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## Book Reviews

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Margaret PABST BATTIN (ed.). *The Ethics of Suicide: Historical Sources*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 720 pp.

I regularly encountered Margaret Pabst Battin while attending international conferences. She is a strong debater, and highly trained in a wide variety of bioethical traditions and theories. I also observed – on many occasions – that she almost completely incarnates a lifelong commitment to the acceptance of societal regulations for the practice of euthanasia, assisted suicide and suicide. That she in particular (and behind her the University of Utah) is the editor of this resource book on suicide comes as no surprise, certainly to me and I suspect to many others. It is, in my perception, the logical outcome of a lifelong interest and commitment.

The focus of this book (and the associated Digital Archive) is on self-caused death, or suicide, and how it should be regarded from an ethical point of view. This collection – both the printed volume and the archive (you have to take both as complementary sources) – is intended to facilitate exploration of such current practical issues by exhibiting the astonishingly diverse range of thinking about suicide throughout human intellectual history, in its full range of cultures and traditions (1). The collection is organized chronologically, although dating, particularly of early texts, is often imprecise, and the identities of authors and sources are unclear (3).

Among the many issues raised by the full range of views on suicide is the question of the bases of analysis. This collection focuses on the ethical issues related to suicide, but there are substantial differences in precisely what it is that is to be assessed. Is it the act itself that is the focus of normative assessment? Is it the intention under which it is done? Is it the pattern of behaviour or cultural tradition within which it occurs? Is it the outcome of the act, its effects on other individuals or social groups, and if so, how broad is the scope of these effects?

Of particular importance in this collection is the fact that no attempt has been made to differentiate what Durkheim understood as societally caused ‘institutional’ suicide from the sorts of suicide usually understood under the label ‘suicide’ in Western, professional contexts – roughly, between suicide expected in certain circumstances as a normal part of the practices of a culture, as distinct from suicide that is conceptualized as the individual’s own idiosyncratic act, whether reasoned or the product of mental illness or psychopathology (9).

Let me provide a short overview of the major parts of the collection. Starting with the Egyptian Didactic Tale, the Vedas, and the Hebrew Bible, we read citations crossing many centuries, until we arrive at contributions by Daniel Callahan (°1930) and Peter Y. Windt (°1938). The volume includes North American Indigenous Cultures (documented 1635-1970), Oceania Indigenous Cultures (documented 1820-1984), Arctic Indigenous Cultures (documented 1840-1940), African Traditional Sub-Saharan Cultures (documented 1853-).

Famous intellectual authorities are also included. In chronological order: Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Augustine, Martin Luther, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Tillich, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Albert Camus, et al.

This book is a gold mine for those in search of historical sources on suicide, assisted suicide and euthanasia. In the present reviewers own view, however, the Digital Archive will be of greater importance. Indeed, readers of this volume are invited to submit corrections, comments, and further texts for inclusion in the Digital Archive.

Paul Schotsmans  
KU Leuven

Susi FERRARELLO. *Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality*. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. 269 pp.

In the past sixty years, the unpublished manuscripts of Edmund Husserl, father to the phenomenological movement, have been made available to the public thanks to the efforts of many people. As of today, forty carefully edited Husserliana volumes enable scholars to focus on specific topics and tendencies in Husserl's work, which can now be comprehensively reconstructed from the original texts. One of these topics is Husserl's ethics, which occupied him intensively during his lifetime and to which he devoted several manuscripts and lectures that remained nonetheless unpublished. Despite his enormous influence on almost every important 20<sup>th</sup> century continental philosopher, it is probably for this reason that Husserl's ideas on ethics have played only a minor role in the ethical debates of the last decades. As a matter of fact, Husserl's influence on today's mostly analytical ethics is virtually nil, certainly compared to the attention philosophers have given to two towering philosophers who owe so much to his work, Heidegger and Levinas. Heidegger himself remained largely silent on the ethical implications of his ground-breaking philosophy, in spite of the well-known occasions during his lifetime when he spoke in public about his moral stance during World War II. But his influence on much of the critique of 'ethical theorizing' and the idea of values in the so-called anti-theory movement is undisputed. Levinas conceived of ethics as a metaphysics of the Other and proclaimed it to be the 'First Philosophy', not least in a radically critical response to the primacy that Heidegger granted to ontology. But precisely in this responsiveness, Levinas is also heavily indebted, as he has always acknowledged, to Heidegger's work, particularly in his view of the role of ethical theorizing premised on principles of universality and theoretical justification.

Exploring the way in which Husserl's thoughts on ethics relate to these debates offers a singular opportunity to continue them, knowing that he prepared the way for both thinkers. A new book in the series 'Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy' by Susi Ferrarello, an American phenomenologist based at Loyola University in Chicago, provides important contributions to the extant debate.

Ferrarello's book goes a long way to unravel and reconstruct the intricate relations between practical intentionality in general, axiology and ethics, and Husserl's general 'founding' phenomenological project. Husserl developed the phenomenological project during his lifetime in an ongoing self-critical process that followed a number of different lines: descriptive, eidetic, transcendental, genetic, historical-cultural and even eschatological (12). Ferrarello's account of how his ethical thought fared in this sequence, is deliberately systematic and 'immanent', based on the presumption of an intense relation of 'co-presence' between the static/eidetic part of Husserl's phenomenology and the genetic/constitutive part that came later (4/5). She starts by explaining Husserl's ethics from the basics of his thinking about the philosophical meaning of the '*a priori*'. Based on my own reading experience, I am inclined to argue that this may not be the best way to draw non-specialist readers into the book. (Indeed, those who come with a particular interest in ethics would do well to begin with chapter 7, on "The Truth of the Will", which, in spite of its title, is much more accessible and clarifying, especially from page 168 onwards). The explanation in the first chapter is compact and philosophically rather technical and sophisticated. Ferrarello's book is far from being an easy read. The text stays close to Husserl's original vocabulary and the author presupposes a great deal, not only regarding the letter of Husserl's way of thinking but also the spirit thereof. Ferrarello's expertise is beyond doubt, but she makes little effort to find a voice of her own to bring her thoughts closer to the contemporary reader. It pays, nevertheless, to work carefully through these pages and allow Ferrarello's exposition of Husserl's ethics to gradually emerge.

The main idea is that axiology (connected to value) as key to the contents of formal practice (connected to willing) is, according to Husserl, a comprehensive '*a priori* science' of its own, parallel to logic. Axiology and logic develop the formal '*a prioris*' that consequently found, underpin, structure the 'material *a prioris*'. The idea of a material '*a priori*' is Husserl's great innovation relative to Kant's formalism, although he came, in time, to regard Kant (with Descartes) as his most important predecessor when he developed descriptive into transcendental phenomenology. The schematism of formal and material '*a prioris*' that are central to phenomenology as a philosophical method, prepares the way for Ferrarello's general claim that Husserl's broader aim with ethics was to develop a fundamental parallel between theoretical and practical philosophy, that is: between logic and a phenomenologically grounded science of nature, and axiology, a logic of values and a phenomenologically grounded ethical science. The theoretical-logical element of this undertaking, with which the larger part of Husserl's published work is concerned, should in the long run be elaborated into regional material onto-logies of the various sciences such as physics and biology. The practical-axiological element is based on the fact that the human being is not only a conscious, knowing subject by way of perceptual

and other intentionalities related to the world, but also a striving, willing and acting subject that, by way of his or her, body is actively involved in the world. But ‘willing’ is evidently very different from ‘knowing’ and ‘feeling’ and demands a phenomenological study of its own. Axiology, the logic of valuing, is the bridge that materially and epistemically connects the agent to the world of willing and acting.

