

BETWEEN THE STATE AND SOCIETY – CIRCULATION OF PROFESSIONS WITHIN THE POLITICAL ELITE

Esser Silva & Moisés de Lemos Martins

ABSTRACT

This article aims to explore the theoretical structures that influence the formation of the elite class – or *the elites* – analysing the affirmation of these structures within the circulation of professions that have access to the political sphere, while comparing Foucault’s studies on *parrhesia* and *eluteria* with Weber’s concept of social *closure* by means of political parties, to understand how political professionals articulate their existence between civil society and public service. This analysis is orientated towards understanding the distinct traits of professional groups, as an objective characteristic for access to, and use of, power for personal benefit. Based on a study of MPs of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic and the finding that “economists”, “lawyers” and “teachers” are the predominant professions, detailed analysis is provided of two structures of cohabitation within this *elite class*: characterised on the one hand, by nonchalance, fearlessness and the capacity to act frankly, enunciated as constituent inner qualities of any politician, and on the other hand, by externalized practices, with hidden goals in the strategies of the party apparatuses. These two structures establish two configurations – that of the *full-time politician* and that of the *fractioned politician*, both of which are cultivated in a hegemonic coexistence, which expresses, as an extensive mode of politics, a transmutation of ideological solidarity for the introduction of economic antagonism.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Parrhesia; elite; closure; extra-political professionals; legitimisation

RESUMO

Este artigo pretende, por um lado, explorar as ordenações teóricas que traçam a formação da classe eleita – ou *as elites* – transcorrendo a sua afirmação da circulação das profissões que acedem ao campo político e, por outro, entrecruzando os estudos de Foucault sobre *parresía* e *elutéria* com a noção weberiana de *fechamento* partidário, compreender o modo como os profissionais da política articulam a sua existência entre a vida civil e a vida estatal. Assim, esta análise orienta-se para a compreensão dos traços distintos dos grupos profissionais, enquanto característica objetiva para acesso e uso do poder em benefício próprio. Assente num estudo, que tem por base o caso dos deputados da Assembleia da República Portuguesa e na constatação que nela predominam “economistas”, “advogados” e “professores”, enquanto membros ativos, escrutam-se duas ordenações em coabitação nesta *classe eleita*: por um lado, entre o desapego, a ausência de medo e a capacidade de agir francamente, enunciados como qualidades interiores constituintes do político, e por outro lado, as práticas exteriorizadas com fins acobertados nas estratégias dos aparelhos partidários, formam-se duas configurações de sentido – a do *político inteiro* e a do *político fracionado*, ambos cultivados numa coexistência hegemónica, que enuncia, como modo extensivo da política, a transmutação da solidariedade ideológica para a introdução do antagonismo económico.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Parresía; elite; fechamento; profissionais extrapolítica; legitimação

INTRODUCTION

The political elite can be identified, on the basis of professions predisposed to seek places of political representation (Gaxie, 1980). The professions of MPs who belong to the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic, whose origin is civil, is an appropriate indicator to confirm, not only the statistical breakdown of these professionals, but also understand the dynamics and transformations that have occurred in recent years in the political sphere (Parsons, 1939). With Gaxie (1980) as a precursor, analysis of the professions involved in the political sphere has been the subject of several studies in Portugal, such as Braga da Cruz (1988), Freire (1998), Belchior (2011) and Lisi (2011) and Jalali (2017). The studies generally identify variations based on societal dynamics in general, which are introduced into the political sphere (Jalali, Silva, & Silva, 2012; Joly, 2005), thereby contributing to a better understanding of activities which are more predisposed to occupy places of mediation and influence, in relations of reciprocity, exchanged between civil society (Fernandes, 2014) and the state (Bourdieu, 2012; Burton & Higley, 2001).

It is commonly accepted that the attributes of elites, in particular regarding the degree of their cohesion, self-awareness, strategies and practices, can only be ascertained via “empirical research”, wherein a distinction should be consistently made “between ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’” (Higley, 2010, p.17). The simplified nature of this premise must be viewed critically, given that, without such care, examination and interpretation of practices runs the risk of distorting the “true political stratification of societies” (Higley, 2010, p.17). The separation between “elites” and “non-elites” expresses the opportunity to use, as a technical resource, the creation of a framework of analytical experience (Goffman, 1986), constructed through simplification of reality. The ideal type – a Weberian construct formed using several characteristics of the subject as an object – allows us to attain knowledge by emphasizing transversality, and deepening the specific aspects of a given phenomenon, studying it in isolation (Weber, 2005b).

In order to analyse the principal professions of the Portuguese political elite between 1974 and 2015, we need to determine the dominant professions, their distribution, and their respective individual and collective dynamics? This knowledge will allow us to identify the professions which have more active strategies within the field under analysis. This will also enable us to foster a fuller understanding of the political phenomenon, from a differentiating perspective (beyond the classic division into various political parties), which is capable of explaining the links valued in civil society, to access, and use, the functioning of the State apparatus, in accordance with modalities that are suited to the benefits that may be withdrawn.

SELF-WILL AND THE STEP FORWARD

The main endeavour of the individual, identified as a political agent, is to understand the laws underlying his own self-government that can enable him to govern others, his countrymen (Foucault, 1994, 2008; Martins & Neves, 2000). In principle, the right to the *politeia*, or to the *city*, extends to all citizens; in this case, exclusively those who have

the right to vote. This is guaranteed by the principle of *isonomy*, this is the “equality of all before the law” (Foucault, 2008, p. 138). But it is not enough to belong to the *politeia* to gain the right to be an elected person, an exclusive characteristic of those who are chosen to “represent” others. In order to be an elected person – a representative – it is necessary to possess certain virtues, which distinguish and place the citizen in the “front row” (Foucault, 2008, p. 138).

The first of these qualities is to possess *eleuteria*, an inner state of freedom that is required of every politician, a presupposition that corresponds to the capacity to be independent, which is based on the principle that there is no power “held in a despotic or tyrannical manner by a single leader” (Foucault, 2008, p. 138). Above all, this concerns not being afraid of power, wherein power resides in the hands of others, and in one’s own hands. The possession of *eleuteria* is immediately manifested in the citizen who advances to the “first line”, an act that has no precedence and which exclusively results from self-will (Rothe, 2011).

