime fur trade to more permanent models of shipping

in the Pacific. I emphasize that the conclusions in this article are tentative, and that further research on the subject is warranted.

## 1. Revisiting the early sandalwood trade

The documentary record strongly indicates that the sandalwood trade began around 1790. Joseph Felgelson, a forester, incorrectly claimed that "Sandalwood has been of historical importance since it was first exported in 1778" (Felgelson, 1990: 42). There is no evidence, however, that Cook's companions collected Hawaiian sandalwood or recognized its commercial value. King Kalakaua recounted a legend that "in 1787 several trading vessels visited the group, and the natives began to barter provisions and sandal-wood for firearms and other weapons of metal." This chronology, presented as an example of "fabulous folklore," may represent the conflation of multiple events (Kalakaua, 1888: 26-27). In 1788, William Douglas, a British captain, received instructions to reconnoiter the North Pacific and "lade on board as much as you can... of sandel-wood" (Mearns, 1791, II: appendix). In 1790, he stationed two crewmembers at Maui to collect *'iliahī*, but their mission failed when the local ruler "threw off his protection" of them (Ingraham, 1971: 78, 82-83). It is also possible that Douglas shipped an "inferior quality" of wood, and there is no indication that he made a second attempt (Gibson, 1992: 254). Amaso Delano, an American captain, claimed that "as long ago as the year 1790, I saw more than thirty tons of what was called sandal wood brought from these islands to Canton" (Delano, 1817: 399). The precision of that date is questionable, but 1790 also approximates several events surrounding John Kendrick, the first American to navigate the Pacific Ocean.

One tradition suggests that Kendrick, commander of the Columbia expedition, pioneered the sandalwood trade between the Hawaiian Islands and China. In fact, Kendrick's appropriation of the brig *Lady Washington* may have necessitated an experiment in sandalwood. His decision to "take the Brig on my own account... and abide by all losses and gains" divided the expedition and left him in desperate need of operating funds (Howay, 1941: 471). Kendrick's subsequent activities have proven difficult to reconstruct, but he is documented to have replenished at the Hawaiian Islands in 1789 (Howay, 1928: 37). Tradition holds that his discovery of *'iliahī* was "accidental" and arising "in the purchase of firewood" (Thrum, 1904: 48). Ralph Kuykendall concluded that "it is altogether probable that sticks of this fragrant wood were included in batches of firewood delivered to trading ships and that its existence on the islands was discovered by the traders in this way" (Kuykendall, 1934: 370). The tale may be apocryphal, or even the inspiration for a later legend that John Jacob Astor "enjoyed a monopoly" on *Santalum* after one of his captains purchased it as fuel. (BHS, 1929: 15). George Vancouver reported that, in 1791, Kendrick left three crewmembers in the islands "for the purpose of collecting sandal-wood, and pearls" (Vancouver, 1798, I: 172).

New evidence—albeit of a circumstantial nature—also suggests that Kendrick received market intelligence from his colleagues aboard *Columbia*. Captain Robert Gray documented the price of four grades of sandalwood at Canton. Gray observed that “Sandall Wood, first sort” sold at an astonishing \$55 dollars per picul. Even third-rate varieties fetched an appealing sum of \$28 (Columbia Papers I, 1787-1793). He also corresponded with Kendrick during his reconnaissance of the Hawaiian Islands. Gray made no mention of sandalwood, but he reported that the inhabitants of Niihau had few “curiosities” to trade because William Douglas—a rival sandalwood captain—had already “drained them of those articles.” Could this be an oblique reference to *‘iliahi*, an untested commodity? Gray deposited a second letter (now lost, contents unknown) at Kauai—an island Kendrick later targeted for sandalwood (Nokes, 1991: 285). Moreover, *Columbia’s* carpenter remained on the “big island” of Hawaii. Historians have described Isaac Ridler as a “deserter,” but the evidence does not support this characterization. Ridler’s expertise in the processing of wood suggests that he remained in the archipelago as a purchasing agent for Kendrick (Bradley, 1939: 286; Ingraham, 1972: 78).

The following decades, 1790-1810, probably saw greater experimentation with sandalwood than prior historians have recognized. Kuykendall believed that “the sandalwood trade of Hawaii was not of a great importance much before 1810,” although he affirmed that “the wood was being exported in a small way for several years prior to that date” (Kuykendall, 1934: 370). Harold St. John couched the trade in purely hypothetical terms, arguing that “from 1790 to 1810 sandalwood may have been exported, but if so, in very small quantity, for little record is found” (St. John, 1947: 6). Prior historians were correct in their assessment that *‘iliahi* is poorly attested in sources from 1792-1804. However, one must read between the lines in cases where multiple societies, languages, and cultural traditions are at play. Delano remarked, in the context of expeditions between 1801 and 1806, that Americans discovered “within the past seven or eight years a considerable quantity of sandal-wood, and... made large profits by the traffic”. If true, his statement indicates the establishment of a viable trade sometime between 1794 and 1799 (Delano, 1817: 399).

The prevailing historiographical attitude toward sandalwood is best illustrated in the editorial notes to Joseph Ingraham’s *Journal of the Brigantine Hope*. In 1791, Ingraham learned that American vessels were “taking in sandalwood” and that islanders even used the commodity as bait in their attempt to capture the brig *Eleanora*. Ingraham did not question the ruse—he regarded sandalwood as an element of “trading as usual.” Robert Kaplanoff, a modern editor, dismissed the account as an “error about the *Eleanora’s* business” and suggested that “apparently, she was only taking on firewood.” His conclusion is problematic in several ways. Ingraham received the report from a professional who understood the status of sandalwood: the carpenter, Isaac Ridler (Ingraham, 1972: 79). Other navigators heard similar accounts from individuals associated with *Eleanor* (Boit, 1981: 73).

Material culture reinforces the reliability of the source. Hawaiians did differentiate between mundane wood and 'la'au 'ala, or aromatic wood, but both could be considered "firewood" (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 49-50). Traders may have used the term interchangeably in the context of a commercial pidgin later known as "Sandalwood English" (Drechsel, 2014: 7-11).

The early absence of sources concerning sandalwood is frequently taken as confirmation that the initial cargo represented "an inferior kind... and the Chinese would not give anything for it" (Delano, 1817: 399). This much could be true. Outsiders could easily mistake naio or "false sandalwood," another aromatic hardwood, for the real item (Malo, 1898: 42; USDA, 1989: 4). Vancouver inspected a specimen but explained that it "seemed but lightly to answer the description given of the yellow sandal wood of India" and that his expedition was "not able... to determine its particular class or species" (Vancouver, 1798, I: 189). A botanical error could explain the failure of a cargo or two. It strains credulity, though, to suggest that traders shipped the wrong species for more than a decade. Published narratives of scientific navigation offered ample knowledge concerning the natural wealth of the Pacific World. *Santalum* appeared in references to a hardwood "which is burnt for people of distinction," a species resembling "mahogany," and "shrubs... used as a perfume in the east" (Bougainville, 1772: 269; Quimper, 1791: 36; Flinders, 1814, II: 171). Time was money, and most fur traders made frequent visits to the islands. Those returning from Canton could identify "true" sandalwood on sight (Perkins, 1856: 41). If John Kendrick failed to acquire true 'iliahi during his 1789 visit, or even in 1791, we cannot doubt he attempted to upon returning in 1793. In short, the botanical error was easy to correct.

How can we explain the documentary silence concerning sandalwood during a period of clear experimentation in the commodity? The best explanation is that sandalwood did not become a significant cargo item until 1804-05. American traders could not be considered "sandalwooders" prior to this period, as 'iliahi remained secondary to their main line of business—animal furs. Traders diversified their fur cargoes with smaller quantities of sandalwood, pearls, ambergris, and trepang (Gibson, 1993: 132, 156-59). Early shipments of sandalwood were small, unofficial affairs. Hawaiian nobles often presented foreigners with ceremonial gifts such as "a large log of sandalwood" (Bloxam, 1925: 72). Other traders accepted 'iliahi in exchange for services rendered, and one received "passage money" in the form of "sandalwood to the value of \$1,000" (Lydgate, 1916: 37). Most "shipments," however, originated in barter between individual Americans and Hawaiians. In acquiring "wood as handsome as mahogany," officers availed themselves of a traditional right to "personal trade" (Townsend, 1921: 28). These forms of sandalwood "cargo" occurred informally, and none warranted inclusion in official ship manifests, logs, or letters.

## 2. The market for sandalwood, 1804-1832

Beginning in 1804, documentary evidence is adequate to construct an estimated price history for the American sandalwood trade in the Pacific. The disjointed character of the evidence, however, may explain why no historian has done so before now. The principal sources are incomplete in their treatment of sandalwood tonnages, prices, and earnings. As a result, they present some problems of reconciliation and calculation. Charles Gutzlaff published a table of American sandalwood imports at Canton, by weight, in *A Sketch of Chinese History*, Vol. II (1838). Hosea Ballou Morse included reference to sandalwood tonnage, price, and earnings data throughout five volumes of *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834* (1926). Timothy Pitkin recorded a decade sandalwood imports at Canton, by gross earnings, in *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America* (1835). Other data is drawn from scattered ship journals, prices current, and other minor sources.

Gutzlaff presented data that approximates, but does not match, American imports as documented by the East India Company (E.I.C.). The discrepancies could represent trade secrets, smuggling, errors of documentation, or other unknowns. Gutzlaff did, however, supply a consistent record of imports from 1804-1832. For this reason, he provides the main source for import tonnages (Gutzlaff, 1838, II: Appendix IV). In comparison, Morse gave a fragmented account of sandalwood tonnages, with successive years of data available only for 1811-1812. Nevertheless, E.I.C. documents present a relatively consistent account of prices from 1817-1832. The documents also include gross earnings or profits realized in other years. Where this information is known in conjunction with tonnage, it becomes possible to estimate a sales price for sandalwood. As a result, Morse serves as the main source for sandalwood prices (Morse, 1929, III-IV). It is noteworthy that Pitkin's data diverges from Morse in some trading seasons (1817-1821) and matches in others (1822-1826). Considering this, I treat Pitkin as the authoritative source for American earnings during that decade (Pitkin, 1835: 304).

Some caveats are warranted. As demonstrated above, Cantonese merchants purchased multiple grades of sandalwood: first, second, third, and "Timore" (Columbia Papers I, 1787-1793). Most sources, however, record a single price—likely the premium grade. This assumption cannot be confirmed, making a clear differentiation between prices impossible. This essay generalizes upon an assumption that American captains trafficked in the same species and grade (pending ecological constraints). Unfortunately, the sources do not afford greater clarity. Americans also drew upon multiple supplies of sandalwood in the Pacific. The Hawaiian archipelago constituted the most lucrative supplier, but traders also acquired wood at Fiji, the Marquesas, "New Holland" and unnamed "islands of the Pacific." (Morse, 1929, III: 3-4, 104, 176, 215). The sources make little distinction between points of

origin, but it is logical to presume that most shipments came from the Hawaiian Islands. The documented imports at Canton correspond to a period of declining production in Fiji and the Marquesas, leaving the Hawaiian Islands as the most likely supplier. (Shineberg, 1967: 7-8; Fontenoy, 1997: 11; Fichter, 2010: 219). Further research is warranted to illuminate these blind spots.

The construction of a price history also depends upon conversion between multiple currencies of the Pacific and Indian Ocean Worlds. Traders purchased Hawaiian sandalwood through barter in textiles, firearms, manufactured goods, and services, making the calculation of "purchase price" too abstract to be useful. Sandalwood transactions in China are recorded in a selection of six currencies (Chinese Taels, British Pounds, Spanish Dollars, Star Pagodas, Sikka Rupees, and Arcot Rupees).<sup>1</sup> Cantonese exchange rates between the silver currencies (Taels, Pounds, Dollars) remained fixed throughout the sandalwood era, easing the calculation of transactions in China. Minor fluctuations occurred with respect to E.I.C. coinage (Pagodas and Rupees), which floated in rough proportion to the British Pound. For this reason, calculations are less reliable where evidence rests upon sandalwood purchased in India (Dubost, 1806: 183, 340; Milburn, 1813: 471; Morse, 1929, I: xxii).

<sup>1</sup> Morse explained that E.I.C. accounts recognized a fixed exchange rate for sterling [£1 = 3 Taels]. Spanish Dollars also maintained a fixed rate [\$1 = 0.72 Taels] until 1815. Thereafter, the Spanish Dollar was "invoiced at the actual cost (c.i.f.) per oz.," although the E.I.C. records a minor variation from the previous value only in 1818 [0.7199 Taels]. The stability of exchange rates eases our ability to estimate the sales price of sandalwood (Morse, 1929 II: xxii, II-III passim). The U.S. dollar also experienced minor fluctuations versus the Spanish Dollar. Timothy Pitkin appears to have treated them as interchangeable for purposes of his data (Pitkin, 1834: 304). Joseph Blunt gave the exchange rate for Indian currencies as: 1 Star Pagoda = 7s 5¼d [£0.3719]; and 1 Arcot Rupee = 23¼d [£0.0968]. His numbers account for the introduction of standardized Rupees after 1818, but the earlier currencies remained in circulation and continued to appear in E.I.C. records (Blunt, 1837: 371-72). Christopher Dubost provided a rate where 1 Sikka Rupee = 0.9309 Arcot Rupees or approximately 21 d [£0.0902] (Dubost, 1806: 103).

Table 1: Estimated Sales and Unit Price of American Sandalwood Imports at Canton, 1804-1832

YEAR	IMPORTS (PICULS) Gutzlaff	SALES (\$) Pitkin	SALES (\$) Morse	SALES (\$) <i>Reconstr.</i>	PRICE (\$ / PICUL) Gibson, <i>et al.</i>	PRICE (\$ / PICUL) <i>Reconstr.</i>
1804	900					
1805	1,600			44,445	27.78	
1806	2,700			72,900	27.00	
1807	2,000					
1808	4,800					
1809	1,815			34,032	18.75	
1810	496			9,920	20.00	
1811	11,261					
1812	19,036			394,045		20.70*
1813	1,100			20,548		18.68*
1814						22.97*
1815	2,500					
1816	7,400					
1817	15,825	174,075	166,200			11.00
1818	14,874	91,368				6.14
1819	10,073	82,228	101,228			8.16
1820	6,005	67,133				11.18
1821	26,822	268,220	269,320			10.00
1822	20,653	139,408	139,408		10.00	6.75
1823	8,404	67,232	67,232		8.50	8.00
1824	7,438	66,942	66,942			9.00
1825	3,097	32,518	32,518			10.50
1826	6,680	83,500	83,500			12.50
1827	13,265		211,070		11.50	15.91
1828	18,206		127,442		7.00	7.00
1829	10,807		43,228		4.75	4.00
1830	9,750		39,000		4.25	4.00
1831	1,400		7,000			5.00
1832	5,600		28,000			5.00

All values given in Spanish Dollars. Import volume drawn from Gutzlaff. Italics indicate total sales calculated from a combination of import volume (piculs) and sale value (\$/picul). Price calculations are made with a first preference for sale values given in Pitkin (1835), which may represent the most

accurate picture of U.S. imports during the decade 1817-1826. Second preference is given to sale values provided in Morse (1929), and third preference given to sales reconstructed from ancillary data in Morse. Prices marked with an asterisk (\*) are derived entirely from data in Morse. See exchange rates cited above.

Sources: GIBSON, 1992: 256; GUTZLAFF, 1838, II: appendix IV; MILBURN, 1823, II: 491; MORSE 1929, III: 3-4, 104, 158, 176, 205-06, 228, 307, 328, 330-31, 344, 346, 368-69; MORSE, 1929, IV: 4, 20, 67, 84, 88, 99, 118, 121, 127, 139, 143, 158, 181, 191, 248, 271, 339.; *New York Herald* (25 June 1806), 2; PITKIN, 1835: 304; ROQUEFUEIL, 1823: 52-53.

### 3. Obstacles to trade, 1791-1814

American merchant-captains experimented with sandalwood in both formal and informal ways from 1791-1814, but their experience did not immediately result in reliable trade. What explains their failure to capitalize on a promising new commodity? With the possible exception of Hawaiian political upheavals in 1795, there was no significant obstacle to the acquisition of *'iliabi*. Sandalwood was widely available in the early years. A growing—although sensitive—market waited at Canton. One explanation is that the Pacific sandalwood trade came of age during a time of geopolitical instability.

The beginning of the sandalwood trade corresponds to a period of intermittent warfare between rival kingdoms administered from the islands of Hawaii and Maui. The most powerful warlords funded the modernization of their forces through the sale of sandalwood. Vancouver observed that Kamehameha sold Hawaiian goods at the cost of “arms and ammunition.” The importation of firearms, he noted, “has produced in every chief of consequence an inordinate thirst for power” and “great avidity for these destructive engines.” (Vancouver, 1798, I: 186-87). Sandalwood also purchased heavier weapons. One visitor later reported that “there were from 600 to 700 pieces of artillery upon the several islands” (Bloxam, 1824: 34). Kamehameha financed an ambitious program of naval armament, featuring shipyards and a blacksmith forge, in part with exports of sandalwood (Townsend, 1921: 23-34). The fiscal demands of unification and state-formation prompted nobles to harvest enormous quantities of *'iliabi*. The islands exported an estimated 6.1 million pounds of wood, worth perhaps \$576,000, during the first decade of documented exports (1804-1813). In short, sandalwood was available and profitable to the producers. Challenges to the development of a reliable trade did not originate on the supply side.

Instead, Americans encountered demand-side obstacles to their development of a sandalwood trade at Canton. Competition from preexisting business was a significant hindrance. Chinese consumers had a longstanding relationship



with *tanxiang*, and they obtained aromatic wood through a succession of middlemen prior to the arrival of Americans. Sandalwood appears in Chinese documents as early as 454, and Cambodian vessels made deliveries throughout the following century (Schafer, 1957: 130; Wang, 1958: 53). Thereafter, Arabian and Malay captains imported sandalwood along with resins such as frankincense, aloes, and camphor (Morley, 1949: 145, 164; Villiers, 2001: 27-28). Demand for tropical aromatics boomed in parallel with globalization during the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties (Ptak, 2006: 484-85; Soon, 2001: 146). Cantonese captains sought *tanxiang* in distant Sumatra, India, and perhaps Africa (Sen, 2006: 424). Europeans dominated the trade in aromatics after 1750, and they regarded sandalwood as a “cornerstone” of the China Trade (Morse, 1922: 251). The incomplete nature of the evidence makes it impossible to know the overall scale of *tanxiang* imports at Canton, but Americans clearly entered an established market.

The delicate balance of supply and demand also complicated American trade. Prior to U.S. involvement, Chinese demand for *tanxiang* rested at an equilibrium price of around \$20-24 per picul (133 pounds) and prices occasionally spiked as high as \$31 (Morse, 1929, II: 70). Beginning in 1804, American traders flooded the market, with predictable results. Over the subsequent decade, U.S. vessels imported 45,708 piculs of sandalwood, representing fully 52% of all documented imports and doubling the overall supply. The glut of *tanxiang* was particularly noticeable from 1811-1812, when Americans imported 4,000,000 pounds of wood—three times the reported E.I.C. volume. In 1812, the outbreak of war between the United States and Great Britain prevented the market from reaching a terminal state of saturation. The following year, prices rebounded by 23% when “the war kept American ships away from Canton, or at any rate much diminished their number” (Morse, 1929, III: 191). In short, conflict sustained the delicate market for aromatic wood.

Table 2: Estimated U.S., East India Company, and Private British imports of Sandalwood at Canton (Piculs), 1804-1832

YEAR	U.S. (PICULS)	E.I.C. (PICULS)	PRIVATE (PICULS)	TOTAL (PICULS)	U.S. SHARE (%)
1804	900	841		1,741	51.69
1805	1,600			1,600	
1806	2,700			2,700	
1807	2,000			2,000	
1808	4,800			4,800	
1809	1,815	9,650		11,465	15.83
1810	496		7,588	8,084	6.14
1811	11,261	4,067		15,328	73.47
1812	19,036	5,559		24,595	77.40
1813	1,100	15,108		16,208	6.79
1814		7,162		7,162	
1815	2,500	12,430		14,930	16.74
1816	7,400			7,400	
1817	15,825			15,825	
1818	14,874			14,874	
1819	10,073			10,073	
1820	6,005			6,005	
1821	26,822		6,667	33,489	80.09
1822	20,653			20,653	
1823	8,404			8,404	
1824	7,438			7,438	
1825	3,097	574	8,011	11,682	26.51
1826	6,680	1,793		8,473	78.84
1827	13,265			13,265	
1828	18,206		9,892	28,098	64.79
1829	10,807		16,697	27,504	39.29
1830	9,750		11,100	20,850	46.76
1831	1,400		6,338	7,738	18.09
1832	5,600		2,075	7,675	72.96
Total	234,507	57,184	68,368	360,059	45.03

This chart does not present U.S. percentage share for seasons when company and private tonnages are unknown (either due to absence of imports or omission).

Sources: GUTZLAFF, 1838, II: appendix IV; MORSE, 1929, III: 3-4, 104, 158, 176, 205-06, 228, 307, 328, 330-31, 344, 346, 368-69; IV: 4, 20, 67, 84, 88, 99, 118, 121, 127, 139, 143, 158, 181, 191, 248, 271, 339.

Recent scholarship reflects a growing consensus that protracted warfare from 1793 to 1815 promoted the economic growth of neutral or “weak” nations such as the United States. One argument holds that neutral states experienced economic growth as suppliers and markets to more powerful belligerents. In this respect, the American China Trade represented part of a larger expansion of trade to nations other than Great Britain and France (Land *et al.*, 2018: 29-30, 42). James Fichter emphasizes that U.S. traders entered the commercial breach in a manner that presented the East India Company with “a new and vigorous competitor in Asia” (Fichter, 2010: 4). The American sandalwood trade demonstrates a variation on the theme. U.S. traders certainly benefitted from access to producers on “neutral” islands, but political tensions and warfare often hindered their ability to deliver sandalwood to Canton.

Geopolitical interruptions contributed to the fitful development of the sandalwood trade. Some obstacles resulted from the Qing Imperial practice of using commerce as a political weapon. In 1791, imperial officials extended an embargo against Russian merchants to include the maritime fur trade in general. In 1810, Cantonese officials threatened another embargo over issues of unpaid duties, smuggling, and an ongoing murder investigation. Chinese pirates also attacked, captured, and ransomed foreign ships with impunity (Fu, 1966: 319-20, 360). European merchantmen soon sailed under escort, but U.S. warships were too few to protect sandalwood traders in the Pacific (Morse, 1929, III: 116). Other interruptions originated in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In 1797, Bostonian merchant Thomas Handasyd Perkins complained of the “vile conduct of the Republican Cruisers” and feared that “privateers may be troublesome in the Straights of Sunda next spring.” Thereafter, Perkins reaffirmed his determination “to concentrate our property in the Canton trade,” but his plans faltered during Jefferson’s notorious embargo of 1807-1809 (Perkins, 1944: 54, 64, 98; Morse, 1929, III: 77).

American efforts to establish the sandalwood trade became doubly difficult when European affairs intruded upon the Canton System. In 1808, the British occupation of Portuguese Macao—still Qing territory—brought Atlantic warfare to the shores of China. In response, the emperor punished “the barbarian soldiers of England” by threatening a blockade of foreign communications and supplies (Fu, 1966: 371-73). From 1808-10, American sandalwood imports plummeted from 4,800 piculs to 496 piculs, a 90% decline. The eruption of the Anglo-American War, in 1812, represented the culmination of two decades of uncertain trade. Cantonese officials reported that the nations had begun “plundering each other’s goods and money” in the South China Sea. Qing authorities insisted that the belligerents should “obey and respect the prohibitions of the Celestial Empire” and demanded that British privateers not attempt “to obtain revenge on the Americans here” (Fu, 1966: 371-73). By and large, U.S. traders elected to remain in port, in the islands, or to sail homeward during the conflict (Howay, 1973: 92-102). American sandalwood

imports collapsed in wartime, falling from the robust volume of 19,036 piculs in 1812 to nothing in 1814. Overall, the sandalwood trade faced interruptions from embargos, piracy, or armed conflict in 13 of 23 seasons from 1791-1814.

#### 4. The decline and fall of sandalwood, 1821-32

In 1815, following the war, American sandalwood traders returned to Canton and again saturated the market. From this point onward, no serious interruptions hindered the development of a reliable trade in *'iliahi*. Indeed, American traders dominated the Hawaii-China circuit in increasing numbers after 1815. One diplomat estimated that at least five U.S. vessels, averaging 200-300 tons burden, traded sandalwood each year (Bland, 1834: 311). Stability, however, brought new problems. The American trade that seemed so promising in the 1790s, and appeared within reach after 1804, began a terminal slide in 1822. In short, sandalwood became a victim of its own success.

Scholars long ago identified some general reasons for the decline and fall of sandalwood, but their explanations lack chronological and causal nuance. Mark Merlin, a botanist, claimed that “the price fell in the later 1820’s as a result of poor quality” (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 50). In fact, prices began their dramatic slide in 1817. Paul Fontenoy explained that “the assault on the sandalwood forests was so devastating that the trade effectively ceased by 1829 due to over-cutting.” The impact of intensive harvesting cannot be denied, but this explanation neglects the prohibitive cost of harvesting alternative species of *Santalum*. Fontenoy identifies the competitive role of Fijian and Marquesan sandalwood, from 1804-17, but he overlooks the growth of Melanesian production in the 1820s (Fontenoy, 1997: 11-12). The remainder of this essay considers a constellation of factors in the decline of *'iliahi*.

The period from 1817-21 represented a sweet spot in the sandalwood trade. Chinese demand for sandalwood was underserved from 1814-16, when imports totaled only 53% of the previous three-year period (1811-13). Americans returned with ample cargoes—more than 9.8 million pounds!—from 1817-21. The glut of sandalwood drove sale prices downward, but not catastrophically. In fact, *tanxiang* settled at a plateau around \$10 by 1817. The most profitable year for American traders, 1821, saw peak imports of 1,788 tons and earnings of \$269,000. During this intermediate period, then, trade probably approached an equilibrium of supply and demand. The American sandalwood trade would never again be so robust or profitable. In 1822, the market for *tanxiang* was so near saturation that the import of 20,653 piculs (1,377 tons), triggered a collapse in demand. Sales prices fell 33%, from roughly \$10 to \$6.75 per picul, in a single year. Prices continued to slide throughout the decade (despite a few healthy seasons), ultimately reaching

the abysmal rate of \$5 per picul by 1829. Three good seasons, from 1825-27, are probably the reason that traders did not abandon sandalwood sooner.

The decade 1822-32 witnessed the long death of the American sandalwood trade, but the decline of *'iliahi* represented the confluence of several factors. The economics of deforestation was probably a consideration. We cannot be certain which species early traders collected, as scientific classification began later, in 1819 (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). Two candidates grew at the documented sites of early trading. *Santalum ellipticum*, a shrub known as "coastal sandalwood," spanned the archipelago at altitudes below 1400 meters. *Santalum paniculatum*, a tree, grows exclusively on Hawaii at altitudes below 1390 meters (Stemmermann, 1980: 49-52). Species native to higher elevations became important only after the depopulation of more convenient lowland varieties. In this respect, sandalwood corresponds to the larger pattern of exploitation and collapse of other biological resources in the region, such as sea otters, seals, and whales (Gibson, 1992: 175-76; Busch, 1985: 191-220; Iglar, 2013: 99-127).

Deforestation appears to have occurred in a relatively short period of time—one that corresponds to the era of reliable and moderate profits between 1817 and 1821. Chinese demand ensured the cutting of sandalwood at an unsustainable pace. In 1817, James Hunnewell identified sandalwood as the "chief article" of business and a commodity so plentiful that it constituted "the standard coin" of the islands (Hunnewell, 1895: 16). King Kamehameha compelled commoners to harvest thousands of tons of *'iliahi* through corvée labor. In 1822, Gilbert Mathison explained that "gratuitous" labor had reduced the cost of production to "absolutely nothing." Nonetheless, he concluded that *'iliahi* was "not likely to become exhausted for a considerable period of time" and observed that "large forests still remain untouched" on Hawaii (Mathison, 1825: 450-51, 457-58). Mathison underestimated the pace of deforestation. *Santalum* reaches commercial maturity only after a century of growth (USDA, 1990: 4). William Ellis observed large parties of "three or four hundred people, returning with sandal wood, which they had been cutting in the mountains" (Ellis, 1917: 227). Natural replenishment could not keep up with harvests on such a scale, and some chiefs began to withhold supplies (Hammatt, 1999: 26).

Scarcity fueled a transition toward less accessible species of *'iliahi* and a probable spike in the cost of production. *Santalum freycinetianum* grows throughout the islands at elevations up to 1150 meters, although the best specimens prefer an altitude of 600+ meters. This species, which achieves a height of 80 feet and a diameter of 3 feet, was commercially desirable for its high output of aromatic heartwood (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). But commercial exploitation decimated the coastal forests. By 1824, Andrew Bloxam remarked that he "could not find one sandalwood tree" in lowland Oahu because "all had probably been cut down about here for the purpose of barter" (Bloxam, 1925: 38). *Santalum*

*haleakale*, the remaining species, grows at higher elevations of 1800-2590 meters (Merlin and VanRavenswaay, 1990: 46). Indeed, Jacobus Boelen reported in 1828 that sandalwood “already... had to be fetched from the most inaccessible parts of the mountains” (Boelen, 1988: 76). The higher investment in labor, time, and transport undoubtedly increased the production cost, as well as purchase price. In a climate of shrinking profits, many American traders looked to alternative branches of commerce in goods, provisions, and shipping-for-hire.