The difficult and at the same time most intriguing tenet of Ferrarello’s book pushes this parallel structure and Husserl’s programme one step further. This tenet is that the theoretical and practical dimensions of our human functioning are structurally interwoven. The practical-axiological element relates necessarily to the way the human being is part of both ‘Nature’ and ‘Spirit’. The practical and moral meaning of our lives is always also connected to theoretical science, to conceptions and perceptions of the world, including ourselves. Ferrarello captures this relation with the metaphor of the double helix in the structure of DNA, in which two strands of nucleic acid molecules are entwined in a pairwise spiral along two lines. In similar fashion, practical and ethical intentionality structurally entangles two strands of thinking: theoretical findings and findings concerning the state of the world on the one hand, and practical findings and findings concerning the valuing, strivings, feelings and willings pertaining to the normativity and desirability of a world that will result from our actions on the other. This entanglement can then in turn be situated on two levels in view of the fact that we are part of nature with our bodies while acting, and part of spirit with our minds while thinking. This makes for two ways in which ethics can be conceived: first as practical intentionality, an ethics of our bodies, or ethics as practice, which is constantly developing in relation to the ‘hyletic’ givens of the world; and second as an ethics of the mind and reflection, a meta-ethics that is called ethical science and refers to the eidetic laws of valuing that condition the normativity of our actions.

This programme also explains the – at first somewhat strange – general description of ethics as a science of the ‘volitional body’. According to Ferrarello, however, the two conceptions of ethics as practice and ethics as ethical science are both viewed by Husserl as sciences because they are both ontologically founded in the ‘volitional body’ as a specific region of the human being. Practical intentionality refers to the active, first-order way of organizing the basic, given hyletic materials of practice into moral conduct, into the unity of a moral action. This hyletic ethics, as Ferrarello calls it, is more related to the body (which is itself a ‘constitutive achievement’ of the ego), and with the way we interact with the world. Ethical science or reflective ethics is more related to the life of the reflexive mind. But both are parts of a comprehensive ethics as science. Ferrarello calls them “[...] interdependent and necessary for us to fully grasp ethics as such and to fully recognize our own ethical agency” (6).

In nine chapters, Ferrarello then develops this basic perspective that claims to hold Husserl’s views on ethics together. She devotes chapters to the relation between essential laws and practical norms, the role of evidence in practical intentionality, the role of the body and of willing, and to intersubjectivity. She concludes with the final, mature and most ‘eschatological’ and teleological work on social teleology and theology of the later Husserl of the *Krisis*. Within this all embracing framework, according to Ferrarello,

Husserl never lost sight of a unified concept of ethics as both a science of theoretical laws *and* a practice of norms that are tied to these laws, however imperfect and unfinished Husserl, the ‘true beginner’ as he called himself, considered his efforts to describe and found these laws and norms to be.

This book may be of interest to philosophers working in any of the following research contexts: historians of philosophy, interested in the history of phenomenology, philosophers who work in the tradition that is inspired by 20<sup>th</sup> century continental phenomenology, and ethicists with a strong interest in the philosophical roots of ethics in metaphysics, ontology and epistemology. As for the first two groups, for obvious reasons Ferrarello is unable to offer a lengthy treatment of the relation between Husserl’s ideas on ethics and those who worked at the time on similar phenomenological projects in ethics such as Scheler and von Hartmann, and certainly not on the more complex influence on Heidegger, Levinas, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. But here and there we encounter the occasional remark and sometimes a more elaborate suggestion, especially on Gurwitsch (114), Ricoeur (*passim*), Levinas and Merleau-Ponty (esp. 87-88), that may be inviting enough for others to pursue. None of these authors, however, are mentioned in the index, which, in addition to a number of typos, unnecessarily and undeservedly devalues the scientific ethos of the book.

After reading this book, one can hardly doubt that Heidegger’s conception of *Dasein*, for instance, or Merleau-Ponty’s conception of *corps-sujet*, in spite of (or thanks to) their fundamental criticisms of Husserl’s own phenomenological, and increasingly idealist project, would not have been possible without Husserl’s teaching and writing. To give just one example: Heidegger’s vocabulary, by many, especially non-specialists, considered as unique and an important feature of his philosophy, is in many respects indebted to Husserl’s work. When Husserl describes the inevitably naïve attitude with which everyday consciousness entertains ‘reality’ in terms of a ‘general assumption’ (*Generalthesis*) he characterizes this attitude as follows: “[...] alles aus der natürlichen Welt erfahrungsmäßig und vor jedem Denken Bewußte [...] trägt in seiner Gesamtheit und nach allen artikulierten Abgehobenheiten den Character ‘da’, ‘vorhanden’” (Hua III/1, 62; quoted in Husserl Lexicon by Hans Gander – “[...] everything in the natural world experientially and before any thinking, consciously [...] as totality as well as along all articulated features has the character of being ‘there’ (*Da*), being ‘present’ (*Vorhanden*) [translation, JV]). Husserl also uses these concepts in published texts (*Dasein* in *Ideen I*, Hua III/1, 97), *vorhanden* in Hua III/1, 56ff.).

Heidegger distanced himself from Husserl’s foundational idea that philosophy always has to start from the conception of a first ‘originary’ perceptual and epistemological take on the world to create further meanings on the level of our everyday encounters with the world. He replaced this by a number of phenomenological/hermeneutical openings to the world: the pragmatist one of *Zuhandenheit*, the affective of the *Befindlichkeit* and the linguistic one of language as ‘the house of being’, all of which start from the assumption that we are always already *in medias res*. This runs counter to Husserl’s ultimately deeply modern view of how the human being relates by way of consciousness to reality, celebrating its openness to reality and its freedom that is founded in every

sphere on a constitutive way of integrating the ‘hyletic’ offerings (or ‘data’) into a unity that creates meaning and value on all levels of human functioning, from perception to the political. In ethics, this freedom is founded on values and valuing, a notion that met with fundamental criticism from Heidegger as being tied to the dualism of subject-object, which in his view determined the fundamental ontology of modern philosophy.