The other quality is the right to speak, as a way of existing in the *city*. *Isegoria* alludes to the principle of the equal right to make one’s voice heard, as a universal right of everyone who is constituted as a citizen. But *isegoria*, by establishing the right to speak, does not guarantee, by itself, the emergence of individuals endowed with singular idiosyncrasy and personal verve. In addition to the right to speak, the aspiring individual must possess free-will as a foundation, which qualifies him and guides him to make a distinct and intrepid act, identified in the “freedom to speak and to speak his mind frankly, using words” (Foucault, 2008, p. 139). For this purpose, it is necessary to rely on “manifestations of truth, a series of operations and procedures whereby truth is spoken” (Foucault, 2008, p. 139), giving substance to a conduct called *parrhesia*, a notion that, evokes speaking sincerely and without ulterior motives.

Parrhesia is based on the principle of oracular truth, which endows to the prognosis the anticipated contours of authenticity and precision (Rothe, 2011). It is the anchor point of every individual who may potentially enter the political sphere and, likewise, also constitutes the initiatory dimension and the very foundation of democracy. It is the anticipated result of the “quest” (Foucault, 2008, p. 141) of all those who seek to debate public matters and who feel that they possess virtuous qualities.

But like all political praxis, *parrhesia* is “a human right, a human risk” (Foucault, 2008, p. 141). On the one hand, it is a flight of fancy, linked to the meaning of human existence, while on the other hand, it constitutes the political sphere and is a pillar of democracy, wherein one can’t exist without the other (Foucault, 2008, p. 142). This circularity, however, does not end with the possibilities of demarcating “relations between *parrhesia* and democracy” (Foucault, 2008, p. 142), especially in the ways in which *parrhesia* is recognized in the individual. Only an individual who holds this quality will move forward, towards the “small group of people who constitute the first rank of citizens” (Foucault, 2008, p. 142) and who, as in the case of the brave and virtuous soldier, prominently advances towards the first line of combat.

BETWEEN *PARRHESIA* AND THE DOMINATION OF THE ELITE CLASS

The self-imposed obligation of the discourse of truth does not incorporate the entire concept of *parrhesia*. In the antechamber of its conceptual formulation lies the *politeia* and the equal right held by all citizens to speak. *Parrhesia* goes beyond this constituted right to take the floor and to speak one's mind. It is also the element that allows certain individuals "to acquire a certain ascendancy over others" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145), recognizing within themselves aspects that differentiate them from others, in this case, self-acknowledging a kind of inner call to advance to the front line, where, after moving beyond the frontier, they shall address "others to tell them what they think, what they think is true, what they truly think is true" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145) and exclusively by telling the truth, never deceiving or defrauding, persuading others with good advice "and thereby manage and take care of the city" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145), ruling others with their finest attributes¹.

The sense of superiority constituted therein does not derive from an exclusive predominance, but rather from a shared superiority "with others in the form of competition, rivalry, conflict, litigation" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145) and this factor introduces the principle of emulation, in order to provoke a kind of competition aimed at surpassing their finest qualities. In this sense, *parrhesia* constitutes an "agonistic structure" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145), in which something more than a status emerges, insofar as other changes are introduced, based on the principles of a "dynamic structure" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). It is this dynamic which congregates within itself the movement that can place the politician in the position of taking care of "the city in the form, and through exercise of a genuine discourse" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). It is also in this function that the politician, using his own qualities and, primarily, experiencing the holding of power, finds himself set apart and separated from the common citizen, with the possibility of acts of domination (Weber, 2004).

This dominating condition, circumscribed to the affirmation and renewal of power, is a reality that transcends the entire civilized world (Mills, 1956). In contrast to the possession of *parrhesia*, the transmission of this stabilisation is achieved in the hereditary chain and "in an unending ferment of endosmosis and exosmosis between the ruling classes and certain portions of the lower classes" (Mosca, 1923, p. 69). The process of the stable political class only ends when the qualities recognized within themselves lose value and importance, and cease to assume any social function.

Using a malleable framework, Pareto (2004), following Mosca's line of reasoning (1923), conceives a formulation in which individuals maintain the possibilities of ascending the social ladder. To the imagined vision of homogeneous "society", viewed from the outside, Pareto contrasts heterogeneous society, formed in the interstices of its additions and contradictions. He starts from the principle that there is a dynamic

¹ It is appropriate, in this context, to open room for discussion of publicly-used discourses. See, in this regard, Roland Barthes (1970), on *L'ancienne rhétorique*, and also issue 16 of the journal *Comunicação e Sociedade*, "Comunicação, Argumentação e Retórica" [Communication, Argumentation and Rhetoric] (Martins & Grácio, 2009), as well as the article "Epistemologia do saber quotidiano" [The epistemology of everyday knowledge] (Martins, 1993).

plasticity within civilized nations, that results from the action and mobility of their components, thereby generating “intense circulation between the various classes” (Pareto, 2004, p. 449). It is the qualities of individuals that make possible the existence of various degrees in the composition of the social scale. The stratified division makes it possible to separate those who have exceptional qualities and those who end up being placed in the “highest places in the branch of their activity” (Pareto, 2004, p. 451). Pareto calls this category the *elite class*, and also intended to affirm that this is the “elite”, which is divided into two fractions: the “governing elite” and the “non-governing elite” (Pareto, 2004, p. 451). In general, the entirety of the *elite class* forms the ruling class. Below this we find the lower strata that are globally called the *non-elite*.

The ‘governing elite’ is distinguished from the “non-governing elite” by harbouring nobles, although hereditary titles have disappeared. But indirectly, hereditary power “remains powerful”, maintaining the principle that “whoever has inherited great wealth... can ensure the election of an MP, by paying voters and flattering them”, thereby creating a scenario in which “wealth, kinship, relationships” (Pareto, 2004, p. 452) function as levers that can elevate individuals, to the elite class, in general, and to the governing elite, including persons who in some cases have, and in others do not have, the necessary prerequisites for these functions.

According to Higley (2010), both Mosca and Pareto have perspectives that are excessively based on reproductive critical theories, in which the elites are constituted as a separate group, based on factors of distinction and belonging, supported by “superior individual qualities, whether intelligence, talent or personal magnetism” (Higley, 2010, p. 15). This idea is rooted in the well-known idea that destiny is traced out, in principle, according to an established system of social reproduction, constituted in accordance with a base that justifies the attraction and circulation of “individual social advantages and skills” (Higley, 2010, p. 15), between individuals who recognize each other and make themselves known to others. This strand of the elite is based on a specific type of cohesion, wherein its members are seemingly disconnected and with a silent bond, but vigorously founded on holding onto power.

