do we get from unreflected absorption to reflected opinion? Hints as to how to get there I am sure will be welcome especially to students who plan to use fiction in their future classes but maybe also helpful for academic teachers who look for attractive examples for university classes but are afraid of seeming too shallow if they adopt bits of mainstream public culture.

The discussions in the volume also lack a stronger degree of media awareness. Arguably there is a difference between a story read and a story seen. It would be interesting to have a discussion about how to consume values through fiction in different media. An exception to this is the second last essay in the volume by Martha Rainbolt. She discusses the neglect of the ethical motives of Katniss Everdeen in the movies based on the Hunger Game series in comparison to the original books by Suzanne Collins. To me this seems an excellent starting point for raising media awareness: What happens to a story once it is adapted for the screen? Is ethical simplification a necessary feature of this transfer? Or can it be done otherwise?

This volume offers many ideas about the passing on of some of our most valuable thoughts that deserve wide discussion not only among teachers looking for books to read in class but also – and maybe even more so – among moral philosophers who tend not to think so much about the developing intellect of children and teenagers, but address rather the fully-fledged imago of brains that are open to nothing but arguments and ready to criticize them.

Claudia Mill's volume encourages us to look for ethics in unknown places – like children's literature.

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David PALMER (ed.). *Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 235 pp.

A book title *Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates* may be misleading for the potential reader due to two different sets of reasons. On one hand, the book is *not* about libertarianism in the more common political sense, i.e. "[...] the view that justice accords priority to respect for a wide range of basic liberties" (4, note 2) as in, let us say, Locke, or Nozick, or Valentyne. On the other hand, it is not a survey of the question of liberty as *liberum arbitrium* in recent analytical theory, but a homage book intended to discuss – Robert Kane's ideas about free will and moral responsibility (4).

Following an introduction by David Palmer, the book consists of five parts. Part I – "Libertarian Theories of Free Will" deals with metaphysical problems related to liberty and determinism. Parts II – "The Luck Objection" and (III) "Incompatibilism and Omissions" both address some moral issues and consequences of free will, namely the 'luck' factor in human action; the question of ultimate moral responsibility in a world of fate, and how much human beings share the burdens of responsibility by 'omission'. Part IV – "The Significance of Free Will" is among the more promising (more below).

Since the book is in fact about Robert Kane's theories, he replies to his critics in a final part, a single chapter.

However, in spite of our initial warning, the title turns out not to be entirely misleading, even for those merely interested in political theory, since there is an obvious connection. If free will is just an illusion, that is, if our genetic constitution, the environment, fate, or God (181) are the real causes of our behaviour and we do not act freely, the political case for the respect of basic freedoms is severely weakened – it makes no sense to attempt to reduce our constraints to agency if one assumes we are completely predisposed by external or internal factors. In this sense, some kind of real moral responsibility – or in Kane's formulation an 'Ultimate Responsibility' (UR) in the self-formation of our actions (SFA) – is relevant to libertarianism in politics. Nor is the ambitious subtitle, 'Contemporary Debates', just a disguise for a *Festschrift* either, because the editor (David Palmer) has in fact been able to gather contributions from some of the best minds in the field. Moreover, the contributors go far beyond a mere analysis of Kane's ideas. The book does not really cover new ground, but certainly makes an excellent entry point, in a readable style and without concessions to superficiality.

The central question, as David Palmer states in the introduction, is an ancient one, free will, "a central topic in philosophy" (3), often "maligned" (4). The basic puzzle is this: is causal determinism compatible with free will and moral responsibility? Ayer, in his 1954 *Philosophical Essays* (chapter 12) formulated the puzzle as follows: "When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid. But if human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is commonly assumed both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is required to make them morally responsible, and that human behaviour is entirely governed by causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will" (Ayer later changed or nuanced his view). It may seem clear, then, that we may embrace one or the other, but not both. Libertarians embrace free will and moral responsibility.