Scarcity, competition, and declining profits contributed to the collapse of the American trade in Hawaiian sandalwood. The inaccessibility of mature *‘iliabi* created conditions of scarcity, such that “old fashioned good wood” became rare and in some places “not a stick of wood” could be found. Meanwhile, prices rose for specimens considered “of rather inferior quality” (Hammatt, 1999: 32, 42). Indian production continued to exert competitive pressure, and the exploitation of mature forests had begun in Melanesia. Ships laden with hundreds of tons of sandalwood became commonplace sights at Guam, New Guinea, and the Isle of Pines. In Canton, *tanxiang* sold at unprofitable rates. Some captains imported hundreds of tons—and realized only a few dozen dollars (Shineberg, 1967: 9-13, 29-46, 138). In short, American traders found themselves trapped between a widening pair of price scissors in the 1820s. In 1823, Charles Hammatt was exasperated that the brig Arab “sold their wood at \$5/4” at Canton. He lamented that “I thought it was bad enough when we expected to get \$10 for our wood, but losing 50 percent on that, will just about finish it.” (Hammatt, 1999: 32-33). Within a decade, his fellow traders followed suit.

## Primary sources

- BLAND, Theodorick (1834), “Report of Theodorick Bland, on the Condition of South America [1819],” in *American State Papers*, Vol. IV, edited by Walter Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin, Washington, Gales and Seaton, 270-323.
- BLOXAM, Andrew (1925), *Diary of Andrew Bloxham, Naturalist of the “Blonde” on Her Trip from England to the Hawaiian Islands, 1824-25*, Honolulu, Bernice P. Bishop Museum.
- BLUNT, Joseph (1837), *The Shipmaster’s Assistant and Commercial Digest: Containing Information Useful to Merchants, Owners, and Masters of Ships*, New York, E. & G.W. Blunt.
- BOELEN, Jacobus (1988), *A Merchant’s Perspective: Captain Jacobus Boelen’s Narrative of His Visit to Hawai’i in 1828*, Honolulu, Hawaiian Historical Society.
- BOIT, John (1981), *Log of the Union: John Boit’s Remarkable Voyage to the Northwest Coast and Around the World, 1794-1796*, edited by Edmund Hayes, Portland, Oregon Historical Society.
- DELANO, Amasa (1817), *Narrative of Voyages and Travels in the Northern and Southern Hemisphere: Comprising Three Voyages Round the World; Together with a Voyage of Survey and Discovery in the Pacific Ocean and Oriental Islands*, Boston, E.G. House.
- DUBOST, Christopher (1806), *The Elements of Commerce*, 2 vols., London, Knight and Compton.
- ELLIS, William (1917), *Narrative of a Tour through Hawaii, or Owhyhee; with Remarks on the History Traditions, Manners, Customs, and Language of the Inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands*, Honolulu, Honolulu Gazette Co., Ltd.

- GUTZLAFF, Charles (1834), *A Sketch of Chinese History, Ancient and Modern: Comprising a Retrospect of the Foreign Intercourse and Trade with China*, 2 vols., London, Smith, Elder and Company.
- HAMMATT, Charles H. (1999), *Ships, Furs, and Sandalwood: A Yankee Trader in Hawai'i, 1823-1825*, edited by Sandra Wagner-Wright, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press.
- HUNNEWELL, James Jr. (ed.) (1895), "Honolulu in 1817 and 1818, by James Hunnewell", *Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society*, 8, 3-23.
- INGRAHAM, Joseph (1971), *Voyage of the Brigantine "Hope" on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North America, 1790-1792*, edited by Mark D. Kaplanoff, Barre, MA, Imprint Society.
- KALAKUA, David (1888), *The Legends and Myths of Hawaii: The Fables and Folk-Lore of a Strange People*, edited by R.M. Daggett, New York, Charles L. Webster & Company.
- KUYKENDALL, Ralph S. (1934), "Early Hawaiian Commercial Development", *Pacific Historical Review*, 3, 365-85.
- LEDYARD, John (1783), *A Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean and in Quest of a North-West Passage between Asia & America, Performed in the Years 1776, 1777, 1778, and 1779*, Hartford, Nathaniel Patten.
- MILBURN, William (1813), *Oriental Commerce; Containing a Geographical Description of the Principal Places in the East Indies, China, and Japan, Including the Coasting or Country Trade from Port to Port*, 2 vols., London, Black, Parry, & Co.
- MALO, David (1903), *Hawaiian Antiquities (Moolelo Hawaii)*, translated by N.B. Emerson, Honolulu, Hawaiian Gazette Co.
- MATHISON, Gilbert Farquhar (1825), *Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Sandwich Islands, During the Years 1821 and 1822*, London, Charles Knight.
- New York Herald* (New York, New York), 25 June 1806, 2.
- PERKINS, Thomas Handasyd (1856), *Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins: Containing Extracts from his Diaries and Letters*, edited by Thomas G. Gray, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company.
- PERKINS, Thomas Handasyd (1944), *Extracts from Letter Books of J. and T.H. Perkins et al., 1786-1838*, edited by James Elliot Cabot, Boston Athenaeum, Typescript.
- PITKIN, Timothy (1835), *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America*, New Haven, Durrie & Peck.
- QUIMPER, Manuel (1952), "The Hawaiian Journal of Manuel Quimper", edited by William Harvey Minson, Jr., MA Thesis, Honolulu, University of Hawaii.
- ROQUEFEUIL, M. Camille de (1823), *Voyage Round the World Between the Years 1816-1819*, London, Sire Richard Phillips and Co.
- TOWNSEND, Ebenezer, Jr. (1921), "Extract from the Diary of Ebenezer Townsend, Jr., Supercargo of the Sealing Ship 'Neptune' on Her Voyage to the South Pacific and Canton", *Hawaiian Historical Society Reprints*, 4, 1-33.
- VANCOUVER, George (1798), *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World*, 3 vols., London, G.G. and J. Robinson and J. Edwards.

## Secondary sources

- BRADLEY, Harold Whitman (1939), "The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785-1813", *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 39, 275-299.
- BUSCH, Briton Cooper (1985), *The War Against the Seals: A History of the North American Seal Fishery*, Montreal, McGill—Queen's University Press.
- Business Historical Society (1929), "China and the Foreign Devils", *Bulletin of the Business Historical Society*, 3, 9-19.

- DRECHSEL, Emanuel J. (2014), *Language Contact in the Early Colonial Pacific: Maritime Polynesian Pidgin before Pidgin English*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- ELMORE, H. M. (1802), *The British Mariner's Directory and Guide to the Trade and Navigation of the Indian and Chinese Seas*, London, T. Bensley.
- FELGELSON, Joseph (1990), "Sandalwood—the Myth and the Reality," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Research Station, *General Technical Report PSW-122. Proceedings of the Symposium on Sandalwood in the Pacific, April 9-11, 1990*, Honolulu, USDA, 39-42.
- FICHTER, James (2010), *So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
- FONTENOY, Paul E. (1997), "Ginseng, Otter Skins, and Sandalwood: The Conundrum of the China Trade", *The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord*, 7, 1-16.
- FU, Lo-shu (ed.) (1966), *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644-1820*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press.
- GIBSON, Arrell Morgan, WHITEHEAD, John S. (1993), *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier*, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- GIBSON, James R. (1992), *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841*, Montreal, McGill—Queens University Press.
- HOWAY, Frederic W. (1928), "The Hawaiian Islands: Early Relations with the Pacific" in Albert Pierce Taylor and Ralph S. Kuykendall (eds.), *Papers Read During the Captain Cook Sesquicentennial Celebration, Honolulu, August 17, 1928*, Honolulu, Captain Cook Sesquicentennial Commission and Archives of Hawaii Commission, 11-38.
- HOWAY, Frederic W. (ed.) (1941), *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, Boston, Massachusetts Historical Society.
- HOWAY, Frederic W., PIERCE, Richard A. (eds.) (1973), *A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1785-1825*, Kingston ON, The Limestone Press.
- IGLER, David (2013), *The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- KAMAKAU, Samuel M. (1961), *Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii*, Honolulu, Kamehameha Schools.
- KUYKENDALL, Ralph S. (1934), "Early Hawaiian Commercial Development", *Pacific Historical Review*, 3, 365-385.
- LAND, Jeremy, ELORANTA, Jari, MOREIRA, Maria Cristina (2018), "Early American Trade and Neutrality: 1783-1860", in Jari Eloranta, Eric Golson, Peter Hedburg, Maria Cristina Moreira (eds.), *Small and Medium Powers in Global History: Trade, Conflicts, and Neutrality from the 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, New York, Routledge, 461-479.
- LITTLE, Elbert L., Jr., SKOLMEN, Roger G. (1989), *Common Forest Trees of Hawaii (Native and Introduced)*, Washington, D.C., USDA, Forest Service.
- LYDGATE, John M. (1916), "Ka-umu-ali'i, The Last King of Kauai", *Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society*, 24, 21-43.
- MERLIN, Mark, VANRAVENSWAAY, Dan (1990), "The History of Human Impact on the Genus Santalum in Hawai'i," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Research Station, *General Technical Report PSW-122. Proceedings of the Symposium on Sandalwood in the Pacific, April 9-11, Honolulu, USDA*, 46-60.
- MORISON, Samuel Elliot (1920-21), "Boston Traders in the Hawaiian Islands, 1789-1823", *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Third Series, 54, 9-47.
- MORLEY, J. A. E. (1949), "The Arabs and the Eastern Trade", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 22, 143-176.



- MORSE, Hosea Ballou (1926), *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834*, 5 Vols., Oxford, The Clarendon Press.
- MORSE, Hosea Ballou (1922), "The Provision of Funds for the East India Company's Trade at Canton during the Eighteenth Century", *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 2, 227-255.
- NOKES, Richard (1991), *Columbia's River: The Voyages of Robert Gray, 1787-1793*, Tacoma WA, Washington State Historical Society.
- PTAK, Roderich (2006), "Trade Between Macau and Southeast Asia in Ming Times: A Survey", *Monumenta Serica*, 54, 465-489.
- SCHAFFER, Edward H. (1957), "Rosewood, Dragon's Blood, and Lac", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 77, 129-136.
- SUBASINGHE, Upul (2013), "Sandalwood Research: A Global Perspective", *Journal of Tropical Forestry and Environment*, 3, 1-8.
- ST. JOHN, Harold, (1947) "The History, Present Distribution, and Abundance of Sandalwood on Oahu, Hawaiian Islands: Hawaiian Plant Studies 14", *Pacific Science*, 1, 5-20.
- STEMMERMANN, Lani (1980) "Observations on the Genus Santalum (Santalaceae) in Hawai'i", *Pacific Science*, 34, 41-54.
- SOON, Derek Heng Thiam (2001), "The Trade in Lakawood Products Between South China and the Malay World from the Twelfth to Fifteenth Centuries AD", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32, 133-149.
- THRUM, Thomas G. (1904), "The Sandalwood Trade of Early Hawaii", *Thrum's Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1905*, Honolulu, Thomas Thrum.
- VILLIERS, John (2001), "Great Plenty of Almug Trees: The Trade in Southeast Asian Aromatic Woods in the Indian Ocean and China, 500 BC—AD 1500", *The Great Circle*, 23, 24-43.
- WANG, Gungwu (1958), "The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 31, 1-135.



## **Economy and Ecology in the Iberian Cork Oak Forests: Land Use in the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

CARLOS MANUEL FAÍSCA\*

CEIS20 - Universidade de Coimbra

### **Abstract**

The supply of raw material is probably the most important issue in the cork business, mainly due to its preponderance in the industry cost structure. This article analyses, from a comparative perspective between Spain and Portugal, a practice with a high repercussion in the cork production, the use of the soil. The main goal is to identify, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, agroforestry practices that reduced the cork potential of any of the countries, helping recognise a factor that can explain the gap in the level of development of the cork sector in Spain and Portugal. However, it is concluded that there were constant harmful actions against cork development in both countries. Soil mobilisation and extraction of plants, often due to cereal cultivation, led to a decline in soil fertility with a negative economic and ecological impact.

**Keywords:** Cork oak forest, cork, cork business, soil degradation.

### **Resumo**

*Economia e ecologia no montado ibérico de sobro: uso do solo na segunda metade do século XIX*

A oferta de matéria-prima é provavelmente o aspeto mais importante no negócio corticeiro, devido à preponderância que apresenta na estrutura de custos da indústria. Neste artigo analisa-se, numa perspetiva comparada entre Espanha e Portugal, uma prática cultural com elevada repercussão na produção florestal de cortiça, o uso do solo. O objetivo principal é identificar, durante a segunda metade do século XIX, práticas agroflorestais que possam ter reduzido o potencial suberícola dos países ibéricos, ajudando a explicar o

\*E-mail: carlos.faisca@uc.pt

diferente nível de desenvolvimento do negócio corticeiro em Portugal e Espanha. Contudo, conclui-se que em ambos os países ocorreram ações nocivas para o correto crescimento da cortiça. A mobilização do solo e a extração de plantas, em virtude da cerealicultura, provocaram uma queda na fertilidade do solo e na utilidade da terra com repercussões económicas e ecológicas negativas.

**Palavras-chave:** montado de sobro, cortiça, negócio corticeiro, degradação do solo.

### Résumé

*Économie et écologie dans les forêts ibériques de chêne-liège: l'utilisation des terres dans la seconde moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*

L'approvisionnement en matières premières est probablement l'aspect le plus important dans le secteur du liège en raison de sa prépondérance dans la structure des coûts de l'industrie. Cet article analyse, dans une perspective comparative entre l'Espagne et le Portugal, l'utilisation du sol, une pratique culturelle à forte répercussion sur la production forestière du liège. L'objectif principal est d'identifier, au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, les pratiques agroforestières qui peuvent avoir réduit le potentiel du liège des pays ibériques, contribuant ainsi à expliquer les niveaux différents de développement du commerce du liège au Portugal et en Espagne. Nous avons cependant conclu qu'il y a eu dans les deux pays des actions néfastes pour la croissance correcte du liège. La mobilisation du sol et le déboisement, dus à la culture céréalière, ont provoqué la baisse de la fertilité du sol et de l'utilité de la terre avec des répercussions économiques et écologiques négatives.

**Mots-clés:** forêt de chêne-liège, liège, commerce du liège, dégradation du sol.

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Currently, Portugal leads worldwide in all facets of the cork business, from the forestry market through industrial transformation to the commercialization of cork products. The Portuguese cork sector concentrates around two-thirds of world exports in an amount that reached, in 2018, 1,068 million euros (Associação Portuguesa de Cortiça, 2020a: 2). However, in the 19th century, the cork business, and in particular the industrial transformation and subsequent commercialization, was dominated by Spain, with several non-cork producing countries with a meaningful participation in the cork business – the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Germany, among others (Parejo Moruno, 2010: 20-23). Knowing that Portugal is, for edaphoclimatic reasons, the globe's region where the cork oak reaches its ecological optimum (Natividade, 1950: 53), the apparent underutilization of the Portuguese cork business, especially by comparison with

<sup>1</sup> The author wishes to express his thanks to Sónia Martins, Forest Engineer, who reviewed the forestry considerations of this work, as well as to Ana Pereira Ferreira who read and commented on the text.

the Spanish one, was the subject of several debates (Nunes, 1905; Cabreira, 1914). The goals included the identification of the reasons leading to this situation and, consequently, its adjustment. Within a relatively wide range of motives that included, for example, the customs policy or the technological “backwardness” of the Portuguese industry, the eventual lower quality of cork due to the occurrence of harmful cultural practices was also mentioned<sup>2</sup>.

This article focuses on the cultural practices in the cork oak forests – *Dehesa Alcornocal* in Spanish and *Montado de Sobro* in Portuguese. While previous research focused on how the cork stripping was carried out (Faísca, 2015), the present work will address the use of soil in the Iberian cork oak forests. This aspect has a strong influence on the quantity and quality of cork, as well as in the maintenance of the fertility of the land and, consequently, of its ability to develop plants, fix economic activity and populations. Based on the identification of agricultural practices in cork oak forests that are harmful to the correct development of the cork oak tree, this article proposes to achieve one main objective and a subsequent one, from a comparative perspective between Spain and Portugal. First, from an economic perspective, the main focus of this study is to understand if there were, in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, agricultural practices in the cork oak forests of Spain and Portugal that can help to identify the reasons that led to the production of less and worse quality raw cork in any of the countries. Then, from an environmental perspective, we aim to establish whether there were human actions over nature with serious ecological effects in the medium and long term. The consequences would be the impoverishment of soils, the breakdown of the land’s utility, and therefore human and environmental desertification in these regions. To reach these goals, we used several sources from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, including some official reports written by agronomists and memories of local farmers that were complemented by contemporary bibliography.

This article is organized as follows. First, we explain the impact of soil management on the economy and ecology of cork oak forests. We further clarify the main characteristics of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century cork business and how, in this historical context, the decrease in the quality of cork and the productive potential of each cork oak was a significant factor in the loss of international competitiveness. After a demonstration of the sources and methods used, we present and analyse the results of the research, as well as the institutional and political framework that probably contributed to them. Finally, we conclude that between the main cork oak forest regions of Spain and Portugal, there were no significant differences in the uses of the cork oak forest soils, subsisting soil mobilizations, and other actions with harmful effects in the production of cork, that led to the degradation of soil fertility. Likewise, and not surprisingly, the Iberian states’ institutional and political

2 On the technological “backwardness” of the cork industry in Spain and Portugal in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, see (Faísca, 2019a).

frameworks were similar. Thus, not only the knowledge about cork oak systems was scarce in scientific research and in forestry education, but also forestry policy was oriented towards other types of issues. Besides, an agricultural policy favoured cereal crops with which the cork oak competed for all kinds of resources – environmental, financial, and so forth.

## 1. Importance of the soil in the quantity and quality of the cork and its impact in the context of the 19<sup>th</sup>-century cork business

There are essentially two types of cork oak forests globally: either areas with high tree density or areas occupied by a sparsely populated tree area with wide interspersed spaces (ca. 80 trees/hectare), resembling an African Savannah. The first ones, called *Sobreirais* in Portuguese and *Alcornocales* in Spanish, are less frequent and practically restricted, in the Iberian Peninsula, to the Province of Gerona in Catalonia. The second ones, called *Montados de Sobro* in Portuguese and *Dehesas Alcornocales* in Spanish, are more common and concentrated in the Southwest of the Iberian Peninsula, specifically in the regions of Extremadura and Andalusia in Spain, and of Alentejo and Algarve in Portugal. They are an agro-silvo-pastoral ecosystem, meaning that, together with the forest exploitation – wood, acorns and cork –, this system supports livestock activities, such as grazing sheep and pigs, and agricultural activities, as the cultivation of cereals or legumes. However, cereal cultivation often creates ecological stress due to the exhaustion of soil fertility and it contributes to the weakening of the cork oak trees through the damage of their roots due to the mobilization of the soil that cultivation implies.

In Portugal, the awareness of this situation has led to the fact that the current legislation does not allow crops that affect the root system of cork oak trees done by mechanical or other means. It is even forbidden to engage in any mechanical mobilization of the soil on slopes greater than 30 per cent, as well as all those that are not carried out according to contour lines on slopes between 10 to 30 per cent (Goes and Tenreiro, 2001: 24-25). Also, symptomatic of the frequent incompatibility of these two activities – cork oak forestry and cereal farming – is that currently only 5 per cent of the area of cork oak forests of the planet is cultivated with cereals, such as wheat, barley, or oat (Associação Portuguesa de Cortiça, 2020b).

It was only in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century that the *Junta Nacional de Cortiça*<sup>3</sup>, mainly due to the research carried out by Joaquim Vieira Natividade at the *Estação Experimental do Sobreiro e do Eucalipto*<sup>4</sup>, warned about the decline in the quality of Portuguese cork, as well as in quantity produced per tree. This situation

<sup>3</sup> *Junta Nacional da Cortiça* was a corporate organization with several functions, one of them being the development of scientific research of the cork oak tree to improve the cork production quality and quantity in Portugal. It was created in 1936 and extinct in 1972.

<sup>4</sup> *Estação Experimental do Sobreiro e do Eucalipto* was a state-owned scientific laboratory to improve both the cork oak and eucalyptus' economic possibilities.

was, among other issues, because of the loss of soil fertility and the mutilations of the root system of the cork oaks, both with origins in the agriculture practices and cereal cultures (Natividade, 1951: 6).


Figure 1: Cork oak forest of *Montado* type in Southern Portugal, April 2020



Source: Personal collection.

On several occasions, Joaquim Vieira Natividade presented a critical view of the treatment that Portuguese cork oak forests had been undergoing since the 19th century (Natividade, 1950, 1951). The most pronounced aspect was the soil, as the conservation of soil fertility was one of the most relevant problems of the Portuguese cork oak forests (Natividade, 1950: 124). Vieira Natividade stated that the cork oak forest soils suffered from several activities that led to a decline in the organic matter content present in the soil, promoting erosive work, weakening microbial activity, and making aridity more pronounced. The final consequence was the lack of strength of the cork oak trees that led to a reduction in the cork production quantity and quality (Natividade, 1950: 125). As shown in Chart 1, the cultivation of cereals led to a loss in the average calibre of cork between 30 to 50 per cent (Natividade, 1951: 13), compared with an area without any agriculture practices.

Chart 1: Cork growth in the tree according to the use of the soil



Source: (Natividade, 1951: 4).

Note: The solid line represents cork growth from a cork oak forest without agriculture practices for the last 40 years; the dashed line represents cork growth from a cork oak forest exposed to the competition from cereal culture. The Y axis represents, in millimetre, the thickness of the annual cork layers, and the X axis the number of years.

Besides affecting cork production, soil degradation led to higher mortality among grown cork oak trees due to lower resistance to diseases, pests, and premature aging. In younger trees, it disfavours their growth, increases mortality and, therefore, affects the natural regeneration of the cork oak ecosystem considerably, the primary «method» of creating new cork oak forests in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Natividade, 1951: 12; Faísca, 2019b: 103-106).

The main action responsible for the scenarios described was the agricultural use of the soil that led to the destruction of the plants under the trees and to the periodic mobilizations of the soil. In the absence of small plants under the trees, the soil was exposed to the Mediterranean climate's typical wide thermal variations. This meant excessive heating and dryness in the dry season, while during winter the concentration of rainfall washed away part of the soil, which further reinforced its impoverishment (Natividade, 1950: 124). Vieira Natividade was peremptory in stating that what was demanded of the tree was more than reasonable, while it was more than it could give from the soil (Natividade, 1951: 4). Another renowned forest engineer, Jaime Salazar Sampaio, noticed the same when he studied, in 1951, the cork oak forest of Grândola, a municipality in the core of the cork oak forests of Southern Portugal. The degradation of the soils in the *Montado* also meant that any crop had to be preceded by a long fallow of no less than 6 years in the best lands and 8 in the poorest ones. A wheat crop, because is quite demanding of the land, was almost impossible to utilise (Zapata Blanco *et al.*, 2012: 27). The



consequences described above – namely, decrease in the quantity and quality of cork – can have a negative impact on the entire cork industry at any historical time, but even more so in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century cork business.

Currently, the extracted cork from the trees can be used to manufacture a wide range of products. Within the cork stoppers, the principal product of this industry, there are the natural cork stoppers that, from a single piece from a cork-board, constitute a uniform stopper without the use of any other type of technique. Then, we have the technical cork stoppers. These result from a combination of a natural cork disc, the only part that comes into direct contact with the bottled liquid, with a body of cork agglomerate. In this way, the central core of the stopper comes from the use of waste generated in the manufacture of natural cork stoppers and/or of cork of the lowest quality and without calibre for the production of natural cork stoppers, while the extremities are made of natural cork. Finally, there are total agglomerated cork stoppers, the ones with less economic value, originated in the same way as the body of the technical stopper. In addition to the production of stoppers, the cork industry has specialized in the manufacture of a wide range of products, with emphasis on insulators for civil construction, since the invention of the agglomerate. However, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, cork agglomerate was not yet used as it was only invented at the end of the century. In the Iberian Peninsula, cork agglomerate only began to be produced significantly after the First World War (Flores, 2003: 60; Filipe and Afonso, 2010: 39; Parejo Moruno, 2010: 37-38). Therefore, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the cork industry could only work with natural cork stoppers. This meant that not only the corks with the largest calibre had industrial use but also the quality of cork was, even more than today, a fundamental factor in the manufacture of stoppers, since the worst categories could originate stoppers with their sealing functions compromised. Additionally, corks without quality and waste did not have any industrial use, which devalued these products immensely. Thus, the quality of cork, a crucial aspect today, was fundamental in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Besides quality, the loss of vigour of the cork oak trees and, ultimately, their death reduce the amount of cork that can be extracted from each tree. This is particularly relevant because the supply of raw material is one of the most critical aspects of the cork industry, essentially because it is the main cost factor of the entire industry. For instance, in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century cork industry, the raw material corresponded to more than 70 per cent of the cost structure. That was true even in manufacturing units where the productive logic had already replaced, at least in part, labour intensive for capital intensive production (Fáisca, 2019b: 168-169). With such preponderance, the possibility for the cork industry to have cork at competitive prices was decisive for achieving commercial success in international markets that absorbed the vast majority of Iberian cork products (Parejo Moruno, 2010: 59).

The domestic supply of raw material, by its turn, depends on the national forest production of cork and on the customs policy that can prevent or facilitate

the export of raw cork to other countries. In the case of the two Iberian countries, during the period under examination here, the policy regarding the export of raw cork was relatively free, sometimes with the absence of any obstacles, sometimes with the imposition of low customs tariffs (Faísca, 2019b: 240-252). There were, however, two exceptions. In Spain, in the Catalonia region, where most of the Spanish cork industry was located, the export of raw cork was heavily penalized or even banned until 1877. From then on, it still paid a customs fee. However, most of the forestry production of cork in Spain was in Southwest regions, essentially Andalusia and Extremadura. In these, except for 1876-77, the exports of raw cork were always facilitated. In Portugal, the export of raw cork did not have any major restrictions until 1910. From then onwards, all cork that was not cooked, scraped, cut, and duly bandaged could not be exported (Flores, 2003: 158-159). Therefore, in the 19th century, both Spain and Portugal presented similar policies regarding exporting raw cork. This meant that significant differences between the two countries concerning the supply of prime matter were restricted to each national production, which, among other issues, depended on the use of cork oak forest soil.

It is noteworthy to explain that cork sustained an important economic sector for both countries during this historical period, as it was one of the main contributors to exports in Spain and in Portugal. In the latter, cork, either raw or industrially transformed, became, in a little more than half a century, the second most important item of the country exportations from a share of 2.6 per cent of the total Portuguese exports in 1850, to 12.4 per cent in 1914 (Lains, 2003: 75). Only wine had a bigger share. In Spain, the importance of the cork sector in exportations was smaller, but nevertheless the share of the exports of cork was around 3 per cent of the total, far from being of little relevance (Parejo Moruno, 2010: 19). It also supported about 1,250 factories which employed over 36,000 Spanish workers at the end of the 19th century (Parejo Moruno, 2010: 88).

Consequently, the economic importance of cork in rural properties grew quickly over the 19th century. The list of authors who have referred to it, whether writing at that time or more recently, is vast. Silva Picão, for instance, claimed in 1903 that "Nobody ignores how much cork is demanded and paid with prices that would look fantastic to our grandparents" (Picão, 1947: 42). In the same sense, economic historiography identified cork, from the mid-19th century onwards, as the main product of the primary sector of the Southwest of the Iberian Peninsula (Serrano Vargas, 2007; Martins, 2005; Parejo Moruno, Faísca and Rangel Preciado, 2013; Branco and Silva, 2017). In the specific case of Portugal, cork represented the highest growth rate of all agroforestry products between 1870 and 1930 (Branco and Silva, 2017: 222). Thus, the ability for producing cork became the major factor for calculating the market value of rural properties (Martins, 2005: 246). In fact, in several statistics that present the revenue of forestry products, cork is the most

valued element. It is the case of two municipalities in Southern Portugal, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Gross average income by forest product in the *Montados* in late 19<sup>th</sup> century

Municipality	Corn	Cork	Wood	Pasture
Santiago do Cacém (1894)	13.17%	76.03%	4.96%	3.16%
Odemira (1891)	17.33%	79.71%	3.87%	2.77%

Source: Calculated from the following documents: for Santiago do Cacém, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Ministério das Obras Públicas, Comércio e Indústria, Direcção-Geral de Agricultura, NP 901, Doc. 19; for Odemira, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Ministério da Agricultura, Direcção-Geral de Economia e Estatística Agrícola, Caixa 283, Maço 14.

Also, when compared with husbandry or other crops, cork production is one of the most economically valued resources, if not the most valuable one. This can be noted in Tables 2 and 3 respectively, for example in the municipality of Alvito where the net average income is more significant than the one from the husbandry of pigs.