UNIFICATION AND CLOSURE OF THE ELITE

Our perception of an elite is so diluted that Higley admits that any process aimed at eradicating social advantages and benefits, that may limit the role of the elite, are in principle condemned to failure. In fact, an elite establishes itself invisibly, without any organized expression of a collective group, and without any transversal interests, capable of being transformed into a political manifesto or organisation. Unlike collective groups, elites are “ambiguous and vague” (Higley, 2010, p. 15). They are not crossed by “social and cultural understandings”, to the point that not even the perks sought by their members derive from the claim of “status positions and objects of value”, whether for the individual member of the elite or for their allies, so that “they are only partially compatible with the satisfactions sought by others” (Higley, 2010, p. 15).

Independently of the country under analysis and the existence, or otherwise, of stability within its political system, the tendency towards control and “personalized manipulation” through various types of forces, often occurs by individuals or constituent groups of the elites, which, regardless of their sympathies for different political parties, interpret power as something that is personal and “directly dependent on the support of organic coercive forces” (Higley, 2010, pp. 18-19). For the members of high-society, power does not derive from occupying “institutional positions”, defined within the political organisation, but rather from the “success of a specific group, in obtaining control of the main means of coercion” (Higley, 2010, p. 19). This purpose, which is present in all groups of elites, not only expresses a congenial distrust in relation to the group itself, but, on the other hand, signals an endless predisposition towards struggle, in which attempts to seize power are “plausible and even probable” (Higley, 2010, p. 19). These configurations even assume contours of a “disunited elite”, characterized by the instability of the political system, which is often subjected to “profound and abrupt” changes, without the consequences of the struggles being considered in advance.

The disunited elite has practical expression in the marking of differences and permanent struggles, viewed as natural acts within the struggles of democracy. Relations in the political sphere, understood as being volatile and disposable, are constantly changing, “according to the forces and powers that link people together or that set them apart, in order to assert themselves” (Schmitt, 2015, p. 30). This view follows the broadly debated, and often refuted, perspective that the essence of politics (Freund, 1969) rests on the radical principle by which political parties live in a permanent antagonistic state, which separates parties between friend and foe (Schmitt, 2015).

In turn, the unified elite emerges as a result of the absence of instability and abrupt seizures of power. Respect for what society designates as an expression of authority, inscribing “institutionalized procedures that have been perpetuated and stabilized over long periods of time” (Higley, 2010, p. 20), seems to be explained by the behaviour of individuals who belong to the top of society. We cannot infer herein the idea of the implantation of a kind of tacit non-aggression pact between different groups of the elite. The primordial dimension of stability resides in the political sphere and is related to “acting with authority”, to the precise extent that one should not provoke the hostility of those who are actively involved in disputing valuable assets, nor lead inactive persons to embrace this “hostile sentiment” (Higley, 2010, p. 20). Political stability is obtained through a dynamic process of interaction between dissimilar persons, constituting an “artificial product of astute decisions taken by truly influential individuals” (Higley, 2010, p. 20), who, in turn, don’t refrain from using subterfuges and devices, achieved through “suppressing, distorting or manipulating issues”, directly, or indirectly taking part in decision-making, whereby by upholding the ignorance of the general public, as well as maintenance of its underlying “secret”, which is only disclosed to the few, “disastrous conflict” is avoided (Higley, 2010, p. 20).

The ability to keep secret the use of cunning, as a practice within a circle of differentiated groups of high society, implies a minimum degree of trust within this environment,

“in order not to expose its stratagems” (Higley, 2010, pp. 20-21), so as to hide the perceptible actions of everyday life. This concerted action, which is close to a “conspiracy of influential and effective decision-makers”, consolidates not only a tacit understanding “concerning the desirability of a stable political system”, but also reinforces the commitment between groups that structure “a unified elite” (Higley, 2010, pp. 20-21).

We can characterize the elites into two distinct types: “ideologically unified” elites and “consensually unified elites” (Higley, 2010, p. 21). The first type is characterized by adherence to a unique ideology, expressed, in general, after the emergence of a leader who is held to be homogeneous, and also by the fact that it is possible to avoid conflicts, in public, between the elite’s different aspirants. The harmony expressed in public actions thereby constitutes a device of power which is “capable of forcing the totality or the majority of members of the elite (...) to harmonize their public statements with the orthodox view” (Higley, 2010, p. 21). This, in turn, is imposed by individuals who are authorised to define the precepts, the leaders, and who perceive severity and control as means to block the “expression of divergent interests” (Higley, 2010, p. 21).

The “consensually unified elite” can be said to be built through adherence to differentiated forms of the political spectrum. And its members – the holders or aspirants of power – do not refrain from assuming “clearly divergent positions on public affairs” (Higley, 2010, p. 21). The conflictual situation implied in this type of elite constitutes an antagonism of different forces. This antagonism sees itself, however, within the context of a “set of rules”, naturalized as being primordial, not prescribed, but held as being indispensable in order “to eliminate the serious personal risks of disputes between elites” (Higley, 2010, p. 21). In this case, the dispute imposes a demarcated limit in the general interests, that will not be forgotten within the action of the political actors and that configures social closure.

The notion of social closure encompasses the contours of a claim to social prestige and honour, which a group attributes (to itself), through the tacit appeal, in reactivated permanence, of an honorific distinction (Weber, 2004). It presupposes a constant appeal of separation, and distinguishes itself by traits of dignity and possession of specific and exclusive properties for its members. As in medieval societies, the circle generated by social closure resembles a domain, not of tangible possessions, but of intangible configurations, which, as a rule, form a monopoly.

A monopoly exists whenever a “group imposes social closure, with variable limits, in order to increase the opportunities of its activity against those outside the group” (Freund, 2003, p. 115). Monopoly constitutes the supreme practical representation of a closed system, which promotes a privilege, and its typical form, in history, is located in the “corporation” (Freund, 2003, p. 116). In turn, it is the nature of a corporation to subject its potential members to a period of apprenticeship, whose aim is to learn how the organisational system functions, and is aimed at maintaining its monopoly over time (Dal Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009).

On the basis of this understanding, a Darwinian judgment is formed, which leads to self-attribution of special blood-based qualities, constitutive of a putative ruling class

of politicians. This fallacy – oft repeated and announced as a truth – inspired Mosca (1923) to consider another way of preserving the political elite. This alternative approach is founded on the cult of the educational dimension. This determines, as factors to justify the outstanding qualities of the members of the aristocracy, a rigorous and “highly specific education”. Although possession of school skills explains superiority of knowledge and the virtuous grace of “purely intellectual attitudes” (Mosca, 1923, p. 67), this dimension does not clarify “differences of moral character, such as willpower, courage, pride, energy”, presented by individuals as a propensity to take “the step forward” mentioned by Foucault. There is no doubt, therefore, that social conditions resulting from birth, specifically “social position, family traditions, class habits” (Mosca, 1923, p. 67), end up by constituting a strengthened and decisive presence in the individual’s overall preparation, contributing, practically effortlessly, but as if derived from the intervention of pre-ordained destiny, “to the greater or lesser development” (Mosca, 1923, p. 67) of the presented personal qualities.

