Portugal and the CPLP: heightened expectations, unfounded disillusions

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«The CPLP is a disaster, and for that I blame the Portuguese government»
Mário Soares, Braga (Universidade do Minho), 28.06.2000.

«The CPLP appears not only to have been born of a ‘caesarean section’ but it also suffers from a very considerable ‘ideal deficit’. In fact, it undoubtedly seems to have started out with the wrong ideal»

Introduction
Portugal’s relation with the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) has been uneasy from the start. Although proposals for the creation of a new institutionalised relation with its former African colonies and Brazil had been put forward at least since 1983, several different factors concurred to prevent any serious undertaking until the end of the 1980’s: first and foremost, pre-1989 international involvement in Angola and – to a lesser extent – in Mozambique, greatly reduced both Portugal’s diplomatic leeway and the new countries’ interest in a new entity. Secondly, Portugal’s own internal political life was going through a time-consuming state of instability until 1987, leaving governments very little scope for dealing with less than immediate concerns. Finally, less than 15 years after Decolonisation, Lisbon’s position regarding its former African colonies was still very much determined by a fear of neo-colonialism accusations. By the same token, relevant sectors of the African single party regimes’ were weary of any political or diplomatic option which might even hint at any Portuguese prominence.
Portugal’s role in the Angolan peace process, and its insistence on maintaining some degree of intervention in the Mozambican peace discussions appeared to be instrumental in changing its own perception of what the new relationship could amount to, and also in gradually securing a
level of mutual trust especially with these two countries\(^1\). The political wrangling which followed the debacle of the Angolan peace process, and particularly the length and the periodic susceptibilities of the ensuing process of creation of the CPLP would nevertheless come to prove that doubt, suspicion, and resentment remained an integral part of the relation, and were thus inevitably both integrated in the genetic code of the new organisation and conditioning Portugal’s role.

Four years after the formal institutionalisation of the CPLP, Portugal maintains a cautious position, based on the same structuring premise - the necessity to shy away from almost every ‘leading role’ opportunity for fear of neo-colonial accusation – and on more down to earth reasons like the limited availability of funds.

Should we thus infer that the empty shell like existence of the CPLP derives from such a Portuguese attitude? Should we alternatively argue that the demise of the Community is linked to its ‘Lusotropical emanation’ beginnings?

We would submit that even if both these queries did get favourable answers, another dimension should be added to the debate – a discussion on the level of expectations. Indeed, both those who defend that Portugal should have had a more prominent role in the organisation from the start, and those who instead argue that a new relationship framework should be in place before the CPLP could work, seem to share the notion that a great deal more could be attained.

In this paper we would like to propose that such readings seem to compare their own (sometimes very elaborate) specific notions on what the CPLP should be like with actual plans and achievements, invariably drawing negative conclusions on the organisation/community’s performance.

An ambiguous start

The idea of a Community anchored on a shared linguistic background has been hovering over Portuguese politics at least since the mid-1950’s. The first enunciators of such proposals were undoubtedly influenced by the writings of Gilberto Freyre on the singularity of a Lusotropical culture\(^2\). Agostinho da Silva would write in 1956 that Portugal or Brazil should take it upon

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\(^1\) Post-1974 relations with Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe were never haunted by severe disputes, thus allowing for an incremental build up of bilateral trust. However, in questions relating to the formation of the CPLP, these small Portuguese speaking countries have always tended to follow the lead of Angola and Mozambique. Such a procedure was self-evident when Angola decided to boycott the constitutive summit of the organisation, initially arranged for November 1994.

\(^2\) The broad analytical area of Portuguese relations with the Africans has clearly been exposed to political appropriation by both those who argued in defence of some sort of singularity, and those who have strenuously attempted to prove quite the opposite. Gilberto Freyre’s theoretical postulations on the existence of a distinct
themselves the task of creating a linguistically based association in order to develop the ‘common cultural affection’ (quoted in Domingues, 1999: 4). Nearly a decade latter, one of the staunchest defenders of Portugal's strategic turning to the Atlantic, Adriano Moreira, would organise the First Portuguese Culture Community Congress in Lisbon. It would be followed by a second gathering, in Mozambique, and two organisations would emerge as a result: the Union of Portuguese Culture Communities, and the Portuguese Culture International Academy.