Table 2: Net average income in the *Montados* of the municipality of Alvito (1884)

Parish	Husbandry (Pigs)			Cork	
	Surface (Hectare)	Number of pigs	Value (Réis)	Production	Value (Réis)
Alvito	3.515	1.230	7.380.000	248.000	14.880.000
Baronia	2.160	712	4.272.000	1.978	2.100.000
Total	5.675	1.942	11.652.000	283.000	16.980.000

Source: (Pery, 1885: 36).

Then, when compared with all the main grain crops, cork presented a net income per hectare higher than any – wheat, barley, rye, oats and maize – with the exception of rice. However, rice cultivation was restricted to the existence of stable supply of water, which in the cork regions of the Southwest of the Iberian Peninsula was something that was found only in very few places, unlike the cork oak.

Table 3: Net yield per hectare, expressed in *réis*, of grain crops, cork, and olive oil in Santiago do Cacém and Alvito in late 19<sup>th</sup> century

Crop/Product	Santiago do Cacém (1894)	Alvito (1884)
Rice	20.430	–
Cork	9.585	11.800
Maize	8.870	7.800
Wheat	8.035	3.526
Olive oil	6.585	9.777
Barley	4.620	4.026
Oats	3.650	3.165
Rye	3.225	2.328

Source: For Santiago do Cacém, the same as Table 1, and for Alvito the same as Table 2.

## 2. Sources and methods

As far as we know, sources that describe the cultural practices in the soils of cork oak forests in the Iberian Peninsula of the 19<sup>th</sup> century are scarce. Notwithstanding, it is possible to gather information from different types of sources. On the Portuguese side, here we use mainly official reports written by specialized technicians – agronomists, civil engineers, geologists, etc. – working for the Portuguese state and the published memoirs of an important Alentejo farmer and landowner. Describing these sources in chronological order, the survey of the state of the cork and holm oak forests in the municipality of Ponte de Sor, located in one of the main regions of forestry production of cork in Portugal – Alto Alentejo –, appears first. This document, produced by the *Comissão Geológica e Mineralógica*<sup>5</sup>, directed by the Civil Engineer Charles Bonnet, dates 1851. It resulted from several journeys that this commission did to the Alentejo to produce an exhaustive survey of the region for the future publication of the Physical and Geological Map of Portugal (Leitão, 2004: 58). Although the Map was not completed during this commission, it generated a great deal of knowledge about the physical geography in the south of Portugal, including forests and agricultural use of the soil. A similar situation occurred with the information obtained in the official publication of the *Direcção-Geral de Agricultura* – the State organism for the Portuguese Agriculture – the *Boletim da Direcção-Geral de Agricultura*. The similarities between the two documents are remarkable, since the latter was produced in the context of several journeys made

<sup>5</sup> To better understand the objectives and actions of the *Comissão Geológica e Mineralógica* see Leitão (2004).

by a team led by Gerardo Pery, in the 1880s and 1890s, to complete the Agriculture Map of Portugal, which they never did.

Nevertheless, provisional results were published and those are the ones we gathered information from. Moreover, António Filipe da Silva, the agronomist of the Portuguese State to the Portalegre district, signed an extensive report in 1904 that focused only on the cultural practices of the cork oak forests in Alto Alentejo, on which we have based a significant part of our analysis. Finally, among other sources with less information, we used the work of the farmer and landowner José da Silva Picão, published the first time in 1903, which describes the Alentejo agricultural practices and several other aspects of rural life (Picão, 1947).

On the Spanish side, due to the existence of a more significant number of studies on this topic, we used exhaustively contemporary bibliography published by major authors. They studied the cork oak forests from forestry, economic, or economic history perspectives. These were the cases of the works of Antonio Linares, Santiago Zapata Blanco, Pablo Campos, or Gregorio Montero, among others (Linares Luján and Zapata Blanco, 2003; Pulido, Campos and Montero, 2003). Regarding 19th-century sources, we analysed the book of Salvador Céron (1879), a renowned Spanish Forestry Engineer and Botanist, on the agroforestry sector in the Andalusian province of Cádiz, as well as dozens of lease contracts of raw cork recorded in the Public Notaries of several villages in Extremadura (García García, 2006; García García, 2008). The latter includes information on the existence of agricultural practices in cork oak forests in the various clauses that regulated the cork extraction. Finally, we used a chorography, the *Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, written by Pascoal Madoz (Madoz, 1845-50). Composed of sixteen volumes, this Dictionary is considered one of the most complete works on the knowledge of Spanish territory in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Having described the main sources, it is critical to explain the geographical area in our analysis. We looked into the main regions of the Iberian Peninsula where cork oak grows. These are, in Portugal, Alentejo and, in Spain, Extremadura and Andalusia. In this article, Alentejo corresponds to the sum of the current Nomenclatures of Territorial Units for Statistical Purposes (NUTS III) that presently uses this designation— Alto Alentejo, Alentejo Central, Alentejo Litoral and Baixo Alentejo. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as nowadays, it was the main Portuguese raw cork producer region consisting of, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, more than 260 thousand hectares of cork oak forest of a national total of just over 366 thousand, thus approximately 71.47 per cent (Pereira, 1915: 275-276). In Spain, it is also in the autonomous communities of Extremadura and Andalusia that most the cork oak areas were located. In 1888, according to Primitivo Artigas, the cork forest area in Spain was 255 thousand hectares, of which almost 100 thousand hectares were found in these two autonomous communities, with 80 thousand being in Catalonia, especially in the province of Gerona (Artigas y Teixidor, 1888: 283). However, in

Catalonia, the cork forest areas are concentrated— Sobreirais or Alcornocales — and not extensive— Montados or Dehesas — where there is not an agro-silvo-pastoral exploitation logic. Thus, circa 40 per cent of the total area of cork oak forest in Spain at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was located in Extremadura and Andalusia, but when considering only the cork oak forests extensively explored, the figure rises to almost 60 per cent of the total. Therefore, analysing Alentejo, Extremadura and Andalusia, the vast majority of the cork oak forests areas extensively explored in the Iberian Peninsula are covered.

### 3. The use of the soil in the cork oak forests of the Iberian Peninsula

Beginning with Portugal and, therefore Alentejo, one of the best sources to understand the use of the soils of the cork oak forests in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is undoubtedly a testimony written by António Filipe da Silva, the State agronomist for the district of Portalegre, in 1904<sup>6</sup>. It is important to note that, besides being a document written by a highly specialized technician, it also reports on one of the core regions of the cork oak forests in Portugal. As a matter of fact, the district of Portalegre, which currently corresponds to the NUTSIII region of Alto Alentejo, had, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the largest NUTSIII area of cork oak forest in Portugal, with more than 71 thousand hectares (Pereira, 1915: 275-276).

This source confirms the existence of the several agroforestry practices that harmed the development of the trees, much like the ones pointed out by Vieira Natividade. Thus, to the question “what is the number of cultural operations since the clearing or sowing until the adult age for a cork oak tree?”<sup>7</sup>, the agronomist describes the deforestation of all plants with more than 15 cm in height. António Filipe da Silva acknowledges that this action caused a massive loss of organic matter in the soil. Even worse was the cultivation of grains that required the deep mobilization of the soil to grow crops like wheat or rye. The consequences were the ones already mentioned and that nowadays the Portuguese legislation forbids<sup>8</sup>. Returning to the document, it states that the next operation again involved the sowing of wheat or rye and, after the harvest, in October of the following year, more digging of the soil was done for a new crop, using now the grain that was not used before. Additionally, whenever necessary, the *pélas* were made, which is, once again, the pulling out of the plants by hand or with the aid of sachets, done by a group of women as soon as the plants began to reappear. At the end of the harvest of the second year, due to the exhaustion of the soil, a fallow period of four

6 The document can be found in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Ministério das Obras Públicas Comércio e Indústria, Direcção-Geral de Agricultura, Maço 977, Processo 161.

7 In original Portuguese language “Qual é a série d’operações culturais desde o desbravamento, ou sementeira até à idade adulta do sobreiro?”.

8 The Decree of Law n.º 11/97 prohibits any deep soil mobilization that can affect the root system of trees and destroy the natural regeneration by mechanical or other means.

or more years began, so that finally the soil could acquire some fertility from the microorganisms that decompose organic matter and promote the fixation of the atmospheric nitrogen. However, according to Vieira Natividade, the attenuation of the harmful effects done on the soil due to the cultivation of cereals with the fallow was manifestly insufficient. Firstly, the duration of the fallow, even if more than four years, was too short to restore any reasonable amount of fertility, but, above all, when the plants were successively pulled out, it left only thin vegetation that only gave the soil precarious protection. In the context of the Mediterranean climate, this situation led to the total calcination of the soil by the hot sun in the long summer and, in the rainy season, the soil that remained was washed away by the rain (Natividade, 1951: 10). This led to a reduction in the humus content, which, in the long run, would not only lower the yields of any cereal culture, but also harm the quality and quantity of the cork production (Natividade, 1951: 11).

Regarding fertilization, the scenario described by Vieira Natividade almost half a century later was already present, since António Filipe da Silva recommended that the farmer should only use the fertilizers that were already used in the cereal crops present in the interspersed areas of the cork oak forest. He stated that any amount that exceeded the cereal's requirements would be enough to stimulate vegetative activity with the help of substances made by microbes present in the soil. The fertilizers were used only due to presence of cereal crops and not to help the cork oak tree and/or the growth of cork. Finally, the agronomist claimed that, beyond weeding and giving some protection to young trees from cattle, no other care was given to the cork oaks. Therefore, the scenario was not favourable to capture the whole potential for growing the best quality cork. António Filipe da Silva himself recognized his lack of scientific knowledge on the cork oak forests because neither had he analysed, experienced, or gained any specific knowledge that could guide him. Thus, he used the works of M. Wagner, director of the Darmstadt Agronomic Station in Germany, which concentrated on the fruit trees as a proxy to cork oak trees.

The agricultural monograph of Moura – a municipality in Baixo Alentejo with some cork production – published in 1894 also identifies the heavy agriculture practices in the cork and holm oaks forest. In the most populous parishes in the interspersed areas of cork oak, holm oak and olive trees, the land was being cultivated with wheat, barley and oats in a total of 7,605 hectares (Portugal, 1894: 212). D. Luiz de Castro, an agronomist and future Minister, claimed that the cork oak forests should be sowed with any grain that the land could accept well (Castro, 1892-1893: 177). Moving on to primary sources, the lease contracts for cork extraction are full of information that indicates the multiple uses of the land of cork oak forests for grain crops when, for instance, warns the cork strippers that they have

to be careful not to damage the crops<sup>9</sup>. A statistical survey dated 1851, produced by the Comissão Geológica e Mineralógica, is more than clear that in almost all the cork oak forests of the Ponte de Sor municipality, in Alto Alentejo, a cereal culture coexisted with the trees. This municipality was the one with the largest cork oak forest area and with the highest forest production of cork in Alto Alentejo. Thus, of more than 4,415 tons of cork extracted in Alto Alentejo, in 1905, 800 tons, or 18.12 per cent, came from the municipality of Ponte de Sor<sup>10</sup>. As shown in Table 4, of 63 cork oak forest proprieties, 53 were pure and ten were mixed with holm oak; only ten did not have any cereal crop. Regarding the type of crop, rye predominated, followed by corn and there were still three wheat production case.

Table 4: Crop production in cork or holm oak forest properties (1851)

Properties with wheat	3 (4.35%)
Properties with maize	15 (21.74%)
Properties with rye	53 (76.81%)
Properties without any cereal crop	10 (14.50%)
Pure cork oak properties	53 (76.81%)
Pure holm oak properties	6 (8.7%)
Pure cork oak properties or with cork oak areas	63 (91.30%)
Total number of properties	69 (100.00%)

Source: Arquivo Histórico Municipal de Ponte de Sor, Administração do Concelho de Ponte de Sor, Correspondência expedida, 1851.

Note: Some proprieties had more than one crop at the same time.

Finally, the farmers not only described these practices, but also presented them as good examples of managing cork oak forests. José da Silva Picão, an important farmer in a border region between Portugal and Spain, in Elvas Municipality, confirmed that partial or total destruction of the plants was recurrent. Picão, further, recommended the absolute pulling out of the plants to allow the maximum use of the land in the interspersed areas through cereal cultivation – the so-called clearings or uproots. The only lament of this Alentejo farmer and landowner was the low frequency of clearing due to the high cost resulting from the intensive use of labour and in cases where this does not even occur due to the scarcity of resources of smallholders or the lack of interest of short-term tenants (Picão, 1947: 34). Therefore, Silva Picão concluded that with these practices “(...) everything profits, including the land, which is also used in the cultivation of cereals (...)”, since “(...)

<sup>9</sup> This document is available in Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Cartório Notarial de Montemor-O-Novo, Livro 124, fl. 135.

<sup>10</sup> This information is available at Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Ministério das Obras Públicas, Comércio e Indústria, Direcção-Geral de Agricultura, NP 853, Doc. 144.



the cork oak forests who benefit from cleaning radical and persistent show a luxuriant appearance" (Picão, 1947: 34-36). In conclusion, official reports, primary sources and the farmers' opinions point towards a scenario where the management of the soil in Alentejo, the main region of Portugal of cork oak forests, was not the most favourable for the total harnessing of the potential of raw cork production.

Nevertheless, on the Spanish side, the scenario seems very similar to the Portuguese one. Authors and sources confirm an increase in the agricultural use of the cork oak forest soil during the period in question. Considering that, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there was a widespread expansion of the area of cultivation in the Spanish southwest, with a particular focus on cereal culture, a situation of this kind would be expected. Thus, in Extremadura alone, it is estimated that about one and a half million hectares had been added to the cultivated soil in the region (Linares Luján and Zapata Blanco, 2003: 19). As in Portugal, cereal protectionism, as it will be shown later, exerted pressure on forest exploitation, increasing ploughing in the cork oak forests. However, in a period when cork and livestock also experienced a strong appreciation, the solution was to intensify the agro-silvo-pastoral logic, making the cork oak forests more agricultural, with more livestock and with more cork exploitation than before (Linares Luján and Zapata Blanco, 2003: 23; Ezquerro Boticario, 2009: 6). The conclusion seems clear, during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in Extremadura and Andalusian regions, there was an increase in cultivated areas, especially cereals, as well as the adoption of shorter rotations, which meant an increase in the agricultural component of these forest areas (Zapata Blanco, 1986: 981).

Consequently, there was a growth in the soil wear risk, just like Vieira Natividade pointed out for Alentejo and the 19<sup>th</sup>-century sources confirmed. In fact, the Spanish authors of the 19<sup>th</sup> century recommended the complete extraction of all plants, claiming that this work on the soil is not only convenient, but also necessary so that trees could grow better and reduce the risk of fire (Pulido, Campos and Montero, 2003: 33). However, bare soil was subject to substantial variations of the Mediterranean climate with adverse effects on soil fertility, leading other Spanish specialists, such as agronomist Ramón Paredes, in 1875, to advise prudence in the way agricultural expansion was carried out. He feared, especially, that it could lead to high deforestation and, consequently, the impoverishment of the soil (Linares Luján and Zapata Blanco, 2003: 21).

Moving now to specific cases, it is apparent that from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in the cork and holm oak forests of Azuaga, province of Badajoz, Extremadura, the grazes became more frequent. With a periodicity of two to three years, the objective was sowing wheat, rye, and barley, by this order (Gallego Fernández and García Novo, 1997: 34). The ecological consequences were such that, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the mountainous area in the south of the region became a secondary forest system, with soils subject to great erosion (Gallego Fernández and García Novo, 1997: 42). Like in Portugal, several cork lease contracts referred to the

ploughing and cereal use of the soil. For instance, in 1853, in Cabeza de la Vaca, province of Badajoz, Extremadura, a contract stated that "(...) within the circle that comprises the sown area it will not be possible to extract and pack the cork up until the farmers do the harvest of the crop. (...)" (García García, 2006: 73). There are several examples regarding the ploughing of the soil, but we wish to highlight a contract, concluded in Jerez de los Caballeros, province of Badajoz, Extremadura, in 1865. In this document, it is stated that "(...) being of the responsibility of the tenant the cleaning of the cork oaks in the necessary part, so that it produces cork (...) when the land is ploughed, the owner, D. Angel Esteban Sánchez, can clean the branches (...)" (García García, 2008: 60). Meanwhile, in the province of Cádiz, in Andalusia, a source reports the proliferation of grazes and fires to obtain a "clean" land suitable for annual crops, making more than 20 thousand hectares populated with cork oak trees sterile and "(...) exposed in all their nudity to the devastating effects of climatic agents (...)" (Cerón, 1879: 89).

Finally, in the seminal work *Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, published between 1846 and 1850 by Pascual Madoz, references to situations as the ones we have described are multiple and transversal to the entire Spanish Southwest. To name a few examples, in Zafra, province of Badajoz, Extremadura, a propriety that contained about 5.500 holm oaks and 6.000 cork oaks had several plants like rock rose, broom, mastic, rosemary, heather, among other bushes, that were grazed and burned to prepare the soil to sow with wheat and barley (...)" (Madoz, 1850: 442-443). Further north in Cerezo, province of Cáceres, still in Extremadura, but circa 250 km from the previous example, there was also a property "(...) populated by holm oak and cork oak trees, which is sowed every three years (...)" (Madoz, 1847: 330-331). In the south, to focus on an Andalusian case, in Beal de la Jara, province of Seville, the Sierra Morena is "(...) populated with holm oak and cork oak trees, with little production, because to be able to sow it is necessary to create a propriety with graze and burn of the bushes (...)" (Madoz, 1847: 379).

We can conclude that although there is some scarcity of historical sources, the available information suggests that in the Spanish southwest the problems identified in Alentejo were the same. Concretely, due to the strong agricultural use of the interspersed areas of the cork oak forests, there were periodic mobilizations of the soil, the extraction of all the plants or, at least, with that intention, and a regular cereal crop, especially of wheat and rye, which probably competed with the development of the cork oak and enhanced soil depletion. Recent studies have been reaffirming the negative consequences for the soil, since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of the intensification of agricultural practices that, in many cases, have broken the balance of the agro-silvo-pastoral ecosystems. The total suppression of vegetation, the reduction of manure and the use of nitrogen-deficient fertilizers led to an erosive process and the breakdown of organic matter,

impoverishing the soil with consequences that extend to the present day (Carmo, 2018: 47-51).

#### **4. Institutional and political context of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Spain and Portugal: Behind the misuse of the soil of the cork oak forests**

The Iberian cork oak forests scenario was quite similar and reflected at least three probable causes felt in very analogous ways on both sides of the border. First, there was a general scarcity of scientific studies and a lack of qualification regarding the cork oak forests among specialized technicians in both countries, which is confirmed, for example, in the words of the agronomist of the district of Portalegre. Then, there was also a deficiency of knowledge about the cork oak ecosystem by farmers, something we can extract from the memories of Silva Picão, which probably is related to a deficient primary and secondary educational system. Finally, there were strong state incentives for cereal production in Spain and Portugal in this historical period and, simultaneously, an absence of legal protection and/or any incentive in the forestry policy for the cork oak tree.

The first two issues are related as they come from the underdevelopment of education and the scientific research about cork oak forests, both in Spain and Portugal, in the 19th century. In reality, the scientific research on the Mediterranean forest, where the cork oak tree is included, was almost inexistent. In forestry education, contents related to these trees were of little relevance (Faísca, 2019b: 290-307). Both situations had the same origin, the large influence that dasonomy, the forest science developed in Germany, had on Iberian forestry until the beginning of the 20th century. A good part of the first Portuguese and Spanish foresters was trained in German schools or were strongly influenced by German forestry education (García Pereda, 2018; Faísca, 2019b: 306). In the absence of Mediterranean species in German territory, as is the case of the cork oak, dasonomy did not include them, so the research and teaching propagated by Portuguese and Spanish forest engineers did not consider the harmful effect of the practices. In fact, as already mentioned, António Filipe da Silva, with a Degree by the Agrarian Superior Institute of Lisbon, recognized this gap by supporting his answers on cultural techniques in the cork oak forests of Alto Alentejo in German bibliography. In Spain, the situation was similar, just like Primitivo Artigas, one of the few Spanish experts on the cork oak at the time, recognized in 1875. He claimed that "(...) although this species [the cork oak] is one of the most profitable ones, it has not yet been sufficiently studied under a dasonomical point of view, not even has been applied to these trees the scientific precepts that the physical-natural sciences advice" (Artigas y Teixidor, 1875: 27). In addition to the lack of education on cork oak forests, the number of Iberian forest engineers was limited for the size of the territory, especially in the Portuguese case where they did not exceed a dozen at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Radich and Alves, 2000: 94). Additionally, among the few forestry

engineers working in Iberian forests, their actions were directed to other problems, so even few who were assigned to areas of cork oak forests only achieved practical results well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The chronic scarcity of means and, once again, the lack of adaptation between dasonomy taught to them and the valorisation of the Mediterranean forest wealth, dictated it (Linares Luján, 2002: 570-573).

Outside of higher education and scientific research, at basic and secondary education levels, where farmers like Silva Picão could acquire knowledge about the cork oak trees, the panorama was also not encouraging. First of all, it should be noted that the implementation of an educational system with reasonable national coverage suffered from a chronic lack of financial resources that affected the Iberian States throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Additionally, forestry education, which was often included in agricultural education, was of little importance, while cork oak contents were practically non-existent (Faísca, 2019b: 290-307). A good example is the creation of the Portuguese Practical Agriculture Schools network in the late 1880s, intended for elementary agricultural education. Of the six that opened to the public, in only one, in Portalegre, the study plan presupposed the existence of a discipline related to cork oak forests. However, this school had a short life of only six years, therefore predictably with little impact on the formation of managers of Portuguese cork oak forests (Faísca, 2019b: 293-294).

Farmers and other agricultural workers with less formal education are represented in higher illiteracy rates in rural areas, and less frequency in schools (Faísca, 2019b: 304-305). In Table 5, we can find the example of Badajoz's secondary school, Extremadura, where, according to the fathers' profession, the students of agricultural background are the less numerous.

Table 5: Number of students registered in Badajoz's secondary school, according to the fathers' profession (1877-1900)

Professional sector of the father	1877	1887	1900
Agriculture	0,15	0,21	0,22
Industry	0,39	0,52	0,48
Commerce	0,72	1,40	1,90
Liberal professions	5,30	10,33	12,15
Public workers	3,24	3,02	7,80

Source: (Sánchez Pascua, 1985: 123-125).

Note: The numbers match the number of students for each one thousand workers in each professional sector.

The lack of research and educational content about cork oak trees in Iberian countries is also a consequence of forestry policies aimed at other problems than the growth and improvement of cork production. In reality, Portugal and Spain's forestry policies were conditioned by the interests of agriculture and, once again, by the German dasonomy. Thus, the state's efforts in forestry matters were oriented towards the fixation of dunes and mountain soil to prevent the expansion of sand to agricultural land and, in the latter, to regularize river flows and stop the subsidence of land over crops (Faísca, 2017: 25). At the same time, from the 1870s, in Spain, and the 1880s, in Portugal, an agricultural policy of strong protection of domestic cereal production was implemented. Either by fixing administrative prices, imposing high import tariffs, or both, the Iberian states began in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a policy to promote cereal cultivation that extended almost until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. In Iberian agriculture, wheat was the most protected cereal, precisely the most widespread in the drylands of the Southwest Peninsular regions populated by cork oaks trees. This way, the Iberian agricultural policy promoted the dispute by the cereal culture over territories and natural resources with the cork oaks trees, harming the forest production of cork according to the examples cited in this work (Costa, Miranda and Lains, 2011: 307-308; Faísca, 2019b: 261-290). In reality, it was nothing new, since both States followed a secular concern of the populations of the Mediterranean areas of the Iberian Peninsula: agriculture soil was seen as more important than forests, with the trees being often destroyed due to the agricultural needs of the populations (Branco, 2005: 63).

## Conclusions

Contrary to what has been occurring since, roughly, the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the world leader in the cork business was Spain and not Portugal. This happened despite the potential advantage in the supply of cork by Portugal, which is due to edaphoclimatic reasons, a key factor for competitiveness in a business where around 70 per cent of the industry's cost structure was derived from the raw material. Several factors might explain Spain's leading position. In this article, we focused on the supply of raw material both in quantity and quality, based on the influence of the use of the soil of the cork oak forests on the cork produced there. This aspect is mentioned in the Portuguese cork oak bibliography, published in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as one of the main causes of the reduction, both qualitative and quantitative, of the cork's potential in Portugal and with a historical background. We questioned whether the 19<sup>th</sup>-century sources confirmed what half a century later was claimed and, from a comparative perspective, whether the cork oak trees also suffered from the same problem in Spain. If not, that would be an advantage that could help explaining the better performance of the Spanish cork

business in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, the main conclusion of this study is that, both in Portugal and Spain, the harmful agricultural practices— soil mobilization, excessive deforestation, intensive cereal cultivation, among others – were common. We did not identify, by the way the soil was treated, any advantage for the Spanish cork business, neither any disadvantage. We identified a set of practices with negative effects in the medium and long term from an economic point of view, for the reasons mentioned and from an environmental one. In this case, the practices identified probably led to the impoverishment of soils and the land use breakdown. In fact, this is precisely what Vieira Natividade and Jaime Salazar Sampaio, two renowned Portuguese scientists and forest engineers, noticed for the Portuguese Southern Region of Alentejo in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They would most likely have reported the same problems if they had studied the Spanish Southwest's cork and holm oak forests with the similar detail.

When we look into Spain and Portugal's political and institutional context in this historical period, it is without any doubt that the agroforestry practices of the two countries were, at least, quite similar, since the whole framework was also very similar. Scientific research on the cork oak ecosystem was underdeveloped due to, among other aspects, the influence of German dasonomy on Iberian forestry. Designed to be applied in Central Europe's forests, forest science in vogue in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was not prepared to deal with the specificities of Mediterranean forests, especially with the multifunctional systems of the cork and holm oak forests. In addition to science itself, dasonomy was also present in forestry higher education in Spain and Portugal, which influenced Iberian agronomists and foresters. At the other levels of education, more likely to be attended by farmers and landowners, forestry content was hardly taught in a system that, in turn, had little representation in rural societies of Spain and Portugal. At the same time, the Iberian agricultural policy favoured cereal cultivation, encouraging it in the cork oak forests. Moreover, the forestry policy did not protect the soils of the cork forest areas contrary to what currently occurs.

In sum, economically all the potential for cork production was not fully explored and, ecologically, the soil depletion probably favoured regional environmental, economic and, consequently, human desertification, since the land lost a part of its fertility. Ecologically, the soil became more vulnerable to erosive processes, especially rainfall erosion, with negative impacts on ecosystems and on rural landscapes, that are still felt today (Gonçalves, 2017). Particularly, the consequences covered the weakening of the potential for oak forests, the loss of shrub biodiversity and, indirectly, of fauna. Despite the conflict between the use of intensive agricultural land and forest soil in cork oak forests, which only began to be discussed systematically well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the truth is that it was already noticed earlier. For this reason, in 1915, the preliminary draft of the constitution of the Union of Portuguese Cork Producers, a production cooperative, mentioned

it. The document considered it a positive that "(...) the government, through the Inspection of Forest Services, establishes the necessary penalties to avoid (...) that, due to the exaggerated treatment of the cork oak soil (...), the good quality of cork is harmed (...)" (Pessanha, 1915: 12).

Therefore, what explains the preponderance of the Spanish cork industry in the 19<sup>th</sup> century despite the advantage of Portugal in the supply of raw material which, as we saw, was not exploited in a more harmful way in any of the two countries? A recent PhD thesis argues that the idea of an underutilization of the Portuguese cork potentialities, claimed by many authors of the time (Nunes, 1905; Cabreira, 1914), is somehow a biased perspective (Faísca, 2019b: 320-321). As a matter of fact, the Portuguese cork sector evolved, in less than a century, from its birth to world leadership. This happened in a very competitive market in which some of the most industrialized countries on the planet participated. Being in one of the most peripheral economies of Europe, the 19<sup>th</sup> century seems more an initial stage of a success story for the Portuguese cork business than otherwise. It should be noted that the Spanish cork business was already established in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, while the Portuguese didn't really start until a century later. Additionally, Spanish industry, concentrated in Catalonia, combined closeness to large consumer markets, such as France, with proximity to raw materials. Around mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Spanish corks already had a high prestige in foreign markets. Nevertheless, throughout this period the Portuguese cork business grew continuously and also changed its structure, from supplier of raw material to seller of industrial products, generating a growing increase in domestic retained added value. Thus, the added value of the cork industry went from 1,1 per cent of the total added value of the Portuguese industry in 1850 to 7 per cent in 1910; the number of industrial workers, in the same period, grown from 164 to 6.634 (Lains, 2003: 138); and, finally, the industrial exports changed from a share of only ca. 3 per cent of fully transformed products, in 1860s, to 40 per cent in 1914 (Faísca, 2019b: 159).

Thus, the Portuguese cork business had, in the «long» 19<sup>th</sup> century, a fairly positive evolution. It could have been boosted by state action and/or private economic agents, as it came to be in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, in problems such as those covered in this article. However, the absence of that impulse did not provide a particular disadvantage in relation to the Spanish cork business. The disadvantage was already there, for historical reasons, when the exploitation of the cork industry appeared in Portugal almost a hundred years after starting in Spain. Despite this gap, the inequality between the two countries was reduced over the 19<sup>th</sup> century and, some decades later, the situation reversed with the help of State intervention in forestry, industry and commerce of cork products (Zapata Blanco, 2002; Branco, 2005; Parejo Moruno, 2010).

