Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/12890

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dc.contributor.authorAidt, Toke S.-
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Francisco José-
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Linda Gonçalves-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-19T13:17:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-19T13:17:08Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829por
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/12890-
dc.description.abstractThe literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre-election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that explores the two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a large panel of Portuguese municipalities. The results show that opportunism leads to a larger winmargin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model.por
dc.description.sponsorshipFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)por
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.publisherSpringer por
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/POCI/58641/PT-
dc.rightsrestrictedAccesspor
dc.subjectVote and popularity functionspor
dc.subjectOpportunismpor
dc.subjectRational political business cyclespor
dc.subjectLocal governmenpor
dc.subjectSystem estimationpor
dc.subjectPortugalpor
dc.subjectLocal governmentpor
dc.titleElection results and opportunistic policies : a new test of the rational political business cycle modelpor
dc.typearticlepor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/d671p843268q5n5m/por
sdum.publicationstatuspublishedpor
oaire.citationStartPage21por
oaire.citationEndPage44por
oaire.citationIssue1-2por
oaire.citationTitlePublic Choicepor
oaire.citationVolume148por
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3por
dc.subject.wosSocial Sciencespor
sdum.journalPublic Choicepor
Appears in Collections:NIPE - Artigos em Revistas de Circulação Internacional com Arbitragem Científica

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