Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/2275

TitleIMF arrangements, politics and the timing of stabilizations
Author(s)Veiga, Francisco José
KeywordsIMF
Stabilization
Timing
Politics
Issue dateAug-1999
CitationWORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 12, Buenos Aires, 1999
Abstract(s)This paper analyses the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangements on the timing of inflation stabilization programs. Essentially, we test the hypothesis that IMF aid accelerates stabilization using probit and proportional hazards models. As in theoretical models, results are mixed: larger withdrawals of the amounts agreed to seem to hasten stabilization, but there is weak evidence that IMF arrangements lead to greater delays. Concerning other effects, greater fragmentation of the political system delays stabilization while higher inflation tends to hasten it. Other political and economic variables do not seem to have significant effects on the timing of stabilizations.
TypeConference paper
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/2275
Peer-Reviewedyes
AccessOpen access
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Comunicações a Conferências

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