Not being our purpose to analyse in detail these organisations and initiatives, two remarks should be nevertheless be made; firstly, they were somewhat contradictory in purpose, by taking on board Freyre’s notions on the added value of cultural interplay, yet at the same time clearly stating their metropolitan-centred nature; secondly, their creation – ostensibly parting from the reality of an ongoing war – should be interpreted more as an indication that they were part of the proposed alternative path on colonial matters for a very particular group within the regime than as an objective and, especially, viable proposition. Their importance as creators of a particular framework which would demarcate the debate henceforth should not however be in any way diminished by the previous comments. Indeed, the longevity of some basic notions – the pivotal role of the Portuguese language and the proposed cultural prominence – advises against any hasty dismissals, and the existence of ambiguities in the past if anything reinforces the link with the foundation and initial wavering of the CPLP itself.

It would take nearly two decades for the theme to resurface in Portuguese politics. The so-called ‘spirit of Bissau’4 had formally initiated a period of more open contacts between Portugal and its former African colonies, and Jaime Gama (Foreign Affairs minister in 1983) would venture the possibility of institutionalising this strengthening of ties. The aim was to “bring consistency and decentralisation” to the Portuguese Language tri-continental dialogue, via a biannual summit of Heads of State and government, annual meetings at ministerial level, and frequent consultations.
between Foreign Affairs Ministry representatives. A Permanent Secretariat ("ideally located in Cape Verde") would secure the management of this "new dynamic" (Gama, 15.11.1983).

The carefully selected wording of the project, and its ostensive focus on mutually beneficial diplomatic actions would not however be sufficient to promote its materialisation. It could generally be argued that Portugal's post-colonial relations with the African Portuguese speaking countries had not yet reached "the state of friendliness which such a move required" (Venâncio and Chan, 1996: 47), although some very particular but intertwined factors could be presented as major contributors to such a scenario: Portugal's political instability\(^5\), the emergence of distinct approaches to the question of relations with the former colonies, the limitations still imposed by an international bipolar division, and also the new African countries’ continued (if somewhat dimmed) suspicion of Portuguese intentions.

In a period of no more than a decade, democratic Portugal had had very distinct approaches to the relationship with its former colonies, and relevantly, they very seldom reflected a ‘national’ strategy, agreed upon by government, Presidency, political parties, and military. President Eanes – who sough for himself an interventive role in this particular area of external relations – believed in a pragmatic (though personalised) approach, hoping to enhance Portugal’s economic and political presence in Africa. In essence, this strategy was shared by the Social Democrats, led by Sá Carneiro, although they believed these matters should not be in the hands of the President. The Socialists, led by Mário Soares, were more permeable to both American intentions and the pressures of interest groups and African anti-governmental organisations. The alternation of Social Democrats and Socialists in power had clear reflections on political attitudes towards Africa, and also on the African posture towards Portugal. The fact that Jaime Gama’s proposals were not followed by any concrete measures hence tells us very little about their specific validity. If reasons are to be sought, they rather lay in the demise of the Socialist lead Central Bloc government, in the expression of Angola and Mozambique’s by now chronic misgivings towards Soares’ inspired initiatives (Venâncio and McMillan, 1993: 101-104), and also in the ostensive non-involvement of Brazil in any type of discussions on the matter.

By 1989 conditions had considerably changed. In Portugal, Cavaco Silva’s majority Social-Democrat government assumed that relations with Portuguese speaking African countries were strategically important, and that concrete confidence building and cooperation measures were

needed. A strategic plan, elaborated by diplomats and officials at the Foreign Affairs ministry in March 1988, foresaw Portugal's active involvement in the search for peace both in Angola and Mozambique, following a process which entailed the promotion of state to state relations, and the cessation of contacts and imposition of circulation restrictions to Angolan and Mozambican rebel movements (Interview with A. Monteiro, 19.07.2000). At the economic level, Portugal's proposal on the existence of assistance programmes for countries without geographical continuity was accepted during the Lome IV discussions, thus allowing the five Portuguese speaking African countries to be treated as a 'regional group'. Much in the manner previously envisaged by Eanes and especially Sá Carneiro, this rapprochement was linked to the perception that Portugal's role within Europe would be enhanced. Relevantly, Constitutional revisions had by now clearly established governmental prominence over the conduction of Foreign Affairs, reducing the risks of Presidential 'interference', and promoting an external image of greater unity on these matters. A specific set of conditions led Angola to interpret Portugal's commitment with less suspicion than in the past. Indeed, Soviet effective retreat from Africa under Gorbachev, a severe economic crisis, a desire to further relations with the EC, and significantly an intention to establish a new relation with the United States, secured Luanda's adhesion to a mutually beneficial political and diplomatic convergence, nudged forward by 'confidence building' measures, like the curtailment of UNITA's activities in Lisbon and the symbolic refusal of an entry visa to its leader, Jonas Savimbi.