CIVIL PROFESSIONS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE

According to Gaxie (1980), the individual’s most recent profession before entering the world of politics, in addition to the social position and place occupied by that profession, will determine the likelihood of access to senior positions and the exercise of power within the political hierarchy. This is the reason for the conclusion that there is “close correlation between the political representation of a group and the social position of its members” (Gaxie, 1980, p. 5). This relationship paves the way to over-representation of professional categories from the ruling classes and under-representation – or even lack of representation – of “segments from the middle or working classes – with the significant exception of primary school teachers”, thus verifying an “inverted image of the social structure” (Gaxie, 1980, p. 6).

This paradoxical situation of representation reveals the monopoly of interest in political competition by agents who inhabit the “top of the social hierarchy”. This situation reveals characteristic traits of the aristocracy, to the extent that it establishes “the hierarchy of power and the prestige of positions in competition” (Gaxie, 1980, p. 6). In this manner there is a significant percentage increase of individuals pertaining to the ruling classes “in the hierarchies of political parties”, or when one goes through the hierarchy of political positions, from municipal councils to general boards, through candidates to become MPs and elected MPs and ministers (Gaxie, 1980, p. 6). In this competitive sphere of free-will, political agents favoured by their social condition assume “positions of political power, thereby reinforcing their social supremacy and political authority” which they come to hold (Gaxie, 1980, p. 6).

The regularity of these “general laws of political recruitment” (Gaxie, 1980, p. 6) is processed in immutable terms and from the perspective of the social reproduction of its members, with a view towards maintaining a status attributed to specific professional groups. As a rule, political recruitment operates with an iron fist and the tendencies that

prevail in the functioning of political organisations are of an oligarchical nature (Michels, 2001). As mediators of social power, political organisations harbour practices that reconcile the notion of public utility, based on civil society, with the convenience in instrumentalising the power localised within the State.

The statement of the existence of a “parliamentary tendency towards division into parties and party-based parliamentarisation”, by Braga da Cruz (1988) is our initial step towards ascertaining the professions present in the Assembly of the Republic. André Freire (1998), continued the work of Braga da Cruz, complementing it with the legislatures elected in the meantime. The social transformations that have taken place in Portugal over recent decades oblige us to introduce several changes in analysis of the professions. In the work analysed herein new professions have been added, which have gained access to the Portuguese Parliament and recomposed the composition of the Assembly of the Republic.

SUBSTITUTION EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES

There are three main professions with greater predisposition to gain access to the Assembly of the Republic and which, over 40 years of Portuguese democracy, have formed the basis of the dominant professions in Parliament. Lawyers and jurists, teachers and professors in general, and economists and equivalent professions are, in particular, the professional groups that have the highest representation in the Assembly of the Republic, representing two-thirds of MPs between the VIII and XIII legislatures, as a result of the legislative elections held between 1999 and 2015 (chart 2). Between 1985 and 2015, the weight of these professional groups in the Assembly of the Republic has not always been the same. But roughly speaking, it can be said that the variations that have taken place in the meantime have not diminished their weight, as the most representative groups of the legislative branch.

These three dominant professional groups are complemented by the group of engineers, in their various specialisations, and the group of intermediate technicians, usually specialist agents, who hold non-managerial positions, from various fields. Both groups have maintained a constant representation over the years, although slightly reinforced over the last decade (Chart 1 and Chart 2).

The presence of medical professionals in the Assembly of the Republic, in historical terms, constitutes around 3% of Members, on average, and is therefore also a stabilized profession within Parliament. In contrast, the group of journalists and writers, together with the group of agricultural and industrial workers, have recorded a downward trend over the years, representing only 1% of MPs in 2015. General analysis of the chart reveals a progressive effect of substitution and/or, in certain cases, decrease, of certain professional groups. In the 2005 elections, no “senior civil servant” was elected, a category that in 1985, in the IV legislature, had some expression (5%), and remained relevant until 1995 (6%), declined in the VIII legislature (3%), and completely disappeared in the IX legislature.




Chart 1: Professional areas of MPs of the Assembly of the Republic 1974-1985

Source: Braga da Cruz, 1988




Chart 2: Professional areas of MPs of the Assembly of the Republic 1985-2015 (%)

Source: Braga da Cruz, 1988; Freire, 1998

This pattern of decline of a specific professional group was also recorded in the case of “party leaders”, which represented 4% of parliamentarians in 1985, but soon declined to 1% of the active members and is likely to disappear completely.

The number of “administrative employees” have also demonstrated an effect of substitution. They constituted 6% of MPs in 1987, persisted in 1995 (5%), but since 1999, this professional group has practically ceased to be represented amongst Portuguese MPs.

The departure of certain professions is the result of the reinforcement of other existing professions and the entry of other professions, reflecting the dynamics of Civil Society, which has spawned new professional fields. Indeed, after gaining some social support, new professional fields have sought to broaden their influence through inclusion within the political sphere. Since 2005, a new professional domain has appeared, expressed in the electoral geometry as MPs from the professional area of “consultants

and advisers”. This group immediately stabilized as 3% of all MPs. Along with this new category, there is extension of several professional activities, of miscellaneous natures – and therefore not categorisable – generically accumulated in the group ‘Other’.

“ECONOMISTS” AND “COMPANY MANAGERS”

Economists are a particular case, if analysed over the years. In the first three legislatures – between 1974 and 1985 – this professional group attained a level of representation that, in 1980-1983, reached a maximum of 6% of MPs (Graph 1). In the following years, between the IV and VII legislature (1985 to 1999), economists became less involved in the political sphere, ranging from 3% to 4% of individuals. However, from the 8th legislature onwards, this professional field emerged in strength within the legislative branch, becoming the third largest professional group in Parliament between 1999-2002, with 14% of the MPs. Despite the drop to 9% in 2009, economists then stabilized at 11% of all MPs elected to the Assembly of the Republic (Chart 2).

