
The counterculture of the 1960s gave rise to the plea for new moral values: a new environmental ethic. While some works in this discipline still give the impression that ‘environmental ethics’ is a label for a particular set of norms, Robin Attfield correctly points out that it is just another field of application of normative enquiry, which encompasses very diverse substantial views. As such, environmental ethics has made its way into university and college courses, where it is accompanied by partly overlapping fields of applied ethics, such as climate ethics, population ethics and animal ethics. The first edition of Attfield’s *Environmental Ethics* appeared around the turn of the new millennium and was meant to assist students, researchers and scholars in this discipline. It introduced relevant concepts and issues and it discussed a wide range of relevant schools of thought. Attfield also defended his own normative theory, which is called ‘biocentric consequentialism’. Throughout the book, Attfield provided opportunities to pause and review the issues raised in proceeding sections. Furthermore, he offered chapter summaries, a glossary of key terms, and suggestions for further reading as well as useful websites. The second edition retains these features, but is fully revised and expanded, most notably with a chapter on climate ethics.

This makes for the following outline: Chapter 1 provides a categorization of environmental problems and introduces theories about the genesis of these problems. Chapter 2 introduces the major contending views concerning which entities ought to be given direct moral consideration: only humans or all sentient beings, or even plants or collectives, such as species or ecosystems? Chapter 3 explores in more detail whether a concern for human good covers all that matters morally and inquires to what extent going beyond it is useful and even possible. Chapter 4 explores duties towards future generations. Chapter 5 introduces influential principles in environmental ethics and policy-making, such as the principle of sustainable development and the precautionary principle. Chapter 6 explores the concepts of ‘global citizenship’ and ‘global governance’. Chapter 7 discusses the ethics of climate change. Throughout the book, Attfield introduces major debates and – drawing on and referring to his own work – defends a particular stance on the issues that he covers.

Attfield’s aim is not only to enhance the study and critical understanding of the relevant issues, but also to “[…] foster the kind of campaigning which the study of this
subject often encourages, and for some, makes possible” (xii). The book serves its purposes reasonably well. It explains the relevant concepts and theories and the interested reader will find ample inspiration for further research, food for discussion and, last but not least, starting points for environmental activism.

The book would benefit from a clearer structure, a stronger rationale for why a particular issue is discussed in a particular chapter and how it relates to the others. As it stands, parts of the book read like a patchwork of various papers, manuscripts or talks that the author has produced for other occasions. At times, the reader is drawn into detailed discussions of particular examples and arguments. In his discussion of the stewardship account, for instance, Attfield zooms in on a recent essay on this issue and in his discussion of the precautionary principle he discusses a paper about Norwegian salmon farming. At times, important issues are discussed all too briefly, such as those concerning moral duties towards contingent individuals, i.e. those who are not yet living and may or may not come into existence in the future. It is certainly unavoidable to keep some things very brief in an introductory text and it is surely wise to zoom in on some examples and arguments by way of illustration. It would have been helpful, however, if the underlying structure was exposed in a clearer way, perhaps by using different levels of headings or by inserting boxes with detailed examples.

Since Attfield presents his own stance throughout the book, the reader will, unsurprisingly, have ample opportunity for disagreement. Much of Attfield’s defense remains superficial, even though a considerable part of the book is devoted to the defense of biocentric consequentialism against possible critique. Readers who are not yet familiar with the basic characteristics of consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories, and with variations of consequentialism in particular, will not be able to follow this discussion. Readers who have this knowledge, on the other hand, will be unsatisfied with Attfield’s all too sketchy and sometimes faulty arguments.

Attfield agrees, for example, with a view that he wrongly ascribes to Peter Singer: “Interests in the exercise of sophisticated capacities such as self-determination require that these interests be recognized as more significant than those of creatures that lack such interests” (42). Attfield takes this to imply both that these more significant interests should not be “[…] aggregated with the preferences of all other creatures” and that the bearers of these interests have a higher moral standing. Singer – and utilitarians in general – however, accept none of these views. They accept that all bearers of interests have equal moral status and that all interests count and should be aggregated according to their strength and not their content. Differences in interests (including the lack of particular interests) can justify differential treatment, but do not bear on moral status.

