6. A Non-Negotiable Commitment to an Endless [R]evolution

There are a myriad of ways to analyze the impact of a particular scholar in a given field. And if that is so, one could consider Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical approach from many different angles. For example, one could have drawn from Manzani’s approach towards particular segments of Gramsci’s work. That is to say, reading Manzani’s The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, one finds Gramsci’s full texts on particular issues such as Base and Superstructure, which are interrupted by Manzani’s notes interacting both with Gramsci and with the reader. Making this kind of analysis of Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical approach would be interesting. However, given Michael Apple’s prolific political and pedagogical work, this particular kind of analysis could be weakened because of the concerns over what kinds of material to include and exclude. We also could have followed Michael Apple’s suggestion and conducted a composite analysis of Cultural Politics and Education and Democratic Schools. We could, of course, go on and on since a list over the ways one could analyze a particular work is almost endless. However, we have chosen to analyze three of the most significant books within Michael Apple’s work—Ideology and Curriculum, Official Knowledge and Democratic Schools—since, as we already have mentioned, they represent each of Michael Apple’s trilogies, and also (and this is quite important) they function as a starting point for each trilogy. To conduct our analysis, we gathered a sufficient amount of data to address our goal of determining Michael Apple’s impact within the field of curriculum studies.

Given the fact that the target of our research is not static, which makes this research even more challenging and interesting, this ‘final’ chapter assumes particular characteristics, and we hope that the reader does not ‘unfold’ this text it as a conclusion. Rather, this chapter should be perceived as a take off point between the past, present and future for further kinds of research, not necessarily on Michael Apple’s impact, but on the larger field of curriculum studies. This is quite important, especially in a moment when

the field seems so flaccid (we will return to this issue later). For these reasons, we will no longer refer to this chapter as the ‘final’ one. With this in mind, it is our aim in this particular chapter to accomplish several goals. First, we want to provide a brief synopsis of what we were able to accomplish so far. This will help the reader we trust since we summarize the major arguments that were constructed in each chapter, and we consider a bit more deeply some of the tensions within Michael Apple’s approach that we noted in the previous chapter, precisely the tensions between continuity vs. discontinuity within his line of thought. In so doing, not only do we address Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical phases or stages, and the probability of some particular connections between his and Foucault’s approaches, but also we try to situate Michael Apple in the Foucaultian tension between author vs. founder of discursivities, which allows us to begin to understand Michael Apple’s intellectual commitment. We will not put a final period on our analyzes before calling the reader’s attention to one of the latest AERA Conference themes Becoming a Curriculum Scholar⁵, one that we believe is profoundly emblematic of the current state of the field. Let us then, as the saying goes, begin from the beginning.

Each chapter of this research pointed to the same purpose. Despite the fact that they can function on their own, since they ‘exhibit’ relative autonomy, they all were based on particular arguments that help us, ultimately, to understand Michael Apple’s effect within the field of curriculum studies.

Chapter one functions as the methodological chapter. In this chapter, we were able to achieve the following. First, we explained and documented how the power of the personal cannot be dissociated from research such as this. Clearly, it was our personal history that led us to pursue research of this kind (as we mentioned before, unlike Casey, we were not genetically determined to be a teacher but socially determined), but also the impact of a scholar such as Michael Apple within the curriculum field drove us to pursue such a study. In so doing, we were able to understand the person Michael Apple and his history, the context in which this particular person and his history emerged, both professional and social, and some of the most significant texts that he produced. Second, to accomplish

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such a task, we used critical qualitative analyses of multiple kinds, based on the following methodological tools: textual analyses; long term and continuous informal interviews, over a three-year period, with Michael Apple, with his major professor, and a notable curriculum figure Huebner; and historical work on the history of the curriculum. We maintain here that we are not using a hybrid methodology but critical qualitative methodology, in which the data was triangulated in order to understand the particular problem of Michael Apple and his work in context. It is, in fact, a critical approach with complementary qualitative methods, and these methods are deeply connected to each other, given the complex nature of the research. Thirdly, we also documented extensively that this particular approach has a long tradition within the field of curriculum studies. Fourthly, we unveiled the map of our research, structured in six chapters, thus preparing readers for the kinds of arguments that they will find. Finally, we created a space to openly talk over some of the dilemmas that we faced in pursuing this research. Looking back now, and recapturing the research purpose explicitly expressed at the very end of chapter one, we are quite confident that this chapter mapped out and scientifically justified the way we approached and conducted our analyses.

In chapter two, we met the following goals. First, we were able to understand Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical position within the field of curriculum studies. Having as our starting point an analysis of Michael Apple’s homage to Macdonald’s in *There is a River: James B. MacDonald and Curriculum Tradition*[^4] and Harding’s *There is a River. The Black Struggle for Freedom in America*[^5], we were able to design a framework of reference for Michael Apple’s most significant roots. In so doing, we put forward the metaphor of a particular progressive curriculum river in which to situate Michael Apple. Second, this particular metaphor allowed us to swim in it backwards and forwards and thus trace some of the most significant influences which, decisively, overtly or covertly, have come to interfere in the construction of what we end up calling Michael Apple’s line of thought. Among those influences, we identified four major, interrelated spheres: the curriculum, the new sociology of education, analytical philosophy and political science.

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Thirdly, this accomplishment allowed us to debunk and dispute the concept of reconceptualization; after all, even Pinar acknowledges the havoc that he created within the field with a book the he “edited, and published, and mis-entitled Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists”. We managed to claim a particular progressive curriculum river in which Michael Apple’s work should be understood. By tracing those influences, we were able to go further, and within curriculum influences, reveal that the works of Dewey, Bode, Counts, Rugg, Huebner, MacDonald, among others served as the roots of Michael Apple’s intellectual journey.

Having mapped out Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical ‘journey’ within a particular progressive curriculum river, the next step was predictable and unavoidable. That is, it was profoundly important to understand and situate this particular progressive curriculum river—and consequently Michael Apple’s work—within the general tensions within the curriculum field. This particular purpose was accomplished within the arguments raised chapters three and four. Thus, chapters three and four are bound together under the same purpose. Again one could approach such an aim from many different angles. Since we wanted to focus on the impact of Michael Apple’s work on the curriculum field, we chose, as a take off strategy for chapter three, an exegesis of one of Michael Apple’s first noteworthy pieces, in his post-Ed.D. phase, The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of the Conflict. In this exegesis, we had the opportunity to reveal that Michael Apple was able to interrogate the so-called ‘consensus curriculum tradition’, and in so doing bring to the forefront the urgent need to deal with the issue of conflict, which is central to the way curriculum knowledge was (has) been taught in schools. After an extended analysis of this crucial argument, we took the reader to a flashback within the history of the curriculum field, with the purpose of uncovering the general tensions present within the curriculum field since its inception at the end of the nineteenth century. In so doing, we were able to uncover the conflicts, tensions and compromises between the so-called ‘mind as muscle’ doctrine that pervaded the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the political and pedagogical positions portrayed by Eliot, Harris,

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Ward, Rice, Hall, and the *Herbartians*, without neglecting Dewey’s towering contribution. Moreover, we were also able to demystify the idea of prizing Bobbitt’s work as the field’s pioneer. We managed to reveal that those currently coined as the ‘curriculum pioneers’ had also been towering figures within the field of educational administration, an issue that might help explain why the field has been dominated by the logic of the administration.

