

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE PORTUGUESE PARTIES: STRATEGIC INNOVATION AND THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE PARTY POLICY SPACE

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Abstract. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the Portuguese parties and their policy space. We show how and how well the parties have been able to adapt to the changing environment in the party system. Our analyses show that, not only are we able to check existing static expert assessments of the Portuguese party and policy space, but we are also able to track the dynamics of the system. In this way, we expand on what little has been said thus far about the Portuguese party system. We conclude with three important ideas. First, we confirm that the Portuguese policy space is unidimensional, with the parties lining up from Left to Right, as some but not all experts, have suggested. Second, we propose that the environment of the Portuguese party system is one of compression, that is, parties have been office-seekers in that they have all been approaching the Centre of the political spectrum for a number of reasons we explore in detail. Last, we learn that only through issue dimensions and how parties pronounce themselves on these dimensions are the smaller parties able to survive and avoid extinction in the compressing environment of the party system.

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In democracy political electorates and popular control depend on political parties to present viable governing options. It is through the parties and their competitive struggle to gain power that democratic theory becomes a reality. In the midst of increasing pressures for innovation, political parties are forced to change how they organize themselves and relate to one another within a given political system. In the face of a changing environment in the party system, the parties have to adapt in order to survive and flourish.

Our purpose in this paper is to show how and how well the Portuguese parties have been able to adapt. This is interesting in two regards. First, it is relevant as a theoretical matter because we will be observing the parties during a period when they are still young, inexperienced, and, in some sense, vulnerable to extinction. Second, it is interesting as a descriptive matter because there is not too terribly much information on Portugal and the Portuguese party system.

Given adaptability as the core theme of the paper, we begin with the context of the Portuguese system by describing it, its parties and their origins and also by speculating about how the changing environment has conditioned their behaviour and will continue to condition it in the future. We then turn to the critical question of what democratic choice the parties provide and how they organise themselves in the policy space. Through a comprehensive analysis of the Portuguese manifestoes provided by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), which is especially designed to pick up on valid and reliable party dynamics (McDonald and Mendes 2000; Mendes and McDonald 2001a; Volkens 2001), we provide a picture of what the policy space looks like, and more importantly, how party strategic manoeuvring has changed it throughout Portugal's short democratic history.

We conclude with three important ideas. First, we are able to confirm that the Portuguese policy space is unidimensional, with the parties lining up from Left to Right, as some but not all experts, have suggested. Second, we propose that the environment of the Portuguese party system is one of compression, that is, parties have been office-seekers in that they have all been approaching the Centre of the political spectrum for a number of reasons we explore below in detail. Finally, we learn that only through issue dimensions and how parties pronounce themselves on these dimensions are the smaller parties able to survive in the contracting environment of the party system.

Historical and Socio-Economic Background

Living in Portugal today is not quite what it used to be a quarter of a century ago. The Portuguese are more well off, more educated, sophisticated, well-dressed, and confident about the future with a GDP per capita that is now more than two thirds of the EU average compared to 15 years ago when it was only half the EU average (*The Economist* 2001).

This change in the Portuguese way of life is even more noticeable when we recall how the Portuguese were struggling 15 years ago amidst skyrocketing inflation rates, rampant unemployment, and chaotic public finance. It took two IMF interventions, newfound governance stability, and entry into the EU to salvage the fledgling young democracy. It is hard to believe that it was once one of two major world powers. As a daring and courageous nation, they won their independence from Spain in the mid 12th century and built an empire from the small lot of land handed down from Spain and expanded south to the Mediterranean.

As the saying goes, that was then and this is now. It is true, Portugal ranks far from where it once did, but it is making comeback in wide strides. A series of economic, political, and natural disasters in 18th and 19th centuries—the earthquake 1755 destroying Lisbon, the Napoleonic invasion and the loss of Brazil as their major colony, and civil war in the late nineteenth century—very contributing to an already crumbling empire. The fifty-year dictatorship in the 20th century finally finished it off. That is why in Portugal the national pride tends to focus on the Portuguese heritage around the time of the maritime discoveries. Growing up in Portugal, one is not allowed to forget the heroic feats at sea that set famous Portuguese sailors in stone, such as Vasco da Gama, Ferdinand Magellan, Pedro Cabral, and Bartolomeu Dias to name a few of the more reknown discoverers. These daring and pioneering seamen introduced the Western world to new and exciting places.

Today, just 25 years since the bloodless *Revolução dos Cravos* or the Revolution of the Carnations and the democratic victory over the *Estado Novo*, the Portuguese are making a eye-opening comeback. As the Portuguese would say, “*Estamos a sair da casca*”. They are coming out of their shell and their making way, headway that is.

Historical Background

The adoption of the democratic Constitution of 1976, marked the 4th chapter in 20th century political life: the Monarchy, the First Republic, the dictatorship in the *Estado Novo*, and democracy. Manuel II was the last king of the Portuguese monarchy ending in 1910 (Magone 1997, 17). His father’s reign, Carlos I, was a struggling one with increasing political and social unrest and conflict between the republican and the monarchic forces. When Carlos I was

assassinated in Lisbon in 1908, Manuel II took one last stab at salvaging the monarchical traditions by restoring the constitutional government. It was too late, however. The republican movements were already strongly mobilized and ready to take charge. On October 5th 1910 that is what they did. The monarchy was officially replaced by a republican regime after almost 800 years and four monarchical dynasties.

The First Republic, as it was called, lasted from 1910 to 1926. It was an uneasy era, plagued with economic turmoil and political volatility (Bruneau 1997) . A total of forty prime ministers took office for an average duration of government of about four months. Matters became particularly bleak when Portugal's external political relations forced them into the WWI. Portugal honored its alliance with Britain and seized German ships in Lisbon's harbor in 1916. This context got worse with corruption and mismanagement. All this terminated in May 1926, when a military coup led by General Oscar Fragoso Carmona deposed the government and assumed the power. In the Presidential elections of 1928 General Carmona was inducted into office and appointed António Oliveira Salazar as finance minister, who imposed stringent conditions on accepting the position (Schmitter 1979). With ever growing popularity and power, Salazar became Prime Minister in 1932 and virtually the sole power holder. The *União Nacional* (National Union) was the sole party of the Portuguese system. The Prime Minister became the sole decisionmaker of a corporatist regime that was administratively and politically centralized under the authoritarian thumb Salazar.

Despite some adjustments over time, the nature of the authoritarian regime did not change much. However, two events helped lead to its downfall in 1974. During the 1950s, there was some attempt to make the regime appear to be more democratic in the eyes of the outside world. An opposition candidate, General Humberto Delgado was allowed to run for the President in 1958. Although the candidate was ultimately defeated by the government's candidate, General Américo Tomás, it proved to be a somewhat of a scare. The election of 1958 proved to be a key event in the mobilization of the pro-democratic, oppositionist movements. It was enough to prompt the government to change the electoral rule so that the President would be indirectly elected by the National Assembly, rather than through direct suffrage.

The Portuguese colonial wars in Africa also proved to be destructive to the *Estado Novo*. Portugal was among the last nations still hanging on to colonies in the post WWII era. The eruption of wars for independence in three of the five African territories or the *Províncias Ultramarinas* as they were called (Overseas Provinces): Angola, São Tomé e Príncipe, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, and the Portuguese Guinea. In 1961, the Portuguese let go of its Indian territories—of Goa, Damão, and Diu—with no Portuguese resistance. But in Africa the rise of

independence movements was more dramatic. Salazar did not want to let go of these colonies. Soon the Portuguese were forced to fight on three fronts: beginning in 1961 in Angola, in 1962 in the Portuguese Guinea, and in 1964 in Mozambique. During much of the 60s, Portugal became more and more isolated and criticized by the international community.

In the meantime, the Portuguese armed forces gained newfound strength and mobilization that provided the necessary human power to set repressed anti-*Estado Novo* discontent into motion. On April 25th 1974, the *Capitães de Abril* (Movement of Captains) overthrew the government with ease and paved the way for democracy, decolonisation, and development (Graham and Makler 1979). “The liberation of Portugal from dictatorship, oppression and colonization represent a revolutionary change and an historic new beginning in Portuguese society.” (Preamble of Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1976, 4th revision).

Social Structure

The twentieth century was particularly difficult for the Portuguese people. Economic strife was the rule in the First Republic and, although Salazar must be credited for bringing stability to the nation in his early years of governance, the country was purposely kept more or less isolated from the rest of the world, with the almost certain result of profound socio-economic underdevelopment in the post WWII era. At the time of the Revolution, the Portuguese economy looked and operated more like that of a second or third world nation, still heavily dependent on agriculture with significant mal-distribution of wealth. Income distribution during the 1970s was somewhere between that in Western Europe and Latin American countries (Muller and Seligson 1994). Their GDP per capita was certainly the lowest in Western Europe (*The Economist* 2001)

The Economy and Society

In the early 20th century, the population of approximately 5.5 million in Continental Portugal was dependent on a poor and undeveloped agricultural society, with 80% of the population living in rural areas (Machado 1991) and a large percentage not having any schooling. In Lisbon alone, the rate of illiteracy ranged from 46% in 1920 to 31% in 1940. In other districts this percentage reached more than 75% (Machado 1991). The life expectancy then was only about 35 years. Only after the restoration of democracy did the agricultural sector lose its primary place, going from 56% of the labor force in the 1930s to 34% in 1970 and finally 12% in the 1990s (Barreto 1996). Given this situation, the *Estado Novo* had plenty of fertile soil to grow in power and strength.

World War II represented a significant turning point in Portuguese life in society, with important consequences. Portugal had not had a positive balance of the commercial trade between World War I and 1941. The trade of wolfram, useful for making armor shells, during the WWII proved to be good for business. When the War ended, Portugal was on good terms with the Allies, enough so to warrant a founding place in establishment of NATO (Oliveira 1995).

Adherence to EFTA in the post-War era represented an important step towards the opening of the Portuguese economy. It was not until the 1950s that Portugal saw some improvement in the social and economic conditions: GDP per capita doubled before the decade was over although this did not represent much.

At the time of the Revolution in 1974, Portugal was clearly among the poorest of the Western European countries. The inherent political instability in the two years immediately after the Revolution led to a considerable underutilization and loss of economic resources and productive factors that in turn led to the first intervention of the IMF in 1978 and again in 1983. Even after the regular functioning of democratic institutions were secured, political instability plagued the young democracy. Two important events proved to be largely responsible for economic stability and progress in the latter half of the 1980s: 1) entry into the European Union after eight years of negotiations; and 2) governing stability in the latter half of the 80s (Gallagher 1988). Today a noticeable improvement in the quality of life in Portugal and approximation to the advanced industrial nations is undeniable.

This general upward socioeconomic trend was accompanied by an increasing role of women in the social and economic life. For instance, the percentage of women in the labour force increased dramatically, from about 18.2% of the total population in 1960 to 43.6% in 1997 (Barreto 1996). Women also became active in the political arena. In the national legislative body the percentage of female deputies was 6.8% in 1980, 13% in 1997, and 19.6% in 2000 (Interparliamentary Union Report 1995). Today, the percentage of women in the national government is approximately 12%; it is also 12% in the Autonomous Regional Governments; and 14% in the local governments. As for the percentage of female members of the four major parties, it ranges from 19 to 25% (*European Data Base* www.db-decision.de/factsheets).

Illiteracy was halved, going from 34% of the total population in 1970 to 15% in 1991. The percentage of the population over 65 years of age doubled, going from 7.9% of the total population in 1960 to 16% in 1997. University degrees increased going from 1.5% of the total population of the in 1970 to 4.9% in 1991 (Barreto 1996).

Social Cleavages

With respect to cleavages, Portugal is still among the most homogenous of the European nations. It has no language divide; virtually every speaks Portuguese. There is no religious divide; most everyone is Roman Catholic. And although with every passing year there are more legal and illegal immigrants from the former African colonies, ethnicity and race are still not issues. The cleavages that do exist appear to be regional and ideological in nature. There are essentially three that deserve mention: 1) Church/Anti-clergy; 2) North/South regional cleavage; and finally 3) urban/rural cleavage.

The cleavage between the Church and the anticlerical beliefs of the Portuguese Communist Party, the oldest of the parties we know today, dates back to the early 20s (Cunha 1997). The Portuguese are approximately 97% Roman Catholic. This party was most strongly established in rural provinces of the Alentejo, south of Tagus river. This region is known as the *Celeiro* (or Silo) of Portugal because this was where the largest landowners had their properties in early 20th century. Even today, this southern part of the country is mostly left-leaning in partisan preference. Northern Portugal, as well as the Islands, being divided into smaller land lots and more traditionalist and Catholic managed to be Salazar's largest support group in the early years. Salazar used this regional cleavage to his advantage and it is still reflected in today's society and ideological support of political parties. This is especially notable when questions of moral nature arise. The results of the 1998 referendum on abortion is a good example (see Mendes 2000). Although the results were not binding, for reasons we shall speculate about later in the paper, they were revealing in two related respects: the North/South and Church/Communist party cleavages. The most devoutly Catholic northern region clearly voted in favour of the preservation of life and against the proposed extension of the period during which women could terminate their pregnancies under strict conditions of legality—75%—whereas the southern regions, noted for their anticlerical and Communist leanings voted pro-choice and safer settings for abortions, thus they voted in favour of the bill—73%.

