

that becoming aware of these processes will contribute to genuine reflection, and hence will tend to reinforce new skills and practices, is warranted. Beyond the individual level, he even touches upon its social and political implications, conceiving of a pluralist and participatory environmental ‘politics of skill’ in which know-how is potentially levelling the hierarchy between ‘experts’ and ‘lay persons’.

Coeckelbergh’s emphasis on the potency of engaged practical skill forms a timely and invigorating contribution to a field of environmental ethics in need of approaches to overcome its - as yet – limited effectiveness to translate ethical insights into lasting patterns of behaviour. At just over 200 pages, this work is replete with potential inspirational avenues for further interdisciplinary research. Even if highly condensed, the breadth of scope and the use of an impressive body of literature from different disciplines and subfields well beyond his own core field of expertise, which is technological and environmental ethics, clearly merits praise. One can only hope that this volume will serve as a first exploration and a first overall map to further explore the terrain he intends to develop on a more detailed scale, thereby readdressing core arguments and filling in some of the remaining blanks, and especially exploring the practical embodied answers to be found in what may be a true virtue ethics of environmental skill. This is a philosophical groundwork on the hopeful heterotopy that is currently already developing at grass-roots level (such as in repair-café’s or urban gardening), and which indeed deserves philosophical attention to understand the soundness of both its aspirations and its actual *praxis*. Coeckelbergh has indeed provided a valuable and stimulating stepping-stone to this end.

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Brian HARDING and Michael R. KELLY (eds.). *Early Phenomenology: Metaphysics, Ethics, and the Philosophy of Religion*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. 242 pp.

In popular literature and in most scholarly writings, the history of phenomenology is usually presented as follows: “Husserl invented it and he had a bunch of students. One of them was named Martin Heidegger” (1), who took it in a very different direction. Most other philosophers may arguably be neglected since they were “overshadowed by Heidegger” (3).

To reach some degree of clarity about the nature of contemporary phenomenology, the contributors to this volume turn to the early period of its history. They seek some kind of return to the sources (*ressourcement*) in order to “retrieve forgotten insights” about “the things themselves” (4).

It is usually said that phenomenology was born, or came to the fore, with Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900), and underwent fundamental changes through the French existentialists after 1945. The early phenomenologists are therefore the authors of “major works *prior* to the Second World War” (2). The first section of the book,

“Phenomenological Occasions,” starts with an essay from Lester Embree (13-24) and is largely based on his own ‘insider’ (13) perspective. Embree questions this birth, recalling a statement from Husserl that considered the *Logische* as ‘pre-philosophical’. Rather, Embree dates the foundational moment to 1911 or 1913 with *Ideen* (13; 15; 19). Trying to ‘bridge (20ff.) the gap between the “[...] difference (or differences) in which mental life can be approached” (15), he presents a rather brief historical survey of the different strands or stages of phenomenology: realistic, ‘constitutive’, ‘existential’ and ‘lifeworldly’. Despite the initial disclaimer (1; 4), the other essay in this section goes back to the archives and is simply a translation of a rather brief piece of an early phenomenologist, Adolf Reinach (25-29). Reinach is discussed at greater length later in the volume in an essay on “Foreboding,” (67-85) – i.e. the propensity of soldiers to foresee their own death – which causes Reinach’s own text in the first section to appear as an appendix that is out of place.

The three main sections in the volume are on (early) “phenomenology of affection, emotion and volition,” through Dietrich Hildebrand, Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, and Alexander Pfander; on the (early) “reactions phenomenology” of Ortega y Gasset, Nicolai Hartmann, and Martin Buber; and, more surprisingly perhaps to most scholars, on (early) phenomenology of religion, ranging from Rudolf Otto’s famous essay on “The Idea of the Holy,” to less known texts from Edith Stein and Bohnoeffer, none of which are often included in works on phenomenology.

In general terms, this section may in fact be this volume’s most important contribution to the extant literature: given Heidegger’s claim that ontology precedes religion (and ethics), these became marginal until a recent turn. The essays show that this trend is not a derivation (not even a “betrayal” (8), but was in fact present since the beginning. We will comment on a few of the essays to illustrate this point.