As to the third and perhaps largest group, the general readers of this journal, these debates from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century may be considered by many as only of historical interest and no longer relevant for the future of ethics. But the appearances of academic practice, as these appearances can be quantitatively objectified in the number of articles and journals in ethics, may be misleading when we recognize important problems that befall ethics as an academic discipline, such as its connections with general philosophy and especially its relevance for the ethical and political problems of today’s world, a world that seem to cry out for a more comprehensive and in-depth philosophical and intellectual debate. Ferrarello does not venture so far afield in this regard, and rightly so, since only by focusing as she does is she able to deliver valuable insights into Husserl’s ethics. There is certainly no hint as to the way Husserl’s ethics might be relevant to the dominant debates in systematic ethics of the normative, meta-ethical or applied kind. But the possibilities for exploring this relevance offered by Ferrarello’s work are numerous and interesting.

Let me conclude with two examples of areas of applied ethics with which I am personally acquainted. First, Husserl’s ideas on the volitional body might suggest a new ethical outlook on debates in the philosophy and ethics of sport, and especially the problem of doping. Second, the peculiar way in which Husserl uses the notion of technology: “Technology represents a particular case of a normative discipline that arises when the basic norm consists in achieving a universal practical aim” (64). Husserl wrote this at a time when the philosophy of technology was virtually non-existent, and the ethical problems of new and fast developing technologies were of little concern, except for the case of weaponry. But Husserl’s conception might offer an interesting clue to today’s thinking about modern technology, its assumptions and the way ethics relates to it.

Jan Vorstenbosch  
University of Utrecht

Scott W. GUSTAFSON. *At the Altar of Wall Street: The Rituals, Myths, Theologies, Sacraments, and Mission of the Religion Known as the Modern Global Economy*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015. 220 pp.

*At the Altar of Wall Street* is a stimulating and well-written meditation about how economics functions in our current global culture as religions have functioned in other cultures. Eight chapters take us through a thematic reflection.

Chapter 1 introduces the economics rituals and pilgrimage sites, from the Babylonians to contemporary shopping malls, exploring how economic myths and narratives

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give meaning to human life. Chapter 2 delineates economic priests, theologians, reformers, extremists, and terrorists. Chapter 3 explores the economic worldview and the places akin to churches and mosques where people gather to serve their god and receive benefits from their god. Here Gustafson asserts that a great number of the debates between economists are based on shaky assumptions; but the public religiously assumes the scientific validity of economic assumptions and uncritically accepts economic ritual as natural and economic myth (like the barter myth) as scientific fact.

Chapter 4 explores the religious communities of the economic faithful: the limited liability corporation, the modern corporation, corporate persons, corporate values and human values; and money as the expression of corporate values. Chapter 5 follows up with money as the sacrament of the market economy, and the economics global mission. Called 'globalization', it aims to evangelize the world just like Christianity and Islam. Chapter 6 continues the study of globalization marked by a decline of national sovereignty and then examines some of the implications: the mission into the unseen world of microorganisms, the industrial food chain, the 'spiritual' formation of young people, and how the economy gets converts. Gustafson concludes this chapter with the observation that "Large, multinational corporations are to The Economy as megachurches to Jesus. They are the place where the vast majority of the faithful gather to serve their God and receive benefits from their God" (166).

The last two chapters look at debt as civilization's conceptual metaphor as well as the conceptual metaphor behind modern religions; and then move on to demythologization as transition to a new social arrangement that does not use debt as a fundamental component of its order. Gustafson admits that "[...] it is difficult to understand how Economics and other religions would look in this new configuration [...]" but might be understood as "the path to a new, more vibrant future" (205). He never really offers serious insight into how such a demythologization would work.

Scott Gustafson, who served as a seminary professor and Lutheran pastor for more than thirty years, is an independent stock-market investor in Herndon, Virginia. I hesitate to call this book a provocative serious study. He strings together a variety of thoughts, bits of history, and occasional insights. It is a scattered meditation on consumer capitalism as a powerful alternative to Christianity in American society. One finds a lot of thought-starters in this book, but not always well thought-out reflections.

John A. Dick  
Leuven

John HARRIS. *How to be Good: The Possibility of Moral Enhancement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 195 pp.

Recent literature about moral enhancement has been dominated by an interest in the biomedical means through which the moral dimensions of human behaviour may be enhanced. In *How to be Good*, John Harris shifts the focus: the main enhancer in the moral domain, emeritus Professor at the University of Manchester argues, is moral

reasoning. “Ethics is for bad guys” (110) – for those occasions on which altruism, compassion and common decency fail. To prevent such failures, we need to employ the toolkit of ethics.

The overarching aim of moral reasoning, Harris submits, is to pursue those reasons that are best all things considered. How do we find out which reasons these are? Not by consulting our intuitions and emotions, let alone by inferring them from our brain states. To trust “the moral nose” (29), or to pursue emotions and feelings like love, altruism, sympathy, concern and respect, need not necessarily bring us close to doing the right thing, unless such pursuits are guided by moral reasoning. The way forward in ethics is through careful calculation of the consequences of our decisions, geared towards what is best all things considered.

Such calculation has to be made time and time again, and should be attuned to specific contexts. Moral decisions cannot be captured by algorithms and be outsourced to automated decision-making machinery. The typical blind spots of our moral history have been exclusions of other individuals, groups and species from moral consideration. We can only identify such exclusions by carefully exploring the grounds, reasons, and purported justifications for including some agents rather than others from moral consideration, and by constantly reviewing such decisions, and revising them if necessary. To preconfigure our moral decisions means giving up this capacity to review and revise, and constitutes an unacceptable violation of our moral autonomy.

Where does this leave bio-enhancement? Harris is keen to point out that, contrary to what some of his detractors have suggested, he has no principled objection to bio-enhancement in general, or to enhancement of the emotions in particular. But he does object to forms of bio-enhancement that preclude moral reasoning. If we rely solely on chemicals and molecules to enhance our moral decisions, we effectively give up our capacity for ongoing reflection on what is best all things considered – an unwarranted compromise on our freedom.

Bio-enhancement is an option worth considering. But at present, Harris maintains that the tried and tested methods should be kept at the centre of moral enhancement: education, parental and peer group guidance, social and personal example, and – above all – rational ethical reflection. The efficacy of biomedical means to make us behave more ethically has yet to prove itself. The primary step to alter people’s moral psychology and to enhance their moral motivation is to engage in ethical reflection.

Harris also points out that, while discussions on moral enhancement tend to focus on the decisions of individuals, institutions play a major role in steering us towards the course of action that is best all things considered. Many problems call for collective, rather than individual action. “No individual can usually hope to feed the poor, defend the weak, or heal the sick, but good social welfare and health services and infrastructure (whether publicly or privately funded) can and do so far as this is possible at all” (27), Harris maintains. Problems such as global poverty should not be left to personal altruism, but be solved at state or international level. Perhaps the greatest potential for moral enhancement is not to be found at the individual level, but at the level of collective institutions.