One last dichotomy is, as is the North/South cleavage, geographic: the urban/rural divide. Throughout its history as a fishing and navigating country, the urban areas were always on or close to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts. Social and economic development progressed faster in every respect in these areas with professionals, students, and business persons wanting to migrate to the coast and away from the more mountainous and rural interior towns. From 1960 to 1997 alone, the percentage of the population living in urban areas went from 22 to 36.5%. This is reflected in the distribution of party support. Urban areas have been known to

support the larger, more Centrist parties, the PSD and the PS, while the more rural areas have been more supportive of the more extremist parties.

The Development of the Portuguese Electoral and Party System

The contours of the Portuguese political system as we know it today are largely a result of the system the First Republic set in place and that the *Estado Novo* largely erased. The democratic beginnings in the early 20th century already shown its preference for proportional representation and party competition for power-holding positions in the parliament through direct but universal suffrage.

The Electoral System

Three constitutions shaped the existing electoral system in Portugal. The Constitution of 1911 defined the electoral system of the First Republic. It implanted a system of proportional representation with “incomplete lists” and established the supremacy of the parliament or legislative body in the political system (Oliveira 1995). This Constitution set up a bicameral parliamentary system with a deputy chamber and a senate that had the responsibility of electing the President of the Republic, who represented the nation but had no major powers. Only literate men, heads of family, and taxpayers were granted the right to vote. These men amounted to about 10% of the entire population.

Electoral rules of a serious democratic character became extinct during the next 50 years of the *Estado Novo* established in the Constitution of 1933. Elections were held at the convenience of the government, or in other words, Salazar. Presidential elections, although direct, assumed the form of plebiscite up until the 1958 election. This election demonstrated the risk to the regime of granting an opportunity for the people to have a say.

The Constitution of 1976 (revised four times between then and 2001) is the present law of the land, re-established a system of proportional representation and set in place a semi-presidential system. In *Democracia*, all citizens 18 years of age or older were granted the right to vote, including for the first time women. Article 149 of the present Constitution established mandatory and permanent registration but this requirement has been flexibly interpreted to mean that both registration and the act of voting itself are civic rights more than duties, and therefore not automatic and obligatory.

This Constitution names the Assembly of the Republic as one of four organs with supreme authority, along with the President, the Government, and the Courts (4th revision, 1997, Article 110). It is the supreme legislative organ representative of all Portuguese citizens (Article

147), although the Government and the Autonomous Regions' Legislative Assemblies have limited legislating capacity. In addition to having the power to enact legislation and the prerogative to delegate legislative power to the Government and the Regional Legislative Assemblies, the Constitution enables the national Assembly with substantial other powers (Articles 162-3), such as the approval of the formation of Government (Article 187), the review of the Government by approving or not its major economic and political plans, including its budget, passing motions of censure, and questioning and suspending members of the Government and the civil service. Other powers include amending the Constitution, approving international conventions, and selecting a given number of members to the Constitutional Court, the Council of the State, and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.

Two hundred and thirty deputies are elected to the Assembly (Article 148^o). Four are allocated to the votes of the citizens living abroad; the remaining 226 come from 20 electoral districts by way of closed lists of rank-ordered candidates according to the electoral formula of d'Hondt. Eighteen districts are located on the mainland, and one belongs to each of the Atlantic Island formations, Madeira and the Açores.

The President wields substantial power within the norms of a parliamentary system. Among other things, he or she is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, holds conditional power to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers, can within certain limits remove the Prime Minister and the Government, and has limited positive and negative veto powers over legislation.¹ In order for a person to become President, he or she must be 35 years of age and may not have served two consecutive terms as president nor resigned the presidency within the preceding five years.² With those provisos, the President is popularly elected by absolute majority rule, with a two-candidate runoff election should no candidate's votes exceed the majority of the valid votes in the initial election, to a five-year term on a date that cannot coincide

¹ The limited negative veto is what one typically sees in the hands of a chief executive. The Portuguese President can negate a decree passed by the Assembly or Government with a public declaration of reasons for doing so (Article 136). The President's veto power is limited in the sense that the Assembly can override the veto with an absolute majority of votes provided two-thirds of the members are present when that override vote is taken. Another power of negation belongs to the President in conjunction with the Constitutional Court. Upon receiving a decree from the Assembly or Government, the President can ask the Court for an anticipatory review of the constitutionality of the decree's provisions. Failure of the decree to pass constitutional muster negates it. The positive veto is somewhat of an anomaly. Article 283 of the Constitution allows the President to ask the Constitutional Court to decide whether failure to enact legislation on a matter necessary to implement constitutional provisions contravenes the Constitution. When the Court finds the omission is a contravention of the Constitution, it is instructed to report that finding to the competent legislative organ.

² Under the provisions of the original constitution, the President was required to be a member of the armed forces. This requirement was dropped when the Constitution was revised in 1982. This was also the

with Assembly elections (Articles 121-26). He or she represents the entire Republic and holds responsibility for the independence and unity of the state (Article 120).

The Party System in the Electorate and Parliament

The Portuguese party system as we know it today developed in the First Republic. Three parties existed at the time: the *Republicanos*, the *Independentes*, and the *Socialistas* (see Table 1). Political issues were first and foremost about the candidates and personalities and not the policies. The party system was fragmented; different prominent personalities gave rise to several factions with the PRP which resulted in the division of the PRP into four distinct parties: the *Partido Evolucionista*; the *União Republica*; the Independents; and the PRP itself. Factions came and went, with the result that a total of nineteen parties were represented in the Assembly at one point or another. Elections were frequent, on average every two or three years.

[Table 1 about here]

With the *Estado Novo* came the end of the party proliferation and of democratic parties as we know them. The *União Nacional* was the only legal political organisation, but the dictatorship was unable to vanquish all opposing political forces. The most impressive example of this is *Partido Comunista* (Portuguese Communist Party), founded in 1921. It was able to survive under political repression regime. Since the 1940s the party was led by Álvaro Cunhal.

Another political force of the *Estado Novo* was the MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement), founded in 1969 in time to run in the elections for the National Assembly. Although it represented a significant influence in the *Estado Novo*, the party is now a minor party almost always functions as a kind of satellite of the PCP.

The PCTP/MRPP (Portuguese Workers Communist Party/ Revolutionary Movement of the Proletarian Party) emerged in 1970. This was another significant political organisation that was a large inspiration behind students' movements in the 70s. Like the MDP/CDE, it turned out to be a minor party never being able to win a seat in Parliament.

The PS (Socialist Party) was founded in 1973 in Bad Muenstereiffel, West Germany, by a group of socialist oppositionists that were exiled at that time (Sablosky 1997). Among these leaders was Mário Soares who created the Portuguese branch and served as its leader until 1985. Contrary to the previous three parties, the PSP was born of democracy and, eager to hold democratic power situated itself in the Centre-Left.

revision that reduced the power of the controversial Council of the Revolution, which until then supervised the work of all organs of government.

All other parties were created after the dictatorship was replaced. Here, we will focus on the two most relevant parties of the democratic regime, the PSD and the CDS at the Centre-Right of the political spectrum respectively (see Figure 1). The PPD (People's Democratic Party), later called the PSD (Social Democratic Party), appeared in May of 1974. Its three founding fathers were previously members of the liberal wing of the pre-Revolution National Assembly (Frain 1997). The CDS (Social Democratic Centre), later called PP (Popular Party) was created in July of 1974 and is often thought of and described as the most Right-leaning of the conservative parties represented in the Assembly (Frain 1997).

[Figure 1 about here]

Basically, these four parties—the PS, PSD, PCP, and the PP—are the key players in the Portuguese system since 1974. Following the coup these parties struggled through November of 1975 to decide how to mould the new regime. Nation-building decisions sparked heated debates that went down in history as the *Verão Quente de 1975* (Hot Summer of 1975). The PS, PSD, and CDS struggled to secure a more Western-like representative democracy against the intent of the PCP and the Leftist branches of the military forces that preferred an even more Leftist flavor to the democratic regime, similar to the orthodox Communist model or a military regime similar to those of third world countries (Bruneau and Macleod 1986: 3). A compromise was eventually reached with the PS, PSD, and the CDS/PP setting down most of their ideas in what was and still is, at least theoretically speaking, a Leftist-sounding manifesto, the Constitution of 1976.

The Electorate: Party Identification and Voter Turnout

Two aspects characterize an electorate politically: their attachment or identification with the parties and their voting behaviour. Table 2 reports the aggregated results of the Portuguese political attachment and their self-placement along the political spectrum. Typically, the Portuguese have viewed themselves as being in the Centre of the political spectrum. In the last 10 years, they have given large vote percentages to the PS or the PSD. Table 3 crosstabulates the electorate's Left-Right self-placement results with the voters' past vote; these crosstabulates show that the majority of those placing themselves in the Centre of the political spectrum voted for the PS and the PSD.

[Tables 2 and 3 about here]

With such overwhelming numbers, one might guess that the Portuguese are strongly identify themselves with the parties closest to the Centre. However, that is not the case. Surprisingly, the party identification is not high. During Portugal's twenty five years of *Democracia*, the Portuguese electorate has not grown close to the political parties. The EuroBarometer surveys reveal that the Portuguese are quite far from identifying themselves with a particular party. Every time the Portuguese were asked to what extent they felt close to any party, an overwhelming majority—more than three-fourths—stated that it merely sympathised with a party or was not at all close to one. The Portuguese electorate is not very different from the electorates of other EU member states. In general across these same years, the mean has consistently lied in vicinity of 3.0, meaning “merely sympathising with a party”.

Party attachment is not the only political aspect of the Portuguese electorate considered on the low side. The Portuguese have been identified among the Europeans that least to turnout to vote. In the last legislative election, Portugal indeed had the recorded lowest turnout in the legislative elections—61%—compared to the EU average, 76%. It is true that the number of voters has dwindled throughout its 20 districts since the first free election in 1975. However, a look past the raw turnout percentages is worth considering. These latter numbers conceal a phenomenon that may be at the root of the decreasing voter turnout, more so than voting behaviour itself.

Throughout a quarter of a century of democratic rule, voter turnout in legislative elections has gone from a figure in the vicinity of 90 to approximately 60% and even less in most districts. An examination of Table 4 and Figure 2 clearly shows that turnout did indeed decline steadily in every district. For example, consider the turnout rates in Lisboa, Porto, and Braga—the three largest districts. Turnout in these districts was respectively: 91.9%, 93.8%, and 93.0% in 1975,

77.6, 78.7%, and 78.8% in 1985, 67.1%, 71.0%, and 71.1% in 1995, and most recently in 1999, 61.8%, 65.0%, and 67.4%.

[Table 4 and Figure 2 about here]

Given its ratio composition, voter turnout can decline in three ways. One way may be a decrease in the number of voters; another may be an increase in the number of persons eligible to vote; or both. In the Portuguese case, the districts have indeed experienced a decrease in the number of voters. In fact, from 1975 through 1999, the average change in the number of voters across elections years in each district varied approximately from $-.002$ to $.03$, for an average change across election years of $-.01$ across all districts. However, the number of persons registered to vote also increased during this time period. While the number of voters declined slightly, the number of names on the electoral rolls grew dramatically—and at a higher rate. This occurred in very nearly every election year. One exception consistent across all districts is the 1979 election, an especially contested election year in Portuguese democratic history. The average change in the number of those registered is $+.03$. That is higher than the average growth in the population itself and in the segment of the population aged 15 through 19 from one election year to the next. To check this, let us take, for example, the 1991 population, registration, and elections results. Table 5 shows a comparison of these figures. A quick look at this Table clearly reveals that something is suspect about the electoral rolls: the difference between the 1991 Census estimates of the population and the number of persons registered to vote is noticeably smaller than the segment of the population that is not even old enough to be eligible to register.³

[Table 5 about here]

This suggests that the electoral rolls must be inflated. If the electoral rolls were not inflated, this difference should be quite close to the census estimates of those who should not yet be eligible to register. Obviously, there can be and most likely are individuals over 18 who have not yet registered,⁴ but this only means that the difference between the population and the number of those registered should be even larger than the segment of the population under age. Column F of Table 5 shows that in 1991, the rolls in every district were inflated from 12% in Porto and Aveiro to 30% in Vila Real, 33% in Bragança, and a maximum of 64% in Braga.

³ Eighteen the minimum age to register, therefore it would be preferred to have data on the segment of the population aged 18 and younger. However, available statistical data used 19 as the breakoff age. This should not prove damaging to the point we are making concerning the difference between what the electoral rolls suggest should be the population underage to register and the actual number of those ineligible to register given such a large difference. The number of individuals aged 19 should not decrease the difference by very much.

⁴ The Constitution states that electoral registration is compulsory but in practice that is not what occurs. It is up to each individual to take the necessary steps to register.

How is it possible that there are more persons registered than the number of the individuals who are over eligible to register? It is not theoretically logical for number of registered persons registered to grow at the same rate as the actual growth in the population—much less a higher rate. But in fact that is what appears to have happened. The population grew at a rate of .02, and the number of persons eligible to vote, that is the number of registered persons, grew at almost twice that rate, .01. Figure 3 illustrates this quite well. The population as well as the number of voters in each election year grew ever so slightly. But the number of persons registered to vote grew at a rapid rate from 1975 to the present. One reason for this inconsistent phenomenon is that the electoral rolls may be inflated with names of deceased persons. Another reason may be perhaps that the names of those who have moved from one municipality to another have consistently been kept on the rolls in the previous residential municipality so that they become registered in both locales. Either situation is possible given that there has been little control on matters of electoral registration by political authorities.