According to Attfield’s theory, actions are right “[…] either when they optimize the foreseeable balance of good over bad […] or when they comply with practices that overall optimize the foreseeable balance of good over bad” (44). He does not point out why he focuses on the foreseeable, rather than the actual, consequences of one’s actions. This is surprising since he is well aware of the difference between the blameworthiness
of the agent and the wrongness of the action. Nor does he point out how to deal with conflicts that might arise from his acceptance of both actions and practices as direct evaluative focal points.

The question whether particular entities have moral status or not is central to environmental ethics. While Attfield provides a correct overview of the various positions, his arguments against sentientism might not convince the critics. Sentientists agree that it is wrong for the ‘last man on earth’ to needlessly destroy sentient animals. Would it be wrong for him to destroy plants? Even if many people feel that it would be wrong, this is not enough to establish that plants have moral status. After all, needlessly destroying things is usually considered bad, for instance, because it reveals aggression, which is bad because it might also be directed against sentient creatures. Or needlessly destroying things is bad, because sentient creatures might care about these things. So, perhaps when considering the thought experiment, our judgment is due to considering these facts. If we were asked whether needlessly destroying the last works of art was bad, we would likely also say that it is bad. Yet, Attfield does not wish to confer moral standing to works of art. So, additional arguments for conferring moral standing to non-sentient living organisms are needed. The only additional argument that Attfield provides is the claim that living organisms have a good of their own. If health can be good for us without us caring for it, then certainly health can be good for plants without them caring for it, or so he argues. However, it is controversial whether health is intrinsically good for us. A common position is that health is instrumentally good for us to the extent that it contributes to our enjoyment or to our desire-satisfaction. Furthermore, the idea that something is ‘good for’ something else does not entail that this other thing has moral status. For instance, being handled with care is good for my laptop, in some sense. But that does not imply that my laptop has moral status.

Finally, a confusing detail of Attfield’s book is that he speaks of ‘intrinsic value’ in both the ‘Moorean’ and the ‘Kantian’ sense of the term, without ever mentioning the difference. For instance, he accepts along the Moorean line that “[…] reasons for action are ultimately grounded in intrinsic value and disvalue, and it is states of the world that have such value and disvalue” (43). On the other hand, Attfield’s section about different theories concerning which entities have moral status – such as anthropocentrism, sentientism and ecocentrism – is entitled ‘theories of value’ and the theories are described, along the Kantian line, as “theories of the location of intrinsic value” (12). In the Moorean sense, having intrinsic value means that some state of affairs makes the world a better place. In the Kantian sense, that an entity has intrinsic value means that it is due some kind of moral consideration.

In spite of these criticisms, the second edition of Attfield’s book is a welcome addition to the rich pallet of introductory textbooks in Environmental Ethics.

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In his book Basic Income Reconsidered: Social Justice, Liberalism, and the Demands of Equality, Simon Birnbaum builds a defence of an unconditional basic income that is based on three pillars: the first consists in a radical-liberal interpretation of John Rawls’ theory of justice, the second offers a reconstruction and defence of Van Parijs’ ‘jobs as gifts’ argument for basic income, and the third proposes a definition of a work ethics that is not perfectionist and is compatible with state neutrality.

The book is divided in three parts. The first part of the book, entitled “A Society of Equals: Radical Liberalism, Self-Respect, and Basic Income”, is divided in two chapters, the first being devoted to a defence of a Rawlsian case for basic income, while the second is an examination and refutation of the claim that only contributors are entitled to social rights. The general aim of the chapter is to defend an understanding of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, in particular Rawls’ theory of primary goods, including self-respect, which can be compatible with the promotion of a basic income as the best way to protect the status of the least advantaged as free and equal throughout their lives.

A first convincing strategy proposed by Birnbaum in arguing for a Rawlsian case for basic income is to recall that John Rawls, following the work of James Meade on property-owning democracy, argued that justice must also achieve resource equalization ex ante rather than only corrective adjustments ex post. Ex post justice is what the welfare state in capitalist societies already does and it is not working. A basic income should thus be considered as an adequate illustration of a public policy that contributes to realizing the ideal of a property-owning democracy. Furthermore, according to Birnbaum, paid work should not be considered as a necessary condition of Rawlsian self-respect, otherwise it would imply a perfectionist conception of self-respect incompatible with liberal neutrality (61).