## Bibliography

- ARTIGAS Y TEIXIDOR, Primitivo (1875), *El alcornoque y la industria taponera*, Madrid, Imp. Manuel Tello.
- ARTIGAS Y TEIXIDOR, Primitivo (1888), "Noticia sobre el alcornoque y la industria corchera", *Revista de Montes*, 12, 282-291.
- ASSOCIAÇÃO PORTUGUESA DE CORTIÇA (2020a), *Boletim Estatístico 19/20*, Santa Maria da Feira, Associação Portuguesa de Cortiça.
- ASSOCIAÇÃO PORTUGUESA DE CORTIÇA (2020b), *Montado* [online] Available at <https://www.apcor.pt/montado/floresta/> [Consult: 2 May 2020].
- BRANCO, Amélia (2005), *O impacto das florestas no crescimento económico moderno durante o Estado Novo (1930-1974)*, PhD Thesis, Lisboa, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.
- BRANCO, Amélia, SILVA, Ester Gomes da (2017), "Growth, Institutional Change and Innovation", in Dulce Freire, Pedro Lains (eds.), *An Agrarian History of Portugal, 1000-2000*, Leiden, Brill, 219-244.
- CABREIRA, Tomás (1914), "A questão corticeira", in *Congresso Regional Algarvio*, Lisboa, Typ. A Tentadora, 1-16.
- CARMO, Miguel (2018), *Solo e agricultura no século XX português: um problema ambiental, histórico e epistemológico*, PhD Thesis, Lisboa, Universidade de Lisboa.
- CASTRO, D. Luiz (1892-1893), "Revista agrícola", *Portugal Agrícola*, 1(4), 41-42.
- CERÓN, Salvador (1879), *Industria forestal-agrícola*, Cádiz, Biblioteca Nacional Económica.
- COSTA, Leonor Freire, MIRANDA, Susana Münch, LAINS, Pedro (2011), *História Económica de Portugal*, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros.
- EZQUERRA Boticario, Francisco (2009), "Los sistemas de dehesa en la península ibérica: reflexiones acerca de su génesis, historia, dinámica y gestión", in *Congreso Forestal Español: Montes y sociedad: Saber qué hacer*, Ávila, Sociedad Española de Ciencias Forestales, 1-14.
- FAÍSCA, Carlos Manuel (2015), "Criando uma desvantagem? A regulação contratual das práticas suberícolas em Espanha e Portugal (1852-1914)", *Revista Portuguesa de História*, 46, 413-431.
- FAÍSCA, Carlos Manuel (2017), "Promovendo a subercultura? A política florestal de Espanha e Portugal (1852-1914)", *Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria*, n.º 1701.
- FAÍSCA, Carlos Manuel (2019a), "Lagging Behind or Catching Up? The Mechanization of the Portuguese Cork Industry (1880-1914)", *Revista de História Industrial*, 76(Año XXVIII), 49-77.
- FAÍSCA, Carlos Manuel (2019b), *El negocio corchero en Alentejo: producción forestal, industria y política económica*, PhD Thesis, Badajoz, Universidad de Extremadura.
- FILIPPE, Graça, AFONSO, Fátima (coord.) (2010), *Quem diz cortiça, diz Mundet*, Seixal, Município de Seixal.
- FLORES, Alexandre M. (2003), *Almada na História da indústria corticeira e do movimento operário: da Regeneração ao Estado Novo (1860-1930)*, Almada, Câmara Municipal.
- GALLEGO FERNÁNDEZ, Juan B., GARCÍA NOVO, Francisco (1997), "Las dehesas de Azuaga (Badajoz): Análisis de cinco siglos de Historia Ecológica", *Pastos: Revista de la Sociedad Española para el Estudio de los Pastos*, 27(1), 29-46.
- GARCÍA GARCÍA, Antonio (2006), *Explotación comercial del corcho en la provincia de Badajoz: siglo XIX (Alburquerque y San Vicente de Alcántara)*, Badajoz, Junta de Extremadura.
- GARCÍA GARCÍA, Antonio (2008), *Explotación comercial e industrial del corcho en la provincia de Badajoz: Jerez de los Caballeros y Mérida (1833-1912)*, Badajoz, Editora Regional de Extremadura.
- GARCÍA PEREDA, Ignacio (2018), *Experts Florestais: Os primeiros silvicultores em Portugal*, PhD Thesis, Évora, Universidade de Évora.
- GOES, João Maria, TENREIRO, Paulo (2001), *A gestão do montado de sobre na charneca de Ponte de Sor*, Ponte de Sor, Associação de Produtores Agroflorestais de Ponte de Sor.



- GONÇALVES, Maria de Lurdes Fernandes (2017), *Recolha e Análise da informação relativa ao tratamento do fenómeno da desertificação nos PMOT da região do Alentejo*, Master's Dissertation, Évora, Universidade de Évora.
- LAINS, Pedro (2003), *Os progressos do atraso: uma nova história económica de Portugal, 1842-1992*, Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
- LEITÃO, Vanda (2004), *As primeiras Comissões Geológicas portuguesas (1848-1868)*, Phd Thesis, Lisboa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia.
- LINARES LUJÁN, Antonio (2002), *El proceso de privatización de los patrimonios de titularidad pública en Extremadura, 1750-1936*, Phd Thesis, Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona.
- LINARES LUJÁN, Antonio, ZAPATA BLANCO, Santiago (2003), "Una visión panorámica de ocho siglos", in Fernando Pulido, Pablo Campos, Gregorio Monteiro (eds.), *La gestión forestal de las dehesas*, Mérida, IPROCOR, 13-28.
- MADOZ, Pascual (1847-1850), *Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, Madrid, Vols. VI (1847) e XVI (1850).
- MARTINS, Conceição Andrade (2005), "A Agricultura", in Pedro Lains, Álvaro Ferreira da Silva (eds.), *História económica de Portugal*, Vol. II - O século XIX, Lisboa, Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 219-259.
- NATIVIDADE, Joaquim Vieira (1950), *Subercultura*, Lisboa, Ministério da Economia.
- NATIVIDADE, Joaquim Vieira (1951), *A defesa do solo dos sobreiraís*, Lisboa, Junta Nacional de Cortiça.
- NUNES, Jacintho (1905), *Relatório sobre a questão corticeira*, Lisboa, Typ. A Vapor.
- PAREJO MORUNO, Francisco, FAÍSCA, Carlos Manuel, RANGEL PRECIADO, Jose (2013), "Los orígenes de las actividades corcheras en Extremadura: el corcho extremeño entre catalanes e ingleses", *Revista de Estudios Extremeños*, 69(1), 461-490.
- PAREJO MORUNO, Francisco (2010), *El negocio del corcho en España durante el siglo XX*, Madrid, Banco de España.
- PEREIRA, José Campos (1915), *A propriedade rústica em Portugal: superfícies, produções, rendimentos, valores*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional.
- PERY, Gerardo (1885), *Estatística agrícola do districto de Beja: concelho de Alvito*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional.
- PESSANHA, José Maria (1915), *União dos produtores de cortiça portugueses: ante-projecto*, Cascais, Typ. Cardim.
- PICÃO, José da Silva (1947), *Através dos campos: usos e costumes agrícolas alentejanos*, 2.<sup>a</sup> ed., Lisboa, Neogravura.
- PORTUGAL, Ministério das Obras Públicas, Comércio e Indústria, Direcção-Geral de Agricultura (1894), "Monografia do concelho de Moura", *Boletim da Direcção-Geral de Agricultura*, 2(VI ano), 212-291.
- PULIDO, Fernando, CAMPOS, Pablo, MONTERO, Gregorio (eds.), *La gestión forestal de las dehesas*, Mérida, IPROCOR.
- RADICH, Maria Carlos, ALVES, António Monteiro (2000), *Dois séculos de floresta em Portugal*, Lisboa, CELPA.
- SÁNCHEZ PÁSCUA, Felicidad (1985), *Política y educación: incidencias en el Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza de Badajoz (1845-1900)*, Badajoz, Diputación Provincial de Badajoz.
- SERRANO VARGAS, Antonio (2007), *El corcho en la sierra norte sevillana: producción, comercialización y transformación industrial en los siglos XIX y XX*, Phd Thesis, Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla.
- ZAPATA BLANCO, Santiago (2002), "Del suro a la cortiça. El ascenso de Portugal a primera potencia corchera del mundo", *Revista de Historia Industrial*, 22, 109-137.
- ZAPATA BLANCO, Santiago et al. (dir.) (2012), *Jaime Salazar Sampaio: textos de economia corticeira, 1951-1988*, Bragança, Instituto Politécnico de Bragança.



Pires, Leonardo Aboim - A “economia nacional corporativa” e a expressão política dos interesses: orizicultores e industriais nos anos 30. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 107-124.

## **A “economia nacional corporativa” e a expressão política dos interesses: orizicultores e industriais nos anos 30<sup>1</sup>**

LEONARDO ABOIM PIRES\*  
CEIS20, Universidade de Coimbra

### **Resumo**

Este artigo demonstra como os conflitos de interesse e a crescente pressão das elites económicas estiveram na origem do intervencionismo económico na institucionalização do Estado Novo. Através do sector orizícola, é nossa intenção compreender como a moldura institucional do comportamento económico foi reestruturada num período de crise e como o corporativismo foi a forma encontrada para realizar os reajustamentos necessários para um desempenho económico diferente.

**Palavras-chave:** agricultura, corporativismo, economia política, Estado Novo, orizicultura.

### **Abstract**

*The “national corporative economy” and the political expression of interests: rice growers and industrialists in the 1930s*

This article demonstrates how the role of conflict of interests and increased pressure from economic elites were at the origin of economic interventionism during the institutionalisation of *Estado Novo*. Through the rice sector, we aim to shed light on how the institutional framework of economic behaviour was re-structured during a crisis and how corporatism was the solution found to make the necessary arrangements for a different economic performance.

**Keywords:** agriculture, corporatism, political economy, *Estado Novo*, rice growing.

<sup>1</sup> Uma primeira versão deste texto foi apresentada a 6 de dezembro de 2019, na Conferência Internacional «Construção do Estado, Movimentos Sociais e Economia Política», realizada na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

\*E-mail: leonardo.a.pires@uc.pt

## Résumé

### «L'économie nationale corporative» et l'expression politique des intérêts: riziculteurs et industriels dans les années 30

Cet article montre comment les conflits d'intérêts et la pression croissante des élites économiques ont été à l'origine de l'interventionnisme économique dans l'institutionnalisation de l'*Estado Novo*. À travers le secteur du riz, nous avons l'intention de comprendre comment le cadre institutionnel du comportement économique a été restructuré en période de crise et comment le corporatisme a été la forme adoptée pour effectuer les ajustements nécessaires pour une performance économique différente.

Mots-clés: agriculture, corporatisme, économie politique, *Estado Novo*, riziculture.

## Introdução

A construção do regime corporativo português revela-se como uma consequência da crise de 1929, apresentando-se como uma doutrina habilitada a dissipar divergências entre patronato e trabalhadores. Acima de tudo, o corporativismo tornou-se numa forma de criar um aparelho económico ordenado segundo as diretrizes do Estado, lançando as bases para uma “economia nova” (Garrido, 2016), coordenando os vários sectores produtivos, com especial enfoque na agricultura e pescas.

Na orizicultura, este processo foi particularmente relevante, envolvendo a produção agrícola, o processamento industrial e a comercialização. Mimetizando algumas características passíveis de serem observadas noutros cereais, no caso do arroz encontram-se elementos demonstrativos de conflitos intrassectoriais entre produtores e os industriais de descasque. Tal facto extravasou a sua realidade interna, existindo uma pressão das elites ligadas ao sector sobre as instituições políticas. O repertório de intervenção pública destas classes focou-se na imprensa periódica e em representações e reclamações dirigidas a vários ministérios, por intermédio de entidades patronais. Sintoma da circulação global dos produtos, as práticas de dumping eram uma das críticas apontadas, contribuindo para um quadro de crescente apelo da intervenção estatal na preservação da produção nacional perante os ímpetos dos países exportadores, nomeadamente Itália e Espanha, principais concorrentes nos mercados externos.

Perante tal cenário, a arbitragem política da situação acabou por fazer uso do modelo corporativo, realidade transversal a outros subsectores, culminando num modelo de articulação vertical da orizicultura com a indústria do descasque. Em 1933, à semelhança da cerealicultura (Amaral, 1996), da hortofruticultura (Pires, 2018) ou da vinicultura (Freire, 2010), foi criado o organismo de coordenação económica responsável pela regulação sectorial, a Comissão Reguladora do

Comércio de Arroz (CRCA), seguindo-se o Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz (GIDA), em 1934. A CRCA focou-se no incremento e escoamento da produção interna, controlo dos preços e na proteção aos produtores. Por ser turno, o GIDA pretendeu assegurar as margens de lucros dos associados, verificando-se, através dos requerimentos apresentados à Direcção-Geral da Indústria, um investimento no capital fixo, com a remodelação e reconversão de algumas unidades com maquinismos mais modernos.

Como objetivo principal deste estudo é a análise da realidade económica do sector orizícola na década de 1930, averiguando o papel das forças socioeconómicas em presença, mostrando-o como exemplo do processo de implantação institucional do corporativismo e quais as suas consequências na formulação teórica e prática da economia política nos primeiros anos do Estado Novo. A base heurística foi documentação do Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, além de alguns periódicos nos quais foi possível reunir os vários ofícios e representações ligados ao sector. Outras fontes relevantes foram o *Boletim do Trabalho Industrial e o Anuário Estatístico de Portugal*, onde foi possível coletar alguns dados quantitativos. Todavia, outros eram inexistentes, nomeadamente, informações sobre a dimensão dos estabelecimentos e capacidade produtiva instalada das fábricas de descasque.

## 1. O contexto internacional e as organizações económicas

No início do século XIX, o arroz não se destacava na produção cerealífera nacional, marginalidade essa que começou a esbater-se a partir da década de 1850, com níveis de expansão consideráveis na Estremadura e no Ribatejo. Todavia, questões de salubridade pública ditaram um conjunto de medidas restritivas e, como resultado, entre 1870 e 1930 “houve um declínio significativo da produção deste cereal, na sequência do declínio da área cultivada determinado pela nova legislação” (Branco e Silva, 2017: 226). Estas limitações tornar-se-iam um foco de conflitos e como “a cultura do arroz sobreleva em extraordinários lucros” (Mendia, 1883: 174), os proprietários agrícolas seriam durante vários anos uma permanente força de oposição, exercendo grande influência socioeconómica nas áreas em que se encontravam (Vaquinhas, 1996).

No que se refere já ao final dos anos 20, este é feito sob o espectro da mudança a vários níveis. Desde logo, a alteração de regime, em 1926, terminando a Primeira República para dar lugar à Ditadura Militar, a que sucederia o Estado Novo. Do ponto de vista económico, ainda que arredado das dinâmicas globais do capitalismo do entre guerras, Portugal sofreu os impactos da Grande Depressão, sentindo-se “a necessidade de adaptação às condições resultantes do desaparecimento da ordem anterior” (Polanyi, 2012: 381). Observando as suas características

enquanto economia periférica, a competitividade do sistema agrícola português revelou-se enfraquecida. Se por um lado, os fatores de produção utilizados foram fortemente afetados, por outro, a transferência de rendimentos também foi abalada, uma vez que os preços agrícolas baixaram até 50%, tal como em outros países (Madsen, 2001: 332).

Num período em que se notou um recuo do comércio internacional, o que germinou no debate teórico foram os limites da transnacionalidade da circulação dos géneros agrícolas. Sendo a agricultura a base da atividade produtiva, urgia amenizar os danos provocados pela crise, pairando sobre o exercício governativo o anseio de um novo modelo de intervenção na economia, em que o “fortalecimento da autoridade” (Guimarães, 1934: 91) fosse também um requisito. Esta era, aliás, uma velha reivindicação das elites que pediam um Estado forte, capaz de proteger o mercado, impondo uma regulação autoritária da concorrência e a disciplina das reivindicações laborais. Neste clima de “fronda social” (Rosas, 1986: 17) foram estabelecidos os ditames que seriam a base do apoio conferido pelo patronato à emergência do autoritarismo. Todavia, a inércia política face ao sector primário era uma das críticas apontadas, afirmando-se que “a riqueza nacional sentirá pesadamente os seus efeitos e há-de então ouvir-se clamar contra a incúria dos nossos dirigentes”<sup>2</sup>. A Liga Agrária do Norte defendeu mesmo que “A lavoura portuguesa sofre hoje, como ontem do mesmo mal: falta de orientação, falta de continuidade, irregularidade de preços e irregular e deficiente assistência técnica” (Liga Agrária do Norte, 1933: 2). As ideias que daqui derivam assentam, não apenas na clarificação da estratégia política para a agricultura, mas também no princípio de bastar às necessidades das populações, estimular a produção interna, propiciar a oportunidade de mudança nas estruturas e nas formas de importar. Para operacionalizar estas questões, algumas lições foram colhidas nos países com características políticas análogas às portuguesas, nos quais a ação dos agentes económicos foi formatada pela procura da autarcia como superação da dependência existente.

A Itália de Mussolini era entendida como paradigma da política agrária: “no domínio rural, o Fascismo é uma guerra sem tréguas contra as forças que peiam a intensificação das produções e em favor de todos os elementos que favorecem a realização deste fim”<sup>3</sup>. Não obstante a escrita encomiástica, seriam algumas das mudanças operadas pelo regime italiano que colocariam em dificuldades o sector orizícola português. Sendo uma cultura excedentária, parte da produção de arroz italiano era escoada para os mercados externos. Porém, devido ao refluxo comercial internacional do início dos anos 30, tal procedimento encontrou dificuldades. De forma a intervir na orizicultura, o governo italiano criou, em 1931, o Ente Nazionale Risi, cujas funções passavam por “estabelecer preços mínimos para o arroz e pagar prémios aos exportadores para que eles pudessem vender, nos

2 *Actualidades*, ano IX, n.º 45, janeiro de 1933, p. 185.

3 *Gazeta das Aldeias*, 37º ano, n.º 1715, 31 de julho de 1932, p. 69.

mercados externos, abaixo dos preços mundiais” (Cardoza, 1982: 448). O seu funcionamento conduziu à cartelização do sector (Acerbi, 1980) traduzindo-se num aumento da produção que, em Bolonha, entre 1929 e 1935, foi de 12,5%. Numa representação da AIP enviada ao Ministério do Comércio, em janeiro de 1933, constata-se que “sendo para Portugal um dos países para o qual o prémio de exportação era mais elevado<sup>4</sup>, era defendido que o arroz era “oferecido CIF Tejo e Douro por quási metade do preço que é vendido no mercado interno italiano”. Esta situação destruía “a protecção que o Governo português julgou de boa justiça dar à orizicultura portuguesa<sup>5</sup>, como era referido noutra representação dirigida a Salazar, em maio de 1933.

Também a política agrária espanhola passou a votar maior atenção à sua produção de arroz, criando, em 1933, a Federación de Industriales Elaboradores de Arroz de España, cuja base de atuação era, além de “unificar todo o ciclo de produção e processamento” (Camprubí, 2014: 85), atribuir subsídios às exportações de arroz, replicando os ensinamentos da experiência italiana. Perante a crise da comercialização dos produtos agrícolas, os mecanismos regulatórios encontrados na resposta política da Segunda República acabaram por se manter, vindo a ser reforçados pelo regime franquista (Montejo, 2012).

Encontrando dificuldades semelhantes entre si, os governos adotaram um idêntico esquema de intervenção protegendo a produção orizícola com o intuito de a exportar. Sendo competidores diretos com italianos e espanhóis, a importação deste cereal em Portugal levou a que os produtores nacionais apresentassem alguns lamentos. Através da concorrência gerada entre o arroz nacional e o importado, um dos condicionalismos apontados era “a falta de predilecção do consumidor pelo produto indígena, o que mais ainda vinha comprometer a situação da lavoura” (*Corporativismo e produção nacional*, 1945: 17).

Os anos da Ditadura Militar marcam uma continuidade na prática reivindicativa da oligarquia orizícola mas também dos industriais que tinham como principal interlocutor a Associação Industrial Portuguesa. O repertório de intervenção pública focou-se nos jornais e ainda através de representações dirigidas ao governo e aos ministérios responsáveis pela atividade económica. Estes eram os mecanismos usados de forma a (re)configurar a ordem social na qual as elites se encontravam inseridas e que se encontrava ameaçada. Este conjunto de práticas constituía um “sistema fixo de significados [...] através dos quais os atores sociais tentam tornar os seus mundos coerentes” (Wedeen, 2002: 720). A necessidade de tornar inteligível e exteriorizar essa coerência grupal levou a que várias estruturas patronais acentuassem as suas movimentações no sentido de guiar o novo regime para satisfazer as suas reivindicações.

4 *A Indústria do Norte*, ano 87, n.º 233/234, maio/junho de 1939, p. 22.

5 *Diário de Notícias*, ano 69º, n.º 24 159, 7 de maio de 1933, p. 5.

Os agentes económicos acabaram por ter um feliz encontro com as novas dinâmicas políticas dos anos 30. A convergência de esforço entre a lavoura e os industriais era notada pois “havia, por parte da indústria descascadora, interesse em que se desenvolvesse a cultura nacional do arroz, pois assim obteria a matéria-prima necessária à sua actividade”<sup>6</sup>. De um descontentamento latente dos produtores e industriais do sector assistiu-se a uma eficácia organizativa mais relevante, exacerbada pelas perturbações no comércio global e as soluções protecionistas que começavam a pairar sob a política económica europeia. Os apelos centravam-se nesta questão: “O arroz está batido em brecha pelo dumping manifesto do estrangeiro”<sup>7</sup>. Neste sentido, algumas reuniões da Associação Central de Agricultura Portuguesa focavam esta questão “pedindo providências que defendam a indústria arroseira portuguesa do dumping italiano”<sup>8</sup>. Também algumas indústrias, como a Companhia Arroseira Mercantil (Vila Nova de Gaia), manifestaram-se sobre a questão da insuficiência da proteção pautal existente para o arroz pois alguns industriais defendiam o regresso à pauta de 1923 (Decreto n.º 8741)<sup>9</sup>, pauta essa que permita elevar, até o quádruplo, as taxas de navegação e as de importação para os navios e mercadorias procedentes ou originárias de países que não aplicassem a Portugal as suas pautas mínimas.

Quadro 1: Ofícios e representações enviadas ao governo sobre o sector orizícola

Destinatários	Data	Teor do ofício/representação
Ministro das Finanças	13/03/1930	Situação em que se encontra a indústria de descasque de arroz perante a concorrência deste produto estrangeiro
Ministro do Comércio	19/03/1931	A inclusão da indústria de descasque de arroz na relação das indústrias sujeitas às restrições do Artigo 1º do Decreto n.º 19 354
Ministro da Agricultura e Ministro do Comércio	25/05/1931	A inclusão da indústria do descasque de arroz no decreto do condicionamento das indústrias
Ministro da Agricultura e Ministro do Comércio	01/07/1931	Inquérito industrial à indústria de descasque de arroz
Ministro da Agricultura	31/07/1931	Pedido para que não seja autorizada a montagem de novas fábricas de descasque de arroz
Ministro da Agricultura	22/09/1931	Montagem de novas fábricas de descasque de arroz

6 *Diário de Notícias*, ano 69º, n.º 24 159, 7 de maio de 1933, p. 5.

7 *Gazeta das Aldeias*, 38.º ano, n.º 1772, 3 de setembro de 1933, p. 157.

8 *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, ano 80.º, n.º 23 812, 3 de maio de 1933, p. 2.

9 *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 64, 27 de março de 1923, pp. 323-347.



Ministro do Comércio, Indústria e Agricultura	12/01/1933	Providências contra o dumping italiano e o contrabando que do arroz espanhol
Ministro do Comércio, Indústria e Agricultura	12/01/1933	Pedido para a "rigorosa observância" das disposições do condicionamento das indústrias no que respeita a nova montagem de descasque de arroz
Ministro das Finanças	05/05/1933	Pedido para a aplicação do artigo 4º do Decreto n.º 17 823, de 31 de dezembro de 1929
Ministro das Colónias e Governadores de Angola, Guiné e Moçambique	27/05/1933	Indústria do descasque de arroz
Ministro do Comércio e da Indústria	13/11/1933	Conclusões do estudo feito em conjunto pelos descascadores, orizultores e um representante do comércio de arroz, para a organização e regularização do seu comércio
Ministro da Agricultura	31/12/1933	Pedido para a proibição de importação de sêmas de arroz, prejudicial à indústria de descasque
Ministro do Comércio e da Indústria	06/02/1934	Pedido para nomeação de mais um representante para CRCA, em virtude da diversidade de tipos daquele produto no Norte e Sul do País
Ministro do Comércio e da Indústria	26/05/1934	Exposição sobre a necessidade de não ser consentida a montagem de mais maquinismos para o descasque de arroz
Ministro do Comércio e da Indústria	21/07/1934	Envio das bases aprovadas pela respetiva secção da AIP para a criação do GIDA
Ministro do Comércio e da Indústria	10/09/1934	Pedido para a criação do Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz "insistentemente reclamado pelos industriais deste ramo"

Fonte: *Relatórios da Direcção da Associação Industrial Portuguesa, Diário de Notícias e Jornal do Comércio e Colónias.*

Numa luta contra "a carência duma mentalidade económica que oriente o Estado" que colocava Portugal no caminho de "uma situação deprimente de colono" (Sousa, 1930: 78), a pressão das elites acabou por levar à atuação das instâncias governativas que aplicaram medidas protecionistas contra o dumping. Noutros sectores a realidade era idêntica. A cerealicultura viu "a sua produção exposta às arremetidas do dumping, e ainda com «comedia protecção pautal»<sup>10</sup>, e nas pescas, o "dumping islandês e norueguês fazia cair os preços do bacalhau

<sup>10</sup> *Indústria Portuguesa*, ano 2, n.º 40, junho de 1931, p. 19.

nacional, dificultando o reembolso dos capitais investidos e impedindo o progresso da frota” (Garrido, 2018: 36).

Diante do “risco iminente de vermos sucumbir a lavoura do arroz privando-se a agricultura portuguesa de produzir um género de primeira necessidade”<sup>11</sup>, foi entendido que “o Estado não podia continuar alheado do regime em que se estava produzindo, industrializando e comercializando o arroz”<sup>12</sup>. A constatação da necessidade de encontrar estratégias regulatórias das práticas comerciais partiu da influência de um determinado grupo, ou seja, verificaram-se “tentativas dos interesses organizados para moldar o processo de regulação para os seus próprios fins” (Baldwin, Calvin e Lodge, 2012: 75), de que as constantes representações são um indício. É possível considerar que, neste caso, se encontra uma certa captura do Estado pelos interesses económicos. Como primeiro passo, através de uma portaria de 23 de janeiro de 1933, é criada uma comissão para rever a legislação sobre a cultura do arroz e propor as alterações a introduzir. Todavia, as queixas continuaram. A Associação Comercial de Lisboa, numa representação enviada ao Ministro das Finanças, referia que o aumento do preço do arroz italiano, pedido por cultivadores e descascadores, levava a que “o comércio veria uma vez mais atrofiadas as suas transações, limitado como está o poder de compra”<sup>13</sup>, solicitando a reavaliação da proposta.

Pelo que foi exposto, denota-se que a inserção do arroz na economia suscitava queixas e lamentos vindos de todos os elementos envolvidos na cadeia produtiva: produtores, industriais e comerciantes. Todos eles apresentavam reivindicações de forma a garantir uma posição favorável neste processo, embora o Estado, mais tarde, responderia a umas e não a outras.

## 2. A imposição do modelo corporativo como resolução dos problemas

O que advém deste contexto é a passagem de um modelo de livre troca para uma maior participação do Estado nas atividades económicas, experiência ensaiada no período da Grande Guerra, emergindo uma estrutura institucional altamente burocratizada partindo de um nacionalismo económico considerado como “um dos princípios fundamentais em que assenta a vida social do presente momento”<sup>14</sup>. As instituições pretendem “criar ordem e reduzir a incerteza na troca” (North, 1991: 97) mas, num contexto de crise e novos arranjos político-económicos, acabam por ter diferentes consequências nos agentes económicos pois “embora todos possam produzir ganhos ao agir coletivamente, eles distribuem esses benefícios adicionais de maneira diferente” (Knight, 1990: 26).

11 *Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Arroz*, n.º 1, maio de 1937, p. 13.

12 *Boletim dos Organismos Corporativos Patronais*, n.º 2, março de 1936, p. 36.

13 *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, ano 80º, 23 835, 30 de maio de 1933, p. 2.

14 *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, ano 80º, n.º 23 745, 11 de fevereiro de 1933, p. 1.