Ravaged by a succession of natural catastrophes and by a paralysing civil war, Mozambique was also receptive to Portugal's renewed attentions. The intensification of economic and, especially, military cooperation was enshrined in a series of agreements signed in 1988, and the political emphasis was given by Cavaco Silva's official visit to Maputo in 1989. Having initiated a delicate process of peace negotiations with Renamo, the Mozambican government also sought to secure Portugal's help in convincing the Portuguese Community in South Africa to both terminate their support for Renamo, and initiate an investment oriented return to the country.

Possibly due to the lack of post-colonial internal conflicts, lesser international involvement, and the exiguity of self-sufficiency resources, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea-Bissau all opted from a non-confrontational relation with Portugal since 1974. The fact that Portugal was now an EC member if anything increased their interest in strengthening such a link.

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6 Cavaco Silva would say: “Before I took office, the climate was still very much one of intense suspicion. African leaders were tired of ‘political talk’ and wanted concrete plans and actions” (Interview, 20.04.1998).

7 “(...) Portugal’s ties with its former colonies, Brazil, and other areas of the World are indeed trump cards which increase our relative weight in the Community” (Silva, 27.05.1988); “If we are ‘less important’ in Africa, then we will also be worth less in Europe. We cease to have something of our own” (Interview, 20.04.1998).
Finally, a democratic yet economically debilitated Brazil also started to recognise the advantages of closer contacts with Portugal and the Portuguese speaking African countries. The historic affinity and the existence of a 700,000 strong Portuguese community in Brazil had never managed to ignite a substantive relation between the two countries. Caricature images of each other were, until the late 1980’s, the reflection of such a steady aloofness. Portugal’s adhesion to the EC was instrumental in the inversion of that trend; Portugal sought to strengthen its image as a worthy interlocutor not only in Africa but also in Latin America, and Brazil was keen on reinforcing its relation with the European Community. From Africa, Brazil expected an expansion of its cultural products market, but also – particularly in the case of Angola – a spillover effect into other areas.

More than ever before, conditions were hence appropriate to the establishment of a new type of relationship between Portugal, Brazil, and the new African states. The first summit of Portuguese speaking Heads of State – which took place in São Luis do Maranhão (Brazil), on November 1989 - nevertheless resulted in no more than the formal creation of the Portuguese Language International Institute (PLII). Under pressure from distinct internal conditions, and in the absence of clear leadership, the ‘seven’ were only able to vaguely agree on the defence and promotion of a common linguistic heritage.

Whilst the Portuguese President, Mário Soares, seemed to share with his Brazilian counterpart, José Sarney, and with the Brazilian Culture minister, José Aparecido de Oliveira, an enthusiasm over the evolution towards a more encompassing entity (Avillez, 1996: 53), Angola’s failed peace process, and delays in achieving a settlement in Mozambique advised the Portuguese government against any hasty protagonism (Briosa e Gala, Interview, 19.02.1997). In the name of ‘a long term national interest policy’, but also as an indirect acknowledgement of its own limitations, the Portuguese government opted for the safety of an incremental approach, through an engagement in concrete sectorial ‘5+1’ meetings.

The arrival of Itamar Franco at the Presidency, would definitely thrust Brazil into a leading role. Its ambassador in Lisbon, Aparecido de Oliveira, would in March 1993 (some three months after the EC had become the European Union) present a concrete proposal for the creation of the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. Confirming the support of all seven Heads of State, a meeting of Foreign Affairs ministers – held in February 1994, in Brasilia – would state the

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8 Although less formal meetings between the five African countries and Portugal had occurred previously, the ‘5+1’ format was officially a reality since the November 1990 meeting of Foreign Affairs ministers, held in Bissau. In a period of 5 years, at least 56 specific high level sectorial meetings would take place, relating to areas as distinct as Electoral Administration, Social Security, Justice, Customs, Environment, or Finance (MNE, 1995: 130-134).
'spontaneous' nature of a project which was based on the ‘special relationships’ forged by a common language.