We were also able to analyze and document the emergence of the Progressive Movement within the curriculum field, a movement that should not be perceived as monolithic. This is of utter importance since we currently find that ‘powerful’ publications portray the Progressive (curricular) Movement as a unitary group. These include, among others, Ravitch’s later works, *Left Back*[^8], and *The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What Students Learn*[^9], which offer clear examples of such a convenient misreading of the Progressive Movement. Having undertaken such an exegesis in chapter three, in chapter four we were able to see how these particular embryonic tensions expanded, disseminated, and influenced the field throughout the twentieth century. In so doing, we scrutinized the impact of, among others, Bobbitt’s Charter and Snedden’s curriculum scientific fever, the pertinence of the Committees of Ten and Fifteen respectively, the emergence of Vocational Education, the emergence of Tyler, and subsequent developments challenging Tyler’s dominant tradition. Also we think we were able to build our case for the need not to minimize the importance of the Romantic Critics, the Civil Rights Movement and the Highlander Folk School within the curriculum field. In so doing, we believe that our analysis went much further than the analyses produced by Kliebard, Cremin, Krug, Tyack, Kaestle, among others, and yet we admit that Kliebard’s accurate analysis did open the door for us to undertake this part of our research. The flashback that was part of chapter three, ends in chapter four at the very moment that we offered an analysis of the Geneso Conference, a turning point within the curriculum field. In so doing, we were able to analyze another curriculum benchmark,

precisely Michael Apple’s *Commonsense Categories and Curriculum Thought*. As one can see, we were able in chapters three and four, to unveil the general tensions and compromises within the curriculum field from the field’s embryonic stage until the late seventies of the last century, an exegesis that was necessary to situate and understand Michael Apple’s work within the ‘big picture’, keeping in mind Kliebard’s insight that “the twentieth century became the arena [in which the] versions of what knowledge is of most worth and the central functions of schoolings were represented, [an arena in which] no single interest group ever gained absolute supremacy”.

In fact, chapters two, three and four should be understood as a strategic attempt (one that we trust we achieved) to build a solid path for chapter five. Thus, having analyzed both the most important influences on the work and thought of Michael Apple in chapter two and the general tensions within the curriculum field in order to situate Michael Apple in the field in chapters three and four, we turned our focus in chapter five to the following purposes. First, we identified particular stages within Michael Apple’s intellectual work: a first trilogy which incorporates *Ideology and Curriculum, Education and Power and Teachers and Texts*, and a second trilogy that incorporates *Official Knowledge, Cultural Politics and Education* and *Educating the ‘Right’ Way*. Second and drawing from *Ideology and Curriculum, Official Knowledge* and *Democratic Schools*, we were able to analyze Michael Apple’s singular contribution to the curriculum field based on three themes, namely, his position towards the concept of ‘curriculum’, his approach towards curriculum knowledge and his position towards the current ‘right’ turn. In so doing we were able to document that those themes from a powerful line of thought that gradually became more and more complex. That is to say, we were able to argue that for Michael Apple not only was it a waste of time to try to build a curriculum definition, but also that curriculum should not be seen merely as a mechanism of power and social control, since it is in fact, a result of struggles and compromises over knowledge, it is a result of struggles and compromises that turn it into a regulated ‘artifact’ and into a commodity.

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and, in essence, it is also a matter of identity. This is one our primary accomplishments in this research. That is, since well before Ideology and Curriculum, Michael Apple was already making the (political) claim that curriculum is an identity matter as, for instance, one find in Common Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought. Still we were able to unveil how both the textbooks, and the ‘new version’ of texts—Channel One—participate in such a complicated process. As for the textbooks, our task was not only to point out Michael Apple’s arguments, but also to carefully analyze those arguments, using the way Columbus and the role of the U.S. in the Second World War is portrayed in the textbooks, to document that textbooks do act dynamically in the construction of a particular ‘commonsensical’ commonsense. In looking at the role of Channel One, we expanded Michael Apple’s arguments a bit more by documenting how the media play a substantial role in the process of ‘fabricating’ a particular commonsense, using the schools as a strategic political hook. Also, by exploring Michael Apple’s leitmotiv, we were able to understand and document his approach towards the New Right, and understand their intricate process of what we called (de)(re)meaning within the commonsense of particular key social concepts, allowing the ‘unsayable’ to be ‘said’. In essence, we were able to document that the current New Right alliance is winning since it has been able to win the struggle over the commonsense.

Also in chapter five we were able to document that Michael Apple’s line of thought is not linear, which makes this study even more interesting. Michael Apple’s line of thought displays particular tensions over discontinuities vs. continuities vs. silences, also found in the political positions portrayed by Foucault. Since we have already indicated problems with the silences and some other major concerns within Michael Apple’s approach, we will take a few paragraphs to discuss briefly not only the tensions over discontinuities vs. continuities but also to note that it is possible to make the claim that both Michael Apple and Foucault are on the same platform with regards to particular issues, a claim that Michael Apple would not deny. However, and before we start scrutinizing the tensions over discontinuities vs. continuities, it is important to highlight that by comparing

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Democratic Schools with Dewey and Dewey’s Schools of To-Morrow and, sporadically, Experience and Education, we were able to point to close similarities between the given works. In so doing, we identified a reconsideration within Michael Apple’s political position, one that would have been impossible 30 years ago. Moreover, we were able to document how some of Michael Apple’s current political and pedagogical arguments are close to some of those put forward by Dewey. Let us now turn our attention to the problematic of discontinuities vs. continuities within Michael Apple’s approach.

As we just mentioned, by identifying a line of thought within Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical work, one is able to see continuities vs. discontinuities or tensions within his approach. One of the tensions is the following. If in Ideology and Curriculum, both the liberal dominant tradition and particular segments of the counter dominant tradition were put under siege by Michael Apple’s ‘pen’ in Official Knowledge, both the target and the strategy change completely. That is to say, while in Ideology Curriculum we have a Michael Apple talking without any euphemisms to the liberal tradition and particular segments of the counter dominant tradition, in Official Knowledge Michael Apple is not talking to the liberal tradition but deconstructing and attacking, in a sophisticated way, the current new Rightist turn. Also, in Official Knowledge we do not find Michael Apple critiquing the Left. Instead, we find a truthful Michael Apple, deeply concerned with some of the mistakes of the Left, but these concerns are not expressed overtly. So from Ideology and Curriculum to Official Knowledge, one can see a kind of continuity, but also a visible discontinuity.