Correspondendo aos apelos das elites, as instituições teriam de marcar a diferença com o anterior quadro de enquadramento político do económico, passando pela afirmação de um Estado não apenas vigiante e disciplinador, mas claramente interventor. Com o emergir do regime autoritário, as soluções resvalaram para uma economia que encontrou no corporativismo o expediente para os problemas sectoriais e a definição de políticas. Daqui derivou “uma mudança nas regras e procedimentos de aplicação para que comportamentos diferentes sejam restringidos ou incentivados” e cuja materialização se caracterizou através da “dualidade de conter e criar poder” (Levi, 1990: 407). É precisamente esta dupla vertente que, na maioria dos casos, as instituições congregam que encontramos no caso da corporativização do sector orizícola. Ao nível dos ganhos e perdas, através do conflito entre industriais e produtores, os pratos da balança atestam um maior peso da componente agrícola, em contraponto à indústria. Se a contenção do poder que proveio das instituições corporativas se exprimiu, muito claramente, no seio dos industriais, já no que aos produtores concerne a criação do seu poder traduziu-se num conjunto de normativas auxiliaadoras do fomento da produção interna. Por outro lado, esta equação das forças económicas só poderá ficar completa se olharmos aos retalhistas que, em alguns casos, foram acusados de minar o sistema criado pelo regime em torno do arroz. Todas estas divergências confirmam a ideia de que “em Portugal a organização corporativa vai encontrar pesadas dificuldades”<sup>15</sup>.

Através do esquema desenhado para intervir no sector encontramos uma articulação vertical da orizicultura com a indústria do descasque de arroz, classificada como uma coligação estática de tipo corporativo, não sendo um caso isolado, tendo semelhanças com os lanifícios, as conservas, a indústria dos fósforos e a refinação de açúcar (Madureira, 1998: 807).

15 O *Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, ano 80º, n.º 23 803, 21 de abril de 1933, p. 2.

Quadro 2: Organismos corporativos no sector orizícola

Nome	Diploma Legal	Data de criação	Abrangência territorial	Tipo de organismo
Caixa de Abono de Família do Pessoal das Indústrias de Moagem, Massas Alimentícias, Amidos, Descasque de Arroz e Doçaria	Alvará	29/12/1942	Todo o território	Previdência social
Caixa de Previdência dos Empregados e Operários da Indústria do Arroz		23/08/1939	Todo o território	Previdência social
Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Arroz	Decreto-Lei n.º 23 400	23/12/1933	Todo o território	Organismo de coordenação económica
Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz	Decreto-Lei n.º 24 517	28/09/1934	Todo o território	Grémio obrigatório
Grémio dos Importadores e Armazenistas de Bacalhau e Arroz	Decreto-Lei n.º 27 152	30/10/1936	Todo o território	Grémio obrigatório

Fonte: *Boletim do Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência*.

O Decreto-Lei n.º 23 400, de 23 de dezembro de 1933, fez nascer a Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Arroz. Três objetivos foram definidos: “regular, no continente, as operações do comércio de arroz nacional e de importação de arroz colonial e estrangeiro [...] proceder à venda e liquidação do arroz em casca pertencente a produtores, sempre que estes os requeiram; adquirir aos pequenos produtores o arroz em casca pelo preço mínimo fixado”<sup>16</sup>. A CRCA tinha um presidente e quatro vogais: um representante dos produtores, outro dos industriais descascadores, e dois representantes dos importadores de Lisboa e do Porto.

Do lado da indústria, a organização corporativa teve no Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz a sua materialização. No que às suas atribuições diz respeito, o Decreto-Lei n.º 24 517, de 28 de setembro de 1934<sup>17</sup>, enunciava várias. Desde logo, tinha como fim orientar e fiscalizar a atividade da indústria, a que se seguia o dever de distribuir o arroz nacional em casca pelos agremiados; estabelecer as

16 *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 293, 23 de dezembro de 1933, p. 2202.

17 *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 229, 28 de setembro de 1934, pp. 1776-1779.

condições de venda, bem como o seu preço e estabelecer acordos com as empresas de transportes para estipular taxas e fretes. Sendo um elo de ligação com o organismo de coordenação económica, a importação de arroz nacional, colonial ou estrangeiro ficava dependente das condições estabelecidas pela CRCA.

Uma característica das indústrias de descasque era a sua pulverização, encontrando-se em vários pontos do país unidades fabris dedicadas à transformação do arroz. No período anterior à constituição dos organismos corporativos, o parque industrial orizícola estava apetrechado “para fabricar pelos processos mais modernos não só o arroz que se consome em Portugal como em todas as suas províncias ultramarinas”, existindo várias fábricas “accionadas por electricidade, as quais têm os mais modernos maquinismos, sendo a de maior capacidade a da cidade do Porto, e a seguir as de Ovar, Vila Franca de Xira, etc.”<sup>18</sup>. Perante tal cenário, a descentralização da ação administrativa do GIDA era necessária, tendo sido conseguida através da criação de várias delegações pelo país<sup>19</sup>. Estas deveriam prestar toda a colaboração e auxílio necessários, defendendo a atividade dos sócios, através da prestação de informações que estivessem subordinadas à defesa dos seus interesses.


À semelhança de outras instituições gremiais, esta atuou “no sentido de concentrar o poder de decisão nas mãos dos produtores mais fortes e elevar a fasia das condições de entrada no negócio” (Madureira, 2002: 44). Como exemplo disso, veja-se o número de agremiados do GIDA: se em 1935 existiam 66, em 1942 contavam-se apenas 70, um crescimento anual de 1%. Paralelamente, através do condicionamento industrial, assegurar as margens de lucro dos industriais do ramo era vital. Tal facto baseava-se na circunstância de que “deve ser combatido tudo quanto represente aumento de capacidade de produção (tanto a montagem de novas instalações como a ampliação das existentes) [...] elevar essa capacidade de produção acarretará o desenvolvimento dos factores de indisciplina do trabalho” (Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz, 1939: 11). Apesar dos perigos da “indisciplina do trabalho”, realçados pelo GIDA, o que se vê um interesse cada vez maior na instalação e reconversão das fábricas<sup>20</sup> (cf. gráfico 1).

18 *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, ano 80, n.º 27 728, 21 de janeiro de 1933, p. 2.

19 Porto, Coimbra, Figueira da Foz, Ovar, Ribatejo, Lisboa, Setúbal, Alcácer do Sal, Baixo Alentejo e Algarve.

20 Atendendo ao número de pedidos de instalação efetuados junto da Direcção-Geral dos Serviços Industriais, entre 1937 e 1938, contam-se 95 processos pendentes.

Gráfico 1: Existência de fábricas de descasque de arroz em Portugal



Fonte: *Boletim do Trabalho Industrial* (1936-1939).

A emergência dos organismos corporativos apresenta uma sincronia com a série de pedidos feitos pelos produtores e industriais. Para o governo era a forma ideal de assegurar o equilíbrio dos interesses em presença, fornecendo ainda um conjunto de leis que cobriam várias pretensões.

### 3. As mutações no ciclo produtivo e comercial

Além das estruturas administrativas, ao nível da prática económica denota-se uma primazia dos orizicultores. O estabelecimento de um sistema de preços compensadores para a produção portuguesa, aliada à compra do arroz nacional pelos industriais, criando a garantia de um preço mínimo superior ao dos mercados internacionais, foram razões para o estímulo à produção do cereal. O mercado livre era igualmente assegurado pois se o produtor não conseguisse “colocar convenientemente o seu arroz pode vendê-lo à CRCA ou ao Grémio que é obrigado a distribuí-lo pelos industriais aos preços tabelados e segundo as cotas por ele fixadas” (Rosas, 1986: 167).

A importação de arroz exótico ou colonial estava dependente da autorização da CRCA, existindo apenas, como única medida notória de proteção aos industriais, o facto dessa importação poder ser feita em casca para posterior transformação nas fábricas. A reexportação do arroz colonial, depois de laborado nas fábricas metropolitanas, era uma forma de assegurar um maior período de trabalho e

criar um elo entre a produção agrícola colonial e o desenvolvimento industrial da metrópole. Como resultado, se no início da década a importação colonial era diminuta, esta foi crescendo gradualmente nos anos seguintes (cf. quadro 3).

Quadro 3: Importação de arroz colonial na metrópole

Campanha	Arroz em casca (kg)	Arroz descascado (kg)
1930-1931	186.610	368.607
1931-1932	1.990.191	611.508
1933-1934	1.866.245	1.054.412
1934-1935	2.662.748	2.099.074

Fonte: *Diário das Sessões da Assembleia Nacional*, n.º 31, 19 de março de 1935, p. 588.

Fazendo uso dos mecanismos oficiais de reserva de mercado e o estabelecimento de preços administrativos, a política para o arroz revela-se protecionista, estimulando a produção interna, de forma a “manter a uniformidade dos preços, factor este que muito contribuiu para a disciplina da indústria”<sup>21</sup>. Precisamente nesta questão, a orientação seguida pelos organismos corporativos não passou incólume a algumas críticas. Em 1935, o Sindicato Agrícola do Sul do Concelho de Rio Maior queixava-se das consequências dos preços estipulados: “o arroz, comprado antes da fixação de preços do Grémio a 2\$, 2\$10 e 2\$520, custa agora 2\$25, 2\$45 e 2\$60. O mesmo acontece com o arroz comprado antes a 2\$58, 2\$40, que hoje se obtém, com grande dificuldade, a 2\$80”<sup>22</sup>. Os retalhistas afirmavam que “estão escasseando fortemente no mercado os arrozes e bacalhau de preços mais acessíveis às classes pobres e médias, como ainda que os restantes têm subido de preço”<sup>23</sup>. Como as funções da CRCA era fixar os preços ao produtor e ao revendedor e não os preços de retalho este tipo de intervenções e relatos do aumento do custo de vida eram frequentes. De facto, entre 1931 e 1935 verificaram-se variações nos preços do arroz, mas que apontam para uma estabilidade (cf. quadro 4).

21 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (doravante ANTT), Ministério do Comércio e Indústria, Gabinete do Ministro, cx. 28, pt. 11, fl. 4.

22 *Diário das Sessões da Assembleia Nacional*, n.º 13, 12 de fevereiro de 1935, p. 231.

23 *O Comércio de Víveres*, ano VI, n.º 143, 15 de fevereiro de 1935, p. 1.

Quadro 4: Índices simples de preços do arroz em Portugal (1935 = 100)

Ano	Índice de preços no produtor	Índice de preços por grosso	Índice de preços a retalho
1926	78,64	80,62	85,86
1927	87,71	93,04	85,86
1928	89,59	94,64	96,21
1929	96,62	104,12	100,00
1930	92,96	96,91	96,55
1931	86,73	86,08	89,66
1932	96,48	98,97	100,00
1933	97,41	98,97	100,00
1934	99,04	100,00	96,55
1935	100,00	100,00	100,00

Fonte: (Neves, 1996: 114-116).

A política de apoio à produção agrícola fomentava incómodos sobretudo por parte do comércio retalhista e o poder político encontrava-se atento à sua atuação, averiguando possíveis desvios da sua conduta económica, nomeadamente fraudes<sup>24</sup>. O espartilho montado em torno do arroz levou a queixas, sendo considerada prejudicial a política seguida até aí. Em 1938, os importadores armazenistas de mercearias da praça do Porto, numa exposição feita ao Ministro do Comércio e Indústria, argumentavam que, ao nível da procura interna, a apologia feita ao arroz nacional não era benéfica pois “o consumidor [...] que se vê em frente de um produto que não conhece e não lhe agrada, começa, não a habituar-se a ele, mas sim a dispensá-lo” (*Problemas corporativos...*, 1938: 24).

Como se vê, a promoção do consumo interno foi um tópico fundamental para os organismos corporativos da orizicultura atendendo ao facto de que, “em Espanha, e ainda mais na Itália, essa propaganda se faz intensamente” (Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz, 1936: 159). Da ação combinada entre o GIDA e a CRCA várias medidas foram tomadas, contando-se a criação de dois postos de venda de todos os tipos de arroz continental e colonial em Lisboa e no Porto, entendidos como “os mais seguros propagandistas do arroz nacional”<sup>25</sup>. Mas não se tratava apenas de estimular o consumo alimentar dos portugueses, considerados como “grandes comilões de arroz” e que “a ida ao Oriente criou-lhe o gosto pelo arroz de *sustância*, pela canja, pelo arroz doce e outros pratos suculentos” (Pereira, 1972, vol. I: 237). A criação destes postos foi feita “com o fim de evitar a especulação desenfreada que vinham fazendo os armazenistas com os preços do

24 ANTT, Ministério do Interior, Gabinete do Ministro, Mç. 483, [pt. 14/1].

25 Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Arroz, n.º 1, maio de 1937.



arroz estrangeiro<sup>26</sup>, tendo em vista a defesa do consumidor. Na inauguração do primeiro posto, o presidente da CRCA afirmou: “Não é nossa intenção realizar de qualquer maneira concorrência aos estabelecimentos a retalho [...] Apenas queremos dar ao público os meios necessários de, por confronto, saber aquilo que compra e o preço justo que deve pagar<sup>27</sup>. Como se pôde ver anteriormente, estas medidas levaram à oposição clara dos retalhistas.

Ainda dentro do tópico do consumo alimentar e de forma a abarcar as várias faces desta questão, este organismo de coordenação económica encetou algumas iniciativas científicas sobre o sector. Nos anos em estudo, a mais relevante foi o levantamento das variedades de arroz cultivadas em Portugal, realizado pelo professor do Instituto Superior de Agronomia, João de Carvalho e Vasconcellos (1939), a convite da presidência da Comissão. Contrariamente a outros organismos, como a JNF (Pires, 2018: 46), a presença dos agrónomos foi-se cimentando com o passar do tempo existindo, no início, uma maior preocupação económica e comercial. A investigação científica sobre o arroz desenvolver-se-ia nos anos seguintes, na Estação Agronómica Nacional, sob a égide de Manuel Vianna e Silva e em articulação com CRCA.


As próprias condições de armazenamento eram vistas como algo fulcral no desempenho positivo do sector. O excedente no saldo do GIDA, em fevereiro de 1936, foi canalizado na construção de celeiros. Esta medida era rotulada como “acertada que caiu bem no espírito de todos os Agremiados e que demonstra bem a compreensão inteligente da doutrina corporativa” além de que era apresentada como um bom auxílio ao pequeno produtor, “pondo à disposição celeiros onde o arroz pode ser armazenado em boas condições [...]”<sup>28</sup>.

26 O *Comércio de Víveres*, ano VII, n.º 179, 15 de fevereiro de 1936, p. 1.

27 O *Comércio de Víveres*, ano VIII, n.º 217, 5 de março de 1937, p. 2.

28 ANTT, Ministério do Comércio e Indústria, Gabinete do Ministro, cx. 28, pt. 11, fl. 8.

Gráfico 2: Produção e importação de arroz em Portugal (1919-1939)



Fonte: *Anuário Estatístico de Portugal*.

São aparentes os efeitos expansionistas que o protecionismo aplicado ao arroz teve ao longo dos anos 30, situação repetida pelo trigo, milho e centeio. Se se passa de um período de grandes quantidades importadas no final da década de 20, a atuação sobre este sector acaba por impulsionar a produção orizícola, diminuindo significativamente as necessidades de importação até ao início da II Guerra Mundial, sendo 1933 o ano do início dessa tendência. O protecionismo era visto como algo necessário sendo do “interesse da Nação que impõe tais restrições, motivo porque temos de nos conformar com elas”<sup>29</sup>. Todavia, as medidas restritivas não conseguiam por cobro a algumas práticas de economia paralela. Na zona raiana, davam-se casos de contrabando, com a entrada de arroz espanhol na fronteira terrestre, como aconteceu em Marvão e Elvas. Tal situação era entendida como lesiva para os comerciantes pois andavam “candongueiros de porta em porta a oferecer o arroz muito mais barato”<sup>30</sup>.

A ênfase colocada no aumento da produção suscitou alguns problemas, a que a intervenção do Estado não se fez esperar, por intermédio dos organismos corporativos. Em 1938, os decretos 28 493 e 28 494, de 19 de fevereiro, estabeleceram medidas restritivas ao cultivo de arroz, reduções de área determinada pela defesa antissezonática, ficando encarregue o GIDA da compra do excedente da colheita passada. Esta era uma situação que, não obstante o tom positivo das suas declarações, não escondia o pesar que o Grémio tinha em relação ao “sacrifício de juros, quebras, gastos de conservação do arroz em excesso” (Grémio dos Industriais

29 *O Comércio de Víveres*, ano VIII, n.º 230, 17 de julho de 1937, p. 2.

30 *O Comércio de Víveres*, ano IV, n.º 91, 10 de julho de 1933, p. 9.

Descascadores de Arroz 1939: 8). Desse mesmo problema dá conta, mostrando como foi este um “sacrifício suportado pela indústria para não criar embaraços à lavoura”<sup>31</sup>.

## Notas finais

Apesar da sua presença no contexto da agricultura nacional, a orizicultura nunca fora alvo de instituições responsáveis pelo controlo da produção e a sua inserção nos circuitos comerciais. Talvez tenha sido essa a principal base de que deriva a pressão sentida nos primeiros anos da década de 1930, na conquista de um espaço incontestado no mercado. Os produtores encontravam uma oportunidade política favorável às suas pretensões de preservação dos réditos ganhos com esta cultura agrícola e os industriais encontravam neste contexto de transição política uma forma de garantir a sua posição.

Aquando da reorganização da CRCA, em 1936, após a aprovação do ordenamento jurídico dos organismos de coordenação económica, o balanço feito era o seguinte: “[...] é fácil reconhecer que a aplicação dos métodos da economia corporativa conduziu a situações totalmente diversas das que se verificavam então. A cultura do arroz apresenta grande desenvolvimento e a lavoura vende-o por um preço compensador”<sup>32</sup>. De facto, a lavoura foi a principal beneficiada deste sistema de produção/comercialização. Embora os industriais conseguissem alguns ganhos, estes foram menores comparativamente aos que foram conseguidos pelos produtores, visível na expansão na produção nacional e a diminuição das exportações. Atendendo a este contexto, os armazenistas e retalhistas seriam os protagonistas dos protestos na segunda metade da década, devido a um sistema de preço que, na sua ótica, era muito desfavorável.

## Referências bibliográficas

- ACERBI, Suzana (1980), “La risicoltura e la formazione dell’Ente Nazionale Risi”, *Rivista di storia dell’agricoltura*, 1, 39–55.
- AMARAL, Luciano (1996), “Política e economia: o Estado Novo, os latifundiários alentejanos e os antecessores da EPAC”, *Análise Social*, 31(136-137), 465-486.
- BALDWIN, Robert, CALVIN, Martin, LODGE, Martin (2012), *Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- BRANCO, Amélia, SILVA, Ester Gomes da (2017), “Growth, Institutional Change and Innovation, 1820-1930”, in Dulce Freire, Pedro Lains (eds.), *An Agrarian History of Portugal, 1000-2000*, Leiden, Brill, 219-244.
- CAMPRUBÍ, Lino (2014), *Engineers and the Making of the Francoist Regime*, London, MIT Press.

31 *Indústria Portuguesa*, ano 11º, n.º 124, junho de 1938, p. 19.

32 *Diário do Governo*, I Série, n.º 255, 30 de outubro de 1936, p. 1358.

- CARDOZA, Anthony L. (1982), *Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism: The Province of Bologna, 1901-1926*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Corporativismo e produção nacional* (1945), Lisboa, Edições SNI.
- FREIRE, Dulce (2010), *Produzir e beber: a questão do vinho no Estado Novo (1929-1939)*, Lisboa, Âncora.
- GARRIDO, Álvaro (2016), *Queremos uma economia nova!: Estado Novo e corporativismo*, Lisboa, Temas & Debates/Círculo de Leitores.
- GARRIDO, Álvaro (2018), *As pescas em Portugal*, Lisboa, Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
- Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz (1936), *Relatório e contas do exercício de 1935*, Lisboa, Oficina Gráfica Lda.
- Grémio dos Industriais Descascadores de Arroz (1939), *Relatório e contas do exercício de 1938*, Lisboa, Oficina Gráfica Lda.
- GUIMARÃES, Antunes (1934), "A política rural na situação do «28 de Maio»", in *I Congresso da União Nacional*, vol. IV, Lisboa, Editorial Império, 77-109.
- KNIGHT, Jack (1990), *Institutions and Social Conflict*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- LEVI, Margaret (1990), "A Logic of Institutional Change", in Karen Schweers, Margaret Levi (eds.), *The Limits of Rationality*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 402-418.
- Liga Agrária do Norte (1933), *Bases para a organização da lavoura*, Porto, Liga Agrária do Norte.
- MADUREIRA, Nuno Luís (1998), "O Estado, o patronato e a indústria portuguesa (1922-1957)", *Análise Social*, 33(148), 777-822.
- MADUREIRA, Nuno Luís (2002), *A economia dos interesses: Portugal entre guerras*, Lisboa, Livros Horizonte.
- MADSEN, Jakob B. (2001), "Agricultural Crises and the International Transmission of the Great Depression", *The Journal of Economic History*, 61(2), 327-365.
- MENDIA, Henrique da Cunha (1883), *A cultura do arroz no districto de Coimbra*, Lisboa, Imprensa-Nacional.
- MONTOJO, Juan-Pan (2012), "Spanish Agriculture, 1931-1955: Crisis, Wars and New Policies in the Reshaping of Rural Society", in Paul Brassley, Yves Segers, Leen Van Molle (eds.), *War, Agriculture, and Food: Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s*, London/New York, Routledge, 75-95.
- NEVES, Pedro José Marto (1996), *A agricultura portuguesa no período entre as guerras: uma avaliação quantitativa*, Dissertação de Mestrado, Lisboa, ISEG/UTL.
- NORTH, Douglass C. (1991), "Institutions", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97-112.
- PEREIRA, Pedro Teotónio (1972), *Memórias*, 2 vols., Lisboa, Verbo.
- PIRES, Leonardo Alexandre Aboim (2018), *A Junta Nacional das Frutas: corporativismo, desenvolvimento industrial e modernização agrícola no Estado Novo*, Lisboa, FCSH/UNL.
- POLANYI, Karl (2012), *A grande transformação: as origens políticas e económicas do nosso tempo*, Lisboa, Edições 70.
- Problemas corporativos: o condicionamento do comércio de bacalhau e arroz* (1938), Porto, Tipografia Nunes.
- ROSAS, Fernando (1986), *O Estado Novo nos anos trinta (1928-1938)*, Lisboa, Estampa.
- SOUSA, Albano de (1930), *Aspectos da vida industrial portuguesa*, Lisboa, Associação Industrial Portuguesa.
- VAQUINHAS, Irene (1996), *Violência, justiça e sociedade rural: os campos de Coimbra, Montemor-o-Velho e Penacova de 1858 a 1918*, Porto, Afrontamento.
- VASCONCELLOS, João de Carvalho e (1939), *Formas cultivadas de arroz existentes em Portugal*, Lisboa, CRCA.
- WEDEEN, Lisa (2002), "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science", *The American Political Science Review*, 96(4), 713-728.

## Who Rules the Airwaves? The Influence of Radio in the 1946 and 1948 Argentine National Elections<sup>1</sup>

NATHAN WIDENER \*

Pellissippi State Community College

JARI ELORANTA\*\*

University of Helsinki

### Abstract

Our goal in this article is to examine what role radio played in the Argentinian elections of 1946 and 1948 – i.e., whether this medium helped Juan Domingo Perón secure his electoral victories. Through the evaluation of the preceding elections and the emergence of radio in Argentina, the analysis of the two elections will be conducted both qualitatively, via discussion of the political economy surrounding the elections; as well as quantitatively, through an examination of the determining factors of their respective outcomes. We argue that radio played a pivotal role in the elections, especially in 1946, since it provided an effective advertising and public opinion tool for Perón. Moreover, the nationalization of the radio networks in the same period helped to enable Perón's control going forward, both among certain voting constituencies and certain regions.

**Keywords:** Peronism, radio, mass media influence, Argentine elections.

<sup>1</sup> The authors would like to thank several people for their contributions to this research. First, we would like to thank Lee Alston and Andrés Gallo for sharing their data and insights, as well as several conference discussants (especially Anne McCants and Michael Hauptert). We would also like to express our gratitude to: Mary Ann Widener, who created the maps and visual analytics; to the research librarians at Appalachian State University, especially John Wisewell and University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, especially Teresa Chapa; and to Christopher Ellison as an editor.

\* E-mail: nrwidener1@pstcc.edu

\*\* E-mail: jari.eloranta@helsinki.fi

## Resumo

### *Quem manda nas ondas sonoras? A influência da rádio nas eleições nacionais argentinas de 1946 e 1948*

O presente artigo visa examinar a questão do papel desempenhado pela rádio nas eleições de 1946 e 1948: ou seja, examinar se esse meio de comunicação ajudou ou não Juan Domingo Perón a conquistar o poder pela via eleitoral. Ao avaliar as eleições anteriores e a emergência da rádio na Argentina, a análise destas duas eleições realizar-se-á tanto qualitativamente, através de uma argumentação da economia política envolvendo as mesmas; como quantitativamente, ao examinar os fatores determinantes dos seus respetivos resultados. Argumentamos que a rádio desempenhou um papel fundamental nas eleições, sobretudo em 1946, porque forneceu um instrumento de opinião pública eficiente para Perón. Aliás, a nacionalização das redes radiofónicas no mesmo período contribuiu para que Perón pudesse controlar, daí em diante, quer certos eleitorados quer certas regiões.

**Palavras-chave:** Peronismo, rádio, influência dos media, eleições argentinas.

## Résumé

### *Qui dirige les ondes ? L'influence de la radio lors des élections nationales argentines de 1946 et 1948*

Notre objectif dans cet article est d'examiner quel rôle la radio a joué dans les élections argentines de 1946 et 1948 – en d'autres termes, si ce média a aidé ou non Juan Domingo Perón à obtenir ses victoires électorales. En évaluant les élections précédentes et l'émergence de la radiodiffusion en Argentine, ces deux élections seront analysées aussi bien qualitativement, par le biais d'une argumentation de l'économie politique concernant celles-ci que quantitativement, grâce à un examen des facteurs déterminants de ses résultats respectifs. Nous soutenons que la radiodiffusion a joué un rôle fondamental lors des élections, surtout en 1946, car elle a fourni un outil efficace de publicité et d'opinion publique pour Perón. Par ailleurs, la nationalisation des réseaux radio au cours de la même période a contribué pour le contrôle de Perón, tant dans certaines circonscriptions électorales que dans certaines régions.

**Keywords:** Péronisme, radio, influence sur les médias, élections argentines.

## Introduction

In Latin America the media, in particular radio, has played a major role in politics, both in the past and more recently. For example, Brazilian Pres. Jair Bolsonaro has used mass media as a way to engage the electorate and attack the press as a way to consolidate political power. Pres. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela used radio to connect to voters throughout the countryside. Brazilian Pres. Getúlio Vargas established radio stations to help disseminate his populist programs to larger audiences in the 1930s through to the 1950s. In Mexico in the 1930s, Pres. Lázaro Cárdenas used

radio to present political propaganda to help win political support for nationalizing the oilfields. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Ecuadorian Pres. Rafael Correa used weekly radio announcements to connect with voters. The media – whether in the form of newspapers, telegraph, TV, radio, or the Internet – has played a big role in the evolution of democracies over the last 200 years or so (see e.g. Boas, 2005; Brusco et al., 2004). Here we investigate a moment in history when a particular medium, the radio, was just gaining popularity.

We analyze the role radio played in the Argentinian elections of 1946 and 1948, particularly whether this medium helped Perón secure his electoral victories. To do so, we will first examine the period leading up to these two elections, and the spread of radio coverage in Argentina. Then we will put the two elections into qualitative contexts, to be followed by a quantitative analysis of their determinants. We hypothesize that radio played a crucial role. Perón’s first election in 1946 holds the most interest for our research because of the massive number of recounts and the fact that this was the first time the populist leader’s name was explicitly on the ballot. Following the first election, radio became a state-run tool that provided Perón an effective method to monopolize political advertisements and diminish the opposition’s ability to reach potential voters. Information is power, and the person or organization that controls it is able to set the narrative. Our hypothesis is that by looking at radio, we can understand better the broader patterns of Perón’s ascendancy to power and the political evolution of Argentine society.

## **1. Scholarly perspectives: radio, Perón, Argentine Elections and electoral fraud**

Our analysis rests on unpacking four key elements: radio/communications theory, Perón’s use of radio, Argentine elections, and electoral fraud. To begin with, the impact of radio on politics and elections around the early to middle 20<sup>th</sup> century is well-documented. For example, U.S. Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt used the radio in his famous “Fireside Chats” to speak to voters as individuals. Radio played an important role in increasing the political support for most New Deal programs. Moreover, counties with more radio listeners received more relief funds, even when other factors are taken into account (Strömberg, 2004). In Italy and Germany, Mussolini’s and Hitler’s impassioned speaking styles were best suited for frenzied radio broadcasts that contributed to their quick rise to power. Thus, there is a clear relationship between radio and populist politics in the early to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

Our hypothesis builds on of the scholarship and research about media and politics in the 1940s, particularly Benedict Anderson’s seminal work, *Imagined Communities* (2006). Anderson argued that those who engaged with various types of media became connected to one another in an “imagined community.”