Two failed dates for the formalisation of the CPLP - 28th. June 1994, and 29th. November 1994 - would however expose the political frailties of such a special relationship, and hint at the continued stress between different objectives, and relevantly, possible oscillations in member states' interest for the project. Itamar Franco’s last minute unavailability for the proposed June meeting\(^9\) was – despite Portuguese diplomatic efforts\(^10\) – interpreted by the African countries as a political snub. Hence their immediate (and joint) decision to stay away from the planned event. Despite numerous reassurances to the contrary\(^11\), the second attempt would also run into problems when Angola’s President decided to announce his absence, as a result of the perceived interference of his Portuguese counterpart in Luanda’s ‘internal matters’\(^12\). A total collapse was avoided by intense diplomatic activity, which would nevertheless only produce results more than a year latter. What Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano, would (rather euphemistically) describe as a ‘natural maturation process’ (quoted in Domingues, 1999: 7) finally resulted in the July 1996 Heads of State summit, not without a last reminder of how fragile the whole construct was – Angola’s insistence on appointing a former prime-minister as the CPLP’s first Executive Secretary\(^13\), revealed that susceptibilities were still very high, and that not all countries had the same posture towards the new organisation. Indeed, if Angola can – on this particular occasion – be singled out for taking advantage of a tense situation, it should be noted that Brazil’s acceptance of such a demand was decisive. In fact, Brazil’s new President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and (especially) his Foreign Affairs minister, Luis Filipe Lampreia, were not entirely in accordance with Aparecido de Oliveira’s ideas on the nature and purpose of the organisation, and Angola’s demand was an opportunity to solve a potentially damaging internal problem. Not proposing Aparecido de Oliveira, could hence be presented as a goodwill measure, with the purpose of cementing trust among all member states.

\(^9\) It has been argued that in the wake of his nephew’s sudden death, Itamar Franco was advised by Mário Soares to miss the constitutive summit (Meireles e Guardiola, 25.06.1994: 22).
\(^10\) Portugal’s diplomacy attempted to divert attentions (thus avoiding further damage), by insinuating that bureaucratic communication deficiencies were to blame (Albino, 13.07.1994: 10).
\(^12\) Symptomatic of an increasing rift with the Portuguese government’s official policy towards Angola, President Soares had recently made some comments on the Lusaka negotiations, appealing for national reconciliation, but also criticising the Angolan government for its duplicity – whilst discussing peace, they were also attacking Huambo. Portugal’s Foreign Affairs minister at the time, Durão Barroso, has recently revealed that henceforth two (undisclosed) African countries decided they would not participate in any type of organisation while President Soares remained in office (Monteiro, 29.04.2000: 13).
\(^13\) One week before the Foreign Affairs ministers meeting in Maputo, ambassadors from the seven member countries had agreed upon the name of Aparecido de Oliveira for the task. Besides representing the biggest member State, he was generally acknowledged as the ‘father’ of the CPLP. Angola put it to the others that – either resulting from a set consensus or from the adoption of a rotational alphabetic order – the first Executive Secretary had to be an Angolan.
Besides the solemnity of the occasion, the Lisbon summit produced a series of generic undertakings, on the defence of the common language, on the progressive affirmation of a Portuguese Language block in the international fora, and on mutual solidarity and cooperation (see Declaração Constitutiva, 17.07.1996). As the final communiqué so clearly shows, the new organisation was however very much an empty shell, awaiting its ‘mechanisms and instruments’, ‘a list of priorities and projects’, and ‘strategic guidelines’ (see Comunicado Final, 17.07.1996).

In essence, the CPLP had an Executive-Secretary imposed by one member State, no head office, no staff, no clear orientation, and – despite Brazil’s last minute offer of 4 million US dollars – an insufficient and erratic supply of financial means. Its members all admitted an interest in the organisation, although their purposes were not coincidental. If Portugal’s caution advised it against going much further than to hope for a “means to project the language”, and for the development of a genuine new understanding - “We thus actualise a secular familiarity, punctuated by light and shadow, but now assumed in its entirety and without complexes” (...) “Our heritage belongs to us all, and we must all enrich it. The rules are quite clear: equality, solidarity, mutual respect. Not forgetting that this community is marked by our own reading of universalism” (Sampaio, 17.07.1996: 2/6-7) - Brazil was much more straightforward in the expression of its political and economic goals - “we will be presenting some concrete cooperation projects which we would like to see prosper. They are realistic projects, simple but goal oriented initiatives” (Cardoso, 17.07.1996: 2). Brazil’s strenuous appeal for a “sense of realism” (ibid.) was seconded by the African member states, even if relating to different purposes. As Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos, put it, the new States were seeking “new ways to fight exclusion” in the international arena, thus hoping for less “grandiloquence, and sentimental rhetoric”, and more “effective solidarity”(economic, political, technical, but also in sensible areas like migratory policy) (Santos, J.E., 17.06.1996: 1).