*How to be Good* covers much ground and contains several important ideas. There is much to be learned from Harris's expertise and voice of reason and to be enjoyed in his work. Let me finish, however, with two critical remarks, the first concerning the structure of the book, the second concerning its contents. First, Harris builds on much of his previous work, as well as discussions of it by others. As a result, the book reads at times more like a collection of published papers, than as the presentation of an independent argument. The different chapters contain some repetitions, and Harris devotes some chapters exclusively to answering his critics (especially Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Perrson). As a book in its own right, his discussion would have benefited from a more exclusive focus on the development of its own positive line of argument.

Second, and relatedly, while there is much to agree with in Harris's nuanced approach towards moral enhancement, the reader might end up wondering about its originality. Good old moral reasoning is Harris's main candidate for enhancing moral decision-making, but this is hardly a radical proposal. Indeed if moral enhancement comes down to proper moral reasoning, can we even say it constitutes a topic in its own right? Harris might have explored further avenues to present rational enhancement as a new, independent topic by engaging in some detail over specific ways in which reasoning tools can enhance our moral decision-making. One possible way to do so, I submit, would be by highlighting reasoning fallacies in the moral domain, or by engaging with the recent literature on genealogical debunking arguments, and their relevance for the role of emotions and intuitions in ethical decision-making. To frame such discussions in terms of enhancement seems both helpful and apt. Building on Harris's reason-based approach towards moral enhancement, then, there may be more avenues yet to be explored.

Jeroen Hopster  
Utrecht University

Christopher KUTZ. *On War and Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. 332 pp.

*Complicity*, published by the same author in 2002 book by the same author, is a fine book in the emerging field of metaphysics, ethics and legal theory about joint action and intention. The reader of this new book, however, will be caught off guard. Despite the author's claims of a "pervasive influence" (xii) – and even the voices – of both Bernard Williams and Michael Walzer (and the latter's recovery of Just War theory), we found a surprisingly fresh and a very independent approach, even more so because it is much closer to today's current concerns making it all the more compelling reading.

After acknowledging that "[...] we live in an era of belligerent democracy" (1), the book, as a whole, tests the pervasive conviction that democracy is consistently "[...] a source of both domestic and international flourishing," questioning even (unconvincingly, however, given the examples) the empirical 'rule' that democracies never fight each other (2). To test the common assumption that democracies as such are hostile to

violence, Kutz addresses a set of different litmus cases. In this vein, he also wishes to offer an “alternative understanding of democracy” (4) that moves away from an institutional perspective: namely an *agentive* conception of democracy. It is only at this point that continuity with his previous work becomes clear: democracy is understood as “[...] how individuals conceive of their actions in relation to each other” (4) in their goals of building or defending open political institutions. According to Kutz, this alternative understanding of democracy can make sense of the relationship between violence and democracy, namely why eruptions of popular will show up as both ballots and bullets. This alternative account of democracy, he says, will enable the construction of concepts targeted at limiting this violence.

Kutz takes issue with how we should address the ethical constraints on war (which wars should be waged and how) from the perspective of a committed but non-dogmatic attachment to democracy. While doing so, his goal is to understand if and why democracies may have become more permissive toward violence as “[...] democratic wars [...] offer a new form of *holy* war [...] one grounded on the comparative virtue of the democratic belligerent” (8).

Most of the book’s 12 chapters were previously published in academic journals or book collections – all, in fact, with the exception of the introduction and two new texts: chapter 9 on victors’ rights (*Vae Victis?*) and chapter 10 entitled “Drones, Democracy and the Future of War.” These texts were, as a rule, written looking back: some have the stains of the Iraq War and its aftermath, some of the fall from grace of the Arab Spring. Despite their various origins, however, Kutz has managed to gather them into a consistent whole. Given the wide scope of the themes addressed in the book, let us focus especially on two representative essays: (chapter 2) and “Must a Democracy be Ruthless? Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics” (chapter 7).

“Democratic Security” sets the background and launches the problem that gives unity to the whole book. Democracy is the only remaining legitimate form of government, and perhaps too much is expected of it; both an alternative to revolution and to war, while American democracy seems very much belligerent. In his discussion of legitimacy (28), he posits the idea that legitimacy is not an urgent question when situations of illegitimacy do not arise. He resorts to an analogy: the question of the meaning of life: “[...] while it might arise in a philosophy seminar, or while stretched on one’s back and contemplating the stars in the wilderness” (28), the question of the meaning of life only comes in full force at moments of existential crisis (such as, “the death of a loved one” [28]).

Kutz’s main point in this article is to argue that although there are connections between human security and democracy (so strong, in fact, that he fuses both in the term democratic security), he wishes to examine the tensions between them (18). In the 1990s, a marriage occurred between the agenda of democracy promotion and of human security on two levels: on the one hand, both democracy and human security focus on avoiding violence and fostering human welfare (which the classical notion of national sovereignty did to a more limited degree); while on the other, both seem to have an important connection in that they focus on the respect of the individual regardless of rank.

The author's goal is to show that democracy and human security are not easily reduced to a single concept (25): pluralism set limits to this marriage. And although international law is "[...] rarely called upon to meet standard criteria of legitimacy" (32) due to its voluntaristic and performative nature, it does conflict with popular will. He gives a couple of curious examples of such underlying tension, which is not incidental and will happen in institutions that are supposed to further the agenda of human security. According to Kutz, therefore, not everything needs to be about democracy: "[...] recognitions of values, including basic dignitarian and welfare values, can be a legitimate restraint on state behavior" (36). He concludes that to recognize "[...] the value of technocratic performance" is not renouncing democracy, but appreciating "the forms of collective agency that make such governance possible" (36).

This is central to his agentic conception of democracy: in order to shift from an 'institutional view of democracy to an 'agentic' view, Kutz demonstrates that alternative versions of legitimacy are not pressing enough, and because democracy is the dominant concept of legitimation in today's international politics (29), the limits of democracy are not apparent until challenged. Technocratic values, and military culture, even if less dominant, have their place in the distribution of collective responsibilities.

The chapter "Democratic Security" is therefore a good example of his intention to elaborate an 'agentic' account of democracy. In a crucial section of the text, Kutz discusses the traditional view of legitimacy as a 'right to rule'. This view, he says, does not fare well in international relations because, for instance, the UN has legitimacy but no 'right to rule'. In his view, therefore, one has legitimacy when announcing a norm that "[...] gives actors subject to the norm substantial reason to comply with it" (27). There are many alternative versions of legitimacy and Kutz enumerates a few of them: natural legitimacy ("because I come from the House of Stuart" [29]), procedural legitimacy (when there is a reference to the outcome of a favoured procedure), performance legitimacy (when one can defend or produce a specified type of good or interest), and so on (cf. 29). Now, since for Kutz legitimacy is a "*challenge term*" (28), apart from occasional moments of idle philosophical reflection, the question emerges in full force in situations where legitimacy is challenged. This last argumentative step leads him to assert that "[...] pressure builds toward a broader conception of the consenting constituency and a method of revealing and actuating that consent" (30). It becomes clear that democracy is usually the solution to legitimacy once natural justifications are off the table, but Kutz is able to offer a view of democratic legitimacy detached from institutions and focused on collective reason-giving.