Another convincing argument proposed by Birnbaum, allowing him to block a potential objection to a defence of basic income from the Rawlsian conception of society as a system of cooperation, is to distinguish two conceptions of cooperation: a thick and a thin one. A thick conception of cooperation implies both economic and political cooperation and a thin conception implies only one of them (68). Furthermore, both economical and political cooperation can be thick or thin. According to Birnbaum, a thick conception of cooperation, which implies labour market participation, is in tension with some of Rawls’ basic intuitions about justice and therefore should be rejected. If true, this clears the way for a compatibility between Rawls’ conception of social cooperation and a basic income, and thus for radical liberalism.

The second part of the book, entitled “The Exploitation Objection against Basic Income: Equality of Opportunity, Luck, and Responsibility”, is also divided into two chapters. The first consists of a review and a refutation of the main variants of the ‘exploitation objection’ against the defence of a basic income as formulated by Philippe Van Parijs in his book Real Freedom for All, which, according to Birnbaum, offers the best defence against the exploitation objection. The main variant of the exploitation
objection examined is the ‘restriction objection’, according to which the distribution of
the pool of resources is only for those who are willing to work and are involuntary
unemployed (34-35). In this chapter, Birnbaum examines Van Parijs’ controversial claim
according to which employment rents, incorporated in wages of privileged jobs, must
be considered as resources to which all are entitled. Birnbaum distinguishes a weak and
a strong version of this objection and argues that Van Parijs’ ‘jobs as gifts’ argument,
according to which the employment rents should be considered as common resources
to which all have an equal claim, survives the strong version of the restriction objection.
However, this is only possible if some qualifications related to the “long term stability
of justice” (34) are incorporated to the argument. These qualifications are developed in
the second chapter, in a clear and convincing reconstruction and defence of Van Parijs
‘jobs as gifts’ argument for basic income. According to Birnbaum, if Van Parijs’ argument
is to be successful in rejecting the exploitation objection, apart from accommodating the
‘stability of justice’ clause, it also needs to accommodate some considerations regarding
the social and economical conditions of basic autonomy (which are fleshed out in part
one of Birnbaum’s book).

The third and last part of the book, entitled “The Feasibility of Basic Income:
Social Ethos, Work, and the Politics of Universalism”, is divided in two chapters. The
first proposes a conception of a work ethics, which is compatible with liberal neutrality.
Contra Van Parijs, Birnbaum argues for a non-obligatory work ethos that avoids any
perfectionist implications, by proposing a wide definition of an ethos of contribution,
which includes activities that are not ‘productivist’. However, Birnbaum acknowledges
that his anti-perfectionist definition of a work ethics, although having the advantage of
being compatible with neutrality, also exposes itself to the structural exploitation objec-
tion, since it does not protect self-sacrificing individuals from being exploited by selfish
individuals (160). But this is not the freedom that liberal neutrality should protect, nor
the freedom that radical liberal egalitarians seek to promote through the implementation
of a basic income. For this reason Birnbaum tries to avoid this consequence of his
redefinition of the work ethos by introducing the notion of a ‘minimal autonomy’ to
which all individuals must have access if they are to avoid ethical servility and make
well-informed choices about their life-plans (162). As a neutralist, one might worry here
that Birnbaum’s minimal autonomy constraint implies a work ethos and a duty to con-
tribute that may not be compatible after all with liberal neutrality, although it is clearly
less perfectionist than the alternative of a strictly productivist ethos while at the same
time resisting well to the exploitation objection.

The last chapter proposes an exploration of the political implications of radical
liberalism in practical policy issues, such as political legitimacy, environmental sustain-
ability, and gender equity. The author explores these issues in a clear and well-informed
way. The book ends with a realistic proposal by arguing for a gradualist implementation
of a basic income scheme. Overall, the book is a major contribution to the liberal
egalitarian literature on basic income.

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Brettschneider asks how a liberal democracy should respond to prejudicial movements and hate groups that oppose free and equal citizenship. Hardly an unimportant question in today’s increasingly polarized political climates. Should a democratic state protect the rights of hate groups and therefore allow their views to spread or should it ban them thus violating citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, association, and religion?

