Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/16121

TítuloOptimal investiment decisions for two positioned firms competing in a duopoly market with hidden competitors
Autor(es)Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Kryzanowsk, Lawrence
Pereira, Paulo Jorge
Palavras-chaveReal options
Hidden competition
Strategic investment
Investment costs
EditoraBlackwell Publishing Ltd
RevistaEuropean Financial Management
Resumo(s)This paper extends the literature dealing with the option to invest in a duopoly market for a leader-follower setting. A restrictive assumption embodied in the models in the current literature is that investment opportunities are semi-proprietary in that the two identified or positioned firms are guaranteed to hold at least the follower’s position. More competition is realistically captured in our model by introducing the concept of hidden rivals so that the places in the market can be taken not only by positioned firm but also by these hidden competitors. The value functions and the optimal triggers for the positioned firms differ materially in settings with(out) the presence of hidden rivals. Unlike existing models, our model allows for (a)symmetric market shares and investment costs for the leader and the follower. Cooperative entrance by the two positioned firms is also modeled.
Versão da editorahttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00514.x/abstract
Arbitragem científicayes
Aparece nas coleções:NEGE - Publicações em Revistas Internacionais (com referee)
EEG - Artigos em revistas de circulação internacional com arbitragem científica

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