This becomes even more complex (and to introduce another discontinuity) when one delves into Democratic Schools, which presents an ‘abrupt’ cut from Ideology and Curriculum, Education and Power, Teachers and Texts and Official Knowledge. If one finds a discontinuity and continuity from Ideology and Curriculum to Official Knowledge, the fact is that with Democratic Schools, the issue is not one of continuity vs. discontinuity, since it was intentionally transgressed, but an overt reconsideration of previous positions, which was minimally apparent already in Official Knowledge. Arguably, this ‘particular and provocative’ move in Democratic Schools shows a Michael Apple with a much more refined and accurate Gramscian and Williamsean strategy. In
Democratic Schools, Michael Apple expresses regret for the defeat of the American Liberal tradition, since within this particular tradition some political gains had been achieved, but at the same time, it seems also clear (yet paradoxically) that in a way, this Liberal demise was aided by Michael Apple and to many others on the Left.

More evidence of the continuity vs. discontinuity tension is quite clear in the fact that from Ideology and Curriculum on, we notice a continuing analysis on the dynamics of gender and race, as Education and Power, and Teachers and Texts bear testimony. It would be wrong not to admit to this continuity. Another continuity is found with regards to his non-reproductionist claim. In fact, considering Ideology and Curriculum, we argue against claims that the given work is ‘just’ a ‘reproductionist’ analysis. In the same way that Michael Apple suggests that Cultural Politics and Education and Democratic Schools should be read together, we maintain that both Ideology and Curriculum and Education and Power could be integrated in a single volume, an approach that Michael Apple would be unlikely to challenge.

By noting these particular tensions between continuities vs. discontinuities within Michael Apple’s line of thought, we are not claiming that Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical line of thought loses its vigor. What we are claiming is that since we have adopted what Althusser calls a symptomatic reading method of Michael Apple’s work, finding ‘what is in and what is not in’ it, we stumbled across the noted tensions. In a way, this particular symptomatic reading is a double critical hermeneutical process since in disclosing the manifest text, it simultaneously ‘gives life’ to particular silences, continuities and discontinuities, which produce another ‘text’. As a reminder to the reader, we already mentioned this particular perspective in an earlier chapter. At that stage, and on the way to building our arguments for the power of the personal, we relied on Eagleton’s insight, to whom ‘ideology’ is also present in the silences of a given text. Thus, Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical approach is one that exhibits the issues that we just raised. That is to say, when considering his political and pedagogical perspective, one stumbles across particular continuities, and at the same time, those continuities push us to trace and identify particular shifts, discontinuities,

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reconsiderations, reformulations and also silences. Both Macherey’s analysis which furthered the Althusserian concept of ‘symptomatic reading’, and Barthe’s approach can teach us great deal here, helping us better understand such tensions within Michael Apple’s leitmotiv. As Macherey argues, one should refuse the fallacy that the text will drive the reader to find a single meaning. The task of a critical reader is to understand that s/he is not contending with a puzzle that expresses a meaning. Rather the critical reader should be deeply aware that s/he is contending with a construction of many possible meanings. Logically, this implies that the reader should not see the text as a monolithic unity of meanings but that each text is profoundly incomplete which does not (necessarily) mean that the text loses its impact. Moreover, and along with Eagleton, one must say that for Macherey, “a work is tied to ideology not so much by what it says as by what it does not say, [and] it is this silence that the critic must make ‘speak’”14. If that is so, that is, if a ‘text’ is always incomplete (and we do agree with this ‘reading’), then, as Macherey highlights, the real issue is not to search for its central essence but rather to perceive and ‘talk’ with the continuous conflict and disparities of meaning that emerge from the text.

Therefore, and to further borrow from Macherey’s accurate insights, our task with Michael Apple’s themes was not to balance and test the coherence of Michael Apple’s line of thought, or its presumable lack of unity, or the ‘avoided issues’, but to point out that the value of text lies precisely in the conflict that a critical analysis can draw from ‘what is in and what is not in’ it. Macherey’s insightful point deserves some space here:

"conflict is not the sign of imperfection; it reveals the inscription of an otherness in the work, through which it maintains a relationship with that which it is not, that which happens at its margins. To explain the work is to show that, contrary to appearances, it is not independent, but bears in its material substance the imprint of a determined absence which is also the principle of its identity. [Thus] the [text] is not the extension of a meaning; it is generated from the"

incompatibility of several meanings, the strongest bond by which it is attached to reality, in a tense and ever-renewed confrontation15.

One might say that our ‘symptomatic reading’ of Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical position allow us to perceive that Michael Apple’s work is de-centered, that its richness comes not from ‘a’ central meaning—which in a complex intellectual work such as Michael Apple’s would be almost impossible to trace—but precisely from what one can take away from the conflict and disparities of meanings that are woven into the text.

Thus, it is precisely within these intricate clashes over ‘what it is and/vs. what it is not’ that meaning is produced. Moreover, it is precisely through the intertextuality between the manifest and the absent that a critical reader will find new knowledge in a text. As Macherey argues, “the act of knowing is not like listening to a discourse already constituted [which we] have [to] translate”16. Conversely, it is the “elaboration of a new discourse [without neglecting] the articulation[s] of the silence[s]”17. After all, as he straightforwardly stresses, “knowledge is not the discovery or reconstruction of a latent meaning, [rather it] is something newly raised up, an addition to reality from which it begins”18. We believe that we have accomplished this kind of knowledge production in our research. By unveiling the tensions in Michael Apple’s approach, what we are really claiming is the fact that those tensions between the manifest and latent, and the consequent continuities and discontinuities demonstrate his own evolution, an intricate, profoundly complex and long [r]evolution within his approach that did not occur “just as [he] pleased under circumstances choose[n] by [Michael Apple], but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”19.

Our approach towards Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical perspective was deeply aware of this [r]evolution. Our concern, as Barthes reminds us, was not judging Michael Apple’s approach but one of “perceiving, separating, dividing”\(^{20}\) while analyzing some of his major arguments. In so doing, we were faced with the manifest and latent, and also with the continuities, discontinuities and silences. Thus, Althusser’s ‘symptomatic reading’ provided us with a method through which we critically examined Michael Apple’s major arguments. In the process we were able not only to identify ruptures, silences, reconsiderations, continuities and discontinuities, but we were also able to argue that those issues should be understood as characteristic of Michael Apple’s *leitmotiv*, a leitmotiv that is endless [r]evolution. In essence, one might say that in the pursuit of constantly working and reworking his line of thought, Michael Apple ends up paying a price. Despite the fact that there are substantial silences and contradictions within his approach, that we overtly encouraged and challenged Michael Apple to address in the near future, these should not be seen as damaging his political and pedagogical approach. In fact, these tensions—although they might lead a careless reader to see Michael Apple as bogged down in incongruencies—are the subsumed and overt consequences of one who, like Michael Apple, commits himself to a [r]evolution for a just society.

We are nearing the final ‘period’ of this research. Before we come to that, we will consider some of the ‘commonalities’ between Michael Apple and Foucault as we promised, and in so doing, we will uncover the conflict of author *vs.* producer of discursivities. We will also deal briefly with the state of the curriculum field in ending this research.