Answering his question, Brettschneider, political theorist at Brown University, proposes ‘value democracy’. The state should protect the rights of citizens to express illiberal beliefs; but the state should also engage in ‘democratic persuasion’ when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints.

The author explores his value democracy theory in five substantial, and occasionally provocative, chapters. In the first, he proposes a ‘principle of public relevance’, which claims that when beliefs, expression, and practices conflict with the ideal of free and equal citizenship, they should be changed to make them compatible with that ideal. This can occur either through ‘reflective revision’ by citizens themselves or through ‘democratic persuasion’ by the state.

In the second chapter, he explores the place of the family and its basic rights in civil society, advocating ‘publicly justifiable privacy’. It is not clear to me that the author has a realistic view of what ‘family’ means in various contemporary cultures and countries. His argument is that within ‘the family’ people should engage in reflective revision to change those personal beliefs and practices, within the family and civil society, that conflict with the ideal of free and equal citizenship. Is this realistic or even possible?

How the state should simultaneously seek to transform discriminatory or hateful beliefs while defending them from coercive interference is the subject of chapter three. Here Brettschneider argues for non-coercive, but persuasive state action through communication, education and spending. He continues this discussion in chapter four, where he argues that sometimes the state is not capable of changing minds or significantly influencing cultural values and must employ the state’s subsidy power to withdraw state subsidies from groups that oppose the core values of free and equal citizenship.

It follows naturally, I believe, that chapter five must deal with freedom of religion and yet control of religion by the state, when it becomes problematic. “Some religious conceptions,” the author admits “are at odds with the ideal of religious freedom” and then “the state should seek to transform them through its persuasive capacity” (23). My question: how does one effectively deal with or control a fundamentalist theocracy or (as one sees in the United States) big-money conservative control of far-to-the right Catholic and Protestant institutions, which in fact work against the core values of free and equal citizenship?

I strongly recommend this book. It deserves serious reflection and critical discussion. In that discussion, however, there must be more reflection about what I would
have liked to see more fully developed in this book: an exploration into the nature and formation of public morality in a liberal democracy.

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The starting sentence of this book (an English translation of an introduction to bioethics that was first published in German in 2008) makes immediately clear what readers may expect from it: “This book is a philosophically-oriented introduction to bioethics”. The author clarifies that his personal position is part of a Kantian tradition, but the point of the book is not primarily to defend his personal views; his intention is to identify in what ways bioethical assertions, theories and positions are dependent on moral-philosophical premises. “Reflection upon these premises is, I believe, the essential ‘ethical’ element of bioethics” (XI). This is also clearly illustrated by the content of the book: after an introduction to bioethics, the author devotes chapter 2 to moral philosophy and chapter 3 to a cross-section of bioethical (but also highly philosophical) questions (moral status, nature and life, human nature and culture, new technologies and the scope of responsibility). The last chapter enters into current debates in bioethics, such as informed consent, euthanasia, organ transplantation, reproductive medicine, genetic diagnosis, green bioethics.

The author sets out to illustrate that the prescriptive dimension of bioethics is not neutral in a moral-philosophical respect. Moral judgments in the field of bioethics constantly make presumptions that are grounded in meta-ethics and normative ethics (31). He is thus very critical about the decision of many bioethicists to conceive of moral debates only by means of the most modest theories, such as Beauchamp and Childress’s principism approach: “[…] this does not contribute to developing a deeper understanding of the moral dimension of the life sciences” (107). Also in his last chapter (with the aforementioned topics), the author tries to shed some light on certain methodological questions regarding the interrelations between fundamental ethical questions and applied ethics.

I cannot enter here into the foundational aspects of this work. I can only assert that those who want to engage more deeply in bioethical debates, and refuse to be limited by the journalistic style of much of the latter, will find in this book a perfect introduction. It is tough material and demands adequate philosophical knowledge. It might, however, be an opportunity to reserve hours of attentive reading, which certainly will help to make bioethical debates more grounded and founded. I conclude with the words of the author: “Its merit [from academic bioethics] should be to establish ways for grounding concrete moral judgments that take the level of complexity of the question at issue seriously” (269).