[Figure 3 about here]

According to the Portuguese constitutional and electoral law, the apportionment of seats per district is based on the number of registered voters in the district (Article 149), after allowance for four seats elected by Portuguese citizens living abroad, thus providing municipalities with an incentive for not removing names from the rolls and thus restricting turnout figures. Let us consider that the fact that in 1998, the government proceeded for the first time ever to update the electoral rolls. The number of registered persons in the 1999 in the most recent legislative election actually decreased on average -.01 in 14 out of 20 districts. In the eight districts that continued to register an increase in the number of registered persons 1999, it was the lowest increase ever.

The Parties: Number and Competitive Strategies

As the numbers on party identification alluded to, the electoral competition for governmental power in Portugal has focused almost exclusively on the Left-leaning PS and the Right-leaning PSD over the last 10 years. The election results in Table 6 show that in the last three legislative elections, 1991, 1995, and 1999 the combined vote of the PS and PSD totaled approximately 80%. From 1975 through 1987, these two parties won as little as 52 and never more than 76%. Even then, their highest combined vote percentages came when the PS was in an electoral alliance with two smaller parties (UEDS and ASDI, in 1980) and when the PSD was aligned electorally with CDS, PPM, and Reformists (the AD alliance in 1979 and 1980). Up until

1987, the Communists were receiving between 12 and 20% of the vote while the CDS/PP and other small parties to the Right of the PSD were receiving between 10 and 17% of the vote.

These vote percentages tell a common tale of partisan competition during a nation's first generation of democratic governance. The first 12 years of the *Democracia* exhibit a pattern of variable party competition similar to that seen in other emerging democratic systems and, for that matter, in re-established regimes throughout Europe after World War II (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 87-88). New and revamped systems tend to experience an early period of erratic, uncertain competition as ambitious politicians experiment to see what strategies will work. With experience as a teacher, the more as well as less successful politicians and organisations reconsider and re-strategize. The result, often, is to bring clarity to the nature of the competition. That is, through the early years of the process one learns who is vying for governmental power, who might be a pivot party for government formation, and who is positioning to keep their policy or ideological voice heard. Thereafter, electoral competition settles into a relatively more predictable pattern.

The right hand column of Table 6 records the effective number of Portuguese parties, according to both their votes and seats.⁵ From 1975 to 1987, the Portuguese party system had, effectively, from three to five electoral parties and from two-and-a-half to four parliamentary parties. Since 1987, the Portuguese party system has been effectively a three-party system in the electorate and a two-and-a-half party system in the legislature.

[Table 6 about here]

By standards set by mechanical effects of electoral rules, Portugal's party system at the end of *Democracia*'s first generation has to be considered small. With an assembly size of 230, 20 districts, no legal threshold, and a within-district-only d'Hondt allocation rule, Portugal's effective district magnitude is 11.5—i.e., the average number of seats per electoral district as adjusted for compensatory/additional seat allocations and for legal thresholds of inclusion (see Lijphart 1994, 25-9). Alone, that sort of effective district magnitude produces an expected 3.8 effective parties, something on the order of what one might find in Norway or Sweden

⁵ Political scientists have come to rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, originally developed in economics to describe concentrations in foreign trade (Hirschman 1945), to describe the effective number of parties in a system (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The formula weights the system-wide vote or seat proportions received by the parties to describe the system at large. In a formula, the effective number of parties (N_{eff}) is:

$$(N_{\text{eff}}) = 1 / \sum p_i^2,$$

where p_i^2 is the proportion of votes (to produce $N_{V_{\text{eff}}}$) or seats (to produce $N_{S_{\text{eff}}}$), received by party i , and the squared proportion is summed across all parties receiving votes or seats.

(Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 135-41).⁶ But that is not what in fact occurs. During the 1990s, the two-and-a-half to three party system makes Portugal's party system look similar to either Ireland's party system, with its small district magnitudes and with its single-transferable vote rule (STV), or Germany's system, with its high legal threshold and two-tier compensatory allocation.

Three pressures operate to hold down the effective number of Portuguese parties. One is Portugal's semi-presidential system. Another is a relatively small number of issue dimensions that crosscut the Portuguese society. The third is a rather remarkably high breakeven point in the proportionate translation of vote to seat percentages, which is a consequence of an electoral bias favouring large parties, the PSD in particular, when votes are translated into seats.

Presidentialism. The *Constitution of the Portuguese Republic* awards the President substantial power within the norms of a parliamentary system, as we have discussed. According to Matthew Shugart and John Carey (Shugart and Carey 1992; see also, Lijphart 1994, 130-4), such a powerfully endowed and popularly elected individual will tend to focus the electoral energies of parties and thereby exert pressure to reduce the number of effective parties.

The Constitution states that the President represents the entire Republic and holds responsibility for the independence and unity of the state (Article 120). Under that mandate, the Constitution does not anticipate that presidential candidates will be advocates for partisan policy positions. Indeed, presidential nominations come through petitions signed by a requisite number of citizens and submitted to the Constitutional Court (Article 124). With substantial power at stake and with one of the well-served functions of political parties being the organisation of an electorate, the Portuguese parties have found a way into the presidential electoral process. Typically, persons announce their intentions to be presidential candidates; thereafter the parties meet formally and express their preference or support for one of the announced candidates.

The results of Portugal's six presidential elections are reported in Table 7. Overall, there is a tendency of parties to coalesce in one of two patterns that, in the end, has led to the election of a Left/Centre-leaning President. At times a Centre coalition of the PS and PSD formed—1976 and 1981. At other times, Left-leaning versus Right-leaning coalitions have formed—1980, the 1986 runoff, and 1996. One clear consequence is that the candidate supported by the Socialists has won all six elections. Another consequence is that presidential elections do appear to exert

⁶ Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 144) suggest that an approximate description for translating effective district magnitude into an effective number of electoral parties (N_{Veff}) is:

$$(N_{\text{Veff}}) = 1.25 (2 + \log_{10} M_{\text{eff}}).$$

pressure to a reduced number of parties. Except for 1986, the effective number of parties is in the vicinity of 2.0. Interestingly, the 1986 election provides a particularly good illustration of pressure toward a small effective party system *but* also provides a strong qualification to the tendency.

[Table 7 about here]

In the 1985, supporters of President Eanes launched a new party, the PRD, which staked out a position between the PS and the PCP. The infighting among Socialists had its roots in disputes between Eanes and Soares that could be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. With Eanes constitutionally unable to succeed himself, having served two presidential terms, his supporters laid the foundation for a new party in the preceding 1985 Assembly elections. They argued that the PS had lost its compass on the path toward a democratic socialist society. The PRD proved a serious detriment to the electoral appeal of the PS for Assembly seats. It won over 18% of the vote and nearly the same percentage of seats; the PS received its lowest vote percentage, 21.4, during the *Democracia* period. During the following presidential election, the PRD and Eanes himself supported Francisco Salgado Zenha, a founding member of the renewed-PS shortly after the Revolution, who had sided with President Eanes when he took issue with Soares during the late-70's and early-80s. The presidential result was a three-way split of the vote on the left among Soares (PS, 25.4%), Zenha (PRD and PCP, 20.9%), and Lourdes Pintasilgo (UDP, 7.4%)—see Table 7. Soares finished second, ahead of Zenha; and while he was a distant second, it was enough to get him into a runoff with Freitas do Amaral. Seen in the light focused on events leading to Eanes successor, it appears that an ideological dispute resulting from personalities of the candidates seeking power through the presidential office could come together to fractionalise the parties.

The pressure for electoral coalitions was clearly evident during the presidential runoff. Freitas do Amaral, a former student of Marcelo Caetano's pre-Revolution government and a founder of the decidedly Right-of-Centre, CDS/PP, had finished first in the first-round election. To some observers he appeared to be a shoe-in in the runoff. During the three weeks between the elections, however, the PRD, PCP, and UDP stood behind Soares. When the PCP convened in an extraordinary session in early February, the party secretary, Álvaro Cunhal, said: "If it upsets you to vote for him [Soares, former PS leader], shut your eyes. Ignore the name and photo. Just put a cross in the box next to them on the ballot paper" (quoted in Keesing's 1986, 34313). With the PRD, PCP and UDP support, Soares eked out a victory. The seemingly ideological dogmatism on the Left appears to have had its limits.

For an effective district magnitude of 11.5, the expected value of N_v is 3.83.

The presidential results suggest that the electoral basis of this office does indeed have a constricting on the party system, with a focus on the Centre. They also offer evidence of a caution not to overstate that tendency. The presidential office could prove fertile ground for launching a new party given the appropriate candidate with who can claim to be filling an ideological void. Still, typically, there are in the neighborhood of just over two effective parties at the presidential level. Viewed in conjunction with the legislative election results reported above, Table 6, one has the impression of a “stretched” two-party system. The major parties are in the Centre, one leaning a little to the Left and the other to the Right, and each of the major parties has its extremist on its wings. The wings stand on their own principles to the extent that prudence permits. At those times when electoral success and, with it, the pursuit of governing power require, the system temporarily constitutes effectively two umbrella parties.

Issue Cleavages. A second restricting influence on the number of effective parties is that of issue cleavages. The few salient issue cleavages that exist among the Portuguese people and parties do not create much need nor leave much room for the development of a large number of parties. This, too, can be expected to reduce the number of parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1984; 1999; Taagepera and Grofman 1985).

In the early 90s at the request of Michael Laver and Ben Hunt, a few experts weighed in and pronounced themselves on the issue positions of the parties in 16 Western democracies, among them the Portuguese parties (Laver and Hunt 1992). From the expert assessments, Laver and Hunt were among the first to provide the results of a survey of expert opinions on where the parties stand on eight particular issues and how important these issues are to the them.

Table 8 reports the Laver-Hunt recorded salience of the four major Portuguese parties on these eight issues (see, Laver and Hunt 1992, 286-91). The most salient issue for all major parties is *public ownership of the means of production*, which Laver and Hunt report to be the most indicative of the Left-Right dimension. Companion to Table 8 is Figure 4, showing that to whatever extent other issues are salient, the Laver-Hunt experts see the major Portuguese parties as holding different pro-con positions but lining up in essentially the same Left-Right order from one issue area to the next. Looking at the party positions assigned by the experts, one’s first impression is that there is a general Left-Right dimension, covering economic and social issues, and a second centralisation/decentralisation dimension. There is a seeming distinctiveness of a second dimension due to the outlying position of the PCP on the issue of centralisation and decentralisation. Indeed, Laver and Hunt (1992, 53) themselves speak of a singular dimension on

which all of the issues, except for centralization/decentralization, load heavily. Centralisation/decentralisation is the only issue loading on a second dimension.

[Table 8 and Figure 4 about here]

Although there appears to be a second dimension, it must be interpreted with caution. This is because centralisation/decentralisation is much more a matter of the means of organizing political advocacy within the Portuguese context than a goal in and of itself. In advanced industrial societies, the Left tends to advocate centralized decision-making and improving the quality of life in the environment and of the workers congregating in cities. However, centralisation in the Portuguese mindset has instrumental value; it is not an ideological goal. Centralisation makes it easier to organize a planned economy and minimize the risk that localized political jurisdictions will variously define and distribute public sector goods and services with the effect that the scope of public goods is more narrow than it would be were they defined by one decisionmaker for an entire nation (Schattschneider 1960). In Portugal, with its experience of dictatorial rule and totally centralized government, a sizable agricultural sector, and a huge maldistribution of landholdings in rural areas, the political Left sees the instrumental value of centralisation differently. On the far-Left, the groupings of identified Communist factions, including the Greens (PEV), are divided on the question of centralisation (Laver and Hunt 1992, 289). Near the Left-Centre of the spectrum, the PS has mixed motives. Centralisation helps the PS desires to pursue a planned economy. But to avoid the risk of totalitarian rule, the PS favours distributing decision-making. As Silvia Mendes (2000) explains, when the decentralisation question took centre-stage in the form of a 1998 referendum asking whether there should be devolution of political authority to regional units, it was not easy to discern where the Socialists stood. This was despite the PS's seemingly commitment to devolution as foreshadowed by the 1976 Constitution. In 1998, no party seems to have articulated a commanding and appealing principle for or against devolution. The debate seems to have been gone in the direction of technical and ancillary matters—e.g., the public finance expense of decentralisation, what it meant to Portugal's position in the EU, and the predictability how it might rearrange political competition.

By overlaying a single line across the party positions (i.e., dimensional line drawn at about a 45° angle, that Laver and Hunt refer to as the underlying Left-Right dimension), we see that there is only one dimension (see Figure 4).

Given the single-dimension of Portuguese politics, as seen through the lens of experts viewing the major parties, across the board, issue by issue, the PCP is furthest Left and the PP is

furthest Right.⁷ In between, the PS is located at a Centre-Left position and the PSD at a Centre-Right position in conformity with Figure 1, previously introduced. The consequence is that the issue space as organised by the Portuguese major parties appears to form one dimension.