As we noted previously, the way Michael Apple builds his political and pedagogical case allows one to question particular commonalities between Michael Apple’s and Foucault’s approaches. While risky, we trust this endeavor is worthy of the effort and believe that Michael Apple would not oppose it. The very first commonality between Michael Apple’s and Foucault’s approaches is the fact that they both dismiss the crude Marxism ‘nomenclature’, one that prizes economic determinism. Actually, both Michael

Apple and Foucault assume a radical non-negotiable position against such a reductive perspective. Since we have already discussed Michael Apple’s approach against this reductive position, let us now scrutinize Foucault’s position. According to Foucault, power cannot be explained just by the economic forces. His challenge to Marxist economic reductionism deserves to be highlighted:

What means are available to us today if we seek to conduct a non-economic analyzes of power? Very few, I believe. We have in the first place the assertion that power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action. Again, we have at our disposal another assertion to the effect that power is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is above all a relation of force. The questions to be posed would then be these: if power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism?21

However, in fact, Michael Apple’s and Foucault’s commonalities are not just because they both assume a similar radical non-negotiable position against the economic reductionism of so-called hard-core Marxism (if the case were that simple, one could also advance that Michael Apple and Ravitch express a common argument). According to Foucault (as for Michael Apple), power is not a static entity that operates in just one societal sphere, but it is the result of the simultaneous interplay of “non-egalitarian and mobile relations”22 transecting all societal spheres. Fraser also highlights Foucault’s argument against Marxist economic reductionism. As she argues, “Foucault rules out the crude Marxist critiques of ideology and an overemphasis upon the state and economy, and instead rules in the ‘the politics of everyday life’”23. As Fraser carries, she observes that according to Foucault, “power circulates everywhere, even at the most mundane levels [and] any effort to transform the regime must make an effort to address these

everyday practices”\(^{24}\). As one could see in the previous chapter, the way Michael Apple works his own political and pedagogical leitmotiv demonstrates his keen awareness of the need to deconstruct the correspondence theory, and in so doing, he reveals that power relations are everywhere as a result of a myriad of societal spheres in overdetermined interplay. Thus, as one can see, neither Michael Apple nor Foucault hesitate to challenge the weak concept of power which is based simplistically on a relation between dominant vs. dominated forces. If that is so, and with the help of Fraser, one might say that, like Michael Apple, by breaking “with the totalizing theory of Marxism Foucault retains the link with a critical theory of society”\(^{25}\). It seems clear that both Michael Apple and Foucault are quite Althusserian on this particular issue.

This particular commonality between Michael Apple and Foucault takes us to another shared platform focus: their radical critical perspective of society. Again, since we have already discussed Michael Apple’s radical critical political and pedagogical approach at length, we will now briefly discuss some of Foucault’s major arguments on this particular issue. According to Foucault, “critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept rest”\(^{26}\). That is to say criticism “is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such, [that is to say] practicing criticism…mak[es] facile gestures difficult”\(^{27}\). Based on this argument, one can identify a call not just for a radical critical position, but also for a strategic and ongoing position of radical criticism. Since, he cannot “believe there can be a society without relations of power”\(^{28}\) (an argument that ‘the current’ Michael Apple would concur with), for Foucault, the real issue is to transform the way those relations occur and in so doing alter the results of those relations. The only way to achieve that is through a permanent stage

of criticism that “is absolutely indispensable for any [real] transformation”²⁹. This particular position binds together Michael Apple’s and Foucault’s approaches. For both, criticism is the way not only to interpret but also to go beyond that and transform reality, and in so doing they both end up manifesting a Marxist belief.

While on the one hand, the opposition to hard-core Marxist economic reductionism exhibited by Michael Apple and Foucault led us to claim that they both promote the need for a permanent radical critical position, on the other hand, this particular claim directs us to another crucial ‘commonality’ over the role of the intellectuals. Gramsci’s ideas infuse those of Michael Apple and Foucault with regards to this particular issue. Michael Apple is clearly an ‘organic intellectual’, who is able to articulate desires of dominated groups and challenge dominant traditions and, in so doing, participate in the continuous struggle for the emancipation of dominated groups. In this regard, Foucault has a similar point of view. Instead of an ‘organic’ intellectual, Foucault uses the term ‘specific’ intellectual to refer to someone who is capable of expressing and fighting for the many marginalized groups, and who is able to understand the tensions between global vs. local. Thus as Foucault argues, the specific intellectual is one that works “not in the modality of the universal [but] within specific sectors, at precise points”³⁰, of which schools are a paramount example. This particular issue over the role of the intellectuals is quite important since it is within the site of intellectuality that some of the major battles over commonsense occur. It is within this site that one can see the contention between organic-specific intellectuals and what Bourdieu calls “doxosophers—the technicians of opinion”³¹.

Thus far, we have traced some of the ‘commonalities’ between Michael Apple’s and Foucault’s approaches. These ‘commonalities’, more than anything else, reveal that both Foucault and Michael Apple touch particular kinds of issues from similar perspectives. However, we also recognize that Michael Apple and Foucault have differences in their

approaches. A good example would be their difference with regards to state vs. civil society. While on this issue Michael Apple is (again) very Gramscian (and this is quite clear given his approach to the current New Right turn), Foucault challenges this issue with the notion of governmentality. That is to say, while for Michael Apple the state and civil society comprise the two main categories through which he unfolds his critical case, say, towards the New Right turn (categories that should be seen as over-determined in which dynamics such as force and consent should not be minimized), Foucault puts forward the notion of governmentality, one that without neglecting the role of the State, prizes civil society. As Foucault argues, “I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State”32. That is to say, given the tensions between the State vs. the civil society, Foucault warns us to prize the way in which individual practices maintain and transform power relations. Oddly enough, while both Foucault and Michael Apple value the same spheres, and that which is beyond the ‘State realm’, in fact, for both, power relations are crucially dependent on practices and techniques marked by permanent conflict and contradiction that allow for the emergence and defeat of new/residual forces. For both, it is within the civil society that the major battle is conducted.

Undeniably the arguments that we have raised need further and deeper analysis, and we here open the door for further studies. Yet, what is particularly interesting to us is that finding these ‘commonalities’ ends up making Michael Apple’s political and pedagogical position even more powerful. Also, by finding these ‘commonalities’, we were able to note that Michael Apple was already ‘playing’ with particular conceptual tools well before Foucault’s work become prominent within U.S. academia. It is possible that further consideration of such a ‘provocative’ issue will lead us to a slightly or even completely different conclusion. And there is only one way to attend to this concern. By digging further. We think that we have opened the door for further work with these provocative concerns. However, as we already pointed out, it is precisely within the site of ‘intellectuality’ that a significant portion of the struggle for the commonsense occurs.

Thus, it is important to consider more fully Michael Apple’s organic-specific intellectuality. In order to accomplish this, we will need the help of both Eagleton and Foucault’s perspectives.