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Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) was an American philosopher and scholar of constitutional law. He was Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University and Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London, and had taught previously at Yale Law School and the University of Oxford.

Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, in which law is interpreted in terms of consistent and communal moral principles, particularly justice and fairness, is among the most influential contemporary theories about the nature of law. “The world of value,” Dworkin wrote “is self-contained and self-certifying” (16). That understanding permeates his little book Religion Without God.

The book is based on the Einstein lectures that Dworkin gave at the University of Bern in 2011. In those lectures he reflected on questions about the meaning of life, the grandeur of nature, the experience of celestial and earthly beauty, and the human commitment to objective goods, whose value transcends the preferences of those who keep faith with them.

This is a modest little book that has four chapters. In the first, “Religious Atheism”, Dworkin begins with and explores Einstein’s observation that, although an atheist, he was a deeply religious man, meaning that beyond nature he believed there is something that cannot be grasped even by understanding the most fundamental of physical laws.

In chapter two, “The Universe”, we have reflections about physics, the sublime, and the beautiful. This I found the most engaging part of the book. It resonates of course with the old pursuit of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

Chapter three, “Religious Freedom”, explores the notion that freedom of religion exists for those who do not believe in any kind of god (I suspect a number of ‘religious Americans’ would really have difficulty with this observation, but in the Dworkin perspective it makes perfectly good sense).

The final chapter, “Death and Immortality”, is the shortest and was written the same year the author died. It has a certain poignancy. “We face death,” he wrote, “believing we have made something good in response to the greatest challenge a mortal faces. That may not be good enough for you: it may not soften even a bit the fear we face. But it is the only kind of immortality we can imagine...” (158-159).

Dworkin believed that in all human experience there is something of a religious attitude to life, even though in his own life – and in Einstein’s also – there was no belief in what he called “a Sistine God” up there in charge of everything. Therefore, religion without God. “Religion,” he said “does not necessarily mean a belief in God. But then, granted someone can be religious without believing in a god, what does being religious mean?” (6) Later he observes, correctly, I would say, that “[...] religious war is, like cancer, a curse of our species” (7). I understand what he was saying and can resonate with him; but, given my theological background, I would have phrased it differently: a spirituality without religion.

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In *The Point of View of the Universe*, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer introduce the work of the 19th century British philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) – in particular his masterpiece *The Methods of Ethics* – and point out its relevance to contemporary ethics. In contrast to the other two founding fathers of utilitarianism – Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) –, Sidgwick has received less attention in recent decades. G.E. Moore (1873-1958) and his followers challenged Sidgwick’s high reputation early in the 20th century. Nevertheless, Moore together with W.D. Ross, the most influential British moral philosophers at that time, shared at least Sidgwick’s intuitionist method, if not the content of his moral principles. The rise of logical positivism during the 1930s consigned Sidgwick’s ethical theory, based on “[…] unverifiable and therefore meaningless” propositions, to outer darkness (13). There it remained during the following period in which philosophers where mainly preoccupied with a study of the way in which we use ordinary language. Only during the revival of normative and practical ethics in the 1960s did Sidgwick recover his readership and a degree of appreciation. Nowadays, a number of prominent contemporary philosophers, most influentially Derek Parfit (2011), have been rediscovering Sidgwick.