Whether the issue involves the ownership of the means of production, taxation and service allocations by the state, foreign relations, state control over social and religious aspects of life, or others, we find the parties arrange themselves along a one-dimensional policy space. At least according to these experts they are.

Disproportionality. It might be said, half in jest and half-seriously, that political parties provide an answer to the question of whether falling trees make a sound in the forest when no one is around. Parties and their would-be vote supporters ask whether policy advocacy has any meaning if none or few of its candidates find their way to parliament. For this reason, even if policy is its foremost concern, a party that is continually disadvantaged by the rules translating votes into seats faces an uphill battle to keep its voters in subsequent elections and to serve the office-holding ambitions of its politically active members. In turn, it follows, disproportionately high seat returns for large parties and, concomitantly, disproportionately low seat returns for small parties encourage the party system to contract in number. Such is the case in Portugal.

A review of the numbers in Table 6 shows that anytime a party received more than 20% of the vote—and this occurred with the PS and PSD or their alliances—the party received a seat-versus-vote bonus. Taking a party's seat percentage and subtracting from the party's vote percentage shows that Portuguese parties with small to moderate vote shares have suffered seat-versus-vote deficits between -0.1 and -2.8 . The PSD and PS, on the other hand, have received seat-versus-vote bonuses between 1 and 8 percent.

Figure 5 illustrates how the advantages and disadvantages correspond to the variability in the vote levels. The figure helps to illustrate two forms of electoral advantage. First, it marks the breakeven point for votes and seats somewhere near the vicinity of 20% of the vote. Parties winning votes above the 20% mark receive a seat bonus; those below that mark suffer a seat deficit. Relatively speaking, this is a very high breakeven point for a PR system. A breakeven score of 20 is below that of Anglo-American single-member district plurality systems (31 to 47%), but compared to other Western European PR systems during the 20th century, only the

⁷ A convenient way to gain a visual image of the single dimension is to have the mind's eye draw a line from any party issue position to the illustrated dimension so that the imaginary line comes to the illustrated dimension at a 90° angle. We have drawn one such imaginary line from the PCP's position on decentralisation. It should be obvious that, for example, all the PCP issue positions are furthest Left along the illustrated dimension.

French system in 1945-46 had a breakeven point as high as 20 (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 90-1). Almost surely this puts pressure on small and medium-sized parties to coalesce as well as on voters to focus their attention on the two largest parties. The second electoral advantage only involves the two major parties. There is a general tendency for the PSD large-party seat bonus to exceed the seat bonus going to the PS. On average, across all the 10 elections, the PSD seat bonus is +4.4 while the PS seat bonus is +2.8. We believe this has something to do with the degree of the disproportionality because the higher the vote percentage, the larger the seat bonus more so for the PS as shown in the slope comparison. The PSD average vote is 37.7% compared to the PS average of 33.5%. However, as shown in Figure 4, even after taking the vote percentage differences into account, by overlaying a least squares line on seat advantages in relationship to the vote percentages, there is a general tendency for the PSD to receive a larger seat bonus than the PS—this is a bias in favour of the PSD.

[Figure 5 about here]

In addition to what the disproportionality of the system suggests about the pressures that reduce the effective number of parties, it raises a question about the operation of the electoral rules. How could a seemingly reasonable and fair set of rules—an assembly of 230 members, elected under d'Hondt rules in 20 districts with no legal threshold—be associated with such a high breakeven point and with a general tendency to reward the PSD more so than the PS? The answer, we think, could come from biases in the system.

Electoral Bias. Two types of electoral bias can arise under most electoral systems. One is the result of the way a system creates differential voter weights due to either malapportionment in seat allocations or to differential turnout rates. The other comes from the electoral formula used to allocate seats on the basis of votes within districts. In Portugal, this formula is the d'Hondt rule.

Rotten boroughs and rules favouring rural over urban areas are legendary in SMD systems, as in the UK during the 19th century and U.S. into the 1960s, but malapportionment systems can exist in PR systems as well. As a hypothetical example of malapportionment under PR rules in Portugal, imagine that the Lisboa district deserves, on the basis of its number of eligible voters, 60 seats, but that the apportionment allocates only 50 seats. A party that receives its highest vote percentage in this district will win fewer seats than its nationwide percentage of the vote would require because the votes in this district are undervalued. Votes would be weighted as 5/6ths of their fair value. Malapportionment is a structural problem. The same consequence can arise for behavioural reasons associated with turnout differentials across

districts. On this score, imagine two fairly apportioned districts, each with 10 seats and 1000 eligible voters. In District #1, only 100 votes are cast with the parties' votes distributed as $A = 70$, $B = 20$, and $C = 10$. In District #2, all the eligible voters cast a ballot, and the party votes are $A = 300$, $B = 500$, and $C = 200$. Under a fair allocation, by district, party A will win 50% of the seats (seven from District #1 and three from District #2) with only 33.6% of the vote (370/1100).

The 226 seats for resident citizens are apportioned to the 20 electoral districts, 18 contiguous geographical areas on the continent and one district each for the autonomous island regions of the Açores and Madeira. The district boundaries are set by statute. The voter registration on which the apportionment is based is compulsory and permanent (Article 113). As suggested in our discussion of voter turnout, the registration system makes one wonder whether there may not be some form of political maneuvering for partisan gain when it comes to getting and keeping voters' names on the rolls. In turn, basing the apportionment of seats on registration makes one wonder whether electoral bias due to malapportionment may have crept into the system.

Table 9 reports population and registered voters counts, as well as for each of the each of the 20 electoral districts. For the 1991 election, the time of the most recent available official census of population. We can compare the third column of numbers, the actual seat apportionment, to two precisely calculated theoretical apportionment values. The first comparison is to what a hypothetically precise apportionment based on population, rather than on registered voters, would yield. Recognizing that any precise apportionment is impossible because seats are allocated in whole numbers while precise calculations include fractions, we see that only five of the 20 districts have actual apportionments that differ by more than rounding (i.e., ± 0.5). These include the four of the five largest districts—Aveiro, Braga, Lisboa, and Porto—plus the Madeira islands district. Aveiro, Braga, Porto, and Madeira are slightly undervalued; Lisboa is noticeably overvalued with seats 3.16 above what its population size alone would indicate. The second comparison makes it clear that the slight under and overvaluing in certain districts, with respect to population size, is due in part to registration differentials. Comparably speaking, Aveiro, Braga, and Porto are slightly undervalued because their populations are low relative to the individuals registered. Indeed, in the case of Porto, the 1.4 seat undervaluing with respect to population becomes a 1.18 seat overvaluing when it comes to registered voters. It appears that, by and large, using of registration as compared to population may take away from the larger districts is in the end restored by an apportionment formula that provides a slight advantage to large districts. Notice that the two largest districts, Lisboa and Porto, each have seat allocation that is more than 0.5 above what the precise registration-based apportionment would yield. On

the basis of these numbers, we must conclude that it is difficult to see how any sort of systematic malapportionment bias in favour of one party or the other exists in the Portuguese electoral system.

[Table 9 about here]

Could there be some form of interrelationship among apportionment, voter turnout, and the distribution of party votes that come together to favour the larger parties relative to the medium-sized and small parties and to benefit the PSD relative to the PS? The evidence that responds to that question is a resounding *no*. Students of SMD elections since the time of Francis Edgeworth's initial foray into investigating electoral bias (Edgeworth 1898, 536) have shown that the total vote-weight bias, which combines biases due to malapportionment with those due to turnout, can be calculated by means of simple arithmetic (Butler 1947, pp. 284-85). The nationwide vote percentage for a party is implicitly calculated with each voter given an equal weight. The calculation of an average vote percentage for a party across a set of districts with weights set according to the number of seats, means that any difference between the nationwide percentage and the weighted average percentage records the difference between fair vote weights and vote weights that they are affected by malapportionment differentials, turnout differentials, or both. These calculations for Portugal's 1991 election show that the difference is never more than nine one-hundredths of one percent (0.09%). By way of contrast, in the United States this calculation can be shown to have been as large as 3 and 4% (Campbell 1996). In short, there is nothing in either the apportionment or the turnout rates across districts that would appear to produce a degree of partisan bias worth mentioning.

Of course, the high breakeven point, the advantages for the larger parties in general, and the advantage to the PSD over the PS are still unaccounted for. Given that it is not due to electoral biases associated with malapportionment or turnout, it almost certainly must be due to favouritism toward the large parties that arise from the seat allocation formula itself.

The d'Hondt formula for allocating seats based on vote percentages has a well-known tendency to favour parties that win large vote percentages. How much a large party is favoured depends on district magnitude so that the larger the magnitude, the smaller the favouritism. As a general tendency, Portugal's 11.5 effective district magnitude or 11.3 if we only consider the 226 seats allocated from the residential vote ($\text{\#of seats} / \text{\#of districts}$) should produce seat allocations with reasonable proportionate accuracy, or so it would seem. To say that Portugal's district magnitude is 11.5 is to use an average value to describe the system overall. As with so many descriptions based on an average value, there can be distortions in what the average actually tells us about reality. Table 8 showed that the Portugal's average district magnitude is a central

tendency based on a highly skewed distribution. To see this, let us consider the median district magnitude. While the average is 11.5, the median district magnitude is seven. Only 10 out of 20 districts win seats ranging from three to six. The other half have seats ranging from eight to 50 seats, with two of these being outliers on the very high end, Lisboa with its 49 seats and Porto with 37.

From the literature developed by Rokkan (1968) through Rae, Hanby, and Loosemore (1971) and Lijphart and Gibberd (1977), it can and has been shown that under the d'Hondt formula a party could win as much as 25% of the vote in a three-seat district and never actually win a single seat. Generally, to be certain of winning a seat a party's vote percentage must exceed $(100 \times [1 / M + 1])$, where M is the district magnitude. In three, four, five, and six seat districts, therefore, a party would have to exceed, respectively, 25, 20, 16.7, and 14.2 percent of the vote to guarantee itself one seat. In Portugal, therefore, a small party can guarantee itself a seat from the Lisboa district with about 2% of the vote. In half of the districts, the vote percentage must be much higher. In those districts with three to six seats, a party's vote percentage will need to be higher than 25%, with three seats and higher than 14.2%, with six seats.

In stricter terms, whether a party actually has to reach those vote levels to win a seat within a district depends on the vote distribution across all of the parties and not just a single party. To see how allocations might work, we can take an example similar to what we might actually see in Portugal, with five parties, A-E in the table below, receiving vote percentages of 39, 31, 12, 9, and 8. The numbers in the left-hand column give the d'Hondt divisor, from 1 to 5, and the numbers to the right of the divisions (in bold) give the rank order priority for receiving a seat.

		Hypothetical Example of Party Vote Percentage in a District (seat allocation priority number in bold next to the dividend)									
		<i>A</i>		<i>B</i>		<i>C</i>		<i>D</i>		<i>E</i>	
<i>Party</i>		39%		31%		12%		9%		8%	
d'Hondt Divisor											
1		39.00	1	31.00	2	12.00	6	9.00	9	8.00	10
2		19.50	3	15.50	4	6.00	-	4.50	-	4.00	-
3		13.00	5	10.33	7	4.00	-	3.00	-	2.67	-
4		9.75	8	7.75	-	3.00	-	2.25	-	2.00	-
5		7.80	-	6.20	-	2.40	-	1.80	-	1.60	-

Under the given vote percentages, the two largest parties win the first five seats. Thus, in a district with three, four, or five seats, the two large parties win 100% of the seats with 70 percent of the vote. Even in an eight-seat district, the two largest parties win seven out of eight seats, i.e., 87.5% of the seats with 70% of the vote. Notice, also, that generally but not always the single largest party enjoys the single largest advantage. These two tendencies of the d'Hondt formula are important elements when it comes to explaining Portugal's high breakeven point, favouritism toward large parties, and in particular toward the PSD compared to the PS in the small districts. In other words, in Portugal's 10 districts with a small number of seats, even the medium-sized parties such as the Communists have found it difficult to win a seat. For that reason alone, both the PSD and PS enjoy an advantage over the smaller parties, and as the single largest party in the small districts most of the time the PSD enjoys the single largest advantage. To see how these effects arise, we need to turn to the seats won by the parties in each district.

Table 10 shows the number of seats, the party vote percentages, and the number of seats won in each of the 20 electoral districts for the 1999 Assembly election. The first thing to notice is that only in districts with 10 or more seats did a party win a seat with less than 10% of the vote. Furthermore, the most *disproportionate* within-district results arise in the small districts, and the *most directly proportionate* results for the leading party in a district emerged in the largest districts. On the small-district side, Beja with three seats saw the PS win 67% of the seats (two of three) with 46.7% of the vote, and in Portalegre with three seats, the PS won 67% of the seats (two of three) with 51.3% of the vote. On the large-district side, in Lisboa, the PS won 46.9% of the seats (23 of 49) with 42.6% of the vote; in Porto the PS won 51.4% of the seats (19 of 37) with 48.0% of the vote.

[Table 10 about here]

The message that is loud and clear here is that in all districts, regardless of district magnitude, the leading party enjoys a seat-to-vote advantage. And the smaller the district, the larger, generally, is that advantage, unless their regional base warrants substantial electoral effort. For instance, the Communists are discouraged in small districts, except in the Alentejo districts of Beja and Évora. The two large parties tend to enjoy highest vote support in districts with fewer than seven seats.⁸ To the PS and the PSD relative appeal in small districts, the d'Hondt formula adds a bonus.