Chapter 3, "Citizens and Soldiers," details the shift from a soldier in the king's uniform, vulnerable to attack but allowed to kill, to the democratic soldier whose identity and license to kill is grounded in the will of the people and raising doubts about Walzer's prescriptions about *ius in bello*. Acknowledging the difficulties in deciphering the purposes of war and underlining the limits of democracy in explaining *ius in bello*, the next chapter, entitled "A Modest Case for Symmetry," upholds nonetheless the traditional restrictive regime of reprisals and reciprocity. In the following essay, "Leaders and the Gambles of War," he challenges the idea that political outcomes (or 'luck') can justify the decision to go to war, which tempts political leaders, as 'Confidants of

Providence'. Chapter 6, "War, Democracy and Publicity," tackles the problem of secret legal memoranda used to circumvent constitutional restrictions. In a similar vein, chapter 7 tackles the problem of the use of torture in war.

We will focus in the remainder of this review on the litmus case examined in: "Must a Democracy be Ruthless? Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics." The author addresses the 'standard necessity justification', focusing on two types of situations: micro-situations in the case of torture under the Bush administration; and the macro-situation of the constitutional claim for "plenary authority" and "complete discretion" (126). After discarding some fragile justifications in both situations, Kutz says only the 'standard necessity justification' deserves consideration. It goes like this: there is a point at which the benefits of infringing a right largely outweigh its costs; it is therefore *necessary* that we infringe this right. This point is illustrated with a reference to the infamous ticking time-bomb example (141-142): a terrorist has planted a bomb that will kill many innocent people; torturing him is the only hope one has to save them. Kutz argues that it is unlikely that this will achieve "[...] perfect satisfaction of all the traditional criteria of necessity" (142) – he refers to Henry Shue's seminal paper *Torture* in this regard. In practice, such hypothetical examples never really occur (how can one be *certain* that the person to be tortured has relevant information? Or that him being tortured will *really* save lives?). He adds, furthermore, that to institutionalize a rule for these specific cases would lead to abuses on the part of institutions.

What Kutz mainly wishes to argue is that the 'standard necessity justification' leads to confusion when it justifies necessity by reference to a cost/benefit calculus: while certain types of 'institutional rights' fall under this cost/benefit logic, 'pre-institutional' rights do not. While the former refer to general welfare, the latter refer to the institutions' basic legitimacy; while the former are typically utilitarian, the latter are deontological. For Kutz, a proper necessity justification exists, for instance, in cases of war (145-147), when civilian lives and property are destroyed incidentally in bombings. We are not speaking here of an aggregated cost/benefit calculus, but a recognition that civilian lives and property will necessarily be lost in the process of bombing specific military-related targets. One of Kutz's main points lies precisely in the fact that the recognition of an evil must not lead one to *justify it* (148). For Kutz, the ticking time-bomb argument is therefore not a *deduction* (a *justification*) of ethical principles, but a *recognition* that our principles could not possibly withstand pressure from opposed values.

As the author says: "my own feelings still run hot as well" (126), and this 'just wrath' leads him to compare Bush's memo to Carl Schmitt's call for unlimited executive power in the 1930s.

The remaining chapters are somewhat specific, but they keep the same tune, albeit realistically and moderately: democratic states are so sure of their virtue that the slippery slope of justifying all use of violence and denying the same rights to their opponents can lead to moral and political disaster. Chapter 8, "Humanitarian Intervention in the New Democratic Holy Wars" questions the lowering of the threshold of sovereignty, opening the door to more frequent external interventions (such as the use of drones, see chapter 9). While chapters 11 and 12 both look forward, the former "Democracy

and the Death of Norms” addresses the need for more robust restrictions in what concerns *ius in bello*, and the latter tackles repayment of property holders in the aftermath.

Ground-breaking works on ‘democracies and war’ have assumed a correlation between increasing democratization and a peaceful world. In fact, successful democratization appeared to bring peace to warring nations and optimism seemed justified by an invariable political truth: “Democracies don’t attack each other” (Clinton). It is only natural that many statesmen and “most political scientists base their devotion to democracy on the belief that liberal democracy brings with it at least three important virtues: freedom, prosperity, and peace” (Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 1). However, devotion to democracy added a fourth virtue: ‘democracies win wars’. This conviction was so deeply rooted that, at times, even the debate among scholars appeared to narrow to the alternative between the use of soft and hard power. Democracy’s fourth virtue is less and less hard to see. People’s democratic consent can both make democracies at war more efficient or belligerent and make their commitments less coherent.

Any reservations we have, therefore, should not make us forget that Kutz is addressing a real problem. But as he says, it sometimes looks like all ethical theories are current only for the last war (so – famously – the French prepared for the Great War with the Franco-Prussian war in mind and the defence at the Maginot line with Great War in mind. They failed to look forward). In fact, interstate wars have gradually been replaced by internal wars and irregular conflicts that pit regular armies against actors who are subnational (‘insurgents’, ‘rebels’, ‘guerrilla fighters’) or transnational (terrorist groups, mafias). “Globalization has not resulted in a standardization of conflict. Rather, it has made war even more polymorphous and indecipherable. The more unified the planet becomes, the less does diplomacy seem to obey the ordinary calculations of force and the more military technique differs from continent to continent and conflict to conflict” (José Colen and Elisabeth Dutartre-Michaut [eds]. *The Companion to Raymond Aron*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, ???). A new framework for conceptualizing international relations is missing. Part of our perplexity may be due to the fact that we put our trust in ‘institutional arrangements’ and ignore the role of the statesman, the recognition of which tends to be absent in current political theory. Kutz argues elsewhere that groups that act on the basis of the same of intentions can be held morally responsible if there is a ‘significant overlap’ in those intentions. The collective dimensions of warfare certainly need to be explored, but does such emphasis not risk diverting attention from morally responsible leadership in democracies?

By the end of the book, therefore, it seems that the whole story rests on limiting the belligerence of democracies. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not even along the lines set by the author. Let us take an example. In order to decisively tackle the torturer’s rationale and its deceiving simplicity, it is important to go further than to conceive ‘pro-torture’ claims in terms of ticking time-bombs. We must ask ourselves: why does torture seem to be so reasonable from the point of view of the torturer? What can we say that might dissuade potential torturers? To say that “[...] torture in practice never meets the conditions under which it could be justified” is enlightening in the context of this essay

in the book, but it seems counterintuitive from the point of view of the torturer's rationale ("he *obviously* has information," "he gets what he deserves," and so on). Along with the idea that torture can never be justified in practice because the ticking time-bomb conditions are never met, this obscures the *apparent reasonableness* of torture from the point of view of the torturer. The probably true argument that the traditional criteria of necessity are never met cannot be a full account of why torture is wrong. Perhaps we can be more convincing with something along the lines of: "by torturing them, we are destroying the very spirit that animated the Founding Fathers," that is, to torture them is to deny what we are. Or "to torture them is to play the terrorists' game; we are better than this." As the author says, we can certainly not expect to uphold rights without paying some costs.

