Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/2275

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dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Francisco José-
dc.date.accessioned2005-06-20T14:12:55Z-
dc.date.available2005-06-20T14:12:55Z-
dc.date.issued1999-08-
dc.identifier.citationWORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 12, Buenos Aires, 1999eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/2275-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations.eng
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.rightsopenAccesseng
dc.subjectIMFeng
dc.subjectStabilizationeng
dc.subjectTimingeng
dc.subjectPoliticseng
dc.titleIMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizationseng
dc.typeconferencePapereng
dc.peerreviewedyeseng
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