This newly forming community in Argentina was built in part through radio news, music, and sports programs. All of these types of media were means through which Perón was able to reach out and connect to listeners and engage political actors for specific agendas. Their influence on political outcomes, in particular at the ballot box, was clearly among Perón's and Peronists' goals. Both American and Argentine historians agree that the radio played a unique role in Perón's fortunes, yet neither group has attempted to construct the mechanism that Perón used to reach a larger population. One problem is that the historiography is divided into so many different camps that a consensus about mass media and political action becomes difficult to ascertain. For example, Argentine radio historians have focused on two aspects: first, that the radio had a democratizing effect on the population; and second, that Argentine radio history does not have political dimension (Claxton, 2007; Ulanovsky et al., 1996). This creates a tension between the two approaches to understanding how mass media was used by the populist leader.

Traditionally, Peronist historians have never discussed specifically how Perón used the radio in his political propaganda machine. For example, when discussing radio and its importance in the 1946 election, Félix Luna has argued that the radio was the great instrument that Perón used to proselytize. Luna never elaborated on what specific words or images Perón used to activate his listeners. Recently historians of Peronism have attempted to integrate cultural messages on the radio into their analysis, but they have failed to link political action to media expressions. Daniel James incorporated the idea of culture into his study of Peronism by arguing that Perón utilized the heretical language of the tango as a type of identification politics with his listeners (James, 1993: 31).

Pre-Peronist media historians have maintained that radio culture laid the groundwork for populist messaging. Robert Claxton demonstrated that the pre-Peronist radio networks and stations developed programs catering to specific Argentine audiences (Claxton, 2007). The development of four private radio networks in the 1930s inside Argentina (Radio Belgrano, Radio Azul y Blanca, Radio El Mundo, and Radio Splendid, alongside the public network of LRA Radio Nacional) were indicative of this. While Claxton clearly demonstrated the power of radio, he stopped short of discussing its role in Perón's rise and use of radio in 1946. Other Argentine media historians, Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa, have shown how media created a truly Argentinian cultural nationality that blended both city and country lifestyles (Karush, 2012; Chamosa, 2010). Lastly, Carlos Ulanovsky (1996) has chronicled radio's changes throughout the 20th century, though he is vague about the political implications of these. This article will briefly focus on the political addresses given by the candidates, although we advocate for further research on the actual radio content.

Democracy in Latin America is a complicated phenomenon, due to the variety of political parties and cultural components. For example, many political scientists consider Chile to have had the longest continuing democracy in



Latin America, despite its authoritarian interludes. On the other hand, Brazil had a monarchy until 1889 and struggled with military dictatorships throughout the twentieth century, yet today Brazil is considered an important developing-country democracy. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (1985) have argued that Latin American political processes are grounded in a set of assumptions and characteristic features that emphasize hierarchy, authority, personalism, family and kinship ties, centralization, the need for organic national unity, elaborate networks of patron-client relations, patrimonialism, and a pervasive pattern of vertical-corporate organization.

The turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century brought changes in the political realm for many Latin American countries. Peter H. Smith (2005) has contended that there were four types of governments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century: electoral democracy, electoral semi-democracy, oligarchic republicanism, and non-democracy. Following independence, Argentina followed the process that Smith laid out. Argentina in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century was a divided government of liberals and conservatives that enabled the rise of the provincial leader Juan Manuel de Rosas as the central political figure. Rosas reshaped the democracy of Argentina by establishing a military dictatorship that squashed political freedoms, such as freedom of the press and assembly. Rosas represented the oligarchic republicanism and non-democratic features of Argentine political life. Following his death, democratic rule returned to Argentina with the election of Domingo F. Sarmiento in 1868. The flowering of late 19<sup>th</sup> century democracy in Argentina would continue to evolve to incorporate new political parties in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Rock, 1985: 193).

Throughout the 1920s, Argentina experienced economic growth, mostly due to rising prices, foreign investment. This period saw the rise of politicians who were more oligarchic in nature: established leaders such as Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear and Hipólito Yrigoyen. The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 ushered in the oligarchic approach to democracy in Argentina. Conservative factions began to seize power throughout the 1930s, with leaders repeatedly rigging elections to keep themselves in power (Rock, 1985: 214). The rising influence of the Army in Argentine politics came directly from the stagnation in exports. The military dictatorship that emerged in 1930 was led by military leaders such as the army's Gen. José F. Uriburu (see esp. Potash, 1969). By the middle of the 1940s, Argentina had another military coup of young officers; one of the central leaders of this coup was Juan Perón. The rise of Juan Domingo Perón to presidency was his service as Secretary of Unions to eventually becoming Secretary of War. After 1945, the military resolved to return political power to the people and offer the first free election for leadership since the 1930s.

Central to our analysis is the question of fraud in the elections, whether the official results were credible and thus suitable for further quantitative analysis. There were multiple levels of fraud. The political markets in Argentina have traditionally been riddled with corruption and patronage relationships (Calvo &

Murillo, 2004). For example, the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the mid-19th century arose from his patron-client relationship with gauchos throughout the countryside. This is a type of institutionalized fraud that is very difficult to measure. The patron-client relationship was a way that fraud continued into the 20th century. Political parties, unions, and class structures have become the cornerstones of a political system that has depended on patron-client relationships and perpetrated fraud in the political sphere (On similarities with the Perón period and more modern Argentinian elections, see e.g. Gibson & Suárez-Cao, 2010; Levitsky, 2003; Little, 1973a, 1973b; Snow, 1969). As a way to combat patron-client elections, Argentines pushed for compulsory voting for men over 21 (Rock, 1985: 185). Despite this, there was systemic fraud throughout the 1930s with political bosses attempting to retain power, and with such measures including switching ballot boxes, arrests of opposition members on trumped-up charges on election day, police confiscating opposition ballots, falsifying voter rolls to enable dead citizens to vote for political bosses, bribing voters, and having more votes than voters. As Lee Alston and Andrés Gallo (2010) have pointed out, while Argentina in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was fairly developed economically, it never completed the transition towards full democratic consolidation. It was this situation that provided the opportunity for Perón's rise.

While electoral fraud was a real problem in Argentina, there is another problem concerning the charges of fraud. The losing party would commonly denounce elections as fraudulent simply because they did not win. The Radical Party throughout the 1920s and 1930s openly complained of fraud in elections that they lost. These charges of fraud can then compound the impact of actual cases due to the zero-sum nature of elections. What makes the 1946 presidential election unique is the meteoric rise of Perón and the triple recounting of election results at the jurisdictional level. Neither Perón nor his opposition claimed that there was any fraud in this election. While neither side claimed fraud, it is important to point out that historically fraud occurred often in Argentine elections and must be considered as a factor when analyzing historical data. Alston and Gallo (2010) actually created a measure to quantify the various levels of fraud in jurisdictions throughout Argentina in the run-up to the 1946 election, which is a measure we use in this article as well.

Our analysis attempts to bridge these divides within the historiography and verify some of the broader claims. We argue that radio helped form communities of listeners who were engaged with the message presented. We also investigate whether individual radio networks, such as Radio Belgrano, had a more substantial impact on voting behavior. Radio certainly appeared to help Perón to gain political support from the population by recreating the patron-client model of democracy and eventually authoritarian political economy in Argentina.

## 2. Argentina's modernization, elections, and radio

Since Spanish colonization, Argentina has suffered from internal divisions that made it difficult for a democracy to emerge. In the late-19<sup>th</sup> century, Argentina's policies dramatically changed to foster industrialization by encouraging immigration from southern European countries. Many of the immigrants stayed within Buenos Aires to become part of the working classes (Sarmiento, 1998). In 1912, the Sáenz Peña Ley extended universal mandatory male suffrage throughout Argentina, affording immigrants the right to vote. The workers outside the industrial zones were primarily indigenous and mestizo, and they worked for agricultural producers. The rural and urban working classes had little interaction with each other due to differences in geography, cultural affiliation, and job skills.

Argentina developed a native radio industry early in the 1920s that served as the basis for the country to have the second-largest radio network in the world by the late 1930s (Claxton, 2007). In the early days, radio was primarily an outgrowth of newspapers and government organizations. In the 1920s, radio stations created content for small niche audiences. Folk, tango, and jazz were the predominant types of music played on early radio and demonstrated a cross-cultural reach to both the urban and rural working classes. Programs such as *Chispazos de Tradición* (Sparks of Tradition) incorporated folk music and melodrama storylines from urban tango lyrics (Karush, 2012; Claxton, 2007). Thus, radio helped facilitate the emerging Argentine national identity that incorporated images from the rural gaucho like *Martín Fierro*, and urban styles like the tango.

In the 1930s, the Argentine government became interested in regulating radio content. Smaller radio stations could not comply with all the new rules. Owners like Jaime Yankelevich bought fledgling radio stations and incorporated them into larger networks. In the 1940s, radio personalities such as the famous tango singer Carlos Gardel and actress Eva Duarte became household names in Argentina. As seen in Table 1, radios were fairly ubiquitous in interwar Argentina, with over a million receivers by the 1930s. Their number grew fairly slowly in the 1940s, possibly due to impacts of the war. However, the number of receivers at least doubled from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, thus underscoring the growing impact of this medium. The steady growth in radio sets after Perón's election also mirrored the modest economic growth during the postwar period. Moreover, Table 1 highlights the speculative nature of the estimates on the number of radios in Argentina.

Table 1: Number of Radio Receivers in Argentina (Based on Several Sources), 1934–1955


YEAR	Number of Radios (Banks)	Number of Radios (Other Estimates)
1934	..	1,200,200
1935	..	..
1936	..	..
1937	..	..
1938	1,100,000	..
1939	1,112,000	..
1946	1,200,000	1,300,000*
1947	1,300,000	..
1948	1,400,000	..
1949	1,500,000	..
1950	2,200,000	..
1951	2,327,000	..
1952	2,454,000	1,500,000 ±
1953	2,582,000	..
1954	2,710,000	..
1955	2,838,000	2,700,000+

Sources: Banks (1973).

Notes: \*Data and Rates of Radio Stations in the Other American Republics and Puerto Rico (1945), 10);  
± "What Are the Facts About Radio Abroad?" (1952), 230; + World Communications (1956).

We can put the spread of radios into a better context by converting the numbers into per capita terms and by comparing the number of radios to other media, such as telegraphs and telephones. Of course, these are not directly comparable mediums since, for example, telephones are more of a personal communication device, somewhat similar to telegraphs. But they do illustrate the importance of radio alongside other communications technologies. Radio broadcasts were geared for the broad masses and could be financed by advertising.

Figure 1: Telegrams, Telephones, and Radio Receivers per Capita in Argentina, 1870–1973




Source: Banks (1973).

As seen in Figure 1, telegrams per capita were much higher than were telephones or radios, which make sense given the order of appearance of these technological innovations, respectively. While the number of telegrams in Argentina peaked by the time of the First World War, radios and telephones began to spread only after the 1920s. However, the rise in the number of telephones was much earlier than that of the radio, with the latter only expanding steadily beginning in the 1940s. The spread of electricity was also vital.

The period from 1930–1946 is known as the *década infame* (decade of infamy) because of its sluggish economic growth, high unemployment, and rule by military dictatorship (Rock, 1985: 214). The Argentine economy was heavily tied to that of England following World War I. The political instability of Yrigoyen's presidency enabled the military to step in and take control of the country in 1930. The military dictatorship allowed for parliamentary elections but did not allow for significant changes to the status quo to be enacted. A new coup was staged in 1943, led by young officers. The newly-formed government solidified leadership in 1944, under Gen. Farrell. One of the most promising stars within the government was Col. Juan Domingo Perón, who was the Secretary of Labor, Minister of War, and Vice President. The Farrell government was unstable at the top, however, and thus between 1943 and 1945, Perón gained more political power and influence. He especially relied on the emerging trade unions to stabilize his political power in the country. This set the stage for the elections in 1946.

Figure 2: GDP per Capita for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1875–2010



Source: Bolt & van Zanden (2013).

How does Argentina fare in comparison with other South American economies, like Brazil and Chile? From that perspective, its 1930s economic performance does not look quite as bad. For example, as seen in Figure 2, Argentina developed almost in tandem with Chile, while maintaining a lead in terms of real GDP per capita. The Great Depression slump hit Chile harder than Argentina and the latter's recovery was more even. Brazil was substantially behind these two economies in the 1930s, though the Brazilian economy was not nearly as badly hurt by the Depression. The Argentinian economy did not experience a major downturn during the Second World War, but the fairly flat growth in the 1940s that had the potential to impact the elections too.

It is worth noting, that Argentina held democratic elections throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but most of these elections were dominated by the patron-client relationships, rather than addressing national problems. With large numbers of European immigrants in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the political landscape shifted towards open elections. Many members of the working classes supported the Radical Civic Union (Radical Civic Union, or UCR), while conservative factions in Argentina took control of the Elections Board, thereby controlling who voted and whose vote counted (Alston & Gallo, 2010). The counter-push by Conservatives to remain in power resulted in fraud in the elections of the late 1920s and 1930s.

The earlier elections (i.e., before 1946) can be examined in the microcosm of the Federal Capital district, as seen in Table 2. Overall, in 1928, 1931, and 1937,

there was a clear winner in these elections, which may be an indicator of electoral fraud. In turn, in 1942, the vote was much closer. As evidenced by the coefficient of variation, we see much more variation in the vote totals of the lower vote-getting parties. Again, this may (or may not) be merely a sign of electoral fraud among the highest vote-getting parties, since one typically might expect variation among districts.

Table 2: Distribution of the Vote between the Three Biggest Parties in the Buenos Aires Barrio, 1928, 1931, 1937, 1942


Year	Three Biggest Parties	Total # of Votes	% of Total Vote	Coefficient of Variation among Districts
1928	UCR	151,313	61.7	0.06
	UCR (Antip)	59,873	24.4	0.19
	Socialists	33,959	15.5	0.19
1931	Justo-Roca	85,456	29.3	0.23
	Justo-Matienzo	39,632	13.6	0.18
	Social Democrat Alliance	166,353	57.1	0.14
1937	Alvear-Mosca	256,407	65.3	0.07
	Ortiz Castillo	110,225	28.1	0.19
	Socialists	26,021	6.6	0.29
1942	PE	142,061	39.5	0.14
	UCR	124,340	34.6	0.11
	Conc.	93,301	25.9	0.24

Sources: Data provided by Alston & Gallo (2010).

Note: Highest values for each year in bold; coefficient of variation = standard deviation / mean and is a standardized measure of dispersion. All the abbreviations are explained in the text of the article.

It is well known that the Argentine electoral system certainly had electoral fraud built into it. The quantification of the levels of fraud is, naturally, more difficult. Alston and Gallo (2010) attempted to quantify and measure fraud quantitatively. By looking at previous elections alongside agricultural and census data, they created a fraud variable, calculated as difference in voting for the Radical Party in 1938 and 1940. What is striking is that most of the fraud was concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires, and not in other urban centers such as Córdoba. This map (see Figure 3) demonstrates that fraud was not a universal phenomenon across Argentine jurisdictions, and points to larger questions of methodology. Clearly, electoral fraud in Argentina was a significant factor; but as Alston and Gallo's data proves, much more research is needed on this significant historical topic.

Figure 3: Existence of Electoral Fraud in Argentina in 1946



Source: Data provided by Alston and Gallo; mapped by Mary Ann Widener.

Electoral fraud is important to the overall story of the 1946 election. The previous elections in the 1930s demonstrate that fraud was a key factor in determining their respective winners. Alston and Gallo argue that the 1946 election was a fairly clean one, but that fraud in the past changed the beliefs of people who turned to the populist Perón. This is a significant factor since Perón's command of unions gave him the ability to establish a traditional patron-clientele relationship. In addition, Perón thus had a significant electoral bump because of his ability to court certain voters. This also helped Perón legitimize his election and minimize allegations of fraud, as more voters were coming around to his side. The double- and



triple-counted electoral returns also helped reduce claims of fraud (“El Resultados de Elección en 1946,” *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, February 28, 1946; Alston & Gallo, 2010). But what other factors explained his victory in the presidential election of 1946?

### 3. The 1946 elections

By the middle of 1945, tensions within Argentina became so acute that people demanded democratic elections. World War II was almost finished, and many Argentines looked back to the end of the World War I and feared economic stagnation and political instability. The return to the idea of democratic elections after 16 years under military rule was a dramatic event. The political contenders were Juan Perón for the Labor Party and José Tamborini for the Democratic Union.

The Democratic Union (*Unión Democrática*) represented a hodgepodge of previous political parties in Argentina. The majority of the members of this newly-formed party were from the Radical Civic Union (UCR), which was the party of Yrigoyen. The military coup of the 1930s fractured the UCR’s political power base by forcing the party to move too far to the left (Luna, 1969: 28). The UCR and diverse other groups, such as conservatives, Communists, Socialists, Democratic Nationalists, and former UCR members, formed the Democratic Union in 1945 (Rock, 1985: 261).

Another central problem for the Democratic Union was their use of competing news narratives. In fact, the Democratic Union used newspapers as their primary method to reach voters. Many of the speeches given by Tamborini and Democratic Union supporters were detailed policy descriptions that were not engaging for radio listeners. The Democratic Union had equal access and time on the radio, and failed to connect to listeners due to their presentation style (Luna, 1969: 453). Many of the Democratic Union attacks were embedded in the middle of speeches, a style that did not work for radio addresses. For example, one of the biggest ways that the Democratic Union attacked Perón was to level the criticism that the Farrell regime favored Nazi Germany. The Democratic Union extrapolated that Perón favored the Germans because of his high rank within the Farrell regime (Luna, 2000). Newspapers then picked up the major attack as the main newspaper headline: “Perón Favors Nazi Policies” (“Las Elecciones Presidenciales en la País,” *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, April 9, 1946). This type of media strategy represented the traditional use of media in Argentina.

Perón’s political campaign in 1946 was likewise very different from Tamborini’s. On October 9, Juan Domingo Perón resigned as Vice-President and Secretary of Labor of the Farrell regime. In Perón’s farewell speech, the subtext linked Perón’s political fate to the working class (Mercado, 2013; Plotkin, 2002: 52). The run-up to

the election demonstrated Perón's use of the radio as a campaign tool. While there were stipulations for equal airtime for political candidates, that line became increasingly unclear due to the relationship between Perón and Eva Duarte. She was one of the stars of Argentine radio by 1945, and it is plausible that this had a significant impact on the presidential election. The military placed Perón in jail on October 13, 1945 because they saw him as too charismatic. Over the next few days, many listeners went to the radio to get news of the leader. Radio became the rallying point for demonstrators, with daily announcements for people demanding Perón's release from jail. The political pressure reached a boiling point on October 17, 1945, when Farrell decided to release Perón. At 9:30 in the evening, people had begun to use their radios to tune in for regular updates (Luna, 1969: 348). Finally freed, Perón emerged from the Casa Rosada to give a speech directed at the estimated 300,000 demonstrators immediately in front of him in the Plaza de Mayo.

The radio transmissions represented a connection between Perón and working-class voters. He masterfully used the medium, yelling into the microphone, demonstrating his passion for the people. Perón used Argentine national symbols, spoke rousing, and focused on voter needs. The populist focus of the Perón campaign tied into the needs of individuals in every political constituency. For example, when speaking to agricultural workers in La Rioja, Perón spoke of developing agriculture and irrigation; when addressing industrial workers in Buenos Aires, he spoke of more rights and vacation time (Mercado, 2013: 85; Rock, 1985: 254). Perón personally addressed and gained favor from each constituent group. He frequently used nationalistic language, such as the image of the *criollo* and *gaucho* in his speeches. The folklore and tango that was present on Argentine radio also helped give Perón a political base on radio, because listeners knew these images and associated Perón with them. He broke down the classic Argentine political methodology of individualized patron-client relationships and the endorsement of newspapers through his use of style and methodology of radio.

Perón won the February 1946 election for many reasons, yet the importance of radio seems to have been substantial. The radio was the place that his lower-class constituents throughout Argentina were able to connect with their would-be leader. Not only did that connection emerge via his speeches, but also the radio celebrity of Eva Duarte linked the populist leader to the radio culture. Perón's use of the radio to broadcast his thoughts and agenda are all reasons for a critical examination of how important a factor radio was in the election of 1946, and indeed, afterwards.

#### 4. The 1948 elections and beyond

Argentina experienced changes in international prices of cattle exports that caused an economic boom. This boom was not due to Perón's policies, but many at the time accredited this swift change to the charismatic leader. The First Five-Year Plan, from 1946–1951, was the beginning of Perón's economic agenda that favored the lower classes. The Argentine government used export profits to subsidize lower class wages. Argentina's exports totaled approximately \$1.6 billion in 1948, contributing to excess capital that could be redistributed via the Peronist policies (Milanesio, 2013). The transfer of economic power to the lower classes possibly helped increase consumer purchasing power from 1946 to 1948, and certainly increased Perón's popularity among the masses, which also helped make radios more widely available. Thus, the redistribution of wealth helped more people engage with mass media and increased pro-Perón electoral participation.

Perón also saw the expansion of voting rights to women in the Argentinian territories in the South and the North as a method to gain votes, with Eva Perón's support. The 1947 Argentine Census revealed a substantial population in the territories that did not enjoy political suffrage (IV Censo General de la Nación, 1947; Miller, 1979: 51 – the indigenous people of Chaco and Formosa regions were firmly in Perón's camp). Perón's vocal support of voter expansion to both territorial populations and women also helped garner the populist leader new constituents with more potential political support. There were also radio reforms that occurred between 1946 and 1948 that were reinforced these developments. In June 1947, Perón scheduled a radio address to send Eva to Europe. In the middle of the address, on Radio Belgrano, a voice interrupted the transmission and said, "Don't believe any of his lies" (Luna, 2000: 92). Perón's response over the next few months was the purchase of the radio network and subsequently all private radio networks throughout Argentina. By the end of 1948, radio networks inside Argentina were state ran, thus in the hands of pro-Peronists.

After assuming the presidency and gaining control over all radio networks in Argentina, Perón sought even more political power. One of his biggest problems with the 1853 Constitution pertained to the two-term limit for presidents. He started advocating amendments to the Constitution so that it would uphold more Peronist priorities. In 1948, the Peronist Party won enough votes in the Congress to allow a national referendum to change the Constitution. The fight boiled down to Perón against the UCR. The same tactics were used by both sides, except that the UCR had less access to radio networks. They understood that access to an entire media platform meant their efforts to engage newspapers were redoubled. One of the key issues attached to the ballot was women's suffrage to be enacted in the Constitution, advocated for by Eva Duarte and Juan Perón. The voting districts had the same boundaries as in the 1946 election. When the final vote was

tallied, the Peronists won, and by 1949 had changed the Constitution in ways that deeply affected subsequent elections.

The period from 1948–1952 was devoid of major national elections; there were a few gubernatorial, senate, and congressional elections, but nothing on a nationwide scale. The rest of Perón's presidency was spent consolidating political and media power into the hands of a smaller and smaller elite. In 1950, the Visca Commission was turned into a witch hunt to purify the Peronist party of dissidents, which also started the process of a government takeover of newspapers. By 1952, Peronists limited opposition voices through ownership of all major newspapers in Argentina. The push to integrate newspapers into the Peronist state can be seen as a direct result of the 1948 political attacks leveled against Perón by newspaper editors. Also, during this time period the government gerrymandered political jurisdictions to create more favorable Peronist strongholds (Luna, 2013: 167-168). The takeover of news media and redrawing of political jurisdictions consolidated power in Perón's hands and resulted in his second presidential term, beginning in 1952. Like many authoritarian figures of his time and since, he managed to subjugate the media and elections under his control, at least for the time being.

While Perón's power grew because of mass media domination, the economics underlying his government's expansion brought on the final collapse of the Peronist government in 1955. The export boom of the late 1940s quickly turned into a crunch in 1950, when the United States outsold Argentina in terms of cattle exports to Europe. Perón's investment in the industry did not allow the government to recuperate its initial losses, thus the period from 1952–1955 saw a sluggish economy. Audiences started to get turned off by the Peronist messages. The curtain call for Perón turned out to be his attacks on the Catholic Church, a move that gained the attention of the military, and particularly, the Navy, who finally removed him from power in 1955. The return of Perón in 1973 did not mean the return of stability; after a year, the populist leader died in 1974, at the age of 76.

## **5. Quantitative perspectives on the 1946 and 1948 elections**

The Argentinian elections in the 1940s have rarely been analyzed using any quantitative methods or sources. One of the few exceptions is the aforementioned study by Alston and Gallo (2010). They discovered that the electoral system was steeped in fraud, especially during the 1930s, and that this created an informal institutional path going forward. The brief attempt by Pres. Roberto María Ortiz in the 1940s to stop the fraud ended with his demise. The military coup of 1943 facilitated Perón's rise and the normalization of this fraudulent system through the 1940s and 1950s. Alston and Gallo also tested empirically whether fraud was a factor in the 1946 elections. They concluded, based on a jurisdiction-level analysis of votes, that Perón's electoral victory depended on several economic and political-economy variables (such

as industry and presence of cattle) as well as fraud. However, they only analyzed the 1946 election. Thus, we test the determinants of the 1946 and 1948 elections further, to see what role radio played in them. We are more cautious in interpreting the 1946 election as a fraudulent one and maintain that the nationalization of radio ownership solidified Perón's position by the 1948 elections. The elections of the 1950s were not national elections and were likely highly impacted by complete state media control, and thus not suitable for comparative analysis.

It is fairly obvious that control over the radio network, especially via ownership, influenced the elections after 1946. The ownership balance of radio stations changed completely between 1946 and 1948, as shown in Table 3. The nationalization of radio stations proceeded rapidly because Perón used the radio speech attack in a 1947 radio transmission as grounds to take over all radio networks, and most Argentine radio stations. By the end of 1947, all but one radio station in Argentina was under Peronist control. Perón's domination of the news media was further cemented in 1950 following the Visca Commission's investigation that resulted in the public incorporation of most major newspapers (Luna, 2013). The domination of all forms of news media meant that the Peronist party had a clear advantage over opposition parties, who were locked out of access to radio and newspapers (Morrow, 1955, "Perón Paper Bars End of Curbs Now: Answer to Foe's Broadcast Says the Opposition Must End Acts of 'War' First," *New York Times*, July 30, 1955, 34; "Perón Aide Bars Radio Time to Foe: Radical Leader Fails in Bid to Broadcast--- Opposition Setting New Policy," *New York Times*, July 8, 1955, 10).

Table 3: Radio Ownership in Argentina, 1946, 1948, and 1952


Radio Station Ownership	1946	%	1948	%	1952	%
<i>Private</i>	44	91.7	1	1.4	1	1.4
<i>Public</i>	4	8.3	72	98.6	72	98.6
Total	48	100	73	100	73	100

Sources: Data and Rates of Radio Stations (1945:5–10); Broadcasting Stations of the World (1946:4–9); Broadcasting Stations of the World (1952: 6–11); Broadcasting Stations of the World (1955: 5–10).

As can be seen in Table 4, quantitatively the impact of radio was more pronounced in 1948, yet it varied regionally. In 1946, in some provinces radio actually had a slightly negative impact on voting for Perón. Radio seemed to slightly increase voting for Perón in Córdoba, Salta, and Santa Fe. In 1948, the situation had changed quite dramatically. In most regions, the slight negative correlations had changed to positives. And in Jujuy, La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Fe, and Santiago del Estero, radio was clearly positively correlated with Perón votes. This result matches the visual inspection of Figure 4. We can certainly conclude that the changes in

votes between 1946 and 1948 were not just the result of massive electoral fraud, since radio seemed to have a more substantial impact in the latter year. Of course, radio by then had been almost completely nationalized, providing a convenient avenue of campaigning for Perón and his government. Moreover, Perón certainly increased his support in certain key rural areas and in certain regions, and radio helped him do that. A caveat applies, of course, since only multivariate analysis of the key components of these voting patterns, which is what we do next, can provide robust results, and we improved the analysis by Alston and Gallo by adding variables missing from their study, such as the number of radio receivers and various census variables. Furthermore, we analyzed the determinants of both elections, in 1946 and 1948.

Figure 4: Radio's Reach in Argentina and Perón's Gains in the Elections from 1946–1948



Sources: *La Prensa*, Various election results between February 24, 1946 and April 15, 1946. *La Prensa*, Various election results between December 8, 1948 and December 17, 1948. Mapped by Mary Ann Widener.

Note: Perón's gains in 1948, in green (on the left) are juxtaposed with the reach of radio stations and shown for key regions (on the right), Perón as red and opposition as blue.

Table 4: Correlation between Radio Presence and Perón's Vote Totals in 1946 and 1948

Province	Correlation Coefficient in 1946	Correlation Coefficient in 1948
Buenos Aires	0.10	0.18
Catamarca	-0.03	-0.16
Córdoba	0.33	0.25
Corrientes	-0.04	0.12
Entre Ríos	-0.11	0.01
Jujuy	0.03	0.53
La Rioja	0.19	0.44
Mendoza	-0.33	0.03
Salta	0.20	0.20
San Juan	-0.11	0.21
San Luis	0.15	0.47
Santa Fe	0.38	0.39
Santiago del Estero	0.15	0.42
Tucumán	-0.38	..
TOTAL	-0.05	0.04

Sources: *La Prensa*, Various election results between February 24, 1946 and April 15, 1946. *La Prensa*, Various election results between December 8 and 17, 1948.

Note: Pearson correlation coefficient.