⁸ The 1999 PS and PSD combined nationwide vote amounted to 76.3% of the total. With the PSD doing especially poorly in Alentejo districts, the combined percentages of the two major parties is lower. Otherwise, in Viana do Castelo they won an average 76.0%, and in the other six small districts they won more than 80%.

Finally, though a strong inference would require more detailed analysis, the election results in Table 9 offer a strong suggestion that the small advantage over the PS comes from how the PSD's relatively low vote support in Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal. These three districts had, in 1999, 50, 19, and 17 seats, respectively. Other than districts in the Communist strongholds in the Alentejo, Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal are the two districts where the PSD does relatively poorly. The PS, on the other hand, performs at or about its nationwide average in these three districts. Because the d'Hondt formula inflicts disadvantages to medium-sized parties in large districts, the PSD disadvantage for poor performance in a district is attenuated. And, even though the PSD-to-PS advantage is small, if the PS held the advantage, it would almost surely have won a clear majority of the seats in 1999, instead of the exact 50% (115 seats) they did win. That is, if the Lisboa area were divided into 10 five-seat districts, the PS almost surely would have had a parliamentary majority. Alternatively, if Viana do Castelo, Vila Real, Viseu, the Açores, and Madeira formed one combined district of 30 seats, the PS would likely hold a majority.

The development of the Portuguese party system during the nation's 25-plus years of *Democracia* shows us something on the order of a two-and-a-half to three party system. Each of three elements—a presidential office with real powers, legislative electoral rules, and a seemingly unidimensional issue space—tend to push the party system toward fewer rather than more parties. Under the political developments in the light of the push from presidential politics is it likely that the system may go even further toward a two-party model? Today, that looks unlikely. The ideological distances between the parties, especially the Communists and the PS, appear too large to allow a merger except for the temporary electoral convenience at the time of the majoritarian presidential contests. The rules for electing the Assembly of the Republic—as long as there exist a few large districts, the Alentejo geographic Communist base, or both—provide real opportunities for the Communists. For one thing, the party can retain its distinctive voice through the legislative elections and in the Assembly of the Republic itself. Also, Communist leaders will be able to retain their positions of power, in the party organisation and in the Assembly. Having the Communists stand on their own also saves the PS the effort of devising a strategy for trying to figure out how to structure a ballot that balances their politicians with politicians who, but for electoral disincentives, would prefer to stand for election as Communists. The long-run fate of parties that have been standing to the right of the PSD is not so clear. They do not appear to have any particularly strong regional base, similar to the Alentejo for the Communists. And, after 1976, their electoral size has never been so large as to lead anyone to believe that they can mount and sustain electoral efforts that will do much to put power in the hands of their leaders. We can

well imagine that ambitious politicians on the Right will be able to find leadership positions within the PSD, reasonably congenial to their ideological leanings. This is the reason for the AD having recently resurfaced, died, and is a possibility.

We have at this juncture, therefore, a vision of a Portuguese party system that lines up Right to Left with one major Right-leaning party, one major Left-of-Centre party, and a medium-sized party somewhat on the distant Left in the Portuguese policy space. Given, on the one hand, that it is the distance along the Left-Right spectrum that would seem to provide the motivation for the system not to contract to a two-party system and, on the other, that we are assuming there is no significant dimension other than Left-Right that might expand the system, we turn next to the evidence of the policy space of Portuguese politics to see what it can tell us.

Electoral Strategies: Dimensionality of the Portuguese Policy Space

Very little is known about the dimensionality of the Portuguese policy space. Only in the last decade did expert assessments include Portugal. But existing opinions to date do not tell the same story, leaving us with mixed impressions of what is really going on.

In the last section on party competition, we learned that the Laver and Hunt expert study (1992) describe the Portuguese policy space to be unidimensional. John Huber and Ronald Inglehart (1995) appeared on the heels of Laver and Hunt offering their take on the Left-Right dimension in 42 nations, among them Portugal. Arend Lijphart's (1999) added his voice to the discussion of what he calls issue dimensions. What is interesting about these two studies is that they raise the question of whether the Portuguese policy space is really unidimensional. In contrast to Laver and Hunt's public ownership category, Huber and Inglehart (1995, 89) identify "traditional vs. new culture" as the most salient category, where "traditional vs. new culture" refers to (1995, 78) "traditions, religious values, Catholic state, ecological sensitivity, idealism, pacifism, secularism, participation, culture, environment, religion, moral order and social conservatism".

Lijphart (1999, 80) suggests that there is more to the Portuguese policy space than the singular economic dimension. He claims there are 2.5 issue dimensions with socioeconomic issues being the most salient, followed by three other "medium-salience" issues: religion, regime support, and foreign policy issues. Lijphart also considers a "cultural-ethnic" issue category, but contrary to Huber and Inglehart, he does not think it is relevant in characterising the Portuguese policy space.

One message stands out clearly at this point: there is nothing clear about what the Portuguese policy space looks like. Laver and Hunt (1992) tell us one thing; Huber and Inglehart (1995) tell us something else, and so does Lijphart (1999). Their take on the matter is that there is an added complexity. Huber and Inglehart and Lijphart disagree on exactly what that added complexity is. In short, there is considerable wonderment as to how the parties organise themselves and no idea whatsoever as to the dynamics of party alignment in the policy space.

A Closer Look at the Evidence

Up until now, we have been dealing with static views of the Portuguese party positions. They capture snapshot positions, at best, of the time of the expert surveys. McDonald and Mendes (2001a) cast doubt on whether these static distinctions among party positions could accurately reflect the reality of the Party positions. This is because the expert studies were found to be highly stable. But as McDonald and Mendes (2001a), using Comparative Manifesto Project data, show, the parties can and do move about strategically in the short run without straying too far along the Left-Right dimension. Being stable, the expert studies cannot assess party movements. The CMP data allow one to draw inferences about the party dynamics since they report on what the parties say at each election point in time.

As Mendes and McDonald (2001b) later qualify, short run party dynamics can occur because parties change the emphasis they give to specific issues by placing more emphasis on some issues compared to the others, by purposefully placing less emphasis on other issues, or by paying attention to categories that may be largely new to their party programmes. Would it not be interesting to see how, if at all, any redimensioning has occurred in the Portuguese policy space and still more interesting yet to see why and the part of which parties?

Issue Saliency

A preliminary look at the descriptive evidence on the saliency of the issue domains and categories will help us with what to expect when exploring the dimensionality of the Portuguese space. This is because the dimensionality as assessed by the manifestos is extracted under a coding scheme that was founded on saliency theory to begin with (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; McDonald and Mendes 2001a).

The means of the seven CMP domains tell us how much the parties have been referring to or emphasizing them; in other words, they tell us about the saliency or importance of the issue categories to the parties: External Relations (8.3), Freedom & Democracy (13.4), Political System

(7.5),¹ Economy (18.9), Welfare & Quality of Life (19.1), Fabric of Society (3.4), and Social Groups (10.3). As is easily seen, “Fabric of Society” is the domain receiving the least mention, so much so that we exclude it from any dimensional analyses that we perform. Interesting to note as of yet is that this is precisely the domain equivalent to Huber and Inglehart’s “tradition vs. new culture” category. So at this point, we are already doubtful of what these experts tell us since the evidence does not support these authors’ premise regarding the primary issue of concern to the Portuguese parties. Economy (Domain 4) and Welfare and Quality of Life (Domain 5) are the dominant foci of the parties, with Freedom and Democracy (Freedom & Democracy) coming in a distant third.

Table 11 shows these means as well other descriptive statistics of the data we are employing to assess the dimensionality of the Portuguese policy space. Also featured in Table 11 are the descriptive statistics of the 20-year period divided into two sub-periods: 1975-1983 elections and the 1985-1995 elections.⁹

[Table 11 about here]

If we compare across sub-periods, we see that economic matters dominated the first half of this 20-year period with a mean of 17.49. In these first ten years of democratic history, however, it is Domain 2—especially the appeal to democracy and the democratic regime, the promotion of the constitution and the freedoms it awarded—that occupied the second most important domain to Portuguese parties with a mean of 16.77; and close behind was Welfare and Quality of Life with a mean of 16.26. Not too far off was Domain 7, Social Groups—particularly the concern for the well-being of the farming society and the establishment of labour unions.

Social and environmental concerns clearly began receiving more emphasis in the latter half of the period under consideration, as Table 12 specifies more in a more detailed fashion. Most of the favourable mention categories in this Domain gained in emphasis in the last ten years. When the economy began to come under some long-awaited control in the mid 80s, the political stability that followed and accompanied it allowed the parties to turn to building infrastructure and improving the quality of life.

[Table 12 about here]

One domain whose emphasis is clearly overstated when only considering the whole period is that of Domain 2, Freedom & Democracy. Party mentions of freedom and democracy

⁹ Critics may argue whether the 1987 election should have been the election separating the two periods because it was Cavaco Silva’s second win in 1987 that gave him a governing majority for the first time in democratic history. We chose to include the 1985 election given that we are considering a possible disjunction in time due to stability—both economic and political—and since we are assuming the EU entry

received considerably less emphasis in the latter part of the period under analysis—about half of what it was getting before. On the flipside, Domain 3's salience, Political System, nearly doubled from the pre-85 period to the post-85 period.¹⁰

Table 13 shows a breakdown of the mean emphases of the four major parties. All four parties have been concerned with welfare questions, mostly especially the PSP and PSD. It also shows that the most Left-leaning party, PCP, emphasised questions of freedom and democracy far more than any other party. In fact in the last ten years, it was the only major party still heavily focused on these issues when the remaining major players had moved on to other issues. Social matters, as well as agricultural and labour groups have long been important to the Communists (PCP), with the latter more so in the first ten years and welfare and social issues in the last ten. The economic categories most concentrated on are, as would be expected, Marxist-related categories.

[Table 13 about here]

Market-oriented statements have been a major part of the Christian Democrats' or the Popular Party (PP) programmes, more so than the Socialists (PSP) and Social Democrats (PSD). All three of these parties to the left of PCP have been concerned with productivity, infrastructure, and other economic goals—most of all the PSD—as well as governmental and administrative efficiency—most of all the PP at the Right. In fact, the Populists' interest in political matters has only grown over the years, as a comparison of the means shows.

Dimensionality of the Policy Space

We have, at this point, a pretty good idea of what to expect in the dimensional analysis, that of two overall factors that define the party space: an economic and social dimension. Potentially a third and fourth factor coming from the External Relations and Social Groups domains in defining the principal underlying dimensions in Portuguese democratic history. What we know that there has been some strategic manoeuvring on the party of the Portuguese parties.

year as the beginning of less volatile economic times for the Portuguese economy, 1985 seemed to be a reasonable choice (see Gallagher, 1986, 1988).

¹⁰ The category labeled Political Authority is dropped from all of our analyses due the considerable emphasis that all of the parties place on political authority (see Appendix Table 1), so much so that the Communist Party is more Right-leaning than the extreme Rightist in Europe. Keeping it would produce unreliable estimates. The Portuguese experience with the overthrow of the authoritarian regime made the parties emphasise the importance of the new regime. Keeping this category in the analyses would only skew the results.

But solely looking at the issue salience across the board from 1975-95 does not allow us to say this. It is misleading with respect to what issues the parties hold dear to them.

The first stage factor analysis allowed us to extract one factor within each domain (except for Domain 6 as discussed above) using Principal Components method and Varimax rotation. Table 14 reports the factor loadings of the first stage factor analysis using CMP data (Volkens 2001) for the period covering all legislative elections since the first government during the period 1975-95. Table 15 reports on the factor loadings for each of two sub-periods we thought interesting to analyse separately, given the relevance of the crossover period in Portuguese political and economic stability, before and after the 1985 election period.

[Table 14 and 15 about here]

Across the entire period, we extracted a factor that we are designating as “Good International Relations” in the External Relations domain. All of the issue categories receiving a substantial amount of attention (a CMP score of equal to or greater than 1.00) load on or about .6. That which is leads the Portuguese parties to make statements about the Nation’s positive international and good military relations also makes them speak negatively about anti-imperialism and negative military interventions. In the Freedom & Democracy domain, we extracted a “Democratic or Civic Rights or Freedoms” factor on which most all categories load on or about .7. In the third domain, Political System, the issue categories load on a factor “Better Government” about .8. As in the previous domain, most parties seem to agree on matters of democratic freedom. In the next three domains, we extracted an “Economic Growth”, a “Social Concern/Quality of Life”, and an “Economic Groups. On the Economic factor, the issue categories loaded about .6 on free market issues, with the exception of Marxist-like statements. The parties are divided in that the those parties making favorable statements about issues like free enterprise and other free-market oriented issues also make negative statements on Marxist-oriented and market regulated issues. On the question of Quality of Life, most issue categories loaded on this factor on or about .8. The same occurs with the Economic Groups factor. And we get fairly the same picture when our analysis of this 20-year period.

Figures 6 A-F illustrate the individual party scores on each of the six first-stage factors by election. Two things deserve notice: the factor extracted with Domain 2 or the Democratic/Civic Rights or Freedoms factor shown in Figure 6B and the Domain 7 or Economic Groups factor shown in Figure 6F. In both cases, the parties are positioned very close to one another, especially following the 1975 and 1976 elections. This means that they are pretty much in agreement on these matters and, therefore, we would not expect them to organize themselves along any distinguishable dimension.