Less than clear-cut theories may disappoint, but it is worth remembering that necessary simplifications do not always produce even good theories.

Pedro Moreira  
Institute for Political Studies  
J. A. Colen  
Minho University

Shaun NICHOLS. *Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 188 pp.

Determinism and free will are two of the great philosophical problems and commonsense views in everyday contexts. Free will is "[...] the [alleged] aspect of action, decision, or choice" (3). According to determinism, every decision people make is an inevitable consequence of what happened prior to their decision-making. Obviously, determinism undermines the conception that people can make decisions, while threatening the idea that people should be responsible for their decisions.

Based on experimental and philosophical studies, *Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility* by Shaun Nichols (professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Arizona) explores the abovementioned issues, as well as exploring a series of interconnected issues, such as moral responsibility, retributivism, and human anger. The use of so many cases and primary source materials gives readers a multilayered understanding of the argument presented in the book. Nichols takes a clear-cut stand: there is no single answer to whether determinism or free will exists.

This highly readable book has 7 chapters. Nichols' arguments focus on three dimensions, that is, descriptive, substantive, and prescriptive.

On the descriptive dimension, Nichols explains the origins of the problem of free will, and analyzes whether determinism is consistent with the way people think about choice. He reveals the reasons why the problem of free will has existed for so long:

People expect there to be causal explanations for any particular events, including decisions. At the same time, people find it jarring and counterintuitive to think that their own choices are determined (11).

One of Nichols' arguments is impressive to the reviewer. In the opinion of Nichols, it is hard to claim that the entire universe is deterministic. However, "[...] there are perfectly legitimate ways to make inferences about whether a more restricted system is deterministic or not." The key lies in the fact that an observer should "assess all of the inputs to the system" (40). If an observer assesses all of the inputs of a more restricted system, and the system behaves in different ways given the same inputs, the observer might conclude that the system is not deterministic.

On the substantive dimension, Nichols examines whether the way people think about choice reflects the nature of choice. Due to the flexibility of reference, belief in indeterminism and free will has no ultimate justification. For instance, the answer to the question whether free will exists is comparatively contextualized, rather than a univocal answer. In the eyes of eliminativists, there is "[...] no such thing as free will and that everyone is under the illusion that there is free will." In contrast, preservationists and revisionists believe that "[...] there is free will and that everyone has merely been under some misapprehensions about its nature" (62).

In short, people's interests will be served by being elastic to competing ethical considerations. In the case of the retributive norm, wrongdoers should be punished due to their behaviour, which "[...] is part of a set of norms that do not need justification", and is rooted to a large extent in a basic human emotion (119). However, this does not eradicate the normative legitimacy of the retributive norm. As Nichols insists, people "[...] shouldn't take the lack of independent justification as a sufficient reason to abandon our brute retributivism" (140).

Finally, from a psychological-historical perspective, Nichols advances a critical question on the prescriptive dimension: given what people know about determinism and free will, should they change their practices? According to Nichols, the answer to this question is *no*, because in some scenarios people would deny the existence of determinism and free will and in other scenarios they would affirm them.

Nichols' arguments and conclusions are thought-provoking. The reviewer's greatest concern is the extent to which they would be applicable to ethical studies related to international relations, and to be more specific, the debate on China's rise. Some scholars act like advocates of determinism, because they believe that all the rising powers will inevitably challenge the hegemon, and China will be no exception. Some scholars insist that the future of rising China is not deterministic. In such a case, can we illustrate the debate as 'the flexibility of reference?'

A valuable contribution to experimental philosophy, Nichols' *Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility* is novel and provocative at times. It reminds us of an alternative approach to understanding free will and determinism, and helps illuminate the complex relationship between free will, determinism, and responsibility. This book is not only for academics and students in philosophy, but even those more familiar with the subject of free will find it useful. It should be added as course material for philosophy classes.

Kai Chen  
Xiamen University

Nancy SHERMAN. *Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 234 pp.

Georgetown University professor of philosophy, Nancy Sherman, directs her attention in this volume to veteran military personnel and the moral dimensions of their psychological injuries: guilt, shame, feeling responsible for doing wrong, or being wronged. No small issue when one looks at the suicide rate among US soldiers and veterans: 6,500 former military personnel took their own lives in 2012. Current estimates are that each day at least 22 veterans take their own lives, especially young veterans. “I know well the need for empathy in relationships and how sorely many soldiers and veterans, some barely eighteen or nineteen years old, long to be understood so they can understand themselves,” Sherman writes in her introduction (4).

*Afterwar* draws from in-depth interviews with men and women veterans. Their stories are not only moving but often deeply troubling because they pinpoint not only the trauma of war with its suffering and death but the trauma of surviving in a war when one feels responsible for a friend’s death or experiences betrayal and gender and sexual abuse from people in positions of leadership one is expected to trust. “Soldiers lose their identity,” veteran Captain Josh Mantz wrote. “They don’t understand who they are anymore [...] Most people don’t appreciate the awful weight of that moral injury” (7).

Sherman argues that some psychological wounds can only be understood and healed through a kind of moral understanding that is the province of philosophical engagement and listening. She cites the case of ‘Bill’ who entered the war in Vietnam with the encouragement of his father, who saw the war as a great act of patriotism. He later became a Green Beret, slipping through enemy lines as part of President Richard Nixon’s secret war in Cambodia. When attacked, an enemy soldier pinned him down. Bill pulled a knife from his jacket and stabbed the enemy fatally in the chest. While his opponent died on top of him, he at first felt a sense of peace and victory. It did not last long. Bill returned home profoundly disillusioned, regretted the war, and was left with the feeling that the US government had victimized, used, and abused him. He was angry that he had been fooled into thinking that his military service was patriotic. Then followed panic attacks and alcohol abuse. His self-locating mixed with raging resentment toward those he believed had aided and abetted his becoming a murderer.

Bill’s story reverberates in the stories of veterans like Jeff Hall (who after being twice deployed to Iraq ended up realizing his commanders had used him and lied to him) and Dan Berschinski (who lost nearly half of his skeleton in Afghanistan).

I strongly recommend *Afterwar*, especially for people unfamiliar with posttraumatic stress disorder. Sherman’s book not only details the agony of physically and psychologically wounded veterans returning home, but it also narrates the success stories of those who have been able to recover their identity and self-worth. Her well documented and researched book is a powerful narration of what she heard from veterans and a convincing account of what can happen when people really begin to listen to them.

John A. Dick  
Leuven

Peter SLOTERDIJK. *In the Shadow of Mount Sinai*. Translated by Wieland Hoban. Cambridge: Polity, 2016. 71 pp.