Thus, Alston and Gallo analyzed Perón's electoral performance by primarily looking at the persistence of fraud and the impact of various political constituencies: cattle owners who opposed Perón; unions who supported him; and renters who may have opposed landholding elites. They found that the legacy of fraud from the earlier elections had a persistent impact on the 1946 election as well, as did the other explanatory variables. We utilized some of the same variables (number of cattle per farm; proxy for fraud provided by Alston and Gallo; percentage of industrial employment; percentage of renters), as well as several new ones, all at the level of counties/jurisdictions: number of radio stations received in the region (whether Perón's populism was transmitted through this medium, hypothesized as having a positive impact on voting); share of women in the population (the impact of Eva, hypothesized as a positive); unemployment rate (with economic instability possibly benefitting Perón, hypothesized as a positive); and illiteracy rate (not impacted as much by newspapers and written media, hypothesized as a positive for Perón). We also introduced several control variables in our multivariate analysis of counties/jurisdictions: number of businesses; population; population over

18; and urbanization rate. The dependent variable was the same as in Alston and Gallo's study (namely, voting for Perón), but we expanded their data set to include both rural counties missing from their study as well as to include the 1948 election. This gave us a slightly bigger sample to work with (especially if we did not include the fraud variable they constructed).

Table 5: Factors Affecting Voting for Perón in the 1946 Election

Independent Variable (in Jurisdiction)	Specification 1: with Fraud Variable	Specification 2: without Fraud Variable
Cattle per farm	-0.07***	-0.06***
Industry employment (as a share of population)	-	-
Persons renting property	-	-
Number of radios heard	0.21**	0.12**
Women's share of the population	-	-
Unemployment %	-	-
Number of businesses	0.24***	0.13***
Share of illiteracy	-	-
Fraud	1.85***	-
Population	-	-
Population over 18	-	-
Urbanization rate	-	-
Interactive variable (number of radios multiplied by fraud)	-0.55**	-
N	192	245
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.42	0.10
F-statistic	28.78	10.04

Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the logistic voting variable (natural logarithm of share of votes for Perón in jurisdiction divided by 1-share of votes for Perón in jurisdiction). All specifications include a constant (not reported here). The estimations include Newey-West consistent standard errors and covariances. All variables (except the fraud variable) expressed in logarithms.

\* = null hypothesis of no correlation rejected at 10 percent level

\*\* = null rejected at 5 percent level

\*\*\* = null rejected at 1 percent level.



Initially we intended to run these two election years together as a panel, but the dissimilarities between the years suggest that this would not be a worthwhile extension of our work. The results are compiled in Tables 5 and 6.<sup>2</sup> The persistence of fraud as a structural force in both elections was statistically significant, and it increased from 1946–1948. However, it seems that the interaction of fraud and the impact of radio actually decreased voting for Perón, perhaps suggesting that the abundance of one-sided information lessened the impact of fraud. The impact of owning cattle was the same as in Alston and Gallo’s study, as the cattle owners opposed Perón in both elections in a consistent manner. Moreover, in the specifications that mirrored Alston and Gallo, the variables that they used in their study, especially industrial employment, had the expected signs and significance, although these disappeared with the introduction of other control variables.

So, what about the impact of radio? In the 1946 election, radios clearly had a positive and substantial impact on Perón’s election numbers, regardless of the specification. Furthermore, in that particular election radio actually reinforced its significance among the illiterate population. What about in 1948? It seems that our earlier findings about there being major differences between these two elections hold true. As seen in Table 6, fraud had a bigger impact on this election, albeit one partially negated by the radio network. In the second specification, radio seems to have had a negative impact on Perón’s numbers in 1948, however not in both specifications. Based on the partial correlations discussed earlier, it is quite possible that the impact of radio on voting for Perón increased in some parts of Argentina and not in others. Moreover, a higher illiteracy rate again increased voting for him, this time directly. And the higher the share of women in a given jurisdiction, the higher the propensity to vote for Perón. This may be the “Eva effect” at play, again being transmitted through various media. Also, considering that the opposition had limited access to radios in 1948 and that their only recourse was to newspapers could also help to explain that voters were beginning to not engage as much with radio and to look for plurality of views in other media.

<sup>2</sup> Only the best performing specifications listed here. Further information about the data sources, the database, and additional results available from the authors by request.

Table 6: Factors Affecting Voting for Perón in the 1948 Election

Independent Variable (in Jurisdiction)	Specification 1: with Fraud Variable	Specification 2: without Fraud Variable
Cattle per farm	-0.11***	-0.10***
Industry employment (as a share of population)	-	-
Persons renting property	-	-
Number of radios heard	-	-0.23**
Women's share of the population	0.63***	-
Unemployment %	-	-
Number of businesses	-	-
Share of illiteracy	0.23***	-
Fraud	1.67***	-
Population	-	-0.14***
Population over 18	-	-
Urbanization rate	-	-
Interactive variable (number of radios multiplied by another variable)	(Fraud) -0.55***	-
N	213	290
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.38	0.26
F-statistic	26.55	34.09

Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the logistic voting variable (natural logarithm of: share of votes for Perón in jurisdiction divided by 1-share of votes for Perón in jurisdiction). All specifications include a constant (not reported here). The estimations include Newey-West consistent standard errors and covariances. All variables (except the fraud variable) expressed in logarithms.

\* = null hypothesis of no correlation rejected at 10 percent level

\*\* = null rejected at 5 percent level

\*\*\* = null rejected at 1 percent level

Finally, we also tested to see if particular radio networks had a consistent impact, in this case Radio Belgrano and Radio Excelsior, with the latter being the biggest network. In 1946, Radio Belgrano had a large, positive, and statistically significant impact on voting for Perón. Excelsior was not statistically significant. In 1948, however, Belgrano's impact was not statistically significant, whereas Excelsior had a small, negative impact on votes. The location, nature of broadcasts and talent, and advertising played a role in determining their impacts. For example, in Buenos Aires proper, radio advertising costs for a few minutes of airtime

were over \$400 in 1947 US dollars, with many of the programs consisting of more than 40 actors and actresses. Respectively, in La Rioja the same costs came to a little over five dollars, and programs featured eight actors and actresses in total.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the impacts and reach varied greatly.

## Conclusion

The influence of various forms of media are felt daily in politics and public discourse. Modern elections are intricately tied to media outlets and the political economy surrounding their use. While the technologies have changed over time, in the last 200 years at least, media have played an important role in elections and revolutions. Our focus is on radio, which has had a political impact since the 1920s. Once radios became commonplace, they also became a vehicle for politics. In the case of Argentina, this happened in the 1940s and 1950s. While Argentinian elections were not transparent and fraud was rampant, they were not a foregone conclusion. Despite earlier research suggesting that fraud was a key feature in the 1946 election, we argue that the situation was hardly straightforward.

Perón was a master at manipulating crowds, and the radio was well-suited for this purpose. He used gestures and mannerisms to connect with his base. He also utilized radio to enhance the traditional personalistic patron-client relationships that dominated Argentine politics; in fact, he created new patron-client relationships with his effective cultural and economic rhetoric. In addition, Perón made effective use of Eva Duarte's celebrity to attract voters in the urban areas where he had not yet done as well as expected in 1946. Finally, by 1950, he made use of newspapers and journalists, through the government takeover of newspapers, in addition to the radio, to win over hesitant voters and key interest groups.

Based on qualitative and quantitative evidence, we found that Perón's consolidation of power from 1946–1948 (and beyond) was based on the use of media, in addition to courting key interest groups effectively. Moreover, the nationalization of the radio industry by 1948 gave Perón almost complete control over this medium, enhancing his success in the 1948 election. The quantitative evidence suggests that the importance of radio to Perón's electoral success grew substantially from the 1946 to the 1948 elections. Moreover, multivariate analyses showed that radio clearly influenced his victory also in 1946. The situation was a bit more complex in 1948, with Perón gaining among women and certain rural regions in particular. Overall, the qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that radio had a substantial role in installing Perón in power, leading Argentina further down the path towards institutional instability and authoritarian populism.

<sup>3</sup> *Broadcasting Stations of the World* (1946). Here the values in pesos were converted to US dollars with the exchange rate of 1 Peso=\$0.2681. While it would be very interesting to analyze the advertising spending and electoral outcomes, here we simply lack the data to do so.

## Bibliography

### Primary sources

- "1946 Yearbook." *Broadcasting*, 1946, American Radio History.
- Broadcasting Stations of the World: According to Country and City*, Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, War Department, 1946.
- Data and Rates of Radio Stations in the Other American Republics and Puerto Rico*, Washington, D.C.: United States Office of Inter-American Affairs, 1945.
- "El Resultados de Elección en 1946." *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, Argentina: February 28, 1946.
- IV Censo General de la Nación*. Census. Tomo I: Censo de Población. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Presidencia de la Nación y Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos, 1947.
- La Prensa*, 1946 and 1948. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Newspaper.
- "Memorandum of Conversation: Participants Carl Spaeth and Charles R. Burrows." *United States Government Document*. Washington, D.C., August 12, 1946. University of Delaware Library.
- Milton Bracker. "Perón's Challenge to the Free Press: Argentina's Dictator Controls Most Papers but La Prensa and La Nacion Still Resist Him." *New York Times*. March 5, 1950. Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).
- Morrow, Edward A. "Perón Paper Bars End of Curbs Now: Answer to Foe's Broadcast Says the Opposition Must End Acts of 'War' First." *New York Times*. July 30, 1955. Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).
- Mystery Solved*. Daily Report: Briefs, Argentina. Trujillo: United, June 4, 1953. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
- "Perón Aide Bars Radio Time to Foe: Radical Leader Fails in Bid to Broadcast---Opposition Setting New Policy." *New York Times*. July 8, 1955. Proquest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).
- PERÓN, Juan Domingo. *Juan D. Perón Plaza de Mayo October 17, 1945* Speech. MP3. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1945. Biblioteca del Congreso de la Nación Argentina.
- Radio Belgrano (LRY)*. Daily Report: Briefs. Washington D.C.: United States Foreign Radio Broadcasts, June 9, 1947. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, War Department.
- "Resultados de las Tres Últimas Elecciones Metropolitanas de Presidente y Diputados." *La Nación*, February 23, 1946.
- SARMIENTO, Domingo Faustino (1998), *Facundo: Or, Civilization and Barbarianism*. New York: Penguin Classics.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. *World Communications, Press, Radio, Film, and Television*. 3rd ed. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956.
- "What Are the Facts About Radio Abroad?" *Sponsor*, July 14, 1952.

### References

- ALSTON, Lee J, GALLO Andrés A. (2010), "Electoral Fraud, the Rise of Perón and Demise of Checks and Balances in Argentina", *Explorations in Economic History*, 47 (2), 179-197.
- ANDERSON, Benedict (2006), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York, New York, Verso.
- BANKS, Arthur S. (1973), "Cross-National Time Series, 1815-1973", ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

- BOAS, Taylor C. (2005), "Television and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media Effects in Brazil and Peru", *Latin American Research Review*, 40 (2), 27-49.
- BOLT, Jutta, VAN ZANDEN, Jan Luiten (2013), "The First Update of the Maddison Project: Re-Estimating Growth before 1820", *Maddison Project Working Paper WP-4*, University of Groningen, January. Groningen.
- BRUSCO, Valeria, NAZARENO, Marcelo, STOKES Susan Carol (2004), "Vote Buying in Argentina", *Latin American Research Review*, 39 (2), 66-88.
- CALVO, Ernesto, MURILLO María Victoria (2004), "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market", *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (4), 742-757.
- CHAMOSA, Oscar (2010), *The Argentine Folklore Movement: Sugar Elites, Criollo Workers, and the Politics of Cultural Nationalism, 1900-1955*, Tucson, Arizona, University of Arizona Press.
- CLAXTON, Robert H. (2007), *From Parsifal to Perón: Early Radio in Argentina, 1920-1944*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida.
- CRASSWELLER, Robert D. (1987), *Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina*, New York, New York, W. W. Norton & Company.
- FOX, Elizabeth, FOX, Fox de Cardona (1997), *Latin American Broadcasting: From Tango to Telenovela*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press,.
- GIBSON, Edward L., SUÁREZ-CAO, Julieta (2010), "Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina", *Comparative Politics*, 43 (1), 21-39.
- GRAHAM-YOOLL, Andrew (1975), "The Argentinian Press under Perón", *Index on Censorship*, 4 (1), 47-53.
- HILMES, Michele, LOVIGLIO Jason (2002), "Introduction", in Michele Hilmes and Jason Loviglio (eds.), *Radio Reader: Essays in the Cultural History of Radio*, New York, New York, Routledge, xi-xv.
- HORVATH, Ricardo (1986), *La trama secreta de la radiodifusión Argentina: Los dueños de la información electrónica y el largo brazo de su poder*, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Unidad.
- JAMES, Daniel (1993), *Resistance and Integration: Perónism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976*, Cambridge Latin American Studies, New York, N.Y., Cambridge University Press.
- KARUSH, Matthew B. (2012), *Culture of Class: Radio and Cinema in the Making of a Divided Argentina, 1920-1946*, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press.
- KEEN, Benjamin, HAYNES, Keith. (2009), *A History of Latin America*. 8th ed. Boston, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- LEVITSKY, Steven (2003), "From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999", *Latin American Research Review*, 38 (3), 3-36.
- LITTLE, Walter (1973a), "Electoral Aspects of Peronism, 1946-1954", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 15 (3), 267-284.
- LITTLE, Walter (1973b), "Party and State in Peronist Argentina, 1945-1955", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 53 (4), 644-662.
- LUNA, Félix (1969), *El 45: Crónica de un año decisivo*, Argentinos 8, Buenos Aires, Editorial J. Álvarez.
- LUNA, Félix (2000), *Perón y sus tiempos: La Argentina era una fiesta (1946-1949)*, Vol. 1. 3 vols. 8th ed. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana.
- LUNA, Félix (2013), *Perón y Su Tiempo: La Comunidad Organizada (1950-1952)*, Vol. 2 of 3. 5th ed. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana.
- MCCAULEY, Michael P. (2002), "Radio's Digital Future: Preserving the Public Interest in the Age of New Media", in Michele Hilmes and Jason Loviglio (eds.), *Radio Reader: Essays in the Cultural History of Radio*, New York, Routledge, 505-530.
- MERCADO, Silvia D. (2013), *El inventor del Peronismo: Raúl Apold, el cerebro oculto que cambió la política argentina*. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires, Grupo Editorial Planeta S.A.I.C..
- MILANESIO, Natalia (2013), *Workers Go Shopping in Argentina: The Rise of Popular Consumer Culture*, Albuquerque, New Mexico, University of New Mexico Press.

- MILLER, Elmer S. (1979), *Los Tobas Argentinos. Armonía y Disonancia en Una Sociedad*, Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editorial.
- NICHTER, Simeon (2008), "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot", *American Political Science Review*, 102 (01), 19-31.
- NOGUER, Jorge Eduardo (1985), *Radiodifusión en la Argentina*, 1st ed., Buenos Aires, Editorial Bien Común.
- PLOTKIN, Mariano Ben (2002), *Mañana Es San Perón: A Cultural History of Perón's Argentina*, 2nd ed., Wilmington, North Carolina, Scholarly Resources Inc..
- POTASH, Robert A. (1969), *The Army & Politics in Argentina: 1945-1962; Perón to Frondizi*, Vol. 2, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- ROCK, David (1985), *Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War*, 2nd ed., Berkeley, University of California Press.
- SIRVÉN, Pablo (1984), *Perón y los medios de comunicación: La conflictiva relación de los gobiernos justicialistas con la prensa, 1943-2011*, Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de América Latina.
- SMITH, Peter H. (2005), *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective*, New York, Oxford University Press, 5th ed..
- SNOW, Peter G. (1969), "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties", *American Political Science Review*, 63 (1), 163-167.
- STRÖMBERG, David (2004), "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, (1), 189-221.
- ULANOVSKY, Carlos, MERKIN, Marta, PANNO, Juan Jose, TIJMAN, Gabriela (1996), *Días de Radio: Historia de la Radio Argentina*, 4th ed., Buenos Aires, Espasa Calpe.
- WALTER, Richard J. (1993), *Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires: 1910-1942*, Cambridge Latin American Studies 74, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- WIARDA, Howard J., KLINE, Harvey F. (1985), "The Latin American Political Process and Its Present Crisis," in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (eds.), *Latin American Politics and Development*, 2nd ed., Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 106-121.

Aaltonen, Henri; Eloranta, Jari - Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James (2019), *The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin Publishers, New York. 576 pages. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 151-154.

## Recensões| Recensions

**ACEMOGLU, Daron; ROBINSON, James (2019), *The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin Publishers, New York. 576 pages.**

HENRI AALTONEN\*  
University of Helsinki

JARI ELORANTA\*\*  
University of Helsinki

The newest book from Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson is an indirect sequel to their earlier volume called "Why Nations Fail". Both books are focused on the study of institutions and states, while the newer volume centers on the themes of how states can succeed if they meet certain conditions, after getting the institutional mix correct. In some ways, there is some repetition in the book vis-à-vis the earlier book, for example on the discussion of China and authoritarianism, which is not necessarily a negative thing, given the complexity of the factors discussed and the role democracy plays in these processes. The authors do not imply that a liberal democracy is a guarantee of a functioning society, as the example of India has showcased. Instead, they maintain that it can be a crucial building block, one that needs to be constantly nurtured and maintained through societal interactions and institutional development.

In this new book perhaps the best-known proponents of institutional economics in the world today, the dynamic team of Acemoglu and Robinson, stress the role played by institutions that lead to good governance practices and accountability, perhaps even more than in their earlier work. Their study is a broad survey of various societies in history and how they have both created a strong enough of a state to keep order and ways to keep the budding Leviathan in check. In some

\* Email: henri.aaltonen@helsinki.fi

\*\* Email: jari.eloranta@helsinki.fi

ways, Acemoglu and Robinson are re-interpreting the model of government that embodies these ideals, which lead to more stable societal development. Moreover, certain universal rights of individuals are crucial to keep them engaged in the common goals of the society through certain levels of self-interest and the competition for ideas. In this way the authors are also making a strong statement to challenge the values authoritarian China represents in its quest for global economic and political dominance. They in fact keep predicting that the Chinese autocracy is destined to fail – as to when this would happen remains anyone's guess.

One of the key concepts in the book is liberal democracy, which is a concept that has aroused a plethora of renewed debate in the last 30 years, especially after Francis Fukuyama's and Samuel Huntington's work on democracies and religion in the 1990s. Acemoglu and Robinson take a more organic view of the concept and maintain that there is nothing inherently stable or automatic about such a societal contract. Stable societies always originate via social and political competition. In fact, it is constantly in flux, hence the descriptive term "narrow corridor", and thus liberal democracies need to maintain and reproduce such institutions so that they can remain on that narrow band towards societal stability and economic growth. This is perhaps the central theoretical tenet of the book, one that certainly adds to the debate in political science about the very nature of liberal democracies.

As the current academic multidisciplinary literature has established, liberal democracies are vulnerable especially early on and require a complex (and typically long) process of evolution toward stability. The authors here emphasize that such vulnerabilities are built-in into even the more mature democracies and that such societies need to ensure that its citizens feel included in these processes. Furthermore, they emphasize, similar to the early theorists of democracy, that certain types of checks and balances are pivotal in the functioning of the state, with the United States providing an example of these mechanisms. However, the authors are not blind to the weaknesses of the American model of government, which is being played out in real time in the leadup to the 2020 elections. If representatives of capital in the society, in the absence of a functional opposition, gain too much power, the system no longer works in the interests of the majority, thus creating fault lines in the polity itself. In addition, these factors would give an opportunity for an autocrat to take over, or at least increase the risk for such an event. The end result could be an exit from the so-called narrow corridor and a transition to a society in which large swaths of the citizens no longer trust "the system". Formal rules no longer coincide and interact with the informal behavior and rules. Such a gap between the formal and informal rules, as Douglass C. North has argued, could ultimately lead to a collapse of a society, i.e. civil war, or an elite-led authoritarian model in which the oligarchs rule along with the political/military leaders (as in Russia).

A key feature of this narrow corridor is the so-called Red Queen effect, based on Lewis Carroll's classic tale. The authors mean by this the situation in which the



state's power (capacity) develops in tandem with inclusive societal structures and institutions. The balance, or more accurately constant competition, between these two forces is the key to staying on the narrow corridor. Rules in the society have to be able to reinforce and guide this competition. For example, in China the Red Queen is the Communist Party elite that is able to set the rules nearly unilaterally. There is little interaction between various organizations in the society, and this creates constant friction in the political markets. Citizens are considered subjects, without an agency or political voice in the society, which reduces their incentives to participate in politics. When the Red Queen is absent, like in Argentina, the state is weak and disorganized, with a bureaucracy that is inefficient instead of innovative (with government workers that do not even show up for work, the so-called *gnocchis*). This leaves room for other elites to claim power and establish long-lasting political fiefdoms.

Well-functioning societies have ample political competition, checks and balances, and its citizens buy into the core rules of the state. One of the key features is that power should not be too concentrated, such as was in the case of the Renaissance North Italian city states like Venice. The ruling council there consisted of the most prominent merchants, with revolving members, and a doge to serve as the chief magistrate. In Europe at that time there were other players that fought against these instincts, like the rulers of emerging nation states and the Catholic Church. The successful societies like the Netherlands and Great Britain were able to create their own paths toward key institutions, such as a legal system that treated people equally (more or less), parliaments, financial markets, banks, public debt, and so on. This required the elites to share power and create lasting formal institutions to guarantee the rights of certain groups and individuals. They also became the models for most Western nations to follow.

This book is also connected to an emerging debate about state capacity: what it is, how it can be measured, how it relates to military, monetary, and other forms of capacity, and so on. This is a literature that is crucial in order to understand how states evolve and what implications these transitions have. One of the questions that Acemoglu and Robinson is *not* engaging in concerns the shift of states over time from one form to another, for example from military states to welfare states. This of course is directly related to the narrow corridor they describe. Does military capacity have to precede a transition to a welfare state? If so, how and why? Furthermore, the current discussion about state capacity does not take into account enough what was going on at the local and regional levels, wherein we began to see the early forms of welfare provision especially among the Nordic societies. Finally, this debate does not, nor do Acemoglu and Robinson, discern the impacts that spending on various items might have versus the measurement of state capacity by revenue collection figures alone. These factors will add more meat around the central argument in the book, about how states evolve along the narrow corridor.

Overall, this book is another key contribution on the topics of state development and capacity, historical trajectories, and the roles various institutional arrangements play in the successful development of societies. It has a wide variety of historical and current-day examples that are well narrated and thought out. This makes the book an engaging read, albeit not quite as surprising or original than perhaps its predecessor, *“Why Nations Fail”*. Regardless, we would recommend this book as a fun read, and as a book that can stimulate discussions about big issues in the development of the modern world.

Fernandes, Paulo Jorge - Cordeiro, José Manuel Lopes (2020), *1820: revolução liberal do Porto*, Porto, Câmara Municipal do Porto, 497 páginas. ISBN 978-989-54475-8-9. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 155-161.

**CORDEIRO, José Manuel Lopes (2020), *1820: revolução liberal do Porto*, Porto, Câmara Municipal do Porto, 497 páginas. ISBN 978-989-54475-8-9.**

PAULO JORGE FERNANDES\*

Professor Auxiliar do Departamento de História da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas – NOVA FCSH

Assinalou-se em Agosto de 2020 o duplo centenário do pronunciamento militar verificado na cidade do Porto que constituiu o momento de abertura da primeira experiência liberal em Portugal. Este movimento, iniciado a 24 de Agosto de 1820, proclamou como seus objetivos principais o regresso do rei ao Portugal europeu, ausente que estava no Brasil desde 1807-08, mas também a reunião de Cortes Constituintes que deveriam discutir e fazer aprovar uma Constituição, rompendo com o figurino político típico do Antigo Regime. Pretendia-se “regenerar” o país, como então se dizia, e superar o ambiente de decadência experimentado desde as chamadas “Invasões Francesas” (1807-1811). Na época vivia-se um clima de desamparo político motivado pela ausência da Corte do outro lado do Atlântico, mas também devido à crescente degradação da situação económica e social do reino uma vez que se sentia a dupla humilhação de um país que se tinha transformado numa colónia do Brasil e, simultaneamente, num protetorado militar britânico. Para além disso, e aproveitando a conjuntura ibérica, marcada pela insurreição da tropa liberal no sul de Espanha no início do mesmo ano de 1820 e consequente imposição da Constituição de Cádiz ao rei Fernando VII, os revoltosos do Porto procuravam fazer alinhar Portugal pelo modelo institucional então já adotado no país vizinho. Seguir-se-iam uma série de transformações que mudariam para sempre

\* Email: paulojorgefernandes@sapo.pt

a paisagem governativa nacional. Para já, tinha chegado o tempo de afastar uma regência fraca, ainda por cima tutelada por um general estrangeiro.

O contexto em que essa mudança ocorreu é sobejamente conhecido dos especialistas, embora não tenha deixado lastro na memória coletiva do país. O centenário destes acontecimentos, aliás, passou praticamente despercebido no contexto da conturbada Primeira República, que vivia ainda sob a sombra do impacto das consequências da Grande Guerra e do alastrar da Gripe Pneumónica. O pronunciamento de Agosto de 1820 seria um primeiro e breve passo que modificou a face da monarquia abrindo espaço para a implantação de um regime constitucional solidificado apenas depois de várias peripécias sangrentas, que culminaram na eclosão de uma guerra civil que provocou milhares de mortos e destruição um pouco por todo o território nacional.

Os vencedores desse conflito apenas em 1834 puderam consolidar a Monarquia Constitucional. Este tipo de regime, derrubado em Outubro de 1910, foi aquele que até aos nossos dias atingiu maior longevidade no período contemporâneo em Portugal, marcando um tempo decisivo para a compreensão dos vários fenómenos que moldaram a nossa modernidade enquanto país. Todavia, a violência e instabilidade que afligiram o agitado período de 1910-1926, por um lado, e a ideia do “maldito século XIX”, vulgarizada durante quase meio século de autoritarismo, entre 1926 e 1974, por outro, obliteraram praticamente por completo a herança deixada pela época de Oitocentos e pela Revolução Liberal na nossa sociedade. Ao longo do Estado Novo, foi apagada uma parte substancial da memória coletiva sobre a génese de um conjunto de estruturas e valores políticos, económicos, sociais e culturais, recuperados, é certo, já em plena fase democrática, mas cuja origem não tem sido devidamente sublinhada.

Para evocar o papel pioneiro da primeira experiência liberal em Portugal, a Câmara Municipal do Porto decidiu em boa hora promover uma exposição evocativa dos acontecimentos que nortearam este momento fundador do constitucionalismo no país e que decorreu na Casa do Infante / Museu da Cidade entre Fevereiro de 2020 e Janeiro de 2021. Tratou-se de uma iniciativa cultural comissariada pelo Professor Doutor José Manuel Lopes Cordeiro, docente do Departamento de História do Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade do Minho. Lopes Cordeiro apresenta um curriculum que o aconselhava para a tarefa. Doutor em História com uma dissertação sobre *A Indústria Portuense no Séc. XIX*, os seus interesses de investigação repartem-se entre os temas do Património Industrial, da Arqueologia e da História Industrial, assim como da História Empresarial e da História Política Contemporânea. Para além disso, Lopes Cordeiro é investigador integrado do CICS. NOVA.UMinho – Centro Interdisciplinar em Ciências Sociais. O seu percurso conta ainda, entre várias publicações de mérito na área, de uma muito interessante obra sobre *A Imprensa Clandestina e do Exílio no Período 1926-1974*, publicada em Braga pelo Conselho Cultural da Universidade do Minho.

Ao longo de nove capítulos, este livro, que conta com uma nota introdutória do Presidente da Câmara Municipal do Porto, Rui Moreira, e um prefácio da autoria do Presidente da República, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, percorre a história da Revolução desde os seus antecedentes e momentos preparatórios até ao desejado regresso de D. João VI a Lisboa, ocorrido já em Julho de 1821. O grosso volume contempla ainda uma muito útil cronologia do período (1807-1821), que coloca em perspetiva sincrónica os eventos mais marcantes da época verificados na Europa, em Portugal e no Brasil. Esta muito cuidada edição, patrocinada pela Câmara Municipal do Porto, termina com a publicação de uma série de fotografias sobre a referida exposição iconográfica e documental, valorizando ainda mais o conjunto da obra.

No primeiro capítulo revisitam-se os antecedentes da Revolução. Começa-se por evocar a Convenção de Londres, assinada secretamente em Outubro de 1807, poucas semanas antes do embarque que permitiria a transferência da sede da monarquia, da Corte e da capital do Império para a América Portuguesa. Seguidamente, são recordadas as facilidades de comércio que o reino de Portugal – entenda-se o Brasil – concedeu aos britânicos no território da América do Sul, ganhando destaque na narrativa seguida pelo autor o papel do Porto no contexto da segunda invasão francesa. O capítulo encerra com uma análise às decisões saídas do Congresso de Viena e à constituição da Santa Aliança, centrando a sua atenção no que acontecia no Brasil, entretanto elevado à condição de Reino Unido e onde viria a ocorrer – na província de Pernambuco – uma revolução de cariz republicano contra o domínio português sobre a região.