[Figures 6 A-F about here]

In order to more clearly define the Portuguese policy space, we further reduced these six factors in a subsequent factor analysis. Table 16 shows the results of the second stage analysis for all three periods and Figures 7 A-C plot the resulting factors against one another: Factor 1 on the horizontal axis and the Factor 2 on the vertical axis. Here, factors with eigenvalues above 1.00 were extracted, again using the Principal Components extraction method. The factor loadings shown in Table 16 are the Varimax rotated figures. Two factors were extracted, however, as the depiction in Figures 7A-C communicates, there appears to be really only one dimension, a dimension similar to the Left-Right dimension. And this is so regardless of whether we are considering the entire period or the two sub-periods, before and after political and economic stability, although the picture is clearer when we factor analyse the first 10 years of democracy (see Figure 8B). Looking at Table 16 and Figure 7, we can see that one factor creates the suspicion of a possible second dimension: that of “Democratic and Civic Rights”. This factor fails to conform to the general tendency we observe, but the lack of fit on freedom and democracy may very well be a matter of consensus just as Figure 7B shows. What is happening here is that the parties by and large agree on matters of this nature. Given the lack of distinction among them on these questions, it is fair to expect that they would not organize themselves in the same way as they would on Left-Right matters. And indeed they do not.

[Table 16 and Figures 7 A-C about here]

Given that we are excluding the possibility of a second dimension, our final depiction in Figure 8 represents the Portuguese policy space as we see it: a unidimensional space, with the parties moving around strategically from one election to the next, in conformity with our salience analysis, but by and large organising themselves according to a general Left-Right dimension. In this way our analysis confirms that Laver and Hunt (1992) were right on the mark about the Portuguese policy space. It does appear to be unidimensional. But our story goes beyond what Laver and Hunt, as well as any other expert assessment, can tell us. We not only effectively show how the parties align themselves along this singular dimension, but we are also able to say something about the party dynamics. The evidence shows that there is considerable strategic movement or change through time, at least on the part of the four major parties. This change or movement reflects a contracting party system, with the parties moving closer to one another towards the Centre from one election to the next. Figure 8 shows two things: 1) the contracting tendency; but 2) it also reveals how the parties, particularly the smaller parties, the PP and the PCP, adapted to this changing environment.

[Figure 8 about here]

As we can see from Figure 8, party movement is common among all four parties. In the beginning, the parties were strategically closer to the Left, not wanting to be associated with the Right. Indeed, the Constitution of 1976 is Leftist sounding, even today. But in the late 70s, the parties became office-seekers because they began to approach the Centre of the political spectrum. The consequence was a compression in the party system. The greatest contribution to this compression was the PS movement toward the Right. In the first two elections, in 1975 and 1976, the PS was very close to the Communists on the Left, but then it took off to the Right and, but for the in early 1980s elections, stayed there. In a couple of cases it actually leap-frogged the PSD on the Left-Right dimension. This left the PCP, although also having moved toward the especially when in alliance with the Greens, with the most Leftist place in the policy space. In this way, the PCP secured its survival by remaining a clear Leftist option to the Portuguese electorate. Also presenting itself as a distinct policy option is the PP, generally in the Right-most position in the last ten years. It strategically sought to disassociate itself from the PSD following the breakup of the AD, thus providing a distinct policy choice to the public.

Conclusion

This study tells a story of the Portuguese party system and the dimensionality of its policy space in times of mounting pressure in Europe for parties to innovate. It is essentially a story of the changing environment of the party system and the strategic survival behaviour of the parties. We began by describing the Portuguese party system, where it came from, how it developed and adapted to a changing environment. Our main purpose was to explore what strategic changes, if any, had occurred.

Our principal message is one of compression. The Portuguese party system has contracted throughout its democratic history with the parties largely behaving in a Downsian, office-seeking way approaching the middle of the political spectrum. Throughout this paper, we have argued and effectively shown evidence pointing to three main forces contributing to this compression tendency: 1) the characteristics of the electoral system—particularly the nature of the presidential powers, the vote-to-seat-translation rule, d'Hondt, and the geographics and size of the electoral districts— 2) the societal cleavages; and 3) the unidimensional policy space itself.

These features of the Portuguese society and party system are not likely to change, at least not in the near future. That means that one can expect the tendency for Portugal to have a small number of effective parties is likely to continue. And this has important implications for those smaller parties that have up until now been able to compete, and wish to continue

competing for a few seats in parliament, with the two largest Centrist parties, the PS and the PSD. In the Portuguese case, these smaller parties are the PCP and the PP. The only option these parties have to survive in the trend of contraction is through the issue dimensions. Depending on where they position themselves along the Left-Right dimension, they can offer more distinct policy choices to the Portuguese electorate. In this way, they have a chance at successfully adapting to the system environment.

To sum up, in the end our analyses allowed us to, not only check the expert opinions of the Portuguese party and policy space—among which we stand with those of Laver and Hunt (1992) about the unidimensionality of the Portuguese policy space—, but also to track the dynamics of the system, that is, the strategic manoeuvring of the parties. In this way, we expand on what has thus far been said about the Portuguese party system. We learn two addition things. First, throughout its democratic history, the party system is contracting, and second, the only viable option for party survival depends on how they, particularly the smaller parties, pronounce themselves on the issues.

Table 1: Legislative Vote Shares by Party in the First Republic, 1910-26

Parties	Constituent Assembly		1911-15		1915-17		1918-19		1919-21		1921		1922-25		1925-26	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Republicanos	229	97.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Independentes	3	1.2	19	12.1	13	8	5	3.2	13	7.9	5	3	5	3	19	11.6
Socialistas	2	0.8	3	1.9	2	1.2	-	-	8	4.9	-	-	-	-	2	1.2
Democráticos	-	-	82	52.5	106	63.8	-	-	86	52.7	54	33.1	71	43.5	83	50.9
Evolucionistas	-	-	41	26.2	26	15.6	-	-	38	23.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unionistas	-	-	36	23	15	9	-	-	17	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
I.R.	-	-	1	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Católicos	-	-	-	-	1	0.6	5	3.2	1	.6	3	1.8	5	3	4	2.4
P.N.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	108	69.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Monárquicos	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	23.8	-	-	4	2.4	13	7.9	7	4.2
P.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	5.5	12	7.3	17	10.4	-	-
Liberais	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79	48.4	33	20.2	-	-
Dissidentes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1.8	-	-	-	-
Regionalistas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1.2	2	1.2	-	-
Populares	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.6	-	-	-	-
Governamentais	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	7.9	-	-
Nacionalistas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	22
Esquerdistas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3.6
U.I.E.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	3.6

Table 2: Portuguese Party Attachment and Left-Right Self-Positioning, EuroBarometer Data 1986-1994

Years	Party Attachment				Left -Right Scale		
	Very Close	Fairly Close	Sympathise	Not Close	Left	Centre	Right
1986	6.7	18.7	45.2	29.4	5.6	81.1	13.2
1987	2.0	10.8	53.1	34.1	14.6	63.6	21.8
1988	1.5	10.9	52.8	34.8	17.0	63.1	19.2
1989	2.9	7.8	53.2	36.1	32.1	41.3	26.6
1990	2.5	7.1	46.2	44.2	22.9	34.5	42.6
1991	6.2	11.8	53.6	28.5	23.4	43.8	32.8
1992	2.1	8.3	59.2	30.4	24.6	48.9	26.4
1993	2.5	7.6	54.1	35.9	24.2	33.0	42.9
1994	1.9	6.9	53.8	37.4	30.8	55.34	13.9

**Cell entries are percentages.*

Table 3: Cross-tabulation of Left-Right Self-Placement with Party Most Voted For in Recent Elections, EuroBarometer Data, 1986-1996

	1986			1987			1988			1989			1990		
Parties	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R
PCP	42.3	12.0	20.0	25.0	5.5	4.8	24.1	3.1	2.4	3.4	-----	.1	28.3	1.9	.6
PS	42.3	36.9	25.0	57.5	56.7	56.2	66.0	43.4	10.3	83.1	52.4	12.2	67.7	68.6	15.9
PSD	7.7	45.1	46.7	5.0	26.9	19.2	12.9	46.3	65.3	3.8	10.6	11.6	3.0	28.3	72.9
PP	3.8	5.8	8.3	12.5	10.8	19.9	-----	8.9	22.1	9.6	37.0	76.1	1.0	1.3	10.0

	1991			1992			1993			1994			1996		
Parties	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R	L	C	R
PCP	27.1	.4	-----	26.4	.7	.6	25.0	2.4	.5	27.4	2.8	-----	2.6	.3	-----
PS	66.7	39.7	10.2	63.9	43.1	8.3	64.7	65.3	7.4	59.8	44.1	2.7	88.9	56.8	13.2
PSD	5.4	56.9	82.2	8.3	53.2	82.1	7.8	30.6	82.9	9.8	50.0	90.5	1.7	7.9	14.0
PP	-----	2.2	6.1	-----	2.2	8.3	.9	.6	7.9	1.2	2.4	5.4	6.9	35.0	72.8

**Cell entries are percentages.*

Table 4: Voter Turnout in the Legislative Elections in the Portuguese Districts, 1975-1999

Districts	1975	1976	1979	1980	1983	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999
Aveiro	.918	.848	.883	.860	.788	.755	.742	.704	.686	.634
Beja	.918	.841	.868	.842	.781	.744	.677	.635	.641	.587
Braga	.930	.878	.913	.893	.820	.788	.763	.723	.711	.674
Bragança	.908	.788	.843	.797	.695	.654	.650	.609	.591	.547
Castelo Branco	.906	.810	.862	.839	.762	.738	.712	.677	.673	.637
Coimbra	.891	.778	.841	.815	.746	.711	.697	.665	.664	.616
Évora	.943	.884	.906	.894	.837	.807	.754	.701	.694	.622
Faro	.906	.805	.846	.834	.770	.741	.702	.663	.642	.575
Guarda	.919	.822	.880	.836	.740	.713	.695	.651	.598	.596
Leiria	.898	.802	.863	.835	.770	.734	.721	.672	.656	.619
Lisboa	.919	.832	.876	.864	.806	.776	.736	.684	.671	.618
Portalegre	.944	.870	.891	.880	.822	.800	.749	.713	.704	.635
Porto	.938	.882	.906	.891	.820	.787	.780	.723	.710	.650
Santarém	.917	.823	.863	.850	.782	.764	.726	.689	.680	.622
Setúbal	.934	.851	.884	.870	.819	.795	.728	.680	.677	.605
Viana do Castelo	.886	.789	.843	.818	.749	.719	.701	.650	.644	.608
Vila Real	.893	.778	.843	.808	.721	.665	.674	.615	.599	.568
Viseu	.892	.784	.854	.820	.736	.690	.693	.634	.612	.585
Açores	.903	.781	.830	.762	.666	.601	.540	.579	.565	.503
Madeira	.891	.782	.852	.807	.731	.695	.672	.645	.647	.583
Average	.913	.821	.867	.841	.768	.734	.706	.666	.653	.604

**Cell entries are proportions.*

Table 5: Illustration of Inflation of Electoral Rolls, 1991

District	A 1991 Population Count	B 1991 Population 19 or Under Count	C 1991 Registration Count	D (A-B) Persons Theoretically Eligible to Register	F (C-D) Inflation of Electoral Rolls Count	G Percentage of Inflation in 1991
Aveiro	667314	197300	526727	470014	56713	12.07
Beja	165261	41234	152597	124027	28570	23.04
Braga	776254	260771	587337	515483	71854	64.08
Bragança	155423	43290	148876	112133	36743	32.77
Castelo Branco	209948	50824	199654	159124	40530	25.47
Coimbra	425211	107450	370925	317761	53164	16.73
Évora	171143	42812	149495	128331	21164	16.49
Faro	339836	86730	293573	253106	40467	15.99
Guarda	184337	47967	173630	136370	37260	27.32
Leiria	427633	112954	358145	314679	43466	13.81
Lisboa	2057562	530589	1796885	1526973	269912	17.68
Portalegre	130706	30145	117052	100561	16491	16.40
Porto	1686884	506438	1319056	1180446	138610	11.74
Santarém	440006	112019	385602	327987	57615	17.57
Setúbal	719347	198303	595534	521044	74490	14.30
V. do Castelo	242371	72937	214800	169434	45366	26.78
Vila Real	236594	720929	213334	164495	48839	29.69
Viseu	402273	122964	344478	379309	65169	17.18
Açores	239190	84260	181018	154930	26088	16.84
Madeira	250550	86887	193763	163663	30100	18.39

Table 6: Vote and Seat Legislative Election Results by Party, 1975-99

Election	Party Percentages							Effective Number of Parties
	Left Faction	APU/CDU		PS	AD		Right Faction	
		MDP	PCP		PSD	CDS/PP		
1975								
Vote%	0.8	4.4	13.5	40.7	28.3	8.2		3.66
Seat%	0.4	2.0	12.0	46.4	32.4	6.4	2.95	
1976								
Vote%	1.8	----	15.3	36.7	25.2	16.7		4.00
Seat%	0.4	----	15.2	40.7	27.8	16.0		3.43
1979								
Vote%	2.8	19.5		28.2	46.3			3.00
Seat%	0.4	18.8		29.6	51.2			2.60
1980								
Vote%	2.4	17.3		28.7	48.3			2.89
Seat%	0.4	16.4		29.6	53.6			2.49
1983								
Vote%	0.7	18.7		37.3	27.8	12.7		3.73
Seat%	0.0	17.2		40.4	30.0	12.0		3.36
1985								
Vote%	20.4	16.0		21.4	30.6	10.0		4.78
Seat%	18.0	15.2		22.8	35.2	8.8		4.18
1987								
Vote%	6.5	12.5		22.8	51.3	4.4		2.98
Seat%	2.8	12.4		24.0	59.2	1.6		2.36
1991								
Vote%	2.6	9.0		29.6	51.0	4.4	1.7	2.79
Seat%	0.0	7.4		30.9	57.4	2.2	0.4	2.32
1995								
Vote%	1.9	8.7		44.6	34.8	9.2	0.2	2.97
Seat%	0.0	6.5		48.7	38.2	6.5	0.0	2.55
1999								
Vote%	2.5	9.2		44.9	33.0	8.5		3.06
Seat%	0.9	7.4		50.0	35.2	6.5		2.61

Note: For the purpose of exposition, cell entries for the Left faction only include the following parties: UDP, PSR, PRD, PCTP/MRPP; the Right faction refers to PSN.