Less than six months later, Brazil’s Foreign Affairs minister, Luis Filipe Lampreia, would make no effort to hide his personal lack of confidence in a structure like the CPLP, by stating that his country’s first interest was to strengthen ties with the European Union (presumably with Portugal’s help), and that Brazil could very well be in Africa without the CPLP (Sousa, 07.12.1996: 8). The natural follow up to such statements would be the early 1997 internal devaluation of the CPLP, in terms of Brazilian Foreign Affairs priorities14. On the first anniversary of the organisation, the Executive under secretary, Rafael Branco, admitted its chronic

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14 Leading Aparecido de Oliveira to write an article which started as follows: “How goes the CPLP? Very poorly, despite Brazilian rhetoric” (01.03.1997: 12).
shortcomings: the oscillations in member states’ commitment, the lack of a concrete progression strategy, and the exiguity of funds (Silva, 16.07.1997: 5). In 1998, he would add that the organisation still lived “in a sea of ambiguity”, and that it had not yet managed to become “a relevant consideration in each member state’s decision making process on foreign policy” (Abecassis, 09.04.1998: 18).

Some three years (and two Heads of State summits) latter, the CPLP has not yet been able to assert its existence in full, and –significantly – it has not managed to escape the immobility trap. Tentative efforts in the diplomatic arena (as was the case during the 1998 coup in Guinea-Bissau), or the sponsoring of cultural and scientific events and meetings do not seem to be enough to justify the existence of the organisation itself. Lack of political autonomy and financial resources have rendered it powerless in the face of catastrophes (as was the case during the 1999 Mozambican floods), and silent in the face of human rights violations (particularly in matters relating to Angola).

The Heads of State 2000 summit, held in Maputo, has apparently attempted to kick-start a new, more cultural oriented organisation. The choice of an academic for the position of Executive Secretary could be interpreted as an attempt to isolate the CPLP from political interference, thus creating some (until now non-existent) room for manoeuvre. Still, if compared with the initial proposals on greater political, diplomatic, and economic harmonisation, this change cannot but be interpreted as a downgrading of member states individual and collective hopes. It could be argued that conditions are finally in place for the affirmation of a flexible language Community but it could as much be said that a dimming of members’ interest signals the demise of the organisation.

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15 The above mentioned Brazilian downgrading of the CPLP in its own external relations’ priorities list was perhaps the most relevant. Notwithstanding, by June 1997 a strategic re-orientation was already perceptible. In an extensive interview, Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso would admit that ‘mistakes’ had been made, whilst promising a ‘more active involvement’ henceforth (Avillez, 28.06.1997: 46-56).

16 “I have lived these eight months under a lot of pressure. I would sometimes think that people were right when they accused us of doing nothing. Our attitude was – for a period - defensive, to the point of doing things just to counter that notion. An organisation must know what it wants, where it wants to go, and must stick to that. If, after this first year, we can come up with concrete ideas, it will not be so bad” (Silva, 16.07.1996: 7).

17 An estimated first budget prediction of US 506.000 was partly covered by the fixed member states’ contributions of US 30.000 each. The remainder was dependent on the goodwill of those who could afford a supplementary contribution – Brazil and Portugal provided US 100.000 each, and Angola gave US 50.000. Concrete cooperation activities were financed by a separate fund, also dependent on voluntary contributions from member states (Silva, 16.07.1997: 6). Relevantly, the CPLP only managed to occupy its head office – a building in Lisbon, ceded by the Portuguese Foreign Office - two weeks short of the first anniversary.
Interpretations and their weight

Such a troubled and historically attached past, and such problems in the its initial years have had profound effects on the CPLP’s image. Indeed, criticism of the organisation itself and of particular member states (for their perceived ‘responsibilities’) has been constant, with the added peculiarity of uniting politicians from distinct (and sometimes opposing) persuasions, writers, diplomats, and academics.

Notwithstanding the fact that specific positions have distinct nuances (which are often seen as relevant differences by their holders), it could be argued that criticism has revolved along two broad arguments. The first one departs from the notion that Portugal is historically responsible, and therefore should play a more active role in all matters concerning the CPLP. Portugal having hence failed to fulfil its duties, the CPLP could not but be an incomplete (at best) or failed (at worst) project. The second argumentative line, departs from the notion that a Lusophone Community should develop from open and egalitarian exchanges between member states. The CPLP’s undoubted Lusotropical origins imposed ideological, and even structural constraints, which have definitely contributed to some member states’ mistrust, and concomitant deflation of the project.