In chapter 4, Michael Kelly delivers a sharp essay on envy. His main point is that, since Aristotle, envy has been taken by philosophers as essentially “other-directed,” while Judeo-Christianity understood envy to be both “self- and other-directed” (49). In order to retrieve the role of the envier toward the envied, Kelly proposes an account that would further incorporate the *comparative* role of the envier toward the envied. This new account would then create new enlightening distinctions between envy and *ressentiment*. Kelly’s central argumentative move seems to reside in this comparative element: the envier must have a low assessment of his or her own self in order to *comparatively* consider the envied to be, well, enviable. To achieve these goals, Kelly takes as his starting point Scheler’s *Ressentiment* and agrees with his two basic features of envy: a “[...] tension between desire and nonfulfillment” and “[...] a tendency to make comparisons between others and oneself” (51). The disagreement emerges when Kelly raises several objections to Scheler’s distinction between envy and *ressentiment*, and to the different types of envy he outlines. Drawing the distinction between envy and *ressentiment* through a “[...] lasting mental attitude caused by the systematic repression of certain [negative] emotions” (51) does not seem enough, although Kelly agrees with Scheler’s notion of envy as having a specific object (a trait, characteristic, etc.) while *ressentiment* has no determinate object. Scheler’s distinction between envy and ‘true envy’ is untenable:

saying that envy is ‘true’ when it hinders action, rather than incentivises it, seems to confuse the matter rather than clarify it. For Scheler, ‘true envy’ is present when there is both impotence and ‘causal delusion’, i.e. the belief that the other is responsible for the envier’s lack.

For Kelly, however, such causal delusion must not be a necessary part of envy. Kelly’s crucial argumentative move toward a ‘self-oriented’ account of envy can be described as follows: *the envier must necessarily enter a state of self-assessment in order to see him or herself as worthy and deserving of the other’s good*. Drawing on Gabrielle Taylor, Kelly notes that envy attempts to protect a self that is already not liked: “[...] the true badness of envy – its primary intentional focus – lies more persistently in its debilitation of the self” (62). Kelly thus draws a new distinction between types of envy and then between envy and *ressentiment*. By the end of the essay, it becomes clearer that Kelly is using an ‘impotence’ scale in order to draw these distinctions. First, ‘deficiency-envy’ occurs when the envier turns in self-reproof. Here, impotence is at its peak, *but the other is not hostilized* (there is no causal delusion involved). Then, ‘possessor-envy’ is indeed other-directed because the envier “[...] sees the envied as someone who is the cause of, or responsible for, his not having some good.” Impotence is here *minimized* through blame and diminishment, while causal delusion is augmented. Finally, *ressentiment* erases impotence itself and restores self-satisfaction by redefining the value of things, thus preventing the desire to rise in the first place. *Ressentiment* is a falsification of the worldview: while envy still considers the good to be as such, *ressentiment* turns the values held by the possessor as no longer good; the possessor is no longer considered to be a causal factor, but someone to be pitied for having a wrong worldview. This is a fascinating and enlightening essay. Kelly fully succeeds in giving a more central role to the ‘self’ in his account of envy. His use of Taylor is almost graceful. The only oddity is the disproportionate number of footnotes, filled with crunchy details. Since each essay is a sharp twenty pages long, one wonders if Kelly did not relegate large chunks of his essay back to the footnotes. In any case, and although these notes could have filled out some of the transitions (such as why Scheler’s *ressentiment* does not seem well individuated), Kelly’s essay is interesting.

In chapter 9, Robert Wood begins by presenting a straightforward structure: the idea is to pinpoint the differences and similitudes between Heidegger’s and Buber’s thoughts. “Superficially, we might say that while Buber is focused upon the person, Heidegger is focused upon the thing” (141). Even if ‘superficial’, this relation of Buber with the Other, and of Heidegger with ‘the thing’, really seems to be the background idea guiding Wood’s investigation, and it is an enlightening idea. Wood says he will begin with Buber’s discussion of *Being and Time*, move to both thinkers’ description of a tree, then finish with some of their other fundamental issues. Wood thus begins with an overview of Buber’s *Das Problem des Menschens*. (Wood here specifically uses the German rather than the English *What is Man?*, a move that Heidegger saw as a non-question.) After a passing reference to modernity as a general *epoche* of homelessness, Wood describes Buber’s view of *Dasein* as “a kind of abstraction from full human life” (142). For Buber, Heidegger seems to bring the self toward authenticity by keeping it in a

monological relation. What about *Fürsorge* (being-with others), Wood asks? For Buber, Heidegger's *Fürsorge* amounts to making "one's *aid* available but not *oneself*" (145). This is, indeed, Buber's central concern, and (what seems to be) one of Wood's central ideas. While Buber's I-Thou truly makes the Other 'step forward' into everyday life (an Other that can be a tree, a work of art, a person, etc.), Heidegger seems to posit a *closed system* in which the self is mystically saved from within. Wood refers a story told by Buber (taken from "Dialogue" in *Between Man and Man*) when, around the Great War, Buber was unable to fully attend to someone who came to seek his guidance. Buber was in this very state of 'mystical solitude', and he later came to know that the seeker lost his life during the War.