Table 7: Presidential Election Results by Candidate, 1976-2001

Year	Vote%	Party Support	Candidate	Effective Number of Parties
1976	61.5 16.5 14.4 7.6	PS + PSD + PP Independent Independent PCP	António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo Octávio Pato	2.31
1980	56.5 39.0 1.5 0.8 0.8 0.2	PS + PCP PSD + PP Independent Independent Independent POUS	António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes Francisco Sá Carneiro Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho Carlos Galvão de Melo António Pires Veloso António Aires Rodrigues	2.12
1986 <i>First Round</i>	46.3 25.4 20.9 7.4	PSD PS PRD + PCP Independent	Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares Francisco Salgado Zenha María de Lourdes Pintasilgo	3.15
1986 <i>Runoff</i>	51.3 48.7	PS + PCP PP + PSD	Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral	NA
1991	70.4 14.1 12.9 2.2	PS + PSD PP PCP UDP	Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares Basílio Aldolfo Mendonça Horta da França Carlos Alberto do Vale Gomes Carvalhas Carlos Manuel Marques da Silva	1.87
1996	53.8 47.2	PS + PCP PSD	Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio Aníbal Cavaco Silva	1.99
2001	55.8 34.5 5.1 3.0 1.6	PS PSD PCP BE PCTP	Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral António Simões de Abreu Fernando Rosas António Garcia Pereira	2.30

Table 8: Salience and Positions on Eight Policy Issues of Major Portuguese Parties

Issues	PCP		PS		PSD		PP	
	Score	Salience	Score	Salience	Score	Salience	Score	Salience
Increase in services vs. Cut in Taxes	3.43	12.86	8.75	11.63	14.00	12.40	17.00	15.00
Pro-friendly relations vs. Anti-friendly with Former USSR	1.14	13.71	7.88	12.00	13.00	10.50	15.86	12.29
Pro-Public Ownership vs. Anti-Public Ownership	1.14	18.86	9.50	14.00	13.83	15.00	18.14	16.86
Pro-Permissive vs. Anti-Permissive Social Policy	2.67	16.43	8.00	14.38	12.40	13.17	18.17	12.14
Anticlerical vs. Proclerical	2.71	4.83	9.63	7.57	13.50	8.40	19.29	16.67
Pro-Urban Interests vs. Anti Urban Interests	7.00	10.83	8.29	10.43	10.80	9.20	16.50	13.17
Pro-Decentralization vs. Centralization of Decisions	13.83	13.33	8.57	13.29	11.60	13.40	12.50	11.00
Environment vs. Growth	5.83	13.17	9.86	11.00	12.60	10.80	13.83	7.67

Note: These are the results of a survey of expert opinions on party positions conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91)

Table 9: Actual and Hypothetical Apportionment of the Legislative Seats among 20 Districts, 1991

District	1991 Population Count	1991 Registration Count	1991 Actual Seat Apportionment	1991 Precise Apportionment Pop. Basis	1991 Precise Apportionment Regis. Basis
Aveiro	667314	526727	14	15.19	14.30
Beja	165261	152597	4	3.76	4.14
Braga	776254	587337	16	17.67	15.95
Bragança	155423	148876	4	3.54	4.04
Castelo Branco	209948	199654	5	4.78	5.42
Coimbra	425211	370925	10	9.68	10.07
Évora	171143	149495	4	3.90	4.06
Faro	339836	293573	8	7.74	7.97
Guarda	184337	173630	4	4.20	4.71
Leiria	427633	358145	10	9.73	9.73
Lisboa	2057562	1796885	50	46.84	48.80
Portalegre	130706	117052	3	2.98	3.18
Porto	1686884	1319056	37	38.40	35.82
Santarém	440006	385602	10	10.02	10.47
Setúbal	719347	595534	16	16.38	16.17
Viana do Castelo	242371	214800	6	5.52	5.83
Vila Real	236594	213334	6	5.39	5.79
Viseu	402273	344478	9	9.16	9.35
Açores	239190	181018	5	5.44	4.92
Madeira	250550	193763	5	5.70	5.26
TOTAL	9927843	8322481	226	226	226

Table 10: Percentage of Votes and Seats Won by Parties in each of 20 Districts, 1999

District	Number of Seats in the District	PS	PSD	PCP-PEV	CDS	BE
		Vote% Seats	Vote% Seats	Vote% Seats	Vote% Seats	Vote% Seats
Aveiro	15	40.2% 7	38.3% 6	3.5% --	13.6% 2	1.3% --
Beja	3	46.7% 2	14.5% --	28.3% 1	3.9% --	2.0% --
Braga	17	44.3% 8	36.8% 7	5.4% 1	8.8% 1	1.7% --
Bragança	4	39.7% 2	44.9% 2	2.6% --	8.6% --	0.8% --
Castelo Branco	5	51.7% 3	31.9% 2	5.3% --	6.3% --	1.2% --
Coimbra	10	47.1% 6	35.2% 4	6.1% --	6.0% --	2.0% --
Évora	4	45.6% 2	18.7% 1	24.6% 1	5.0% --	1.7% --
Faro	8	48.4% 5	29.4% 3	8.3% --	7.3% --	2.3% --
Guarda	4	43.3% 2	39.2% 2	3.2% --	9.8% --	1.1% --
Leiria	10	36.8% 4	42.6% 5	5.3% --	9.9% 1	1.7% --
Lisboa	49	42.6% 23	27.3% 14	12.3% 6	8.5% 4	4.9% 2
Portalegre	3	51.3% 2	22.6% 1	15.1% --	5.9% --	1.2% --
Porto	37	48.0% 19	32.7% 13	6.3% 2	7.5% 3	2.3% --
Santarém	10	45.5% 5	30.2% 3	10.1% 1	8.1% 1	2.0% --
Setúbal	17	43.7% 8	18.0% 3	24.8% 5	5.6% 1	1.1% --
Viana do Castelo	6	40.2% 3	35.8% 2	5.0% --	14.0% 1	1.2% --
Vila Real	5	40.8% 2	45.4% 3	2.4% --	6.9% --	0.8% --
Viseu	9	38.2% 4	44.3% 4	2.2% --	10.5% 1	1.2% --
Açores	5	53.3% 3	35.8% 2	1.7% --	5.6% --	1.1% --
Maderia	5	35.1% 2	46.3% 3	2.8% --	10.6% --	1.2% --
TOTALS	226	44.0% 112	32.3% 80	9.0% 17	8.4% 15	2.5% 2

Table 11: Means of the Seven Domains of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data

Domains	Entire Period				Before 1985				After 1983			
	Mean	StD	Min	Max	Mean	StD	Min	Max	Mean	StD	Min	Max
Domain 1 External Relations	8.286	5.134	0.00	26.26	7.855	4.419	.80	22.97	8.906	6.062	0.00	26.26
Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy	13.379	11.856	0.00	50.96	16.766	13.719	0.00	50.96	8.503	5.916	0.00	27.08
Domain 3 Political System	7.475	6.193	0.00	30.36	5.867	4.499	0.00	14.20	9.791	7.542	1.04	30.36
Domain 4 Economy	18.926	10.746	0.00	51.25	17.490	8.983	0.00	42.86	21.096	12.756	.93	51.25
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life	19.127	12.433	0.00	59.38	16.256	12.335	0.00	59.38	23.260	11.591	4.88	49.49
Domain 6 Fabric of Society	3.439	3.469	0.00	12.50	3.934	3.979	0.00	12.50	2.726	2.468	0.00	8.65
Domain 7 Social Groups	10.305	6.219	0.00	34.40	12.079	6.811	0.00	34.40	7.751	4.185	0.00	16.67

Table 12: Means in Top Ten Categories of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data

Domains and Categories	Entire Period	Before 1985	After 1983
Domain 1 External Relations			
European Community			3.745
Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy			
Freedom and Human Rights		2.993	
Democracy	8.065	10.686	4.290
Constitutionalism		3.087	
Domain 3 Political System			
Governmental and Adm. Efficiency	3.635	2.811	4.822
Domain 4 Economy			
Enterprise, Incentives, & Market Reg.			
Economic Orthodoxy and Goals	3.235		4.446
Infrastructure	3.121		4.590
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life			
Environmental Protectionism	3.565	2.718	4.786
Social Justice	3.735	3.078	4.681
Welfare	5.636	4.563	7.181
Education	3.531	3.421	3.690
Domain 7 Social Groups			
Labour	3.870	4.418	3.082
Agriculture and Farmers	3.757	4.629	

Table 13: Breakdown of the Means of Top Categories Comparative Manifestos Project by Major Party

Domains and Categories	1975-95				1975-83				1985-95			
	PCP	PS	PSD	PP	PCP	PS	PSD	PP	PCP	PS	PSD	PP
Domain 1 External Relations												
Anti-Imperialism	3.019				3.774	2.879						
Internationalism												
Peace												
European Community				4.206						3.979	3.624	8.230
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy												
Freedom and Human Rights	2.938		3.946		3.106		5.924		2.265			
Democracy	12.579	7.420	3.920		14.649	11.518	5.674		7.917			
Constitutionalism	3.250	2.848			3.897	3.273						
Domain 3 Political System												
Centralisation & Decentralisation								4.943				
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency		5.800	5.780	6.608		4.885	4.885	3.276	2.683	6.943	6.943	10.772
Domain 4 Economy												
Free Enterprise				3.764				3.612				3.954
Incentives		3.061								3.785		
Economic Orthodoxy				6.085				5.306		3.999	3.977	7.057
Market Regulation												3.290
Marxist Analysis	2.235				2.797							
Productivity	1.890		4.317		2.045			3.370			6.102	
Economic Goals		4.627	5.174	4.238		3.684	3.447	3.644		5.807	7.333	4.981

Domains and Categories	PCP	PS	PSD	PP	PCP	PS	PSD	PP	PCP	PS	PSD	PP
Infrastructure		5.519	5.545	4.182		3.129	4.711		3.117	8.508	6.587	5.817
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life												
Culture							3.236		3.953		3.717	
Social Justice	3.009		6.149	3.668	1.992		7.823		5.423	4.833	4.057	4.823
Environmental Protection									2.284			4.294
Welfare	4.559	7.675	7.166	6.907	2.738	7.675	5.928	5.171	6.440	9.063	8.713	9.076
Education		6.562	3.788	4.242		6.562	3.869	5.281	2.364	10.215	3.687	
Domain 7 Social Groups												
Labour	5.988	3.862			6.503	3.402		4.390	5.988			
Agriculture and Farmers	3.950	5.273	4.026	3.641	4.114	7.697	4.665	3.604		4.438		

Table 14: Results of First Stage Factor Analysis, 1975-95

Domains and Categories	1975-95 Factor
Domain 1 External Relations	
Foreign Relations Pos	.668
Internationalism Pos	.367
Military Pos	.793
Military Neg	-.547
European Community Pos	.525
Anti-Imperialism	-.527
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy	
Freedom & Human Rights	.725
Democracy	.725
Constitutionalism Pos	-.002
Domain 3 Political System	
Centralisation & Decentralisation	.703
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency	.619
Political Corruption	.687
Domain 4 Economy	
Free Enterprise	.614
Incentives	.632
Market Regulation	.609
Corporatism	.330
Productivity	.598
Infrastructure	.680
Economic Orthodoxy	.553
Marxist	-.648
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life	
Environmental Protectionism	-.045
Culture	.600
Social Justice	.214
Welfare Pos	.840
Education Pos	.796
Domain 7 Social Groups	
Labour	.343
Agricultural & Farmers	.865
Minority Groups	.790
Non-economic Groups	.042