The first position’s most recognisable proponent is former Portuguese President, Mário Soares. Whilst recently stating that the CPLP is “a disaster”, he blamed the Portuguese government for not being able to go beyond what he considered a “poor formulation” (Lima, 29.06.2000: 11). Committed from the start to a Brazilian led, eminently cultural, and politically autonomous project – that personified by Aparecido de Oliveira - Soares no doubt shares Almeida Santos’ (his long term friend and political ally) notion that Portugal has always “played defensively” for fear of “public opinion’s reactions which never occur” (01.08.1993: 20). In essence, Soares seems to regret that an over-cautious Portuguese attitude (which has been constant in the last decade, irrespective of the party in power) transformed a ‘people’s project’ into no more than a political instrument. This notion is complemented by the former Foreign Affairs minister and European Commissioner, João de Deus Pinheiro: “while the CPLP is seen as a ‘governments thing’ (...) it will be able to do very little” (...) “To have nominated a former Angolan prime-minister

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18 If we substitute ‘Portugal’ for Brazil” in this argumentation, we find that a similar position is shared by prominent (if in the minority) Brazilian diplomats, writers, and academics. The most visible face of this informal group, Aparecido de Oliveira, already spoke of the need to reformat the whole project as early as February 1998 (Visão, 26.02.1998: 20). For the purposes of this specific paper we will devote greater attention to the Portuguese version of the argumentation.

19 The suggestion has been made that in fact Soares was behind the whole project from the start, yet he ‘used’ Brazil as a vehicle to present it, as if by procuration (Cahen, 1997: 398).
for the top job was, I believe, an enormous political mistake (...) A ‘civilian’ was needed, capable of making the organisation as much ‘civilian’ as possible” (Nóbrega, 27.05.2000: 25).

Notwithstanding the obvious fuel provided to these positions by a tense relation with some African leaders (namely in the Angolan government), the fact is that they are supported by a series of assumptions on what the Portuguese foreign affairs attitude towards both the CPLP and its members should be: political assertiveness, commitment to the upholding of human rights and civil liberties, and concrete economic investment. Ranging from the prudent - “The Portugal that has come out of April, 25th. is not neo-colonialist, and should thus not squat, always begging forgiveness for the help it provides” (Vasconcelos, 09.07.1998: 32) – to the hyperbolic – “Portugal should assume the right of interference” (Tavares, 05.02.1999: 13) - supporting comments all embody the notion that opportunities are being lost, either due to unnecessary complexes or overzealous ‘real politick’.

The second position’s scepticism derives from one main premise - the CPLP’s ideological origins are embedded in a time resistant Lusotropical discourse, and it embodies the fanciful self-esteem constructions of a predominantly white Brazilian community whilst providing an ‘imagined’ sustenance to Portugal’s national identity. This “adaptation of paternalism to modernity” – as Michel Cahen calls it (1997: 431) – could not but create suspicion among the African countries, thus preparing the ground for an uneven commitment and, ultimately, for a growing disinterest in the organisation. The fact that the organisation is sometimes referred to as ‘Lusophone’ hints at the existence of an invisible centre/periphery construct, which can seldom be either flattering or beneficial to members other than Portugal.

Even if positions might slightly diverge on what Portugal does get from this fundamentally discursive insistence on the “community of affections” - the Angolan historian, Carlos Pacheco, would stress a straightforward economic interest (“Questions related to Africa are still dealt with in the backyard. Always in the hope some quick profit might be made. Just profit. As it was in the past”) (11.05.1996: 15)), whilst Mozambican writer, Filimone Meigos, would rather focus on the self-perceptive value of institutionalising the global projection of a language that defines the Portuguese nation: “A country like Portugal, periphery of the periphery, now wants a leading role in a process already closed by History” (quoted in Cahen, 1997: 410)) – the shared understanding is that the CPLP proves Lisbon’s still problematic relation with its colonial past.

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20 On this matter, another academic would write that fashionable constructions like the numerous triangular variants (Portugal-Brasil-Africa, Portugal-US-Africa, Portugal-EU-Africa) often run into ‘reality’: “the problem with these builders of strategic triangles is that they seldom know what those situated at the other extremities really think” (Andrea Soares, 18.10.1997: 22).
Disinterest in the reality of African affairs is – again according to Pacheco – “soaked up by ignorance and disguised with folkloric propaganda”, hence leading some politicians to “mingle knowledge of Africa with personal friendships and political complicity forged in PIDE’s gaols, the Students of the Empire’s House, and the exile in Algeria, with Africans which belonged to a very specific socio-cultural universe – the urban one” (11.05.1996: 15). The CPLP is, thus, no more than part of that folklore, serving the dual purpose of guaranteeing some singularity to a country that feels increasingly diluted in Europe and ‘invaded’ by Spain, whilst attempting to cement old self-assurance notions, like the ‘unique ability to interplay with other cultures’, or the ‘non-racist character’ of the Portuguese people.