We trust that at this point of our work, we have provided strong evidence for the fact that Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is deeply committed to the cause of the less advantaged, to the struggle for a just and equal society and for real democracy. However, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality, while indeed a commitment does not fall into a sort of proletkult, or as Eagleton points out, a post-revolutionary Stalinist commonsense that claimed that the proletarian culture should be cleansed of any bourgeoisie influence\(^{33}\). That is to say, and following Eagleton’s approach, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is one that, like Trotsky, “recognizes that artistic form is the product of social ‘content’, but at the same time […] ascribes to it a high degree of autonomy”\(^{34}\). According to Trotsky, “the belief that we force poets, willy-nilly, to write about nothing but factory chimneys or a revolt against capitalism is absurd”\(^{35}\). Thus, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is fully contaminated by “objective partisanship”\(^{36}\). That is, he “need not foist his own political views on his work because, if he reveals the real and potential forces ‘objectively’ at work in a situation, he is already in that sense partisan”\(^{37}\). Given its objective partisanship and also its undeniable vigor based on the tensions of ‘what is in vs. what is out’, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is based on a “principle of contradiction”\(^{38}\). That is to say, “the political views of [Michael Apple] may run counter to what his work objectively reveals”\(^{39}\). Given this particular claim, it is useful to recapture some of Eagleton’s perspectives. As the British scholar unveils, “the text does not merely ‘take’ ideological conflicts in order to ‘solve’ them aesthetically, for the character of those conflicts is itself overdetermined by the textual modes in which


\(^{34}\) Op. Cit., p., 43.


\(^{37}\) OP. Cit., p., 47.

\(^{38}\) OP. Cit., p., 47.

\(^{39}\) OP. Cit., p., 47. This might help us to understand the ‘Polish case’, one which introduced Michael Apple as the first postmodern within the educational field. – Apple, Michael Tape 19 recorded in office “e” of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction and Educational Policy Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
they are produced, [that is to say] the text’s mode of resolving a particular ideological conflict may then produce textual conflicts elsewhere [which] need in turn to be processed”40.

Let us pause here for a moment, and clarify our claim a bit more. What we are claiming here is that not only is Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality not neutral (and he overtly assumes that), but also that his organic intellectuality does not completely wipe out traditional dominant elements. Even those only slightly familiar with Michael Apple’s work are quite able to identify that Michael Apple is in constant struggle between the elements of good sense and bad sense, both within the hegemonic and counter hegemonic tradition. Actually Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is one that seriously takes into account both Gramsci’s and Williams’s political and pedagogical positions and is careful not to minimize the elements of good sense within the so-called dominant tradition. By not marginalizing this crucial political and pedagogical strategy within Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality, one is able to grasp the reason why some of Michael Apple’s most important current dialogues are with scholars such as Ravitch, as in Cultural Politics and Education, in which Michael Apple is clearly responding to and interrupting Bennett’s The De-valuing of America: The Fight for our Culture and our Children41. In so doing, not only is he able to deconstruct some convenient articulations that the ‘right’ has put together, but he also points to the elements of good and bad sense that enable the current ‘right’ turn to seize the hegemonic platform.

It is precisely within the context of his organic intellectuality that one should understand Michael Apple as a ‘producer’ and not as a ‘creator’. That is to say, and to again draw on Eagleton, Michael Apple’s particular organic intellectuality “does not make the materials which he works, [rather he] works up certain given materials into a new product”42. This particular argument becomes even more clear if one pays close attention to the non-negotiable counter claims that Michael Apple put forward against the so-called reconceptualist movement, which we discussed in an earlier Chapter. By

challenging the very concept upon which such a ‘curriculum movement’ is based, Michael Apple not only refuses (to be part of) a ‘creator’ position, but also simultaneously, calls attention to the danger of erasing a particular past and present. However, more than this, by challenging the concept that underlies the said movement Michael Apple claims that his organic intellectualism should be seen in a particular progressive curricular tradition that made it possible for him and many others to go through a myriad of doors left open by that tradition, paving his way and allowing him to unfold crucial issues.

Also by inviting Foucault to our discussion, our arguments for Michael Apple’s particular organic intellectuality become even more powerful. It will be interesting now to consider Foucault’s position with regards to this particular issue. As Foucault argues, it is important to understand the relationship between the author and the text “and with the manner in which the text points to [the author] that at least in appearance, is outside it and antecedes it”\(^{43}\). However, by trying to understand the relation between a particular ‘figure’ with a text, Foucault casts the author into two categories of figures. On the one hand, the author should be seen as someone who tries “to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts, [that is to say] there must be [a] point where contradictions are resolved, where incompatible elements are at least tied together or organized around a fundamental or originating contradiction”\(^{44}\). On the other hand, we have what Foucault calls “founders of discursivity”\(^{45}\) who are able to go farther than the author. As he claims, founders of discursivity are “unique in that they are not just authors of their own works, [rather] they have produced something else [which are] the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts”\(^{46}\). It is within the realm of these particular ‘founders’ that Foucault situates Marx who “establish[es] an endless possibility of discourse”\(^{47}\). According to him, Marx “made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and equally important) a certain number of differences

[since he] created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded”⁴⁸. Undeniably there is something deeply appealing within Foucault’s approach. In fact, and at a first glance, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality might fall under the category of a ‘founder of discursivity’. Despite the fact that Foucault’s categorization is not entirely inaccurate, if one wants a truthful picture of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality, one needs to build further on Foucault’s analyses. Our task then is to try to complexify Foucault’s categorization and in so doing identify as accurately as possible Michael Apple’s organic intellectual commitment.

Unquestionably, situating the prolific expression of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality within an author category seems reductive and hence unfair. However, admitting that the expression of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is one that shows Michael Apple as a ‘founder’ of particular discursivities, not only will contradict the arguments that we are edifying, but also leads to intellectual dishonesty. The task we have before us is to explore Foucault’s category further and to do so without minimizing Foucault’s approach. Our approach to such a delicate undertaking is twofold.

First, it is clear that the expression of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality established “an endless possibility of discourse”⁴⁹, but also “made possible not only a certain number of analogies but also (and equally important) a certain number of differences [since he] created a possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to what they founded”⁵⁰. The vast research that stands on the shoulders of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality bears testimony to our claim. As Schubert, Schubert, Thomas and Caroll highlight, “in the late 1970’s and the 1980’s Michael Apple opened up new languages of inquiry into the ideological ramifications of curriculum in schools [employing] the theoretical construct of neo-Marxist scholars such as Antonio Gramsci; Apple’s early writings reflected an economic-political lens, focusing on the hegemonic domination of U.S. public schooling”⁵¹. The authors argue that Michael

Apple’s “later inquiries opened into a broader sphere [not only] on the interplay of education and power in schools [and] to the political economy of texts, [but also he] saw the problem of ideological domination as even more pervasive and dealt with matters of official knowledge [and] cultural politics [that] actually create or subvert democratic education”\(^52\). In so doing, we also are able to maintain a consistency “in employing an economic and political construct for understanding the power relationships of public schools and control of knowledge, [but also] to identify schools and teachers who embraced and practiced democracy in their schools and classrooms”\(^53\). The same kind of argument is identifiable in Pinar’s personal retrospective. As he highlights, “the primary scholar in [a curriculum area], politically and economically oriented, [is] Michael W. Apple”\(^54\). Pinar’s words deserve to be highlighted at length:

the scope of his achievement is difficult to access, but clearly it is immense. Both in volume and complexity of this scholarship, and through the work of his many first-rate Ph.D. students, Apple’s contribution to curriculum studies is perhaps greater than any other single individual’s associated with the reconceptualization. Through his elaboration of such concepts as ‘hidden curriculum, hegemony, reproduction or correspondence theory’, and others that now form a major element of contemporary curriculum knowledge, Apple alone and with the assistance of his students—among them Landon Beyer, Nancy King, Joel Taxel, Linda Christian-Smith, Andrew Gitlin, Kenneth Teitelbaum, Jose Rosario, Leslie Roman, and others—have produced a significant body of knowledge\(^55\).