Sloterdijk's most recent step towards a theory of everything revolves around the powerful image of the Levite massacre of the idolaters referred to in Exodus 32:

So [Moses] stood at the entrance to the camp and said, 'Whoever is for the LORD, come to me'. And all the Levites rallied to him. Then he said to them, 'This is what the LORD, the God of Israel, says: "Each man strap a sword to his side. Go back and forth through the camp from one end to the other, each killing his brother and friend and neighbour".' The Levites did as Moses commanded, and that day about three thousand of the people died (29).

Sloterdijk reconstructs the massacre at the foot of Mount Sinai as a symbol for the intrinsic violence or cruelty of monotheism at large. Essentially, according to Sloterdijk, the butchery of the idolaters was retribution for the 'breach of covenant' between Yahweh and Israel: God avenged himself on the apostate Israelites for breaking the promise of mutual exclusivity, thereby reminding those who had not (yet) sinned that Yahweh is the One God and Israel his Chosen People. This notion of the breach of covenant continues to inform the entire concept of sin in what Sloterdijk calls the "Sinai Schema" (34): sin is a reminder that being one of the Chosen Ones constitutes an obligation of *total membership*. Every sin, however small, is a reminder of the threat of apostasy – and simultaneously a reminder of God's wrathfulness and the hellfire that he will unleash upon those who forsake him. Sloterdijk derives from this that "[...] the believers find themselves confronted with the self-contradictory command to have unconditional faith in God's mercy because otherwise God will mercilessly exterminate them" (48). But without further elaboration of what is admittedly one of the more interesting thoughts in the book, the author is quick to stack another bold claim on top of this "phobocratic paradox" (48): namely that the Sinai Schema migrated, and that the cruelty that is arguably inherent to the grammar of Judaism ends up likewise constituting the basic fabric of Christianity and Islam. Sloterdijk does not argue for this claim, but rather adduces as 'proof' that the latter two religions have similar concepts to that of total membership in Judaism – *qana* and *jihad* respectively – and also, moreover, consider departure from a salvific community a breach of covenant. *Quod erat demonstrandum*: hence the link between violence or cruelty and monotheism. Sloterdijk concludes, however, with the controversial suggestion that the Sinai Schema is also written into the grammar of contemporary phenomena. "The things termed nationalism, totalitarianism, fascism, communism, fundamentalism, and integristism were and are, in essence, nothing other than varyingly desperate attempts to re-enact earlier forms of collective synthesis offered by omnicompetent religion with new, semi-arbitrary themes such as national culture, socialization of the means of production, Fuehrer cult, racial difference or literalism" (55). In other words, the Levite massacre of the idolaters also seems to symbolize and inspire a large chunk of the morally problematic modern-day social and political phenomena.

Sloterdijk's essay is indisputably bold and very imaginative, and perhaps even stylistically enjoyable to the reader who does not mind the idiosyncratic sentence construction, which Wieland Hoban has done his level best to translate into English. At the same time, however, some deep problems are apparent in Sloterdijk's text. A preliminary oddity concerns his engagement – or lack thereof – with theology and religious studies. Insofar as Sloterdijk discusses Judaism, an occasional reference is made to the research done by one of his German colleagues; when the reflections turn to Christianity and Islam, however, Sloterdijk invokes no source additional to his own (undoubtedly well-informed) imagination. And in light of the boldness of his claims about Islam in particular, as well as the broader fragility of the latter topic in current political discourse, this inward-looking attitude verges on academic irresponsibility. But there is a more substantial philosophical problem with Sloterdijk's argument, which exhibits an awkward reflection of the issues of totalitarian inclusivity that are his object of study. If we assume that Sloterdijk is right in associating violence and cruelty with the ideas of prodigality and the concurrent total obligation towards the force with whom one has entered a relation of mutual exclusivity – which seems plausible enough once we recall that total obligation implies a form of ethical self-abdication that allows one to “kill without becoming a murderer” – then we should acknowledge that there is something inherently dangerous in the entire scheme of thinking in terms of strict inclusive-exclusive membership. Indeed, this scheme *dehumanizes* both those who are completely absorbed into the social group and those who are wholly excluded: the former lose their moral subjectivity – their responsibility to think for themselves – in their complete surrender to the One God; the latter, by their very exclusion from cult membership, lack genuinely human status altogether. To the extent that Sloterdijk's aim is to problematize such totalitarian dehumanization we should welcome his efforts – the problem is that his own way of thinking schematizes along precisely the lines of strict inclusive-exclusive membership that he attempts to criticize. The historical narrative wherein some violent foundational act is considered to unalterably determine the future fate of religions and civilizations *presupposes* the same kind of self-abdication that Sloterdijk wants to challenge. The assumption of a determinate link between the Levite massacre of the idolaters and the development of Fuehrer cult implies, after all, nothing other than a form of *historical determinism* by grace of which it is no longer possible to hold that people *ought* to have done otherwise because they *could not have done otherwise* – the narrative of historical determinism *assumes* the very absence of personal responsibility that it attempts to challenge. Of course Sloterdijk does not explicitly say that the Jews are to blame for the development of the very cults that considered them to have caused the *Untergang des Abendlandes*, and he probably would not accept this claim either, but the scheme of thinking from which he analyses the problem of inclusive-exclusive membership forces him to performatively endorse the thesis that the subject is in the morally relevant sense nothing over and against his or her group. And it seems to me that this last point is precisely the problem with contemporary social and political phenomena such as nationalism, totalitarianism, and fascism.

Dascha Düring  
Utrecht University

Tatjana VIŠAK and Robert GARNER (eds.). *The Ethics of Killing Animals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 252 pp.

While today, thankfully, the idea that animals should not be made to suffer without good reason is common ground, less agreement exists about the question of whether it is harmful for animals to be killed. Does death only harm animals in so far as they experience pain during slaughter or is killing animals morally problematic even if it were done painlessly in their sleep? This is the central question in the philosophically challenging and clearly argued collection *The Ethics of Killing Animals*. As the authors of the first chapter, Kasperbauer and Sandøe, explain, it has often been argued – by well-known animal welfare scientists like Donald Broom – that death itself is not a welfare issue. After all, when an animal is dead, it is no longer interested in its own welfare. Most authors in this volume disagree. They argue that welfare should not only be measured at one particular point in time, but should be considered over the animal's whole lifetime. A long life is better for an animal than a short life, because when an animal's life is ended prematurely it loses out on possible future well-being. This so-called 'foregone opportunities account' or 'deprivation account' raises a fundamental question: can something harm a being when this being no longer exists? Can a certain act be against someone's interests objectively, or does one always have to experience the act subjectively as harmful for it to matter morally? An example that shows we can be harmed even when we are not aware of this is provided by Kaldewaij: suppose someone defames you to a potential employer and this deprives you of a job you would have otherwise landed. Even if you will never find out that you lost out on this job opportunity, you have still been harmed, because something you would have valued is taken away from you. As Kaldewaij points out, death is an extreme form of deprivation, because it takes away any "[...] possibilities of engaging in any activity you value again" (189).