O capítulo seguinte trata da Revolução em curso. Destaca-se a execução de Gomes Freire de Andrade (1817), a formação do Sinédrio portuense (1818) e a sua relação com maçonaria, mas também se dá conta da aclamação de D. João VI no Rio de Janeiro e a proibição das sociedades secretas. O autor salienta depois a situação económica do Porto nas vésperas da revolução. Refere-se a situação de ruína do comércio e o fraco desenvolvimento da indústria. A dimensão ibérica dos antecedentes revolucionários em Portugal é escrutinada através da análise aos pronunciamentos anti-absolutistas verificados em Espanha, sendo depois o leitor conduzido por Lopes Cordeiro a uma abordagem da situação política em Portugal nos primeiros meses de 1820 e ao papel do referido Sinédrio e dos seus membros nos últimos preparativos do golpe.

O capítulo terceiro é dedicado à Revolução do Porto. Os acontecimentos de 24 de Agosto e dos dias subsequentes são então revisitados pelo autor. A ação inicia-se na madrugada de 24 de Agosto e logo passa para a sessão que viria a acontecer na Câmara Municipal do Porto ao início daquela manhã. Lopes Cordeiro ilustra o momento fundador do liberalismo em Portugal com a publicação de inéditas imagens dos fólios do *Livro de Vereações*, onde foi registada a ata da reunião municipal e que seria rasurada já presumivelmente em Junho de 1823, na sequência da Vilafrancada. É também examinado o primeiro jornal liberal a ser publicado

neste novo contexto político, merecendo realce a atuação do governo provisório da Junta do Porto, que passou a exercer funções em nome de D. João VI. O capítulo termina com a descrição dos festejos verificados a propósito do sucesso do golpe portuense.

No capítulo que se segue ganha relevo a propaganda da revolução liberal do Porto. Começa-se pela observação da reação dos governadores do reino em Lisboa às notícias do norte do país, para depois nos determos na adesão do Minho, Trás-os-Montes e da Beira à revolução liberal. A diplomacia da Junta Provisional, o papel da regência e a possibilidade da convocação de Cortes à maneira do Antigo Regime são os temas que seguidamente Lopes Cordeiro enquadra na sua narrativa.

No V capítulo, a Revolução desce à capital, onde é necessário “levar a redenção aos cativos lisboenses”. Diferentes acontecimentos militares e políticos são percorridos apontando-se como exemplo os sucedidos no quartel de Vale de Pereiro. O autor detém-se, seguidamente, sobre a constituição e atuação do governo interino. As relações internacionais nesta nova conjuntura são também alvo de uma cuidada explicação.

Já o capítulo VI discorre sobre os efeitos da entrada da Junta do Porto na cidade de Lisboa. Ao mesmo tempo, são investigadas as várias tentativas de dissolução da Junta do Porto levadas a cabo por António da Silveira, presidente do Governo Supremo do Reino e que se verificam ainda mesmo antes desse momento em que os membros da Junta nortenha chegam à capital.

O capítulo VII é votado às eleições para as Cortes Constituintes. O momento de tensão na narrativa surge com o regresso de Beresford do Rio de Janeiro, sendo o general britânico impedido de desembarcar em Lisboa numa altura em que a questão eleitoral ganha grande visibilidade a propósito da forma como as Cortes seriam convocadas e reunidas. A falta de consenso no momento esteve na origem no golpe da Martinhada, sendo os seus efeitos analisados seguidamente. As primeiras eleições são também merecidamente destacadas por Lopes Cordeiro, assim como o Manifesto da Nação aos soberanos e povos da Europa, onde os revoltosos dão a saber internacionalmente quais as suas intenções. Escolhidos os deputados era chegada a hora de proceder ao reconhecimento nacional à cidade do Porto numa primeira tentativa de perpetuar a memória do 24 de Agosto. Descreve-se seguidamente a sessão preparatória de Cortes.

O VIII e penúltimo capítulo examina a obra legislativa das Cortes até ao momento em que se verificou o regresso de D. João VI à Europa, pondo fim à sua prolongada estadia no Brasil. O autor explica como foi eleita uma regência e escolhido novo governo sendo depois a atenção do leitor desviada para a realização do Congresso de Leibach e para atuação da diplomacia portuguesa nessa ocasião. O famoso relatório que Manuel Fernandes Tomás leu aos constituintes é também aqui dissecado, até porque se tratou da circunstância que deu início verdadeiramente aos trabalhos parlamentares. A aprovação das Bases da Constituição é um

dos momentos mais importantes desta fase, assim como a supressão da estrutura senhorial do Antigo Regime e a abolição da Inquisição. Entretanto, e perante a evolução da situação no Brasil, onde já se tinha conhecimento da evolução política em Portugal, Lopes Cordeiro passa a esclarecer o impacto do Decreto das Cortes Constituintes, datado de 18 de Abril de 1821, que determinou a realização das eleições no Ultramar. Para informar o rei dos sucessos europeus, as Cortes enviam uma carta a D. João VI com o propósito de que o monarca prestasse juramento às Bases da Constituição. As cortes, entretanto, prosseguiram a sua obra legislativa e aprovavam a importante lei de liberdade de imprensa, tema que também é amplamente relatado.

O último capítulo do livro é dedicado ao estudo da receção da Revolução no Brasil até ao momento em que finalmente D. João VI decide regressar a Lisboa. Aqui se dá conta da reacção do governo do Rio de Janeiro à Revolução liberal [do Porto], à chegada do conde de Palmela ao Rio de Janeiro, onde tomou assento no governo, mas também à revolução do Pará, na Bahia e, sobretudo, no Rio de Janeiro. Entretanto, no reino, nas Cortes travou-se a discussão sobre a urgência e as condições em que se deveria processar o retorno de D. João VI, o que acaba por se verificar em Julho de 1821. A partir deste momento, como assinala o Lopes Cordeiro, “inaugurava-se um novo ciclo, que conduziria à aprovação, em 24 de Setembro de 1822, da Constituição Política da Monarquia Portuguesa”, cumprindo desta forma os propósitos que foram anunciados naquela madrugada de 24 de Agosto no Campo de Santo Ovídio na cidade do Porto. Este derradeiro capítulo é seguido da publicação da Ode “24 d’Agosto” da autoria de Almeida Garrett, contemporâneo e observador atento do fenómeno revolucionário.

Para finalizar é de referir duas notas críticas. Por um lado, nota-se a ausência de uma Introdução, que poderia permitir um debate atualizado sobre o “estado da arte” relacionado com a temática. Esta debilidade do livro é de alguma forma atenuada pelo texto que serve de prefácio à obra, onde se procurou discutir o carácter da revolução através da análise de um texto do recentemente desaparecido historiador Vasco Pulido Valente, intitulado “Pássaros de uma só pena: para onde vai a Revolução”, datado de Março de 1978. Na verdade, tratou-se de uma Revolução política com consequências económicas e sociais ou, ao contrário, estamos perante uma Revolução com uma génese económica e social que teve efeitos políticos? Julgamos que a obra e o seu autor perderam uma oportunidade para contribuir para esta discussão colocando-a no contexto dos estudos sobre a matéria, à semelhança do já experimentado por outras historiografias que analisaram as revoluções liberais europeias de finais do século XVIII e inícios do XIX. Em Portugal ainda não se realizou o devido enterro da “Revolução burguesa” como a nota introdutória ao livro deixa perceber. Todavia, a opção do autor é justificável. Trata-se de um trabalho sério e rigoroso, mas destinado ao grande público, pelo que o leitor é poupado ao confronto com a literatura especializada na temática, que pode ser consultada pelos interessados no final do volume.

Na mesma medida, o leitor pode sentir a falta de uma Conclusão que lhe permita compreender em que quadrante interpretativo se situa o autor do texto. As leituras sobre a Revolução de 1820 têm oscilado ao longo dos tempos entre autores que procuram destacar o efeito de rutura do fenómeno revolucionário vintista na linha interpretativa de José de Arriaga, por exemplo, e uma visão mais “*tocquevilliana*”, apostada mais em colocar o foco sobre as continuidades e as persistências verificadas durante este momento de transição do Antigo Regime para a modernidade liberal, na sequência dos trabalhos mais recente de historiadores como José Luís Cardoso, por exemplo. Importaria ficar definido em que corrente se filia este trabalho.

À laia de sugestão seja-nos ainda permitida a proposta de que uma futura edição deste trabalho veja acrescentado no índice do livro todos os sub-capítulos, que fomos passando em revista nesta recensão, mas que agora se encontram ausentes.

Uma segunda crítica de fundo ao livro de Lopes Cordeiro reside no título. “1820. Revolução Liberal do Porto” é um dístico que se pode prestar a equívocos. É verdade que o movimento revolucionário foi pensado e executado na cidade do Porto, a segunda maior do reino, por razões facilmente compreensíveis e que se prendem com a existência de um precedente histórico não muito distante no tempo. Com efeito, seria naquela cidade que se organizou uma primeira Junta de oposição ao domínio francês sobre Lisboa, em 1808. Mas os eventos de 1820 também se explicam por razões da distância existente em relação à capital, deixando os revoltosos com uma considerável margem de manobra para escapar com tempo a uma qualquer reação militar oriunda de Lisboa, onde se encontrava a regência. Subsistia na memória de todos o falhanço recente do golpe dos “Mártires da Pátria” e as condições em que o mesmo decorrera, denunciado que foi nas ruas de Lisboa, em 1817. Os homens do Sinédrio tinham presente todas estas circunstâncias, para além de uma óbvia e evidente ligação ao mundo das classes médias e das profissões liberais portuenses. Todavia, se a paternidade do golpe se pode atribuir à cidade do Porto, o mesmo não se pode dizer em relação ao seu sucesso. Sem a adesão da guarnição de Lisboa e o apoio de sectores sociais decisivos da capital a Revolução poderia mais facilmente fracassar e o destino sofrido por Gome Freire de Andrade corria o risco de se repetir. Bem sabedor de tudo isto, o próprio Manuel Fernandes Tomás, dias antes da eclosão do pronunciamento militar no Campo de Santo Ovídio e da proclamação das intenções dos revoltosos na Câmara Municipal do Porto, deslocou-se a Lisboa para assegurar que o movimento teria o apoio indispensável na capital, amparo esse que seria julgado como absolutamente necessário para fazer vingar o golpe nortenho. A Revolução iniciou-se no Porto, mas sem a ajuda de Lisboa, que lhe deu um carácter verdadeiramente nacional, a mesma teria mais dificuldade em vingar. Apenas uma perspectiva paroquial da história poderá justificar um título desta natureza. A Revolução não é do Porto. A Revolução é nacional.



Nada disto retira mérito ao trabalho de José Manuel Lopes Cordeiro. Profusamente ilustrada, a obra foi redigida num tom narrativo bem ao gosto da História Política praticada pelo seu autor. Sob esse ponto de vista, e até ver, estamos perante a mais clara e atualizada abordagem dos acontecimentos que marcaram o início do vintismo. Trata-se, pois, de um livro que fazia falta. Aqui, o leitor menos familiarizado com os factos, poderá acompanhar a sua evolução de uma forma escorreita. Já os estudiosos do período encontrarão material original para pensar sobre a eclosão do regime liberal em Portugal. Uma das principais virtudes da abordagem de Lopes Cordeiro foi o recurso, que é permanente ao longo da exposição das ocorrências e da colocação em cena das personagens mais significativas deste processo, a fontes documentais da época, algumas delas conhecidas, outras menos utilizadas. Estamos, assim, perante um dos trabalhos de maior valia para a compreensão de um momento tão importante da história de Portugal.



Dominguez, Rodrigo da Costa; Rodrigues, Lisbeth; Land, Jeremy; Eloranta, Jari - Pandemics and spill-over effects: an interview with Vincent Geloso. *Configurações*, vol. 26, 2020, pp. 163-170.

## Entrevista| Interview| Entrevue

### **Pandemics and spill-over effects: an interview with Vincent Geloso**

RODRIGO DA COSTA DOMINGUEZ\*

CICS – University of Minho

LISBETH RODRIGUES\*\*

CSG-ISEG – University of Lisbon

JEREMY LAND\*\*\*

University of Jyväskylä and University of Helsinki

JARI ELORANTA\*\*\*\*

University of Helsinki

#### **Pandemias e efeitos colaterais: uma entrevista com Vincent Geloso**

O ano de 2020 trouxe um cenário de desafios e incertezas ao mundo globalizado, para o qual muitos (ou a maioria) de nós achávamos que estávamos preparados. A rápida disseminação da COVID-19 e o estado de pandemia tiveram impactos profundos nas sociedades, em particular nas relações económicas. Este não é, contudo, o primeiro evento da história da humanidade no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento e propagação de uma doença a escala mundial. Dentro deste panorama, muitas questões surgiram relativamente ao impacto que um evento desta magnitude pode causar numa economia globalizada. Como é que as instituições reagem perante uma pandemia? Qual a sua capacidade de resposta? Aprendemos alguma coisa com as experiências do passado? É possível comparar este evento com outras pandemias anteriores?

Estas e outras questões foram abordadas numa entrevista com o investigador Vincent Geloso, professor de economia no King's University College (Canadá). A sua investigação tem procurado respostas sobre estas e outras questões relativas ao efeito das pandemias mundiais na economia em outros momentos da História, adotando uma perspectiva comparada. Nesta entrevista, Vicent Geloso ressalta que há diferenças importantes a considerar nos diferentes contextos. Sublinha e explica, ainda, os motivos de as democracias serem capazes, a médio-longo prazo, de conferir uma resposta mais duradoura e eficaz em momentos de crise sanitária.

\* E-mail: rcdominguez@ics.uminho.pt

\*\* E-mail: lrodrigues@iseg.ulisboa.pt

\*\*\* E-mail: land25.jeremy@gmail.com

\*\*\*\* E-mail: jari.eloranta@helsinki.fi

### Pandemics and spill-over effects: an interview with Vincent Geloso

The year of 2020 brought a scenario of challenges and uncertainties to the globalized world, which many (or most) of us thought we would be prepared to deal with. The rapid spread of COVID-19 and the state of the pandemic have had profound impacts on societies, especially on economic relations. On the other hand, this is not the first event in the history of mankind regarding the development and spread of a disease on a world scale. Within this panorama, many questions have arisen regarding the impact that an event of this magnitude can have on a globalized economy. How do institutions react to a pandemic? How responsive are these institutions? Have we learned anything from past experiences? Is it possible to compare this event with other previous pandemics?

These and other issues were addressed in an interview with researcher Vincent Geloso, Professor of Economics at King's University College (Canada). His research has sought answers to these and many other questions regarding the effect of global pandemics on the economy at other times in history, from a comparative perspective. However, he stresses that there are important differences to be considered in different contexts, and also underlines and explains why democracies are capable, in the medium/long term, of providing a more lasting and effective response in these moments of health crisis.

### Guiding Questions for Editorial

Vincent Geloso is an assistant professor of economics at King's University College. He earned his PhD in economic history from the London School of Economics. He has published more than 50 articles in journals like *Public Choice*, *Canadian Journal of Economics*, *Explorations in Economic History*, *Health Policy & Planning* and *British Medical Journal: Global Health*. His work can be found at [www.vincentgeloso.com](http://www.vincentgeloso.com).

1. What can economic history tell us about the ways that pandemics can wreak havoc on economies throughout the globe?

Pandemics in the past caused large mortality shocks (as a share of population) and long economic contractions. However, with the exception of an outlier in 1918-19, the trend since the 1857-58 influenza pandemic has been quite favorable.<sup>1</sup> As a share of populations affected, death rates have been falling and the damages induced by pandemics (as a share of Gross Domestic Product) have also been decreasing. Most interestingly is the chronology of influenza pandemics. While there were seven pandemics between 1700 and 1858, there were only five from 1858 to 2010. The last of these was quite minor. Given that the world economy has expanded

<sup>1</sup> For a summary, see Candela, Rosolino, Geloso, Vincent (2020), "Robust Political Economy and Pandemics", *Working Paper*.

considerably, that international travel has soared alongside international trade in goods and that population density has increased markedly (i.e. increasing the odds of infections), this is a *massive* improvement that fails to be noticed by many. In a very strange way, the reason why the present pandemic is so surprising in terms of its impact is that there are no pandemics in people's rearview mirrors.<sup>2</sup> Thus, unlike people of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, there are few reference points in terms of pandemic-events. Combined, these historical elements suggest that mankind has become increasingly better able to withstand extreme health shocks than in the past.

Now, I must add something of importance: the cost of pandemics (both human and economic) is a function of the disease's features, features of the local population and of institutional settings. The former set (i.e. the disease's features) is easy to understand for everyone: how infectious is it, how deadly is it etc. The second is also pretty evident and we can talk about it in a minute but the last factor is the most important. There is a good connection between health and development: richer societies tend to be healthier societies. There is also a connection between institutional quality (i.e. liberal democracies with rule of law, secure property rights and open markets) and development. That entails that there is a connection between institutions and health. Societies with high institutional quality are going to be able to withstand shocks like COVID better because these institutions make them rich. So, the improvement I mentioned earlier is tied to economic development.

However, that connection is a bit *fuzzy*. There are *some* diseases that liberal democracies committed to the protection of individual liberties (of which I count property rights) cannot deal with properly.<sup>3</sup> Some diseases, especially communicable ones, are particularly aggressive and heavy-handed methods are quite effective in quashing that disease. In other words, there are some diseases that can be fought quite well with coercion. The problem is that the institutions that can deploy such coercion are also unlikely to be liberal democracies with strong constraints on the abuse of individual rights. Such illiberal societies are thus going to enjoy lower mortality from extreme communicable diseases, but that illiberalism is probably going to make them poorer. In the long-run, that matters a lot because economic growth has palliative effects: greater incomes reduce the propensity to suffer from non-communicable diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, nephritis, diarrhea, cardiovascular conditions, lung diseases, cirrhosis, etc.) or less aggressive communicable diseases that require heavy investments in things like water treatment and swamp draining (e.g. typhoid fever, malaria).

2 Beveridge, W. I. (1991), "The chronicle of influenza epidemics", *History and philosophy of the life sciences*, 13(2), 223.

3 Troesken, W. (2015), *The pox of liberty: how the constitution left Americans rich, free, and prone to infection*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

These points create a strange paradox that has escaped many. At any given point in time, at any snapshot liberal societies are going to perform poorly in terms of managing an extreme pandemic event like COVID-19. However, they are also going to fare better in terms of economic development and long-term improvements in broadly-defined health outcomes. This is a strange paradox that has escaped many who fail to consider the role of institutions.

The problem, I fear, is that a lot of people are now involved in the debates over the “proper” COVID-19 response and are going about it assuming that they are advisers to benevolent and omnipotent rulers. They fail to consider the rich institutional tapestry in the background. More importantly, they fail to consider that a tapestry is a weaving of many threads that cannot be separated otherwise the whole tapestry unravels. Institutions are like tapestries or, in economic jargon, bundles: you take them as is and accept that you can't pick and choose features. If you want a strong liberal democracy that protects property rights in order to secure economic growth, you cannot have a strong state that use the heavy-handed measures needed to deal with a pandemic. And if you want the state to be strong enough to deal with pandemics, you cannot have the same rate of economic development. Incidentally, that is why there is a strong association between historical prevalence of infectious diseases and the propensity to have authoritarian governments.<sup>4</sup> Alongside Ilia Murtazashvili, I also provide evidence of this relationship by showing that the stringency of government policies in the face of COVID is inversely associated with both the Polity Index (measuring political freedom) and the Economic Freedom of the World Index (measuring economic freedom).<sup>5</sup>

2. Given your recent publications on the 1918 flu pandemic, is that pandemic the best comparison to Covid-19 pandemic? Why not other, more modern pandemics such as the SARS outbreak of 2002-04 or even the 1968 Hong Kong flu pandemic?

There are many elements to consider. In terms of human lives lost, COVID-19 is more like the Hong Kong Flu of 1968 or the Asian Flu of 1957. However, in terms of economic costs, there are fewer similarities. The public health responses in 1957 and 1968 were nowhere near what we observe today with COVID-19. There were few school closings and no lockdowns.<sup>6</sup> Public policy thus limited the economic contraction. The 1918-19 pandemic, however, generated *very similar* economic consequences. Because it tended to kill prime age workers, the Spanish flu decimated a large

4 Murray, D. R., Schaller, M., Suedfeld, P. (2013), “Pathogens and politics: Further evidence that parasite prevalence predicts authoritarianism”, *PloS One*, 8(5), e62275; Pericàs, J. M. (2020), “Authoritarianism and the threat of infectious diseases”, *The Lancet*, 395(10230), 1111-1112.

5 Geloso, V., Murtazashvili, I. (2020), “Can Governments Deal with Pandemics?” Available at SSRN 3671634.

6 Honigsbaum, M. (2020), “Revisiting the 1957 and 1968 influenza pandemics”, *The Lancet*, 395(10240), P1824-1826.

portion of the workforce causing a contraction. Today, because of lockdowns and the need to adjust consumer (e.g. facemasks) and business (e.g. plexiglass equipments) behaviors, COVID-19 caused a similar economic contract to 1918-19. Thus, I would say that 1918-19 is closer to COVID-19 than others in economic terms.

But allow me an important digression here to say that I see in this a massive victory. Few would see a triumph of economic development at first glance but they would be wrong. Thanks to high levels of economic development, we can technically afford lockdowns and other policies that save lives. After all, it is much cheaper (although not cheap *per se*) to shut down your business for three months when you are in a rich economy with people holding larger wealth stocks than in the past. You can afford lockdowns to save lives. Poorer societies do not have that same luxury. Let me put it differently: if we had had COVID-19 when we were half as rich as we are today (globally speaking), the death count from COVID-19 would be immensely greater. That is because wealth allows us to weather shocks like these better.

3. If, as you argue, liberal democracies are less capable of handling pandemics than more authoritarian nations, why are some liberal democracies better able to handle the pandemic than others? Are there other mechanisms at play here?

Earlier I mentioned that the features of the local population are of relevance. In these I would include things like social trust and population homogeneity. High trust and homogenous populations are substitutes for governments in terms of insuring that certain behaviors are adopted. For example, mask-wearing can save lives. However, some people may free-ride on the efforts of conscientious citizens. If too many free-ride the effectiveness of mask-wearing is diminished. How do you limit that free-riding? There are two ways. The first is that governments impose a mask mandate. The second is that non-state organizations enforce a social norm. The latter is quite effective in my opinion as ostracism is actually part of evolutionary nature.<sup>7</sup> Ostracizing and stigmatizing free-riders (e.g. by refusing them service, by refusing to talk to them etc.) can lead free-riders to stop free-riding.<sup>8</sup> The liberal democracies that deal better with COVID-19 are those where these substitutes to state methods are easier to use. These tend to be highly homogenous societies or high-trust societies.

Think about it this way. A society needs to achieve X level of social distancing to minimize the damages of COVID-19. How do you get to 100% of X? Liberal

7 Kurzban, R., Leary, M. R. (2001), "Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion", *Psychological Bulletin*, 127(2), 187.

8 Nakamaru, M., Yokoyama, A. (2014), "The effect of ostracism and optional participation on the evolution of cooperation in the voluntary public goods game", *PloS one*, 9(9), e108423; Maier-Rigaud, F. P., Martinsson, P., Staffiero, G. (2010), "Ostracism and the provision of a public good: experimental evidence", *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 73(3), 387-395.

democracies with high levels (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Germany) of social trust probably can achieve (and these are hypothetical numbers) 80% of X without the need for state methods. Societies with low trust (e.g. France) achieve a smaller proportion and they must thus rely on heavy-handed state methods.

#### 4. What role does institutional flexibility/rigidity play in determining outcomes?

Further complexifying the paradox that I mentioned earlier is the fact that liberal societies with open economies also suffer less economically than closed economies when a pandemic hit. In a paper published in *Contemporary Economic Policy*, my friend Jamie Pavlik and I show that greater economic liberty partially mitigated the economic consequences of excess mortality during the 1918-19 pandemic. In other words, the freer an economy was, the less burdensome were the economic damages.<sup>9</sup>

Why would that be? One way to answer this is to imagine that a pandemic changes costs and benefits of certain activities. Those changes make previous configurations of economic resources less valuable. A rearrangement has to occur. In terms of real-world example, think about capital and labour being reallocated from restaurant and services to the manufacture of personal protection equipment. Such a rearrangement is costly though. Its not easy to train workers to new tasks or move capital to new industries. Part of those rearrangement costs are due to the nature of the crisis. Another part is due to regulatory burdens that make it harder for firms to rearrange their activities. The index of economic liberty that Jamie Pavlik and I used captured that part of the rearrangement costs. Areas with higher levels of economic liberty have more flexibility in terms of adjusting their behavior because these extra adjustment costs are not added to the usual costs of pandemics. Thus, the shock for them is shallower and shorter.

It is worth noting that this is consistent with the literature on economic crises and economic freedom. For example, Christian Bjørnskov analyzed 212 economic crises for a wide array of countries since 1993 and considered the possibility that economic freedom – which he took as a measure of institutional flexibility – mitigated the effects of these crises. While he found that economic freedom did not reduce the risk of a crisis, he found that economic freedom was robustly associated with shorter recoveries and smaller peak-to-trough GDP ratios (i.e. economic contractions were shallower).<sup>10</sup> The current pandemic fits well with his analysis and my own on the 1918-19 pandemic: institutional flexibility is crucially important in dealing with crises.

<sup>9</sup> Geloso, V., Bologna Pavlik, J. (2020), "Economic freedom and the economic consequences of the 1918 pandemic", *Contemporary Economic Policy*.

<sup>10</sup> Bjørnskov, C. (2016), "Economic freedom and economic crises", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 45, 11-23.



5. In the long run, what are some ways that societies can better prepare for pandemics to reduce their susceptibility?

I think that question is built on a false premise to be honest. It implies that there is a “central mind” that can deal with pandemics risk and management in the future. I dispute this on several grounds.

As I pointed out earlier, pandemics have grown less damaging and less frequent over time in spite of greater connectedness between individuals worldwide which should increase pandemic occurrences. That implies that there must be some mitigating forces somewhere. There is an important paper on travel frequency and cross-immunity that provides an answer to this.<sup>11</sup> By travelling more and more, we expose ourselves frequently to low virulence pathogens. This exposure creates cross-immunity in the sense that it reduces the likelihood of a high-virulence strain spreading easily. That paper points out that because of this mechanism, increasing international travel actually reduced the likelihood of a pandemic. Notice something here, such a mechanism doesn’t hinge on a particular government solution. It hinges on no plan by actors. It is an accidental (and fortunate) byproduct of human actions.

And, even more importantly, this gives us a glimpse as to why liberal democracies fare worse in the face of pandemics than authoritarian regimes at any given point in time and why both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes keep getting better at minimizing the demographic costs of pandemics (as evidenced by the death counts, I mentioned earlier). By letting people free to travel, economically and politically free nations are producing a positive externality for people living in less free countries. Indeed, free nations reduce the risk for unfree nations. In other words, free nations are pulling the cart up the hill for everyone else. For their troubles, they are condemned to perform poorly compared to unfree nations at any point in time even though they are driving general improvements for all.

This last point of mine shows why I think that most of our robustness (some would say antifragility) to pandemic shocks are not driven by conscious plans by bureaucrats and technocrats (not that public health bureaucracies play no role). Rather, most of our robustness is due to less evident forces.

11 Thompson, R. N., Thompson, C. P., Pelerman, O., Gupta, S., Obolski, U. (2019), “Increased frequency of travel in the presence of cross-immunity may act to decrease the chance of a global pandemic”, *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 374(1775), 20180274.

6. Finally, how do we reconcile economic concerns with medical and moral concerns (i.e. saving lives vs. saving jobs)?

Again, there is a false premise here. You are assuming a single one-dimensional trade-off. Throughout this interview I have recurrently pointed out that there are multiple trade-offs occurring at once. We first trade-off between greater prosperity later and fewer pandemic-related deaths now. That trade-off sets off a second one whereby less prosperity later means greater mortality from diseases that economic growth combats well. A third trade-off is also generated as the institutions that generate prosperity and make us less able to deal with pandemics are also making the pandemics less costly. Then, there is a fourth trade-off as the institutions that generate prosperity, while they make societies less able to deal with pandemics, inadvertently reduce the risks of extreme pandemics occurring in the first place. These are *not* sequential trade-offs but rather simultaneous. Once we pick one course of action, we settle all four choices at once.

Normatively, I think there is a case to be made for opting in favor of modest responses to pandemics. When I say modest, I do not mean “no action”. I mean that we should try as much as possible to rely on private mechanisms to mitigate propagation (as per my social trust example) and when that fails, governments should step in. However, when we let them step in, we should have a propensity to rely on federalist principles that allow government solutions to be decentralized as much as possible. That will tend to allow information about disease response to be generated allowing other local governments to use these multiple information streams to adjust better. This is important because federalism is market-preserving while it allows for a more optimal provision of public goods.<sup>12</sup> Third, and most importantly, any powers given to governments should come with a sunset clause so that emergency powers are abandoned in totality by a certain date. This combination of approaches, in my view, is the most likely to allow to err on the side of the trade-offs that create the greatest well-being in the long-run.

12 Weingast, B. R. (1995), “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 11(1), 1-31; Breton, A. (1970), “Public goods and the stability of federalism”, *Kyklos*, 23(4), 882-902.