This historical rise of the involvement of economists in Parliament contrasts with the progressive decline of another professional group, originally defined between 1974 and 1985 as “Entrepreneurs and Managers” (Chart 1). In the first ten years after the 1974 revolution, these professionals ranged from 5% to 6% of MPs in the Assembly of the Republic. Their involvement had its highest level in the 10-year period between 1985-1995, in which the formulation of professional categories used in official statistics came closer to actual market practices. In 1985, the new nomenclature, “company managers”, represented 21% of all MPs, but then fell to 16% of MPs in 1987. This professional group’s commitment to the political sphere surged once again in 1991 when they represented 22% of all MPs. In 1995, individuals linked to management of companies still attained 14% of all legislative mandates, thereby maintaining a strong presence in Parliament. But the involvement of this group has fallen since then. From 1999 onwards, especially during the period between 2005 and 2015, the professional class of “company managers” gradually ceased to be represented in the Assembly of the Republic, with fewer MPs – falling to 5% of parliamentarians in 2015.

“LAWYERS” AND “TEACHERS/PROFESSORS”

Parliament has a historic predominance of lawyers and teachers/professors (Freire, 1998), wherein these two professional groups are the most stable source of MPs over the 40 years of Portuguese democracy. The regularity of the involvement of these professions in the Assembly of the Republic, acting as the structural foundation of the Parliament, denotes the consolidation of the institution.

In the case of lawyers, a profession that inevitably coincides with legal education, there is a recognised interconnection between parliament’s productive needs and lawyers’ skills in terms of legislative technical production. The predominant role played by lawyers in the Assembly of the Republic, is also influenced by the “qualities of tribune”

(Freire, 1998, p. 126), a requisite that is always required in a space in which the affirmation of any professional is also dependent on the quality of his or her oratorical skills.

The high numerical expression, and the historical regularity, of the professional group of teachers/professors, reveals a predisposition to take part in the political sphere amongst individuals who hold “socio-professional positions associated with an intermediate volume of resources – in terms of economic, organisational and educational capital” (Freire, 1998, p. 129).

As the dominant professional categories in the Assembly of the Republic, lawyers and teachers also demonstrate a remarkable degree of regularity. Since 1999 they have held slightly more than 50% of all parliamentary mandates. In 2015, in the XIII legislature, the aggregate presence of these two professional groups fell by 3%, and now stands at 47% of MPs.

The decrease in the combined presence of these two professional groups is associated with the substitution effect introduced with the fragmentary extension of new professional activities presented in Parliament. This trend became visible in 2009, and attained 13% of all MPs in 2015².

EXTRA-POLITICAL ACCUMULATION: ONE FOOT IN AND THE OTHER OUT

There are parliamentarians who maintain civil activities, alongside their political functions. Apparently, the duties of loyalty and independence, which spans all parliamentary activity, may be interpreted in a specific manner. About two-thirds (68%) of the 230 MPs declared that they devote themselves exclusively to parliamentary political activity. But the remaining 32% indicated that they carry out other occupations, in addition to regular political work, in the legislative body of the Portuguese Republic³ (Chart 3)⁴.

Legal and business activities (such as company director, manager and owner-manager), are the professions most prone to accumulation (69%). This circumstance demonstrates the tendency of these professions, not only in terms of access to, and domination of, the Assembly of the Republic, but also to identify areas of power, that make it possible to establish a shared path between public life and civil life.

The presence of a significant number of “consultants”, who accumulate both activities (10%), demonstrates the relevance that has been acquired by this professional group – as pointed out above (Chart 3). In this respect, “consultants” are followed, but at a considerable distance, by technical professions, such as doctors (4%), engineers and

² In absolute terms, there are 31 records – including 9 MPs who cite professional activities (actress, assistant, banker, researcher), 13 who indicate the academic field as a profession (including sociologists, psychologists, historians, mathematicians, chemists, archaeologists, geologists), two students, three pensioners, and four who left the space blank.

³ Data collected in May 2016, on the website of the Assembly of the Republic, which gave rise to the study “The Accumulators”, produced by the Observatory of Internal Democracy of Political Parties, of the Movement for Democratisation of Political Parties. Retrieved from <https://tinyurl.com/yapxhgr8>

⁴ The data used in this section was collected and provided by the Movement for the Democratisation of Political Parties, and subsequently analysed by the author.

architects (3%), who declare that they cannot forego their civil profession while working within the political sphere. University activity – understood in pedagogical terms as teaching (14%) – also reveals a predisposition towards teaching, considered in terms of higher education, for accumulation with political activity (Chart 4).




Chart 3: Dedication of MPs of the Assembly of the Republic




Chart 4: Last civil profession of the MPs of the Assembly of the Republic in situation of accumulation

As a rule, most parliamentarians with accumulations, assume a single role outside the political sphere. In extraordinary cases, this tendency is reinforced by individuals who accumulate several external functions with the practice of serving as an MP⁵, even

⁵ Several detailed cases of accumulation: Fernando Anastácio – elected by the constituency of Faro, also claims to be a director of the law firm, Fernando Anastácio & Associados, director of the consulting firm, Lucksin SA, chairman of the Board of Directors of Procota, chairman of the Board of Directors of Quinta do Escarpão (both of which operate in the field of real estate and tourism) and Chairman of the Board of the General Meeting of Mundo Aquático (theme parks). Luís Montenegro – elected by the constituency of Aveiro, is a lawyer with SP&M (he has a 50% shareholding), is President of the General Assembly of Rádio Popular – Eletrodomésticos, SA, member of CADA (Commission for Access to Administrative Documents), which he left in March 2017, and Chairman of the Municipal Assembly of Espinho. Nuno Magalhães – elected by the constituency of Setúbal, is a guest lecturer at the Lusófona University, a deputy of the Municipal Assembly of Setúbal, and a commentator of Sport TV (since 9.8.2016). see Register of interests of the Database of the Assembly of the Republic, at <http://www.parlamento.pt/DeputadoGP/Paginas/Deputadoslista.aspx>

in circumstances in which their parliamentary activity may conflict with specific interests and obligations, that have been constituted in the meantime.




Chart 5: Extra-political functions accumulated by MPs

The Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) has the highest relative number of MPs (37 out of 89) who accumulate extra-political functions, followed by the CDS, which has an almost identical proportion (7 out of 18). At some distance, but revealing the same broad tendency, the Partido Socialista (PS - Socialist Party) presents practically one third (28 out of 86) of MPs, with an active civil life, divided between the state and civil professions. The Partido Comunista Português (PCP - Portuguese Communist Party) completes the framework of MPs who simultaneously pursue professions and extra-political activities, but in a far lower ratio (1 out of 15). This party-based relationship, in terms of MPs who pursue professions outside politics, has the peculiarity of rising from the left to the right of the political spectrum, with no MPs from the Partido Ecológico Os Verdes (PEV – Ecological Party – Green Party), or from the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Block) (Chart 6) accumulating professional activities.