**Heightened expectations**

Apparently opposing as they might seem, these two broad argumentative lines share the assumption that the CPLP could have been much different from what it is at the present. If the first position envisaged an active cultural community, under clear leadership, jointly strengthening its ties on the basis of a mutual linguistic heritage, the second one expected a much looser entity, without any centre, acting as a partial cooperation tool between an heterogeneous but mutually respectful group of states. Irrespective of their intrinsic value, these proposals should not, however, be used in isolation when evaluating the concrete actions and purpose of the four year old organisation. Departing from a high level of expectations, they do bluntly expose some of the most obvious problems of the CPLP, yet precisely that departure point hampers fairness in comment, leaving very little room for a discussion on the expected fluid nature of an organisation like the CPLP.

The first position is in fact the inheritor of more than 40 years of mostly Lusophone centred discussions on the creation of a Community. Its weight has been felt especially during the pre-institutionalisation phase, although it becomes very difficult to read this fact as a somewhat premeditated initiative to ‘re-subjugate’ the former African colonies.

As we tried to show in the first part of this paper, two models of association were debated over for a lengthy period, with oscillations in their relative prominence deriving in essence from the result of internal political disputes, both in Portugal and Brazil. A less ambitious and progressive evolution of the 5+1+1 understanding at different levels, was the preferred option of Portuguese Social-Democrats and also of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency, whilst a more symbolically appealing community, sharing a language and proposing to strengthen cultural, political, and economic ties, was argued for by both José Sarney, Itamar Franco, and their
Portuguese counterpart, Mário Soares. It should be added that throughout only the smaller African states showed some genuine interest in either project, with internal problems conditioning both Angola and Mozambique’s commitment.

The fact that the CPLP resulted in an ambiguous construct – appearing to democratise some of the ideological trappings of the Lusotropical vision\(^{21}\), whilst also enshrining structural anti-centralisation measures, like the fact that important questions are solely decided by unanimity, at the Heads of State summits – does indicate that a deliberate effort to cater for all sensibilities was very much present. The formalisation of a ‘minimum common denominator’ association (Interview with A. Monteiro, 19.07.2000), although appealing to neither the supporters of greater Portuguese intervention nor to those hoping for a cleansed egalitarian association, was the only politically consensual option available. It seems as hard to imagine African concessions to a monolithic ‘Portuguese Culture valorisation’ project, as it does to expect Brazil and Portugal not to have their specific goals and perceptions. In the same manner as a Mozambican finds it difficult to see the relevance of belonging (even if by proxy) to the União Latina (to appropriate one of Michel Cahen’s most telling examples), a Portuguese fails to see any problem in the intertwining of Lusophony and the mythology of the CPLP under one single totality, even if each of its components is characterised by a distinct culture. A project of association between such distinct readings could never exist unless some concessions were not made.

What the first position fails to realise is that such a language derived Portuguese centrality “should not have any other dimension besides the genealogical one” (Lourenço, 1999: 179). When appeals are made for greater Portuguese intervention in African state’s affairs, or for a more politically assertive CPLP, this position inevitably attracts support from more conservative quarters\(^ {22}\), with the twofold effect of heightening African apprehensions and giving added value to an ideological discourse which – in fairness – has long been effectively deflated.

The core problem of the second position is precisely the fact that it takes at almost face value such a discourse, by inference assuming that Portugal could only aspire to construct a centralised, and culturally coated preferential trade arrangement such as France and Britain have with their former colonies. We would rather argue that Portugal does (and cannot afford not to) have a political and geostrategic affirmation policy – where the language plays a pivotal role – although there is very little indication that a neo-colonial attitude is implied. Portugal’s economic and cultural presence in its former colonies results much less from governmental guidance than

\(^{21}\) As Manuel Villaverde Cabral would put it (22.07.1996).

\(^{22}\) See Dias’ strategic consideration on Portugal’s need to safeguard its own sovereignty through an Overseas extension: “As it once was, we will not find in Europe a basis for our freedom and prosperity” (18.04.1998: 22).
from private initiative, and it could hardly be described as intense. Its official political posture in the last decade tends to privilege the maintenance of state to state relations, sometimes at the blunt expense of principles which it so strenuously wants to uphold in other situations. The fact that Portugal undoubtedly uses the geographic extension of its own language as a self-image booster should not be read as more than just that. To use Moura’s expression: “The end of the Empire was compensated by the transfer of a frustrated imperial vocation to the linguistic level. Not being a very intelligent attitude, it nevertheless is pretty much harmless (...) It is a formula like any other, useful for some speeches and to proclaim more or less superficial fraternities” (25.03.2000: 25).