The book is divided in 12 chapters, which are preceded by a biographical prologue and followed by a conclusion. Each chapter starts with a description of Sidgwick’s views, followed by a discussion of their relevance to contemporary ethics. Chapter 1, “What is Ethics?”, explains that for Sidgwick “[…] any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings ought to do will count as a method of ethics” (18). The three methods that Sidgwick discusses are egoism, utilitarianism and common sense morality. The chapter clarifies how exactly to understand Sidgwick’s division of the field of moral theories and argues that it is still defendable. Chapter 2, “Reason and Action”, presents Sidgwick’s views on practical reason and the nature of moral judgment. According to Sidgwick, “[…] ethical judgments present themselves to us as dictates of reason” (39). The chapter engages with the contemporary meta-ethical debate and defends moral objectivism. It also defends the idea, contra Hume (1711-1776), that normative reason can motivate, since “[…] accepting a moral judgment has a normal emotional concomitant or expression” (64). Chapter 3, “Intuition and the Morality of Common Sense”, discusses the roles that intuitions play in Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitionism as opposed to perceptual intuitionism and common sense morality. Sidgwick appeals to intuitionism as a method for grasping very general moral axioms. His axioms are much more general than the intuitions that common sense morality defends. The latter, according to Sidgwick, are unconsciously utilitarian (92). Chapter 4, “Justification in Ethics”, presents four conditions that, according to Sidgwick, need to be met in order to justify ethical principles. Principles of common sense morality do not meet these conditions. For instance, they only seem to be obvious as long as they are left unclear and imprecise. The chapter includes a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
reflective equilibrium and foundationalism. It argues that Sidgwick cannot easily be placed in one or the other camp, since a sufficiently wide notion of reflective equilibrium merges with that of foundationalism. Chapter 5, “The Axioms of Ethics”, presents Sidgwick’s axioms: Justice, Rational Self-love or Prudence and Benevolence, and defends them against contemporary challenges.

Chapter 6, “The Profoundest Problem in Ethics”, introduces Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason, i.e. the seemingly irresolvable conflict between egoism and utilitarianism. It discusses recent insights about the relationship between morality and self-interest and inquires whether this dualism undermines morality. The chapter concludes that the dualism is as yet unsolved. Chapter 7, however, shows how de Lazari-Radek and Singer propose to establish the unity of practical reason. The authors present an evolutionary debunking argument against egoism and resolve the conflict of practical reason in favour of utilitarianism. This is the only place in the book where the authors depart from and move beyond Sidgwick. Sidgwick considered empirical data about the origins of morality and our moral intuitions and even discussed these issues with Darwin and others, but lacked the empirical insights we possess today. The chapter defends the authors’ proposed solution to the profoundest problem in ethics against recent criticism.

Chapters 8 and 9 discuss the “Ultimate Good”, first rejecting “Perfectionism and Desire-Based Theory” and then defending “Hedonism”, again by engaging Sidgwick’s ideas with contemporary positions. Chapter 10, “Rules”, presents and defends Sidgwick’s utilitarian attitude to moral rules. Chapter 12, “Distribution”, discusses the distribution of happiness across individuals and across times.

The Point of View of the Universe presents a particularly clear and accessible introduction to Sidgwick’s ethics. In addition, it can serve as a fascinating general introduction into meta-ethics, normative ethics and value theory. The book convincingly points out the relevance of Sidgwick’s work for contemporary ethics and this makes it a highly recommendable reading for everyone interested in Sidgwick and in ethics, including philosophy students at all levels.

Those familiar with Singer’s previous work will discover that his engagement with Sidgwick – directly and via Parfit’s work – inspired remarkable changes in his moral theory. Singer, who – following his teacher Richard Hare (1919-2002) – used to be a subjectivist and externalist, now defends moral objectivism and a kind of internalism. This change of meta-ethical position leads Singer to answer the question he posed in his Master’s thesis and at many later stages in his career, “Why being moral?”, in an entirely different way. Contrary to what he used to say (http://bigthink.com/videos/why-we-should-be-moral), Singer now asserts that it is irrational to act immorally. Renowned as a preference utilitarian during most of his career, moreover, Singer has now returned to hedonism. This takes away the basis underlying Singer’s highly controversial position – as presented in Should the Baby Live? (OUP 1985) and Practical Ethics (CUP 2011) – according to which painlessly killing young infants does not harm them, because they lack any preferences regarding the future. Singer’s turn to hedonism, and with it to the standard deprivation view on the harm of death, radically changes his views about abortion, infanticide and the killing of animals. One of the most controversial
aspects of Singer’s position is his acceptance of the replaceability argument, which sanctions killing and replacing individuals under certain conditions. The most fundamental changes in Singer’s views over the past decades were due to his efforts to limit the scope of this argument. Even though these revisions turned out to be ultimately unsuccessful, Singer’s turn to hedonism makes him surrender once again to the replaceability argument in its full scope. In this book about Sidgwick, these far-reaching changes to Singer’s position present themselves in a remarkably inconspicuous way. Nevertheless, these impacts on Singer’s thinking underline just how inspiring studying Sidgwick can be today.

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