The data presented on the accumulations of MPs of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic enables us, in an overall reading, to make two interpretations. On the one hand, accumulation can be presented as a condition of the politician's independence vis-a-vis his or her political position. In this case, it would be a question of guaranteeing subsistence beyond the political sphere, thereby demonstrating that his or her political activity is not pursued as a job (Weber, 2005a). However, selfless, unconditional commitment, based on frankness (Foucault, 2008), as a constituent of the true “essence of the politician” (Freund, 1969), is never verified in full. The “step forward” and acting frankly, as instruments of loyalty to themselves and to others (Foucault, 2008), are immediately limited, and the politician's real value is therefore diminished, if we focus on the individual.




Chart 6: Weight in the party of MPs who pursue extra-political professions outside Parliament

In this case, the “step forward” is not realized in full and, unlike Foucault (2008), the candidate to become a political agent uses as a strategy the popular formula of keeping “one foot in and the other out”. And in these circumstances, the tendency for extra-political activities may only be a demonstration of the individual’s willingness to use political office as an instrument to increase his or her private professional activity – in other words, as an instrument that provides access to earnings that would otherwise be unavailable. In this case, the politician sees himself or herself as a kind of entrepreneur, who views political activity as a platform to expand the possibilities in terms of his or her private interests. In this way, the politician is simply a business person, who views politics as another tool to obtain contracts, carry out transactions and secure agreements, aiming at his or her physical accumulation of capital (Weber, 2005a). In this context, political practice is viewed as an activity that is equivalent to any other. And the absence of boundaries between political and private activities is complementary. This situation also reveals that access to political office occurs in the context of a struggle in which the winner is, first and foremost, in possession of a power that authorizes him or her to act in a field whose limits he or she dictates.

The coexistence of MPs in the Assembly of the Republic who accumulate their position with extra-political activities and MPs who dedicate themselves exclusively to political activity appears to be consensual and unquestioned, at least in public. There has been no denunciation or criticism produced to demonstrate the existence of any conflict between the two situations. Apparently everyone is in favour of the possibility of accumulation of activities. At least they don’t perceive any negative or potentially negative aspect of such shared activities, which places the individual in the political sphere and, at the same time, gives him or her the possibility to act professionally and in the civil field. But between an MP in a regime of exclusivity and an MP in a regime of non-exclusivity, two levels of meaning are formed (Elias, 1971). In the first case, we have a full-time politician, who consecrates his or her action, absolutely and fully, to the political sphere. In the second case, we have a divided politician, whose activity spans several domains. This

situation places him or her in the contingent situation of having to justify his or her actions, demonstrating that the private spheres to which he dedicates his or her activity does not collide with his or her public activity.

POLITICAL THEORY OF IMPEDIMENTS – FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT FACTORS

In its conceptual origin, to have *parrhesia* is not a case of opportunity, or a spur of the moment impulse. It doesn't result from a calculated move, for purposes other than the purposes that underpin politics. It is, rather, to have the will to step forward, as the result of an inner conviction, which does not include any other intention. It does not result "in function of wealth but in function of the problem of *dýnamis*" in which it is necessary to consider "three categories of citizens" (Foucault, 2008, p. 142):

- "impotent citizens", who don't have the strength to exercise power – i.e. the general public;
- rich and well-born individuals, who in their capacity as "wise men" don't take care of anything and who, by remaining silent, don't "use the *parrhesia*" that potentially derives from knowledge; and thirdly,
- "those who actually take care of the city", wherein it is only these people who incarnate and use *parrhesia* (Foucault, 2008, p. 143), which is something distinct from the statutory condition, or any obligation imposed by citizenship.

Because this is a faculty that is exclusivity entrusted to a small category of people, the use of *parrhesia* entails major problems, specifically "risks and dangers" to those who use it to intervene in the city. In this context, for example, there is recognition of exposure, which also subjects these individuals to the hatred of the impotent members of society, to the mockery of the wise men, and in general to "rivalry and envy" (Foucault, 2008, p. 144) of the other categories, which, in one way or another, circulate through the city. Thus, *parrhesia* defines "a certain position of certain individuals" (Foucault, 2008, p. 144) and is consubstantiated by differentiation, recognized "by a certain sense of superiority which is also an ambition, and an effort to see oneself in such a position as to be able to command others" (Foucault, 2008, p. 144). Recognition of possession of these attributes, that are identical between persons who are detached from the rest of the population, directs them towards a kind of "fusion" that tends to be associative.

The MPs elected to the Assembly of the Republic configure one of those encounters between peers, who possess an inner drive, orientated towards taking bold actions (Foucault, 2008). However, some MPs don't refrain from participating, individually or at a corporate level, in companies that sign contracts with the State. These MPs are part of the group of parliamentarians who pursue extra-political activities but who, among themselves, constitute a differentiated practice, placing civil activity at the heart of their professional existence. In this case, the State and its agencies are used and treated as clients (see Table 1). In this equation, the role of the MP has a tactical meaning, which metamorphoses him or her into a mediator between the civil profession and clients operating within the sphere of the State.

Through their companies, these politicians are able to conquer civil professional work, in relation to public entities within their constituency, or neighbouring constituencies, which are controlled by local government authorities or regional authorities – in the case of Madeira. Business is always dominated by the respective politicians' party and is obtained in a regime of "ajuste direto" (direct award), facilitated by the absence of a public tender process (see Table 1). The association established between political agents and forms of intervention, produces a typological configuration in which the centre of the encounter between the contractual parties, of strategic gestation and division of power is located in the ruling elite of the political parties.

This practice reveals the predisposition towards something more than a strategy of maintaining one foot within the political sphere and another outside, in civil society, as shown above. In this case, this foot-based metaphor doesn't indicate an expectation of separation between the two fields, due to the individual's fear of failure as a politician, but rather an intimate connection between the two fields, considering the possibilities of action with other state institutions. The fact that activity in civil society can serve as an interface for the specific manipulation of public entities, aiming at fostering economic activities, reduces political activity to a subaltern position, wherein the power of the MP is subjugated to the power of the party agent.