Kane is an hard-boiled 'incompatibilists', that is, he upholds the view that agents are ultimately free and morally responsible and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism (as any libertarian should be, but things sometimes get blurred). Kane is among those responsible for the resurgence of libertarianism as a topic in ontology, in works since his *Free Will and values* (1985) to the more recent *The Significance of Free Will* (1996), although he is more than an initiator, because he never stopped his reflections on the subject. Kane's central idea is that "*ethos* mediates action" (181). Not all of our actions are free, but even so – according to Kane's theory – we are morally responsible when – torn between contrary options – we make an effort to

perform one of the options presented to us and we perform a 'self-forming action' (SFA). Such effort would be causally undetermined, and despite many constraints the agents' previous SFA would make them Ultimately Responsible for their fundamental life choices. Human beings are more than puppets of fate, and the answer to better understanding this phenomenon may lie, as Kane puts it, in the reality of 'effort'.

Kane himself describes the landscape when he approached the field: If you believe in science, either you find some form of 'compatibilism' between free human action and a world of deterministic causality, or you end up as a 'hard determinist', discarding free will entirely. On the other hand, if you uphold free will you are condemned to appeal to 'metaphysics' (180). Kane's project may be defined as an attempt to 'give an intellectual account of free will' without resorting to *hocus pocus* metaphysical entities such as chance or mystery. On the other hand, Kane is a staunch defender of event causation. Let us centre this review into two dimensions: metaphysical doubts and moral problems.

Carl Ginet criticizes Kane's account of event-causation by free will suggesting a different 'non-causal' account – upholding that free choices are completely uncaused – which corresponds better to phenomenology of 'competing efforts' and provides a better response to the luck objection (that is, if all choices are undetermined, they are just a matter of luck without moral value). Timothy O'Connor argues that those who believe in free will should reject 'physicalist' explanations of the mind and endorse a non-reductionist "neo-Aristotelian causal powers account" (32) of causation in which substances or agents appear as the real causes, rather than events, preventing the "problem of the disappearing agent" (34) Alfred Mele argues that the dual efforts approach is insufficient to overcome the luck objection. Mele suggests that indeterminism does not imply a higher degree of control than that which determined agents could possess, but allows for a kind of control that cannot be put on a scale.

John Martin Fischer proposes a different answer to the luck objection suggesting that – in an *in*deterministic scenario represented by a machine – the connection between an agent's mental states and choice is sufficient to make choice not as lucky as we could assume. Mackenna raises doubts about the soundness of Kane's analyses of UR pointing out that compatibilists grant that "the source of an agent's act be within her" (85), but do not think this is inimical to furthers sources "of what's within her for which [she] is not also ultimately responsible" (85). Widerker and Schnall suggest that only through *ad hoc* hypothesis can compatibilists restrict Transfer Non-Responsibility (N-R) to include compatibilist intuitions. Randolph Clarke maintains that in some cases we are responsible for an omission, not taken as a special case of actions and he concludes that one can have basic (non-derivative) responsibility for omissions as well as actions.

Far more interesting than all these attempts to fine tune incompatibility claims is the last section of the book. Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom present a thoughtful discussion of what free agency and an indeterministic source of actions add to make them valuable. Both assert that value and meaning can be achieved without indeterminism, and engage in a kind of dialogue among them with arguments and objections.

In previous works, Robert Kane lists a set of values that confer meaning to human actions and human life: genuine creativity, autonomy, merit, moral responsibility (UR);

capacity for wonder, resentment, indignation; dignity of values, unique sense of individuality; hope, open future; genuine love and friendship, and free action. This enumeration, far from exhaustive, make us recall Isaiah Berlin's unsurpassed account of the amount and significance of the changes in our view of human affairs, praiseworthy and blameworthy actions, depending on free will.

In the end of the volume, Kane provides an important discussion of the essays. . We will only emphasize that against the phenomenological implausibility objection, Kane clarifies that, in his account of SFAs, he does not assert that agents have introspective awareness of making competing efforts. His account deals with what is going on "[...] behind the scenes when we exercise such a free will, not merely a description of what we immediately experience" (197). Kane claims that (incompatibilist) freedom is gained gradually through (compatibilist) control over the competing efforts in such a way that by self-forming actions we become ultimately responsible for our own lives.