However this was not just his sole ‘creation’, which takes us to our second argument. From the beginning of this work, we were able to situate Michael Apple within a particular non-monolithic progressive curricular tradition. In so doing, we were also able to reveal how the prolific expression of Michael Apple’s organic intellectualty not only

\(^{52}\) Op. Cit., pp., 360-361.
is deeply rooted in his family background and in a particular non-monolithic progressive curricular tradition, but also demonstrates how Michael Apple critically interacted with some of his major influences as a teacher and as a student simultaneously. For example, the Friday Seminar bears testimony to this dialogical learning environment and should not be minimized. It provides a space in which one can see the kind of interaction that we are describing. Having participated in Friday Seminar for three years allows us to be confident in saying that it demonstrates real evidence for a dialogical learning environment. Even so, it would be unfair to describe Michael Apple as a ‘founder’ of particular discursivity.

In this context, we have to be especially careful with respect to Michael Apple’s dialogical learning, and it requires that we go beyond Foucault. Thus, and given the arguments that we just raised, it would be more accurate to understand Michael Apple as a ‘producer’ of discursivities, an ‘upgrade’ that we believe neither Michael Apple nor the reader will challenge. In essence, by ‘reading’ Michael Apple as a ‘producer’, we are also challenging Williams’s concept of creative mind discussed at the beginning of this chapter. As we mentioned previously, according to Williams, the writer should not be understood as a creative mind, but as someone who is in the midst of a complex set of social interplays. Thus, cultural production is never a result of someone’s creativity, but simply an expression of something that is produced as a result of a particular set of interactions within a given society both diachronically and synchronically. To put it succinctly, writing is a material production of human sociality.

Since his organic intellectuality should be seen as something that stands on the shoulders of so many individuals and social movements struggling for a more just and equal society, that allowed him to go even further, Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is more than a commitment, it is a way of living that continuously produces particular kinds of discursivities and opens the door for others to go through. Coincidently or not, one of the doors that he opened allows one take a sort of ‘compass eye reading’ over the current state of the field.
However before we turn our attention to this final issue, let us clarify something quite crucial here. We are not claiming here any kind of struggle over the labeling of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality. At no particular point in our work do we follow that path. That would be pretentious and inappropriate, pretentious since our analysis relies on three of his most significant works, and inappropriate since Michael Apple does not fit into a single label. Undeniably Michael Apple is probably a more refined Gramscian and Williamsean than he was before. However, it would be dead-end research to try to label such a complex person. What we are claiming is the need to understand the power, accuracy and pertinence of his organic intellectuality. Its contradictions, continuities, discontinuities, and silences, not only allow one to understand that schooling is deeply rooted within the dynamics of power relations, but also that in order to understand the process of schooling, one has to pay close attention to a multifarious and overdetermined interplay between the cultural, political and economic spheres and race, class and gender dynamics. In so doing, Michael Apple pays homage to a particular past and present, taking crucial issues to a superior level of complexity and opening the door for many others to go further as well.

Before we turn our attention to a very brief analysis of the current state of the field, we will offer a brief panoramic view of Michael Apple’s long [r]evolution. What can we draw from this endless [r]evolution? One way to address such an intricate issue is to try to trace the given [r]evolution by the way he unfolds some of his major arguments, a goal which we are confident we have accomplished. Not only did we pay close attention to the trilogies, which we used as background for this research, but also to point the reader in other directions, which provide clear evidence of the fact that Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is one of long and endless [r]evolution, another goal we believe we have achieved. However, and at this particular stage, a cinemascopic reading of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality allows one to argue that what Michael Apple really has been searching for since the beginning of research is the ‘fabrication’ of a grand theory that is anchored in a Gramscian and Williamsean platform and complexifies new post-structural forms as well. Not surprisingly, these ‘premonitions’ were confirmed by Michael Apple.
Yes, I had an idea about building a grand theory; that is, I wanted to find a coherent way of understanding the relationship between education and power. I’ve been influenced by some post-structural forms more than post-modern forms, but not totally. You know I’m very critical of them, but no less critical than I am of economist ones or Marxisms. I think that I understand increasingly the dangers of trying to do that—to build a grand theory—but I still have that ambition, but it is, I know, a utopian dream that has dangers. So I do want to understand the key components along with class, gender, and race. I now have said instead that the focus must be on social movements that are classed and gendered and raced and sexed and so on. I’ve broadened the categories. I still want to use the political sphere, the economic sphere, and the cultural sphere as analytic distinctions knowing full well that culture has its own economy and that it’s a bit like cognitive, affective and psychomotor behavior. We all know, I would hope, that no one acts cognitively, then psychomotorly and then affectively. It goes on simultaneously. There is nothing economic that is not also cultural. There is nothing cultural that is not also political. They all constantly interact. Thus, I still want to maintain these categories of analysis, but I think I’ve broadened the analysis. I’ve made it much more subtle. I also think I’m much clearer about what hegemony actually means, how counter-hegemonic forces work; I think I’m much more nuanced about the political economy of culture, and how culture actually works, the importance of identity in it. I think I’m much more global than I was before. I’m more international than I was before I don’t simply mean that I apply my analysis internationally. I think I’m open to being taught internationally. Of course, in many ways I always was open. A good deal of the material that I tried to struggle with came from France and Germany and England. That’s the tradition from which I’m from, but now the importance of “the Third World”, about Latin America, about Africa, has become very important to me. These areas and their struggles have acted as my teachers. Thus, I think I’ve broadened that in some powerful ways. I also think that I am more mature strategically. The questions that I want to ask are still the same. Why this knowledge, why not others. But I’m much more sophisticated about asking that question. But I also have gotten clearer on how we might ask and answer the question of what do we do about it? I now understand much better how strategic interruptions work, what is required for counter-hegemonic work, how complicated and hybrid alliances need to be built. After 30 years of work, you just learn a lot more. I also think that I am more nuanced in my political actions, and by that I mean I am no less political than before. In fact I’m actually more political in the actions that I’m engaged in; that is, I’m involved in a lot more issues internationally, politically with labor unions and teachers unions as an example, with dissident groups. Because of that, I’m able to think more strategically and
more subtly about the contingent conditions that are required for counter-hegemonic work and to be less broad and overly general about the claims I want to make.