The strategies that arise in the interstices of the apparatuses of the different political parties are formed in dynamic progressions, in which the latent gradual process orientates the praxis and recursive expedient measures taken (Giddens, 1984). The practices resulting from active experience in positions of power, subjects individuals, at least "in terms of principles" (Michels, 2001, p. 416), to a class that differs from their class of origin, thus engendering, via routines, mutation within the instigating agent of "a contradiction of interests" (Michels, 2001, p. 416). This dissonance is however resolved through recourse to new beliefs of action, which create an inner harmony within the agent, with the external object of his action (Festinger, 1962). In the internal conflict between the various competing interests, the "decision is always based on the greatest force of attraction, this is, on the relationship in which interests correspond to the most important needs of life" (Michels, 2001, p. 416), which has, objectively, immediate repercussions on economic factors. In this spirit-based mutation, produced in opposition to the practical dynamics that constitute reality, "economic antagonism thus surpasses ideological solidarity and is visibly inscribed within the current agenda" (Michels, 2001, p. 416). In this manner, the party's programme – this is the original founding act of the desired political conventions – is relegated to the place of a mere document without value in terms of the practices of the political acts that will be taken.

PARTY	MP'S NAME	CONSTITUENCY	BUSINESS PERIOD	EXTRA-PARTY ACTIVITY	COMPANY	PARTICIPATION	No. CONTRACTS	VALUE
PS	José Rui Cruz	Viseu	2015	Owner-manager	Frutas Cruz II, Lda.	34%	20	164.000,00 € ⁶
PSD	Fernando Virgílio Macedo	Porto	2011	Owner-manager	Virgílio Macedo, SROC, Unip. Lda.	100%	2	83.000,00 € ⁷
					Rodrigo, Gregório & Associados	33%	7	168.000,00 €
PSD	Luís Montenegro	Aveiro	2014 - 2017	Shareholder	Sousa Pinheiro & Montenegro	50%	6	188.000,00 € ⁸
PS	Ricardo Bexiga	Porto	2016	Shareholder	Ricardo Bexiga, Oliveira e Silva & Associados	60%	5	200.000,00 € ⁹
PS	Luís Moreira Testa	Portalegre	2016	Shareholder	CCP Associados	15,39%	1	2.400,00 € ¹⁰
PS	Renato Sampaio	Porto	2009 - 2017	Porto	Nuno Sampaio – Arquitecto Lda.	85%	15	716.000,00€ ¹¹
PSD	Paulo Rios de Oliveira	Porto		Lawyer	Rios, Pinho & Cristo, Soc. Avogados	45%	1	14.000,00 € ¹²
PSD	Guilherme Silva	Madeira	2009 - 2015	Lawyer	work individually	100%	25	638.000,00 € ¹³

Table 1: MPs who are shareholders of companies that have public contracts

Source: *Jornal Económico*, 17 march 2017¹⁴

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The parties are organisations that are subject to a doctrine of a political class (Albertoni, 1987), constituted as associative communities, designed to capture and distribute power between its members. This circumstance makes them apparatuses whose goal is to use accumulated force, on the one hand, to “impose a programme for idealistic

⁶ Contracts signed with the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR - Republican National Guard) and two state schools.

⁷ A company in which Virgílio Macedo, SROC, owns 33,33% of the share capital. Two contracts, made as a direct award, in the amount of €58.000, one signed with the Municipality of Valongo in 2014, and the other with the Municipality of Vila Nova de Gaia in 2013.

⁸ He was Chairman of the Municipal Assembly of Espinho (2009-2013) and councilor of the Municipality of Espinho (1997-2001). There are four contracts signed with Espinho Municipal Council (whose mayor is Joaquim Pinto Moreira, of the PSD) and two contracts signed with Vagos Municipal Council (whose mayor is Silvério Regalo, of the PSD).

⁹ Contracts signed with the Municipality of Valongo, whose mayor is José Ribeiro, of the PS.

¹⁰ Shareholder of UP2Com (33,3%). Contract signed with Portel Municipal Council.

¹¹ Fifteen percent of the company is owned by his son and 85% by his wife. The contracts were signed with the Regional Health Administration of the North, the Municipality of Castelo Branco, Instituto Politécnico do Porto, etc. In March 2010, the Parque Escolar awarded the project to “draw up of the architecture project” of a school in Castelo de Paiva to the company, in the amount of more than €204.000, without conducting a public tender.

¹² Member of the Subcommittee on Ethics and of the Eventual Commission for the Enhancement of Transparency in the Exercise of Public Functions.

¹³ Contracts obtained via “direct awards” by public entities (Vice-Presidency of the Regional Government of Madeira, Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Madeira, University of Madeira, Estradas da Madeira (roads), etc.).

¹⁴ Data collected, from the “register of interests” of the MPs of the Assembly of the Republic and contracts registered in the database of public contracts, signed with the State. Retrieved from <http://www.base.gov.pt/Base/pt/Homepage>.

or material reasons” (Weber, 2004, p. 185), and on the other hand, for acquisition of “favours”, this is favours from the State, which it would otherwise be impossible to acquire. While the first objective aims to achieve the (pre)domination of the organisation, the exclusive objective of the latter is to attain authority, through recognized social possession of “honour for its leaders and supporters” (Weber, 2004, p. 186). Underpinning an understanding of the modern political party, the action of its members owes very little, indeed almost nothing, to reinforcement of ideological goals. It is primarily orientated towards conquest of wealth. This practice recovers the notion of “political domination”, in which domestic power is aggregated “to other relations of domination”, conceived, structurally and sociologically, in accordance with “the two specifically political powers (...), the military and the judicial power. “As in antiquity, such powers are exercised on a “unlimited basis over those who are patrimonially ruled by them” (Weber, 2004, p. 240).

The fact that a “law of impediments” forbids all forms of accumulation, the possibility of which is denied in theory, but which is permitted in practise, given the absence of an explicit reference to the potentially forbidden situation, but which there is no need to impede¹⁵, shows how the laws of the political sphere attain an *intention*, deriving from customs, thereby establishing and organizing, with the form of laws, the coordinates “of the universe of techniques of action and expression”. In this manner, by promoting the “passage from the implicit to the explicit”, in the public manifestation of the legal obligation, “an act of institution” is carried out, with only apparent force of transformation, because this act represents a mere “form of officialisation, of legitimisation” (Bourdieu 1981, p. 4) of a legal reality, which is necessarily acceptable, precisely because it is legal.