How plausible are Kane's theories, asks Palmer (4)? Let us opine: not much (cf. 181, 184). Kane assumes since his 1996 book some kind of "indeterminacy in our neural processes" (193). His hypothesis is that maybe, in moments of effort or neurological stress, free will can take over and command the brain. He suggests that five steps are necessary to move away from determinism (193-195; obviously the same indeterminacy of the nerves of the hand must be involved [194], allowing us the power to act).

Kane still tries to discard the philosophy of conscience (197), fearing some kind of theological interference (200) or 'uncaused' factors (201), upholding instead agent causation (a 'sui generis cause' nonetheless).

How does he know what goes on behind the scenes? In the end, it seems that Kane cannot avoid dualism (203) and is prey of what Gilbert Ryle describes in his famous introduction to *The Concept of the Mind* as the 'official doctrine': "With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his mind are ordinarily harnessed together [...]. Human bodies are in space and are subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space. Bodily processes and states can be inspected by external observers. So a man's bodily life is as much a public affair as are the lives of animals and reptiles and even as the careers of trees, crystals and planets. But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private. Only I can take direct cognisance of the states and processes of my own mind" (????).

Causal indeterminism does not solve the problem of the separation of 'substances': mind or self and brain. An analogue attempt was made by Karl Popper and John Eccles – and the later had knowledge of the 'neurological' processes which was not based on 'logical' assumptions. Notwithstanding, in *Objective Knowledge* (chapter 2), Popper notes when reasoning about the body-mind relation that many theories that try to overcome dualism end up defending some kind of monism (chapter 4). In *Unended Quest* (chapter 39), he acknowledges that his alternative to dualism is not monism but a plurality of factors and, challenged in an interview, he even asserts that there is a 'ghost in the machine'.

Overall, the essays in this book are interesting and very good. With the possible exception of O'Connor's essay, however, they seem far too concerned with logical puzzles, and thus fail to make justice to Kane's contribution to the main question in the larger picture. This is perhaps why, despite competent hands at work, they do not properly explore the riches of Kane's suggestions concerning the connection between life's meaning and free will.

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Janusz SALAMON (ed.). *Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalising World*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 197 pp.

The world is shrinking. What are the ethical implications of globalisation and increased global interdependence? How can we construct a new relevant global ethics? What does global justice and global solidarity imply?

The aim of the anthology *Solidarity Beyond Borders* is to introduce the term solidarity into the discussion on globalisation and global ethics. It is potentially a fruitful idea where 'solidarity' is used as a normative concept in different traditions, from the socialist workers movement to Catholic social teaching. And in between we find *Solidarnosc* in Poland.

The book is multidisciplinary and contains contributions from scholars in political philosophy, moral theology and religious ethics. Steinar Stjerno begins by defining solidarity and gives a historical overview of its uses in the labour movement, Catholic social teaching, Christian democracy and at the present in the European Union. Sebastiano Maffettoni discusses global justice, criticizes both cosmopolitanism and statism and argues in support of a third view he calls 'liberal internationalism'. Anna Abram discusses how solidarity is connected to and dependent on moral imagination. Patrick Riordan discusses different conceptual aspects of solidarity and argues for political friendship as the core meaning of solidarity. Jerome Gellman gives a Jewish, Ebrahim Moosa a Muslim and Yang Guorong a Chinese perspective on solidarity. Gerald Beyer discusses if solidarity is possible in light of the latest findings in evolutionary biology. Charles Webel and Sofia Khaydari argue for a non-violent global ethics and finally Janusz Salamon discusses how the transformation of conflicting identity narratives could be a way to solve transnational conflicts.

In my review I will focus on some ideas in Stjerno's, Abram's, Beyer's and Salamon's contributions. Stierno shows how solidarity was a key word for the European labour movement. Bernstein, for example, summarises Social Democratic values on a threefold basis; equality, solidarity and freedom. During the 1960s and 1970s, this idea was broadened to include solidarity with the Third World. (His insightful analyses contrast with the simplistic introduction to the book by Roger Scruton who dismisses the idea of solidarity in the socialist labour movement without relevant arguments.)