Another significant frailty of the second position is to assume that the African states have been passive observers of a primarily Brazilian-Portuguese construction. Besides being historically inaccurate, this position denotes a predisposition to consider that, to the exclusion of some elite clusters, Africans tend to consider their colonial heritage – including the language of the coloniser – as a malefic. Even if some particular states (or their leaders) do indeed still appear to be so attached to the colonial past to the point of episodically being so emphatic in their ‘exorcism’ attempts, the fact is that African input has been at least as relevant as individual states wanted it to be. Besides the fact that for the first four years of its existence the CPLP was managed by two African politicians, some of its most relevant initiatives (particularly in areas related to professional proficiency) have taken place in African countries. The CPLP was, hence, as much a foreign affairs tool to Angola and Mozambique, as it was for Portugal and Brazil. The obvious existing differences are, surely, much more in terms of degree than substance.

Ideologically conceived as a depurated version of the Lusotropical dream, structurally attached to an ostensibly centre-less framework, financially and politically constrained, an organisation like the CPLP could never be the autonomous embodiment of an active cultural community, not could it be the light, informal, egalitarian shared expression of individual identities. Portugal’s active formal disengagement, Brazil’s ostensive preference (from the start) for little else than a vehicle for preferential trade (especially in cultural products), Angola’s wavering allied to an internal absorbing situation, and Mozambique rather more survival related priorities have all contributed to the feeble, pale, dream-like façade nature of the organisation. In a sense, it could even be argued that by reflecting the general lack of commitment of its founding members, their disparate levels of development (hence their dissimilar needs), and relevantly, their general lack of mutual

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24 As was the case in October 1997 when Eduardo dos Santos ostensibly delayed (for half an hour) a meeting with the Portuguese prime-minister, António Guterres, who was on a scheduled official visit to Luanda (Madrinha, 25.10.1997: 2).
knowledge which seldom goes past folkloric references, the CPLP has become the only possible association of these seven countries, at this particular moment.

To fuel a debate based on high and specifically oriented expectations is useful only insofar as it projects different views on the nature and objectives of the CPLP. To assume it in any way as a scale might lead us to precipitate and inaccurate conclusions.

**Conclusion**

Some four years after its official launching, the CPLP is often presented as a still-born. Among those committed to the debate on its nature and role, the only consensual note is precisely on the aura of failure that surrounds the institution. Those who perceive it as an opportunity for Portugal's international projection rise against the evident lack of political commitment, and concomitant lack of strategic goals and funding. Those who instead interpret it as an emanation of Lusotropical ideas – hence retrograde, and irreversibly attached to the authoritarian past – argue that such a departing point runs against the nature of a true community. If we look beyond the emotional charge of the debate – both at the political and academic levels - we should concur that these postures, whilst highlighting obvious failings in members' commitment, and in the running of the organisation, all seem to depart from exaggerated levels of expectations, hence inducing partial conclusions on its nature and performance.

It is our contention that both these positions hold some validity if we are to consider them in tandem with some important caveats. Firstly, they should not be taken as mutually exclusive interpretations. Secondly, they should be stripped of some of their most obvious oversimplified assumptions. The high level of expectations of these two positions however seems to indicate that, with or without the CPLP, a broad consensus exists on the idea that a language based community is a viable formula to both strengthen internal ties, and create an anti-globalisation barrier.

Irrespective of what might be made of the CPLP, Portugal's interest in such an ostensibly non neo-colonial organisation is high. Not discarding the importance for certain sectors of the Portuguese economy of traditionally receptive markets, and by the same token not diminishing the relevance of an effective political alliance in the international fora, this link with the former colonies is still vital for Portugal's self-image. That explains the fact that, as it did for a considerable part of the authoritarian period, the attachment cuts across political barriers, creating odd alliances and unique partnerships. It might also help to explain the emotional charge of the debate. As Lourenço so aptly put it: “Lusophony is an obscure or voluntarily obscured
jungle”, marked by the uneasy “coexistence of readings, and unconfessed or unconfessable intentions, all of which expressing particular contexts, situations, and cultural mythologies, definitely non-homologous and, only at best, analogous. This is the reality of things, and as such we must all assume it” (1999: 179).

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