In the political sphere, it is the responsibility of the members, who become specialists, to undertake the production of the “politically active and legitimate forms of perception and expression” (Bourdieu 1981, p. 4). In this manner, a limited body of “productive units” (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 4) is constructed, which establishes itself as a monopoly of professionals. This is a small number of persons who operate subject to constraints and control of the same professionals who pertain to this group.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

Albertoni, E. A. (1987). *Doctrine de la classe politique et théorie des élites*. Paris: Librairie des Méridiens.

Barthes, R. (1970). L'ancienne rhétorique. *Communications*, 16(1), 172-223.

Belchior, A. M. (2011). *Democracia e Representação Partidária - A elite parlamentar e os cidadãos*. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

¹⁵ The example is clear in article 21 of the Statute of MPs, which refers to “impediments” and which prohibits an MP who is “involved in a commercial or industrial activity, directly or indirectly, with his spouse, from whom he is not legally separated, in his own name or via an entity in which he holds a relevant shareholding and, in particular, more than 10% of the share capital, from signing contracts with the State and other legal entities governed by public law, take part in public tenders for the supply of goods or service, contract jobs or concessions, opened by the State and by other legal entities governed by public law, as well as by companies that are majority or exclusively state-owned or by concessionaires of public services”. It is important to note the concern not to impede business with companies in which MPs have shareholdings and, simultaneously, the total absence of impediments for the dominant professions of the Assembly of the Republic, who have a tendency to pursue extra-political activities (see Chart 4 and Table 1).

- Bourdieu, P. (1981). La représentation politique - Éléments pour une théorie du champ politique. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales.*, 36-37, 3-24. Retrieved from http://www.persee.fr/doc/arss_0335-5322_1981_num_36_1_2105
- Bourdieu, P. (2012). *Sur l'État. Cours au Collège de France 1989-1992*. Paris: Seuil.
- Braga da Cruz, M. (1988). Sobre o Parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária. *Análise Social*, 24(100), 97-125.
- Burton, M., & Higley, J. (2001). The Study of Political Elite Transformations. *International Review of Sociology*, 11(2), 181-199. doi: 10.1080/713674040
- Dal Bó, E.; Dal Bó, P. & Snyder, J. (2009). Political dynasties. *Review of Economic Studies*, 76(1), 115-142. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00519.x
- Elias, N. (1971). Sociology of Knowledge: New Perspectives: Part One. *Sociology*, 5(2), 149-168. doi: 10.1177/003803857100500201
- Fernandes, T. (2014). *Sociedade Civil*. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
- Festinger, L. (1962). *A theory of cognitive dissonance (vol. 2)*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1994). *História da sexualidade – O cuidado de si*. Lisboa: Relógio D'Água.
- Foucault, M. (2008). *Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres. Cours au Collège de France. 1982-1983*. Paris: Seuil.
- Freire, A. (1998). Lógicas do recrutamento parlamentar – Os deputados portugueses, 1975-1999. *Sociologia – Problemas e Práticas*, (28), 115-147.
- Freund, J. (1969). *L'Essence du Politique*. Paris: Sirey.
- Freund, J. (2003). *Sociologia de Max Weber*. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária.
- Gaxie, D. (1980). Les logiques du recrutement politique. *Revue française de science politique*, 5-45. doi: 10.3406/rfsp.1980.393877
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society – Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Goffman, E. (1986). *Frame Analysis – An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeast.
- Higley, J. (2010). *Elites e Democracia*. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.
- Jalali, C. (2017). *Partidos e Sistemas Partidários*. Lisbon: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
- Jalali, C.; Silva, P. & Silva, S. (2012). Givers and takers: Parties, state resources and civil society in Portugal. *Party Politics*, 18(1), 61-80.
- Joly, H. (2005). Le elites politiques: regard croisé sur le cas français. *CIRAC, Cergy-Pontoise*, 149-167.
- Lisi, M. (2011). *Os Partidos Políticos em Portugal – Continuidade e Transformação*. Lisboa: Almedina.
- Martins, M. L. (1993). A epistemologia do saber quotidiano. *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, 37, 79-100.
- Martins, M. L. & Grácio, R. (Eds.) (2009). *Comunicação e Sociedade*, 16, Comunicação, Argumentação e Retórica.

- Martins, M. & Neves, J. P. (2000). As lágrimas amargas da participação: como pensar o “poder” a partir de Michel Foucault. *Cadernos do Noroeste*, 13, 51-65.
- Michels, R. (2001). *Para uma Sociologia dos partidos políticos*. Lisbon: Antígona.
- Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mosca, G. (1923). *Elementi di Scienza Politica*. Torino: Fratelli Bocca.
- Pareto, V. (2004). Circulação das Elites. In M. Braga da Cruz (Ed.), *Teorias Sociológicas - Os Fundadores e os Clássicos* (pp. 449–457). Lisboa: Gulbenkian.
- Parsons, T. (1939). The Professions and Social Structure. *Social Forces*, 17(4), 457–467. Retrieved from <http://doi.org/10.2307/2570695>
- Rothe, M. (2011). Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France (1984) by Michel Foucault. *Ancient Philosophy*, 31(2), 475-478. doi: 10.5840/ancientphil201131243
- Schmitt, C. (2015). *O Conceito do Político*. Lisbon: Edições 70.
- Weber, M. (2004). *Economia e Sociedade - Vol. II*. S. Paulo: Editora Universidade de Brasília.
- Weber, M. (2005a). A Política como Vocação. In *Três Tipos de Poder e Outros Escritos*. Lisbon: Tribuna da História.
- Weber, M. (2005b). *Conceitos Sociológicos Fundamentais*. Lisboa: Edições 70.

BIOGRAPHIC NOTES

Esser Silva is a PhD student of the doctoral programme funded by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (FCT) “Communication Studies: Technology, Culture and Society” via the Project FCT PD/BD/52617/2014. Master’s degree in Sociology, specialising in Organisations and Human Resources. She focuses on study of political culture and investigates the formation strategies of political professionals.

E-mail: esser.jorge@gmail.com

Address: Communication and Society Research Centre (CECS), Campus de Gualtar, University of Minho, Braga 4710-057, Portugal

Moisés de Lemos Martins is Professor of Sociology of Culture and Communication at the University of Minho (Braga, Portugal). Director of the Communication and Society Research Centre (CECS), which he founded in 2001. He is the author of a vast body of academic work in the field of the epistemology and sociology of communication.

E-mail: moisesm@ics.uminho.pt; moiseslmartins@gmail.com

Address: Communication and Society Research Centre (CECS), Campus de Gualtar, University of Minho, Braga 4710-057, Portugal

* Submitted: 31-05-2017

* Accepted: 6-07-2017