This is only one of the many philosophical quandaries raised in this book, which brings together an impressive group of authoritative philosophers on questions surrounding the ethics of killing animals. Familiar contributors include Peter Sandøe, Jeff McMahan, Shelly Kagan, and Christine Korsgaard. A large portion of the book is devoted to value theory and explores what makes life and death good, bad, or neutral for an animal. On what basis could we say that ceasing to exist is bad for animals? Can existence be better or worse for an animal than never existing? What sort of capacities should an animal possess in order to be harmed by death? The second part of the book is concerned with the moral evaluation of killing animals according to specific moral theories. Despite Kant's own rejection of animal rights, can a Kantian argument be construed that justifies moral duties to animals and if so, what does this imply about animals' right to life? Can a utilitarian argument be made against the killing and replacing of animals that have a good life? The third part of the book aims to draw political lessons from these normative debates. If we were to agree that animals have a right not to be killed, what political implications follow? What constraints on our ideal theory should we accept in the non-ideal world we inhabit? By clearly demarcating the questions surrounding the ethics of killing animals and by mostly inviting contributors that share a number of core assumptions

about animals and our duties towards them, the editors have managed to avoid an overly generalised and shallow discussion. Instead, the contributions have much philosophical depth and the authors genuinely engage in debate with each other about complex questions, such as whether existence and non-existence can be compared and what should be the basis of animal rights. The points in the book where the authors do not agree with each other are the most interesting and lead to the philosophically most challenging discussions. Instead of giving an overview of all the chapters in this book, I will focus therefore on a number of these disagreements. After all, in a short review one simply cannot do justice to all the rich ideas and intricate arguments that can be found in these twelve excellent and thought-provoking chapters.

A first disagreement arises around the question of what capacities a being has to possess in order for death to be bad for him or her in a moral sense. Belshaw challenges the deprivation account by making a distinction between harms that matter from a moral perspective and harms that do not. Just as plants can be harmed, but not in a morally relevant sense, Belshaw argues that while death is harmful to animals, this should not concern us morally. Only persons that are rational and possess self-awareness are harmed by death, because they have an awareness of their own existence through time and can therefore have a desire for a continued life. Most animals lack so-called ‘categorical desires’, a notion Belshaw adopts from Bernard Williams. They have no future desires that give them reason to want to go on living, or in other words, they have no future oriented projects like writing a book or becoming an accomplished violinist. According to Belshaw, this means that from the point of view of the animals living does not matter, because it is not something they consciously want. Only enjoyment and the avoidance of suffering matters to them, because this is something they can experience. This assumption leads him to posit the controversial claim that painless death is in fact often good for animals, if by death they can avoid future suffering. For many of them it may even be better never to exist in the first place. Belshaw’s views have the unsavoury implication that a painless death is not bad for many human beings (at least the so-called ‘marginal cases’) either, and in fact that death would be good for them.

These views are rejected by many of the other contributors, most notably by Bradley, who argues that first of all many animals do possess categorical desires, and that secondly, the possession of such desires is not necessary before an animal can be harmed by death in a morally relevant sense. Bradley thinks that rather than categorical desires, intrinsic desires are necessary for death to be harmful to an individual. When a person is tired of living, this person no longer has intrinsic desires. But many animals do have intrinsic desires; cows for example, intrinsically desire grass. Moreover, cows that plan ahead by walking over a hill to a patch of grass, do seem to have future-directed desires. Of course, this elicits the response that while death may be morally harmful for animals, it surely is not as harmful as it is for most human beings. This response can be grounded in McMahan’s ‘time-relative interest account’. While McMahan shares with most contributors the view that death is bad for animals because it deprives them of the enjoyment of future goods, he argues that it is worse for individuals who lose out on a higher quality and quantity of life. Animals usually stand to lose less than humans and therefore

their deaths matter less. They stand to lose less because they are psychologically less connected to their future selves. This in turn raises questions about personal identity, that are taken up in a very interesting way by Luper who examines the implications of the fact that humans are also animals. He shows that psychological connectedness is very much a mentalistic criterion that does not sufficiently acknowledge our animality. As McMahan admits, the degree of psychological connectedness of animals is also an empirical matter. Nevertheless, he does not seem to underscore the importance of actually drawing on empirical research. Instead, he simply posits that pigs are more psychologically connected than cows, and cows more than chickens. This makes a mockery of those among us who actually do value interdisciplinary research. In this book, the dispute about animal capacities seems to be settled in favour of the deprivation account. Belshaw's account serves the useful purpose of testing the views of the other authors and – in my view – ultimately strengthening them. At times though, his arguments are so counterintuitive and unconvincing that they seem like no more than an interesting, yet sophisticated, thought experiment.

A second interesting discussion in this book is between Singer and Holtug on the one hand and Višak and Kagan on the other about the value of existence as opposed to non-existence. The discussion is raised by Singer's infamous 'replaceability argument'. Sometimes the killing of animals can be defended, the argument goes, when the animals that are killed are replaced by other animals whose lives are at least as good as the lives of the killed animals. As Singer writes in his afterword, this argument was not invented by him, but can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the so called 'logic of the larder'. He quotes Leslie Stephen, who claimed that "[...] the pig has a stronger interest than anyone in the demand for bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all" (231). In other words, the fact that people consume pigs is the very condition for their existence. Višak rejects this defence of meat consumption, because it assumes a specific pig for whom it is better to exist than to never exist in the first place. But in her view such a pig does not exist. We simply cannot compare a state of affairs in which an individual exists with a state of affairs in which the same individual does not exist. In a very challenging contribution, on the other hand, Holtug defends a comparative value of existence view. He argues that we can compare two outcomes, even if we know that if outcome A in reality obtains, outcome B cannot obtain, and vice versa. This leads him to say that "[...] it is wrong to bring a miserable individual into existence, because if we do so, this will be worse *for her*" (111; italics mine). Whether his account is convincing or not, I leave to the reader to decide.

As Singer points out, we encounter an asymmetry here: most people have the intuition that we have no obligation to bring a happy child into existence, but also that we do have an obligation not to bring a thoroughly miserable child into existence. If we hold that existence as such cannot be of value for an individual, it seems that we do not have an argument against bringing a child into existence even though we know it will be miserable. On the other hand, if existence is valuable, we have a reason to bring as many children into the world as possible, leading to the infamous utilitarian 'repugnant conclusion'. As Singer points out, philosophers on both sides of this dilemma will have

to bite the bullet on something and it seems to come down to intuition which bullet one is willing to bite.

Yet, the analytical rigour of most of the contributions to this volume suggests that the authors do not want to leave anything to intuition. Some of the chapters are so tightly argued that it may leave readers who are not philosophically schooled feeling helplessly confused. The theoretical debates and at times far-fetched thought experiments could have benefitted from a reality check from time to time. Still, if the reader manages to form his or her own opinion on the harm of death and the value of existence after reading this book, it is sure to be a very solid and considered opinion.

Bernice Bovenkerk  
Wageningen University