What he is claiming here, and we agree with him, is the need to see Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality as something that is in constant [r]evolution. One good example that supports our claim is the way his non-negotiable claim against the reductionism of hard-core Marxist views of economic determinism has been always a process under construction. Since, in fact both Michael Apple and Lois Weis’s and Cameron McCarthy and Michael Apple’s approaches bear testimony to the accuracy of the claim that he just raised, it is important to summarize some of the major arguments exhibited in those pieces. In a piece co-written with Lois Weis, *Ideology and Practice in Schooling: A Political and Conceptual Introduction*, Michael Apple not only recaptures his argument against the dangerous economic determinism portrayed by hard-core Marxists, already visible in *Ideology and Curriculum*, but he also upgrades the level of complexity of this claim. By analyzing the dynamics of ideology, Michael Apple and Lois Weis argue that “approaches that focused only on the economy and not on culture, or that dealt only with cultural products and not lived cultural processes, were incomplete.” Moreover, since “education was not a stable enterprise dominated by consensus”, but a path dominated by ideological conflicts acting at cultural, economic and political levels in quite dynamic ways, these conflicts should be seen as “in constant motion, each often acting on the others and each stemming from structurally generated antagonisms, compromises, and struggles.” Because of these conflicts, they warn us of the need “to be cautious about assuming that ideologies are only ideas in one’s head, [rather] they are better thought of less as things than as social processes.” In fact, as they claim, “ideologies [are not]...
linear configurations, simple processes that all necessarily work in the same direction or reinforce each other, [rather] these processes sometimes overlap, compete, drown out, and clash with each other"62. Thus, and drawing from Therborn, they argue that “ideologies function as much more than the cement that holds society [since] they empower and disempower”63. It is in this context that they put forward a new approach towards schooling, what they coined as the ‘parallelist position’. As they explain, this approach combines the economic, cultural and political spheres with the dynamics of class, race and gender.

rather than an unidimensional theory in which economic form is determinate, society is conceived of as being made up of ‘three interrelated spheres’—the economic, cultural/ideological and political. [This] process of empowering partly results from the fact that a number of elements or ‘dynamics’ are usually present at the same time in any one instance. This is important. Ideological form is not reducible to class. Processes of gender, age, and race enter directly into the ideological moment. It is actually out of the articulation with, clash among, or contradictions among and within, say, class, race, and sex that ideologies are lived in one’s day-to-day life64.

As one can see, by claiming that “each sphere of social life is constituted by the dynamics of class, race and gender [and that each] of these dynamics, and each of these spheres, has its own internal ‘history in relation to’ the others”65, Michael Apple and Lois Weis, refine the arguments that challenge the economic reductionism portrayed by the so called hard-core Marxists, and in so doing, achieved a superior level of complexity in their approach to schooling. To be fair, this particular sensibility was already visible in Ideology and Curriculum. However, while Ideology and Curriculum demonstrates

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Michael Apple’s class analysis, *Education and Power, Teachers and Texts*, and *Official Knowledge* (not to mention the rest of his work) reveal a Michael Apple who is acutely sensitive to race and gender dynamics. Thus, the awareness of the need to expand the ideological analysis of schooling, in general, and curriculum, in particular, was, in fact, already present in his earliest work.

However, and as clear evidence that Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality is always ‘under construction’ and expressing a ‘long [r]evolution’, in a piece written with Cameron McCarthy, *Class, Race, and Gender in American Education*, Michael Apple upgrades his own ‘parallelist position’. They argue that the ‘parallelist position’ not only allows for a deep understanding of the inter- and intra-dynamics between the cultural, political and economic spheres and class, race and gender elements, but also leads to “a reevaluation of economically reductive explanations as well”⁶⁶. That is to say, notwithstanding the fact that economy should be considered as an exceptionally powerful sphere, it is a mistake to assume to “that all aspects of governmental functions (including education) seemed to reproduce what was economically ‘necessary’”⁶⁷. However, both Cameron McCarthy and Michael Apple end up challenging this ‘parallelist position’, since according to them, this ‘symmetrical model’ reveals limitations “at somewhat ‘lower’ levels of abstraction (i.e. when applied to concrete institutional settings)”⁶⁸. Thus, and drawing from Burawoy, Hicks and Sarup, and Hall, both Cameron McCarthy and Michael Apple lay out the critical problems within Michael Apple and Lois Weis’s parallelist position approach. Their explanation deserves full space here.

First, it has become clear that at a conjunctural level of analysis this model has not been totally adequate. It is often too general and loses cogency and specificity when applied to the actual operation of race, class, and gender in institutional settings such as schools and classrooms. While it does serve to have us stop and think about a broader range of dynamics and spheres than before,

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it is difficult to account for the various twists and turns of social and political life at the micro level if our application of theory is inappropriately ‘pitched’ at too high a level of abstraction. Secondly, this model unfortunately has often been construed in a static and simplistically additive way. Attempts to specify the dynamics of raced, classed, and gendered phenomena in education often got formulated in terms of a system of linear ‘additions’ or gradations of oppression. Thus, for example, much of the recent argument advanced by liberal feminists with respect to the feminization of poverty has rested on the claim that women as gendered and classed subjects are doubly oppressed. Similar claims have been made in relation to women teachers. Spencer, in her insightful case study of women school teachers, draws attention to their double oppression. Simply put, these women performed onerous tasks with respect first to their domestic and emotional labor in the home and secondly with respect to their instructional labor in the classroom. The oppression of these women in the home is ‘added’ to their oppression as teachers working in the classroom. In an essentially additive or incremental model of oppression, patriarchal and class forms of domination unproblematically reproduce each other. Accounts of the intersection of race, class, and gender such as these overlook instances of tension, contradiction, and discontinuity in the institutional life of the school setting. Dynamics of race, class, and gender were thus conceptualized as having individual and uninterrupted effects.

As they argue, one needs “to see these relations as far more complex, problematic, and contradictory”70. It is with this in mind that Cameron McCarthy and Michael Apple pay close attention, not only to Hicks’s approach—one that sees class, race and gender dynamics as “systematically contradictory or nonsynchronous”71, but also draw from other “sources”72 and end up upgrading their outdated ‘parallel list position’. According to them, the “key concepts of nonsynchrony and contradiction need to be fully integrated into the old parallel list framework”73. In so doing, they put forward a nonsynchronous

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parallelist framework, one that it is better able to grasp that the “political, economic, and cultural lives of real people—of real children, of real women and men, of real people of color in schools and elsewhere—are subject not to theoretic but to lived relations of differential power”\(^74\). In fact, these relations “are not abstract, but are experienced in ways that now help or hurt identifiable groups of people in all too visible ways”\(^75\). Thus, “we do need conceptual advances”\(^76\). One might say that the result of this particular upgrade is the strength of the theory of ‘over determination’, “in which the processes and outcomes of teaching and learning and of schooling in general are produced by the constant interactions among three dynamics in three spheres”\(^77\).