This is how Wood, in the second part of his contribution, is able to make sense of how Buber's and Heidegger's description of a tree diverge so sharply. Both authors are indeed worried about the extreme scientific reduction of something like a common tree and the lack of *meeting* between man and being. Both descriptions of this meeting, however, are vastly different: Heidegger uses the language of meeting in order to *be* with the tree, but Buber makes the tree "[...] draw out our whole being and relate to us for a time not as surface-to-surface, but as being-to-being, fullness-to-fullness" (152). Again, Wood notes, a 'meeting' with a tree seems a strange I-Thou relation, but Buber is trying to show how many human relations (especially in sexual terms, he notes) are really just I-It, while many of our 'encounters' with things take a special hold on us. The author of the essay then becomes increasingly less forgiving towards Heidegger. Even Heidegger's view of the work of art does not seem good enough to him: while Buber's I-Thou meetings (which include works of arts) are endowed with a sense of mission, of the 'I' having to bring this encounter into communal life, Heidegger's 'letting' of the work of art seems comparatively impersonal. Even though both authors saw the work of art as a glimpse into the deeper mystery of being, Wood's judgement is final: "Perhaps Heidegger had no such experience and saw his thought better reflected in the impersonal *Tao*, for his central focus was upon things" (155). It might be that Wood is overstating his case, but it is a remarkable essay nonetheless: dense and, we dare say, deep. Wood concludes that Heidegger pays "very little sustained attention to the human Other" (157). He may however just mean that, *compared to Buber*, Heidegger pays little attention to the Other. After all, Heidegger's rebuttal of scientific reductionism is no small feat into peering deeper into the Other. The case of Heidegger's insufficient 'personalism' must be made more generally.

After Wood's dense essay, the tenth chapter by Jonna Bornemark seems, by contrast, more light-hearted. Bornemark initially proposes an analysis of the influence of both Theresa of Avila and John of the Cross on Edith Stein's thought, but the essay is oddly structured: instead of being equally developed, John of the Cross has a disproportionately larger section of the text, and the section on Avila's *The Interior Castle* is smaller and significantly underdeveloped. The section on Stein's appendix to *The Interior Castle* could have received a better, less abridged account, including some (even sparing) connections with Avila's work itself. However, one of Bornemark's main theses seems very promising: "Scholarly work on Stein has been divided between theological and

phenomenological readings: her phenomenological phase has mostly been read by phenomenologists, and her Christian phases have tended to be read by theologians within a purely Christian framework” (164).

This has led, Bornemark observes, to an excessive emphasis on Stein’s ‘religious turn’ at the expense of the study of her continuous phenomenological underpinnings. Bornemark is set to correct this problem with a thesis concerning Stein’s second and third phase (marked by her conversion to Catholicism and her adhesion to the Carmelites, respectively): while Stein’s first phase was indeed purely phenomenological, Bornemark contends, the second and third phase, even if decisively religious, must be understood as a ‘positive’ phase and a ‘negative’ phase: the ‘positive’ phase is marked by Stein’s comment on *The Interior Castle* and attempts to (‘positively’) categorize being and experience, while the ‘negative’ phase is marked by her exploration of John of the Cross and attempts to (‘negatively’) pinpoint the overflowing character of being and experience. For Bornemark, both phases are trying to achieve the same goal (defining being and experience), but in different ways (a positive and a negative one). We doubt if Bornemark’s account of Stein and Avila is sufficient to coin an entire ‘positive phase’. (Stein’s *Potenz und Akt* would have to be explored, and her reading of *The Interior Castle* would need more development). Consequently, pointing to Stein’s third phase as ‘negative’ falls flat. This is unfortunate because the section on Stein and John of the Cross is the more interesting part of the essay. Stein’s ‘negative’ phase is no longer ‘negative’ (in Bornemark’s sense), it is simply the road Stein decided to take, even if essentially marked by her approach through negative theology.

As in most collections, the essays in this volume showcase unwarranted omissions (Ingarden being the most notorious [10]), some questionable arrangements, and a somewhat uneven depth. But if the purpose of this volume is to put back on the agenda authors and works that were central in the heyday of early phenomenology when everything was still wide open, “before orthodoxies solidified” (2), then it certainly succeeds.

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Christian JOPPKE. *Is Multiculturalism Dead? Crisis and Persistence in the Constitutional State*. Cambridge: Polity, 2017. 224 pp.

Ever since the 1970s/1980s, multiculturalism has had both its advocates and its critics. While support long outweighed critique, the tide seemed to change at the beginning of the new millennium. Critical voices have become more numerous and vigorous, and at this point most theorists and politicians would be rather reluctant to assert what Will Kymlicka victoriously stated some twenty years ago, namely that multiculturalists have won the day in defending difference-conscious notions of justice and the accompanying laws and policies. Moreover, the critiques have increasingly merged into a