Note: Extraction Method: Principal components with one factor extracted

Table 15: Results of First Stage Factor Analysis in Both Sub-Periods

	1975-83	1985-95
Domains and Categories	Factor	Factor
Domain 1 External Relations		
Foreign Relations Pos	-.016	.836
Internationalism Pos	-.182	.674
Military Pos	.823	.810
Military Neg	-.475	-.597
European Community Pos	.875	.414
Anti-Imperialism	-.722	-.587
Domain 2 Freedom & Democracy		
Freedom & Human Rights	.066	.806
Democracy	-.724	.762
Constitutionalism Pos	.744	-.078
Domain 3 Political System		
Centralisation & Decentralisation	.610	.881
Governmental & Adm. Efficiency	.756	.403
Political Corruption	-.637	.854
Domain 4 Economy		
Free Enterprise	.714	.528
Incentives	.442	.772
Market Regulation	.695	.567
Corporatism	.532	.070
Productivity	.728	.516
Infrastructure	.519	.791
Economic Orthodoxy	.582	.523
Marxist	-.672	-.539
Domain 5 Welfare & Quality of Life		
Environmental Protectionism	.102	-.454
Culture	.733	.530
Social Justice	-.251	.747
Welfare Pos	.806	.784
Education Pos	.897	.640
Domain 7 Social Groups		
Labour	.402	.058
Agricultural & Farmers	.837	.663
Minority Groups	.718	.666
Non-economic Groups	-.349	.810

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Components with one factor extracted

Table 15: Results of Second Stage Factor Analysis

Factors from 1 st Stage	1975-95		1975-83		1985-95	
	1 st Factor	2 nd Factor	1 st Factor	2 nd Factor	1 st Factor	2 nd Factor
D1 Good International Relations	.722	.032			.835	.0003
D1 Good European Relations			.938	-.022		
D2 Democratic/Civic Freedoms	-.749	-.076	.433	.373	-.481	-.688
D3 Better Government	.667	-.458	.856	.088	-.177	.798
D4 Economic Growth	.868	.146	.753	.245	.745	.461
D5 Social Concerns/Quality of Life	.703	.396	.526	.711	.619	.358
D7 Economic Groups	.146	.905	-.092	.918		
D7 Poverty/Inequality Groups					.852	-.217

Notes: *Extraction Method: Eigenvalues >1.00*
Rotation Method: Varimax

Figure 1: Left-Right Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties According to the Experts




Figure 2: Voter Turnout in Legislative Elections by District, 1975-99




Figure 3: Comparison of the Counts of the Population, Persons Registered, and Voters, 1975-99






Figure 4: Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties on Eight Policy Issues



Issue Domains	PCP	PS	PSD	CDS/PP
A. Services vs. Taxes	3.43	8.75	14.00	17.00
B. Unfriendly with USSR	1.14	7.88	13.00	15.86
C. Public vs. Private Ownership	1.14	9.50	13.83	18.14
D. Restrictive Social Policy	2.67	8.00	12.40	18.17
E. Anti- vs. Pro-clerical	2.71	9.63	13.50	19.29
F. Urban vs. Rural Interests	7.00	8.29	10.80	16.50
G. Centralize Decision Making	13.83	8.57	11.60	12.50
H. Environment vs. Growth	5.83	9.86	16.60	13.83

Source: Party positions are from a survey of experts conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91). High scores represent what are usually taken to be issue positions of parties on the political right.

Figure 5: Relationship between Seat Percentage versus Vote Percentage Advantage/Disadvantage and the Level of Party Vote Percentage, Assembly Elections 1975-99



Notes:

* The seat percentage versus vote percentage advantage/disadvantage is calculated as (% of Seats - % of Votes). A party with an *advantage* has a positive score because it has received a larger percentage of seats compared to votes; a party with a *disadvantage* has a negative score because it has received a smaller percentage of seats compared to votes.

**The breakeven point is an eyeball estimate of the vote percentage level where a party can expect to have neither an advantage nor a disadvantage—i.e., to breakeven.


*** The lines for the PSD and the PS show the respective least squares estimates of how their advantages increase as the level of their vote percentages increase. The equations are:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{PSD} \quad \text{Advantage} = -1.39 + .153 \text{ Vote\%}, \quad \text{with } R^2 = .681; s_e = 1.06 \\
 (n = 10) \qquad \qquad \qquad (1.32) \quad (.034)
 \end{array}$$


$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{PS} \quad \text{Advantage} = -3.44 + .186 \text{ Vote\%}, \quad \text{with } R^2 = .755; s_e = 0.89 \\
 (n = 10) \qquad \qquad \qquad (1.20) \quad (.035)
 \end{array}$$

Figure 6: First Stage Factor Scores by Party and Election, 1975-95


A.




D.




B.




E.



C.



F.




Legend:


Diamond=PCP; Square=PS; Triangle=PSD; X=PP

Figure 7: Second Stage Factor Scores

A. 1975-95



B. 1975-83



C. 1985-95





Figure 8: Unidimensional Portuguese Party Space using CMP Data, 1975-95



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Domains and Categories	PCP				PS				PSD				PP			
	Mean	StD	Min	Max	Mean	StD	Min	Max	Mean	StD	Min	Max	Mean	StD	Min	Max
Welfare & Quality of Life	14.077	13.283	0	36.00	21.602	14.090	0	30.30	23.180	6.205	0	18.87	20.906	9.987	0	11.25
Environmental Protection	1.108	1.549	0	3.90	1.472	2.181	0	5.68	2.595	2.799	0	7.88	3.272	2.872	0	7.64
Culture	2.801	3.055	0	7.90	1.859	2.581	0	6.51	3.450	2.795	0	7.28	2.789	2.282	0	5.98
Social Justice	3.009	3.313	0	8.96	3.346	2.867	0	7.14	5.413	5.874	.52	18.87	4.061	3.543	0	10.19
Welfare State Expansion	4.559	4.142	0	12.59	8.099	4.136	0	13.60	6.813	3.446	1.89	11.48	7.187	3.559	.89	11.25
Welfare State Limitation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.229	.453	0	1.04	.127	.359	0	1.01
Education Expansion	2.600	2.964	0	6.56	6.826	9.157	0	30.30	4.681	2.677	1.89	10.42	3.470	2.289	0	6.86
Education Limitation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fabric of Society	1.900	1.268	.64	3.88	3.697	2.881	0	10.40	4.898	3.888	0	6.25	6.051	4.236	0	8.82
Natl Way of Life Pos	.042	.092	0	.27	.093	.184	0	.55	.267	.437	0	1.10	.548	.753	0	1.79
Natl Way of Life Neg	.091	.273	0	.82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.112	.316	0	.89
Traditional Morality Pos	.138	.249	0	.64	.034	.090	0	.27	.779	.725	0	2.08	2.024	2.918	0	8.82
Traditional Morality Neg	.030	.062	0	.17	0	0	0	0	.008	.024	0	.07	0	0	0	0
Law & Order	.753	.698	0	1.62	2.187	3.294	0	10.40	1.886	1.925	0	6.25	1.416	1.654	0	4.61
Social Harmony	.734	.596	0	1.64	1.343	1.285	0	3.55	1.875	1.759	0	4.41	1.886	2.209	0	6.25
Multiculturalism Pos	.111	.250	0	.74	.040	.083	0	.23	.083	.126	0	.29	.066	.123	0	.29
Multiculturalism Neg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social Groups	13.032	7.350	6.50	31.15	10.737	9.152	0	20.80	10.843	5.575	0	12.36	9.418	3.799	0	6.23
Labour Groups Pos	5.988	2.484	4.05	11.48	4.030	2.516	1.78	8.80	1.755	2.245	0	5.66	1.323	1.545	0	4.46
Labour Groups Neg	0	0	0	0	.019	.056	0	.17	.306	.684	0	2.08	1.237	1.813	0	4.46
Agriculture & Farmers	3.950	4.820	.64	16.39	4.852	6.607	0	20.80	4.604	3.285	1.47	12.36	3.445	2.160	0	6.23
Middle Class & Prof Groups	.540	.744	0	1.64	.026	.057	0	.17	.046	.092	0	.22	.333	.501	0	1.25
Minority Groups	1.235	1.042	0	2.79	.864	.901	0	2.74	1.702	2.335	0	7.51	.846	1.130	0	2.61
Non-Econ Groups	1.320	1.245	0	3.21	.947	1.234	0	3.20	2.429	1.333	.52	4.50	2.233	2.065	0	5.88

Appendix Table 2: Provisional and Constitutional Governments 1974-1999

Governments	Election Date	Govt Date	Pty in Govt	Governing Status
Pre-Election Governments				
Palma Carlos	--	15/05/74	--	--
Gonçalves	--	17/07/74	--	--
Gonçalves	--	30/09/74	--	--
Gonçalves	--	26/03/75	PS, PSD, PCP, MDP	--
Provisional Governments				
Gonçalves	04/75	08/08/75	--	--
Azevedo	04/75	19/09/75	PS, PSD, PCP	--
Constitutional Governments				
Soares	04/76	23/07/76	PS	Min.
Soares	04/76	23/01/78	PSP, PP	Min.
Nobre da Costa	04/76	28/08/78	Ind.; Caretaker	----
Mota Pinto	04/76	21/11/78	Ind.	----
Pintasilgo	04/76	31/07/79	Ind.; Caretaker	----
Sá Carneiro	10/79	31/01/80	AD (PSD, PP, PPM)	Maj. Coal.
Pinto Balsemão	10/80	09/01/81	AD (PSD, PP, PPM)	Maj. Coal.
Pinto Balsemão	10/80	04/09/81	AD (PSD, PP, PPM)	Maj. Coal.
Pinto Balsemão	10/80	23/12/82	AD; Caretaker	Min.
Soares	04/83	09/06/83	PS, PSD	Maj. Coal.
Soares	04/83	07/83	PS	Min.
Cavaco Silva	10/85	06/11/85	PSD	Min.
Cavaco Silva	07/87	17/08/87	PSD	Maj.
Cavaco Silva	10/91	31/10/91	PSD	Maj.
Guterres	10/95	28/10/95	PS	Min.
Guterres	10/99	25/10/99	PS	Parity

Appendix Table 3: Presidents of the Republic Since the First Republic, 1910

Year and Republic	Presidents
<i>I Republic (Primeira República)</i>	
1911	Manuel de Arriaga
1915	Bernardino Machado
1917	Sidónio Pais
1918	Canto e Castro
1919	António José de Almeida
1923	Teixeira Gomes
1925	Bernardino Machado
<i>II Republic (Estado Novo)</i>	
1928	Oscar Fragoso Carmona
1951	Craveiro Lópes
1958	Américo Tomás
<i>III Republic (Democracia)</i>	
1974	António Spínola
1974	Costa Gomes
1976	Ramalho Eanes
1980	Ramalho Eanes
1986	Mário Soares
1991	Mário Soares
1996	Jorge Sampaio
2001	Jorge Sampaio

Appendix Table 4: Existing, Active, & Extinct Portuguese Political Parties Since 1974

Party	Party Name	Partic. in Last Election
Existing		
BE	Left Block—PSR, PXXI, & UDP	X
CDS/PP	Popular Party	X
CDU; PCPPEV	Unitary Democratic Coalition	X
MPT	Earth Party Movement	X
PCTP/MRPP	Communist Party of Portuguese Workers	X
PDA	Democratic Party of the Atlantic	X
PH	Humanist Party	X
POUS	Socialist Unity Worker's Party	X
PSD	Social Democratic Party	X
PPM	Monarchic Popular Party	X
PS	Socialist Party	X
PSN	National Solidarity Party	
FER	Revolutionary Left Front	
FSP	Popular Socialist Front	
PCP	Portuguese Communist Party	X
PDC	Party of the Christian Democracy	
PEV	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	
PNR	National Renewal Party	
PSR	Revolutionary Socialist Party	
PXXI	Politics XXI	
UDP	Popular Democratic Union	
Extinct		
AD	Democratic Alliance	
AOC	Agrarian Operative Association	
APU	United People Alliance	
ASDI	Independent Social Democratic Action	
FEC	Communist Electoral Front	
FEPU	Electoral Front United People	
FRS	Republican and Socialist Front	
FUP	Popular Unity Force	
GDUP	Dynamic Group of Popular Unity	
LGI	Internationalist Communist League	
LST	Socialist League of Workers	
MDP/CDE	Portuguese Democratic Movement	
MES	Socialist Left Movement	
MIRN/PDP	National Reconstruction Independent Movement	
MUT	Unity of Workers Movement	
OCMLP	Portuguese Communist Marxist Leninist Organization	
PCR	Reconstructed Communist Party	
PCP (ML)	Portuguese Communist Party (Marxist Leninist)	
PG	People Party	
PPR	Religious Portuguese Party	
PRD	Renewal Democratic Party	
PRT	Workers' Revolutionary Party	
PT	Labour Party	
PUP	Popular Unity Party	
UEDS	Socialist Democratic Left Union	

Appendix Table 5: Official Status of Parties, 2000

Parliamentary Fraction	Requirements to/for:		
	Ballot	State Subvention	Media Access
None	Candidates are presented by the parties, independently or in coalition. They must be registered by the beginning of the deadline to present the candidates. The party lists may include citizens that are not registered in the party. Coalitions of parties are allowed if submitted to the Constitutional Court. In each of the 20 electoral districts, the lists of candidates are submitted to the Court 41 days before the day of election.	Annual and proportional to the number of votes given to the parties with seats in Assembly of the Republic;	Regulated by the National Elections Commission (CNE).