This example offers clear evidence of an endless [r]evolution within Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality. It is precisely this recognition that one can trace within Michael Apple’s very latest work, *The State and the Politics of Knowledge*\(^78\). As we already discussed, his approach “was criticized, reconstructed, and made much more dynamic and subtle over the years”\(^79\). While at the very beginning of his work—say the phase that includes the Ed.D. thesis and part of what we call the first trilogy—we do have a Michael Apple that criticizes almost everything that puts in jeopardy the foundations of a just society, a non-negotiable radicalism strategy that ‘takes no prisoners’. From what we call the second trilogy onwards, we find a slightly different Michael Apple. This later Michael Apple becomes more strategie, and while not exactly more Gramscian, perhaps a better Gramscian than he was before. Wright’s perspective helps to clarify this claim. While a senior at Harvard, Wright made a film called *The Chess Game*, incorporating a course that he attended at the university. As he explains, the basic story of the film is simple.
The pieces march onto the board in military fashion. First the aristocracy enters, followed by the pawns flanked by the knights. Two pawns try to run away, but are captured and brought back to the board. The game starts. Right from the start, the morality rate for the pawns is very high (from a chess point of view it is a terrible game). When a piece is taken, it falls over and is kicked off the board. The pawns gradually pile up next to the board. Eventually you see them talking to each other, the two sides mixed together. After a while, in a burst of action, they attack the aristocratic pieces playing the game. The soundtrack changes from baroque harpsichord music to Stravinsky’s ‘The Rite of Spring’. Before long, the elite are defeated and pushed from the board. The pawns then dance a Virginia Reel folk dance, light and dark pieces intermingle. The screen fades out. But is the story over? No. The picture comes back and you see the pieces marching back on to the board. They line up to play a new chess game, only this time the pawns are on the back row and the old aristocratic pieces on the front row. The pawns now move like knights, queens, bishops; the elite of the ‘ancien régime’ are reduced to the status of pawns. And the game begins again\textsuperscript{80}.

Using Wright’s insight as a paradigm case, we find that in Michael Apple’s earlier works, he manifests himself as an intellectual who wants to ‘destroy’ the chess board, and in so doing radically transform the power relations by allowing the subjects to construct other subject positions. Gradually we notice that Michael Apple undergoes a critical rethinking process of his own previous strategy, that leads him to reconsider his approach. That is to say, while it is incontestable that Gramsci and Williams infuse Michael Apple from his earliest work, it is also undeniable that Democratic Schools, offers an example of Gramsci’s optimistic approach of the collective will and war of maneuvers \textit{vs.} war of position. It is clear that Michael Apple (and James Beane) act strategically within the ‘cracks of the system’. Thus, the issue is not to destroy the education platform and then embrace a collective process of building another one, but precisely to act within the ‘cracks’ of the very dominant system while promoting transformations, that, in fact, end up transforming the social ‘platform’. Diving into the curriculum field, Michael Apple put forward the call for non-reformist reforms, using Democratic Schools as a practical example. Non-reformist reforms are useful for more than “transforming the practices of schools as they exist now and defending democratic

practices from, say, the rapaciousness of economic logics that are rapidly expanding**, but can be a way of (educational and curriculum) living for those really concerned with a more just society.

Thus, while *Ideology and Curriculum* calls for a revolution, in *Democratic Schools*, we do perceive such a call but rather a call for a kind of reformism. Michael Apple thereby shows not only a continuity in his own endless ‘[r]evolution’, but also achieves a superior level of complexity of Gramscianism. More than ever before, for Michael Apple the issue is not just the need for the dominated classes to seize power. The real issue is to transform the very conception and framework of power.

We are about to lay out the last sentences of this research. Thus far, we have been able to gradually unfold our arguments on the impact of Michael Apple within the field of curriculum. We were also able to see how that impact constrained and promoted new ways of thinking within the field. However, while acknowledging the crucial impact of Michael Apple’s organic intellectuality within the field of curriculum studies, one would be a ‘blind’ and ‘deaf’ researcher not to admit to the current inconsequentiality of the field. As we mentioned before, the field has become so abstract, afraid of dealing with curriculum technicalities, which it really has to address, that it became an inconsequential field. It no longer addresses teachers’ and students’ major practical concerns. Page’s address at the most recent American Education Research Association conference in Chicago, offered one of the clearest pictures of the current state of the field, reminding us of Schwab and Huebner’s position more then three decades ago of the moribund state of field. In her address, Page highlighted that AERA Division B lost more than 30% of its members who joined other SIGs on class, gender, race, critical education. While this is something that one should not minimize, we believe that the current state of the field, though flaccid, should not be seen as suffering from a terminal illness. After all, if one considers the history of the field, it has been undergoing crises one after the other. These crises seem to be in the very DNA of the curriculum field: permanent conflict, permanent

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crises, a permanent search for meaning, permanent contradiction, and a permanent belligerent condition, in essence, a permanent non-stable condition. In fact, and to use Bataille’s perspective, it is important not to neglect the field’s inconsequential position, but to transgress by “transcend[ing] the taboo”83, and often “the transgression is permitted and often it is even prescribed”84. Thus, the explosion of SIGs could arguably also be seen as a sign not exactly of the failure of the curriculum field, but a consequence of the permanent conflict and contradiction that lies at the very marrow of the field, expressing a change within the commonsense of what we regard as the field’s identity and limits. That is to say, since the field went ‘everywhere’ there is a need to rethink how we bound the curriculum field. With regards to such a ‘transgression’, using Bataille’s terminology, Trueit, Doll, Wang, and Pinar85, and Pinar86, (and many others) have already made a move. While that move should be congratulated, it raises serious concerns given its new view toward curriculum as a “complicated conversation”87, a position that Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman, put forward a couple of years ago. That is to say, one has to question the following: Conversation among whom? Who is part of the conversation? Why? Who is not part of the conversation? Why? What kinds of issues are at the core of the conversation? Who controls what would be manifested and what would remain absent from that conversation? Where are the voices of real teachers and real students? What is the impact of the conversation within classroom practices? Who benefits from that ‘complicated’ conversation? The academics? The teachers? The students? Everybody? If the major purpose is to ‘internationalize’ the ‘complicated conservation’, we think that that ‘internationalization’ already occurred many decades ago. To close our argument in a way that might appear quixotic, we actually do concur with Michael Apple, who claims, that “rather than lament the ‘current’ state of the field,

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we should applaud what has happened" 88. From the beginning of this research, we struggled quite hard and believe managed to show how Michael Apple built and rebuilt a particular line of thought and in so doing exhibited his organic intellectuality. Throughout his work, he did not lose for a moment awareness of the need to constantly draw the curriculum debate back under the umbrella of conflict and contradiction. Being the case we trust that we earned the ‘legitimacy’ to stress that arguably it seems there is no better way to end our discussion of Michael Apple’s impact on the curriculum field.

88 Apple, Michael Tape nº 50, recorded in office “e” of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction and Educational Policy Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison.